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i 
ABSTRACT 
This study is an examination of the history of organized metal labor in İstanbul, Turkey after 
the Second World War. It analyzes and displays the complex and intermingled historical processes 
within which laborers in the private metal sector of İstanbul experienced workplace relations and 
actively responded to them. In this regard, although recent immigrants to Istanbul were exposed to 
unfamiliar conditions and labor relations, they attempted to shape those new relations through several 
means, in particular through the establishment of trade unions. In an effort to provide a 
comprehensive picture of class formation in the metal sector after the war, this study, therefore, 
focuses on the experiences of the İstanbul metal workers in their workplaces and living districts, as 
well as their efforts to be organized in effort to influence and change those conditions. 
This dissertation relies on three interrelated levels of social relations, since the majority of the 
metal workers gained a certain class consciousness and habit of acting collectively between 1945 and 
1970 in Turkey: the metal worker’s experiences in their work and social lives, their unionization and 
their collective actions. Of course, those conditions did not exist in a contextual void in Turkey after 
the war years; they were shaped by both the state policies which developed out of a certain world 
context, and by several social and historical problems with which Turkey grappled after 1945, as well 
as the particular type of progress of economic order, namely capitalism. In Turkey, the metal workers’ 
collective responses to the prevalent conditions from which they suffered took shape in parallel with 
changes in the political order, the state institutions, and the balance of political ideologies. What I am 
suggesting in this dissertation is that the İstanbul metal worker’s collective consciousness, and 
collective struggles which reached a peak towards end of the 1960s, were formed by the combination 
of different factors: the changing state intervention in regulating workplace relations after the war 
years, the changing patterns of social relations between bosses and workers, the progress of 
unionization in the sector, and most importantly, the various types of workers’ collective actions that 
occurred as a response to all those dynamics. In the end, it was the workers’ collective actions that 
constituted the most important reason for their rise as distinct social actors, namely; becoming 
members of a defined class in Turkish society. 
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1 
CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
It was between June 15th and 16th, 1970 that the biggest workers’ uprising Turkey 
had ever witnessed took place in İstanbul. By following the Kartal-Göztepe road, or by taking 
Ankara Highway from the Anatolian side of the city, or by marching from the well known 
workers’ districts of Eyüp, Alibeyköy, Topkapı, Sağmalcılar, Levent, Beykoz and İstinye 
from the European side, nearly 100,000 workers fought with state forces in an effort to reach 
the city center in Taksim. The journey was in protest of new legislation which would exert 
significant restrictions on the free union choice of workers, and eventually result in the 
dissolution of DİSK (Devrimci İşçi Sendikaları Konfederasyonu - The Progressive Workers’ 
Trade Union Confederacy of Turkey), one of the two biggest workers’ confederations at the 
time. DİSK had been founded by a few former TÜRK-İŞ (Türkiye İşçi Sendikaları 
Konfederasyonu-The Workers’ Trade Union Confederacy of Turkey) unions in 1967 with a 
socialist cause, and it progressed significantly towards 1970 in terms of its both membership 
numbers and political influence in Turkey, while claiming to be the genuine and 
revolutionary union of workers.  
In order to obstruct its further rise, the administrators of the party in power, namely 
the AP (Adalet Partisi- The Justice Party) and the TÜRK-İŞ officials, had long been working 
on a draft law, which finally came to the Grand National Assembly in 1970. With the 
cooperation of the CHP (Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi-The Republican People’s Party) - the 
founder of the Republic in 1923 and one of the two major parties since the beginning of the 
multi-party politics in 1945-, the AP was able to ratify the draft, first in the Assembly and 
then in the Senate. Afterwards, and with the approval of President Cevdet Sunay, the draft 
was sanctioned on June 11th. While the high officers of DİSK immediately contacted the 
political parties in Ankara to demand a repeal of the legislation, the district and factory 
representatives organized meetings with the workers on the shop floor to explain the 
repercussions of the new law. As they had already experienced conflicts in previous years 
while fighting for their free union choice, a significant number of İstanbul workers responded 
 
 
2 
positively to the call of their representatives and invaded the city streets for two days. Being 
absolutely determined to arrive in the city center and join forces with other workers, they 
surmounted several barricades installed by the police and military. Some workers even 
damaged the Haymak metal factory, which was owned by the nephew of the head of the AP, 
Şevket Demirel.1 During these clashes, one police officer and three workers lost their lives. In 
some factories, the incidents lasted more than two days. The Council of Ministers declared 
martial law on June 16th in İstanbul and in the neighbouring city of Kocaeli, home to several 
factories. Military forces surrounded Türk Demir Döküm, Derby, Çelik Endüstrisi, Elektro 
Metal, Seka, Arçelik, etc., on June 17th, and the workers would not return back to work in 
Türk Demir Döküm, Derby, İzsal, Sungurlar and Rabak until June 22nd. In the end, order was 
restored again, and in addition to the arrest of 50 DİSK administrators, including the general 
secretary, Kemal Türkler, more than 5 000 workers were fired from the factories. 
Nonetheless, the Constitutional Court2 repealed the law in 1971 as a result of an application 
of the Türkiye İşçi Partisi (TİP-The Turkish Labor Party), which had been founded in 1961 
and which became very effective throughout the decade following a socialist cause. 
The June 15-16th labor upsurge left a significant scar on public memory in Turkey. In 
addition to several documentaries, a film called Zengin Mutfağı [The Kitchen of the Wealthy], 
was shot by a prominent director of the Turkish cinema, Başar Sabuncu, with accompanying 
performances of famous actors such as Şener Şen and Nilüfer Açıkalın.3 Today, several trade 
unions and political parties still organize meetings to commemorate the martyrs, and debate 
the legacy and importance of the riot. More importantly, the events signified an important 
threshold for the workers who participated in terms of enriching their collective action 
repertoire and fostering solidarity. In fact, a significant amount of İstanbul’s workers were 
veterans of collective action, especially in the post-Second World War Era, but the June 15-
                                                             
1 His brother’s name was Süleyman Demirel, one of the very influential right-wing politicans in Turkey 
from the 1960s until the mid 1990s. 
2 The Constitutional Court was founded after the 1960 coup d’etat in Turkey with the aim of protecting 
the basic rights and freedoms defined in the 1961 Constitution and checking the compliance of the new 
laws to the Constitution itself. 
3 Zengin Mutfağı [The Kitchen of Riches]. Dir. Başar Sabuncu. Perf. Şener Şen, Nilüfer Açıkalın, 
Oktay Koruyan, Gökhan Mete, and Osman Görgen. Erler, 1988, Film. 
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16th riot was their defining experience. These collective actions contributed to the formation 
of a common consciousness among the workers; therefore, an increasing number of them 
began to define and express their common interests at the expense of the interests of factory 
owners, or wealthy classes. The workers of İstanbul began to see themselves as members of a 
larger group, namely the working class, through their actions after the Second World War. 
Despite being a turning point in the formation of the working class, these collective 
actions, however, were not the sole factor; rather, the workers’ shared experiences, which 
were rooted in their social relations with other groups and various classes in their workplaces 
and living places, were important catalysts that actually spurred them to engage in collective 
action and shaped the formation of their class. That narrative of class that I weave into this 
work follows a complex web of relationships between the workers’ social formations, their 
common experiences, and their struggles to be a prosperous and respected group within the 
larger society. This story of class foundations had a remarkable influence on political and 
social life in Turkey after 1945. 
There are few works, which devote attention to the history of workers of the post-war 
era, especially in comparison to the significant amount of studies about the late Ottoman 
Empire and Early Republican Period.4 Moreover, the already limited historiography, which 
focused on the political and social developments of the post-war era, rarely reflected on how 
social relations in Turkey actually evolved after 1945 through a class lens, and fewer of them 
based their assumptions on situating the class as the important actors in the ongoing social 
relations at the center of their narratives. The existing literature perceived these historical 
developments as the net results of clashes between political parties and movements, or as the 
one-sided reflections of transformations in industrial and social areas where the class as 
                                                             
4 The long enduring Ottoman Empire had participated in the First World War on behalf of the Axis 
Powers led by Germany between 1914 and 1918. After being defeated in the War, a significant portion 
of lands of the Empire were occupied, including its capital city, İstanbul. While the occupation went 
on, a resistant movement emerged in the inner Anatolia and it was later unified and led by Mustafa 
Kemal and his close friends. The resistance defeated the Greek occupation forces in several battles and 
signed several treaties with the other occupation forces, such as the Italian, French and British. As a 
result of those treaties, the foreign military forces were withdrawn from Anatolia. After the victory, 
Mustafa Kemal and his friends declared the dissolution of the old Empire and the foundation of the 
new Republic on October 29th, 1923.  
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subject did not play any part in political developments. With their a top-down approach, these 
studies see class relations or struggles, if any existed, as the natural cause of certain social 
and economic developments; however, the classes as actors were not seen to have had any 
influence on the progress of such developments. When they reflected on class relations, they 
superficially placed emphasis on the laws and legislations, which were exerted by the state on 
trade unions, rather than how those laws actually influenced the very life of real people and 
how those people, in turn, perceived, experienced, and resisted those changes.  
For example, two pre-eminent scholars, Feroz Ahmad and Erik Jan Zürcher, in their 
influential books on Turkish history including the post-war developments, draw attention to 
the polarization of politics between 1945 and 1980. While Feroz Ahmad mainly focuses on 
political developments of the period between 1945 and 1980, he does not assign a position to 
the workers or their institutions in understanding the political and social processes in the 
1950s; nevertheless, he situates the workers movements in the 1960s in the context of such 
developments. Having a certain structuralist perspective that class struggles are the inevitable 
and a direct result of industrial developments rather than the class relations, he sees the 
emergence of the working class and class struggles in the 1960s, but not in the 1950s, as the 
natural result of the capitalist development, which gained a momentum in Turkey in the 
1960s. In doing so, he ignores the development of the private sector, which set the conditions 
for class relations in the 1950s. As a result, he misses important continuities in the relations of 
classes, which began to take a different shape immediately following the post-war period.5 
Erik Jan Zürcher, on the other hand, draws a general framework for the political, economic, 
social and cultural developments in Turkey after 1945. Though he mentions the development 
of working class suburbs and trade unions before the 1960s, for Zürcher, the “actual” 
workers’ movements began to take a shape mostly after 1960, and as a sub-category of the 
                                                             
5 Feroz Ahmad, Modern Türkiye’nin Oluşumu [The Making of Modern Turkey], Yavuz Alogan [trans.] 
(İstanbul: Kaynak, 1995); Feroz Ahmad, Demokrasi Sürecinde Türkiye [The Turkish Experiment in 
Democracy], Ahmet Fethi [trans.] (İstanbul: Hil, 2007).  
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increasing political struggles between left and right.6 By introducing class relations to the 
study of collective actions, and equating the rise of class movement with the rise of 
ideological struggles, Zürcher ignores the importance of actual social relations and the ideals 
and thoughts of ordinary people which contributed to the emergence of the collective actions 
and the notably independent development of the classes and class actions in the 1950s and 
1960s.7  
The situation is not very different for those scholars who claimed to write historical 
accounts of the post-war era by using the concept of class, or some other Marxist 
categorizations. For example, Çağlar Keyder and Korkut Boratav discuss how the Turkish 
economy transformed from an export-oriented model, based on agricultural products, to an 
import-substitution model, based on intermediary goods, thanks to the rise of a new 
bourgeoisie and its changing interests. Both of these writers claim that the increasing 
importance of industry and social welfare paved the way for class conflict over the 
distribution of resources in the 1960s. According to them, the necessities of creating internal 
markets led the state and bourgeoisie to tolerate wage increases for workers. 8  In such 
reasoning, there is no need to analyze the classes as social actors who actually experienced 
industrialization in a specific way, and who engaged in a struggle to take advantage of 
whatever the economic model was. Rather than analyzing the actual class relations and 
developing a model based on those relations, the classes seem only to fulfill roles which were 
assigned by Keyder and/or Boratav themselves, or through a specific reading of Marxism. 
According to their accounts, the redistributive policies of the state contributed to the 
                                                             
6 Erik Jan Zürcher, Turkey: A Modern History, (London: I. B. Tauris, 2004). For a recent study which 
typically analyzes Turkish history between 1960 and 1970 by mostly depending upon the competition 
between political ideals, see Suavi Aydın and Yüksel Taşkın, 1960’tan Günümüze Türkiye Tarihi [The 
Turkish History From 1960 to Today], (İstanbul: İletişim, 2014).  
7 Ibid. For the similar accounts see, Cem Eroğul, Demokrat Parti: Tarihi ve İdeolojisi [The Democrat 
Party: Its History and Ideology], (Ankara: Sevinç, 1970); Taner Timur, Türkiye’de Çok Partili Hayata 
Geçiş [The Transition to the Multi-Party Life in Turkey], (Ankara: İmge, 2003); Mustafa Albayrak, 
Türk Siyasi Tarihinde Demokrat Parti [The Democrat Party in the Turkish Political History], (Ankara: 
Phoenix, 2004); Tevfik Çavdar, Türkiye’nin Demokrasi Tarihi [The History of Democracy in Turkey], 
(Ankara: İmge, 2004). 
8 Çağlar Keyder, State and Class in Turkey: A Study in Capitalist Development, (London: Verso, 
1987); Korkut Boratav, Türkiye İktisat Tarihi: 1908-1985, [The Economic History of Turkey], 
(İstanbul: Gerçek Yayınevi, 1993).  
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emergence of class conflicts, but they did not mention how the class struggles themselves 
took part in shaping those policies.9 In their portrayals, we encounter an idealized picture of 
the classes as categorized social groups, rather than living social actors, since classes are 
assumed to act collectively only to fulfil their economic functions in a given society. To what 
extent this assumption fits within the actual history of the collective or individual acts of class 
actors, however, is unclear. Moreover, due to this idealization, classes acted, for those 
authors, as the groups, which lacked any ideals and independent thought, and merely followed 
their material interests. This is a very mechanistic concept of class, no matter how well it fits 
with the assumed Marxist understanding of class. 
There are other scholars who tried to explain the post-war developments in Turkey by 
focusing on large scale social changes, such as the industrialization of agriculture, migration 
and urbanization which took place after the war. Inspired by the post-war modernization 
theory, those scholars’ perspectives were derived from another teleological assumption: why 
did Turkey’s history not follow the same path taken by developed capitalist countries during 
the nineteenth century? By focusing on this question and assuming an idealized and unilinear 
development pattern for each nation, those scholars analyzed the deviations and anomalies in 
Turkish history, rather than the actual process itself. As a result, even when they seemed to 
explain the transformations in social life and their repercussions on political developments, 
the social groups seemed again to simply fulfill the historical roles assigned by the authors, 
themselves.10  
In short, the existing limited historiography, which focused on the post-war 
economic, social, political or cultural developments, produced a kind of history that lacks 
actual and living social actors. Although this dissertation acknowledges that these scholars 
                                                             
9 For a similar criticism to the literature which analyzes how the distributive policies resulted in 
improvement of workers’ life style during the post-war era in the USA, look at: Richard McIntyre and 
Michael Hillard, “Capitalist Class Agency and the New Deal Order: Against the notion of a Limited 
Capital-Labor Accord”, Review of Radical Political Economics, 45 (2013): 129-148. 
10 For example, see: Kemal Karpat, Türk Demokrasi Tarihi [The History of Turkish Democracy], 
(İstanbul: İstanbul, 1967); Ruşen Keleş, 100 Soruda Türkiye’de Şehirleşme, Konut ve Gecekondu [The 
Urbanization, Housing and Squatter Houses in Turkey in 100 Questions], (İstanbul: Gerçek, 1972); 
Michael N. Danielson and Ruşen Keleş, The Politics of Rapid Urbanization: Government and Growth 
in Modern Turkey, (New York: Holmes & Meier, 1985). 
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contributed significantly to Turkish historiography of the late 1940s and the succeeding two 
decades by presenting the different factors that highlight the structural conditions of the class 
formation and action; notably however, the aforementioned scholarship lacks any proper 
analysis of the real social actors who created their own histories in the context of historical 
developments in Turkey. Accordingly, this dissertation’s main goal is to enrich the field of 
study by situating the human actors, especially workers, in their deserved place in Turkish 
history. 
In fact, the Turkish labor historiography had long been dominated by a similar 
idealization of the working class and teleological perception of history. When the socialist 
scholars, either within or outside of academic circles, who assumed that the developments 
which took place in agriculture and industry would result in the dispossession of people and 
proleterianization, and that this process, naturally, would lead to class struggles and class 
consciousness for the workers, did not find the traces of genuine class consciousness which 
they searched for, they put the blame on the underdevelopment or irregular progress of the 
Turkish capitalism. If those scholars who were looking for the true historical processes found 
the genuine working class and class consciousness, specifically in the moments that the 
collective actions of the workers were on the rise, they analyzed the state and state policies, 
unions, unions leaders and their ideologies, or socialist movements and their leaders rather 
than the ordinary people who actually catalyzed those actions through their own labor. In 
those accounts, ordinary people remain as the passive followers of either the bourgeoisie or 
socialist ideology.  
This kind of history writing was challenged by the studies of Donald Quataert and a 
younger generation of Turkish scholars, who followed the path designated by Quartet’s works 
and developed new research agendas accompanying new perspectives, questions and methods 
through the mid-1990s. A member of this generation, Yiğit Akın, is certainly right in 
criticizing the older, but still dominant historiography methods for (re)producing an elitist 
vision of history, wherein the labor processes and different and conflicting actors of those had 
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been largely ignored.11 This style of history writing, according to Akın, almost completely 
focused on the organization, parties and leaders of the workers and workers’ collective 
action.12 By analyzing how the actual social relations evolved on the shop floor and in living 
places from a bottom-up perspective, rather than an elitist and statist one, most assumptions 
and discussions of the old history might be refuted.13 Rather than looking for the presence or 
absence of an assumed working class or true class consciousness, and taking pains to 
understand real people’s ideals, beliefs or actions in their historical context, those scholars did 
not focus on the whether the laws of capitalism or modernism actually fit in the case of 
Turkey. Rather, they focused on how capitalism took a particular shape and how it evolved in 
Turkey. They engaged in writing the social history of workers’ factories or living place 
experiences as the factors, which situated them in a particular historical context.14 
When examining the labor history of the late Ottoman Empire, scholars generally 
focused on the formation of the working class, workers’ collective action within the history of 
trade unions, industrialization and the socialist movement, as well as the social history of the 
workers. Three theoretical frameworks dominate these studies: the Modernization School, the 
teleological Marxist class analysis, and “the social history of the working class” approach, 
inspired by E. P. Thompson’s monumental work, The Making of English Working Class. Both 
the Modernization School and the Marxist class analysis focus on the workers’ collective 
                                                             
11 By labor process, I am referring to the organization of work in workplaces; that is, how people work, 
how they are controlled and how they are paid for on the shop floor level. This level, I think, is a place 
where capitalist relations can be observed in their most crystallized forms. There is significant 
literature on the labor process: Harry Braverman, Labor and Monopoly Capital,(New York: Free Press, 
1974); Richard Edwards, Contested Terrain: The Transformation of the Workplace in the Twentieth 
Century, (New York: Basic Books, 1979); Michael Burawoy, The Politics of Production: The Factory 
Regimes under Capitalism and Socialism, (London: Verso, 1985); Michel Aglietta, A Theory of 
Capitalist Regulation: The US Experience, (London: Verso, 2000). 
12  Yiğit Akın, “Emek Cumhuriyet Dönemi Emek Tarihçiliğine Katkı: Yeni Yaklaşımlar, Yeni 
Kaynaklar [The Contribution to the Labor Historiography of the Early Republican Period: New 
Approcahes, New Sources]”, Tarih ve Toplum, 2 (Autumn 2005): 75-79. For a reply to Akın, look at: 
Ahmet Makal, “Erken Cumhuriyet Dönemi Emek Tarihi ve Tarihçiliği Üzerine Bir Değerlendirme [An 
Analysis of the Labor History and Historian Craft of the Early Republican Period]”, Tarih ve Toplum, 3 
(Spring 2006): 215-264. 
13 Akın, “Emek Cumhuriyet Dönemi Emek Tarihçiliğine Katkı: Yeni Yaklaşımlar, Yeni Kaynaklar”, 
79-111. 
14  For a fine analysis that focuses on the historical transformation in the international labor 
historiography from the instituionalist approach to another one which primarily focuses on the social 
relations in explaning labor history, see: Geoff Eley and Keith Nield, The Future of Class in History: 
What is Left of the Social, (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2010).  
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actions of the late Ottoman Empire.15  Well-known authors of the Modernization School, 
Toker Dereli and Sedat Ağralı, whose works are often utilized and quoted by subsequent 
scholars of this school, presume that working class action and trade unionism in Turkey 
                                                             
15  For the works of the Modernization School, see Sedat Toydemir, “Türkiye’de İş İhtilaflarının 
Tarihçesi ve Bugünkü Durumu [The History and Current Situation of Work Conflicts in Turkey]” 
Sosyal Siyaset Konferansları, 4 (1951): 45-66; Lütfi Eroğlu, Türkiye’de İşçi Sınıfı Tarihi [The History 
of Working Class in Turkey], (İstanbul: Kutulmuş, 1951); Cahit Talas, Türkiye’de Sendikacılık 
Hareketi ve Toplu Sözleşme [Trade Unionism and the Collective Bargaining in Turkey] , (Ankara: 
Siyasal Bilgiler Fakültesi Maliye Enstitüsü, 1965); Nusret Ekin, “Strikes and Lockouts in Turkey” İ. Ü. 
İktisat Fakültesi Journal 36:26 (1966): 131-154; Sedat Ağralı, Günümüze Kadar Belgelerle Türk 
Sendikacılığı [Turkish Trade Unionism Until Today With Documents], (İstanbul: Son Telgraf 
Matbaası, 1967); Toker Dereli, The Development of Turkish Trade Unionism, (İstanbul: İstanbul 
Üniversitesi İktisat Fakültesi, 1968); Anıl Çeçen, Türkiye’de Sendikacılık [The Trade Unionism in 
Turkey], (Ankara: Özgür İnsan, 1973); Gülten Kutal, Türkiye’de İşçi Sendikacılığı [The Workers’ 
Unionism in Turkey], (İstanbul: İÜ İktisat Fakültesi, 1977); Cahit Talas, Türkiye’nin Açıklamalı Sosyal 
Politika Tarihi [The Explanatory History of Social Politics of Turkey], (Ankara: Bilgi, 1992); Ayşen 
Tokol, Türkiye’de Sendikal Hareket [The Unionist Movement in Turkey] (Bursa: Ezgi Kitabevi, 1994); 
Adnan Mahiroğulları, Cumhuriyetten Günümüze Türkiye’de İşçi Sendikacılığı [The Workers’ Unionism 
From the Republic To Today], (İstanbul: Kitabevi, 2005). For the Marxist analysis, see Radmir 
Platonovich Kornienko, The Labor Movement in Turkey (Washington: Joint Publications Research 
Service, 1967); Kemal Sülker, 100 Soruda Türkiye’de İşçi Hareketleri [The Workers’ Movements in 
Turkey in 100 Questions], (İstanbul: Gerçek, 1968); Oya Sencer, Türkiye’de İşçi Sınıfı: Doğuşu ve 
Yapısı [The Working Class in Turkey: Its Emergence and Characteristic], (İstanbul: Habora, 1969); 
Kurthan Fişek, Türkiye’de Kapitalizmin Gelişmesi ve İşçi Sınıfı [The Development of Capitalism and 
Working Class in Turkey], (İstanbul: Doğan Yayınevi, 1969); Alpaslan Işıklı, Sendikacılık ve Siyaset 
[The Trade Unionism and Politics], (Ankara: Odak, 1974); George Haupt and Paul Dumont, Osmanlı 
İmparatorluğu’nda Sosyalist Hareketler [Socialist Movements in the Ottoman Empire],Tuğrul 
Artunkal [trans.] (İstanbul: Gözlem, 1977); Hüseyin Avni Şanda, 1908 İşçi Hareketleri [The 1908 
Workers’ Movements], (İstanbul: Gözlem, 1978); P. Kitaygorodski, Türkiye Komünist ve İşçi Hareketi 
[The Communist and Worker Movement in Turkey], Fatma Bursalı [trans.] (İstanbul: Aydınlık 
Yayınları, 1979); Yıldırım Koç, Türkiye’de Sınıf Mücadelesinin Gelişimi [The Development of Class 
Struggle in Turkey], (Ankara: Birlik, 1979); Nikolaevich Rozaliev, Türkiye’de Sınıflar ve Sınıf 
Mücadeleleri [The Classes and Class Struggles in Turkey], M. Anibal [trans.], (İstanbul: Belge, 1979); 
Mesut Gülmez, “Bir Belge, Bir Yorum: 1909 Tatil-i Eşgal Yasası ve Grev [A Document, An Analysis: 
The 1909 Strike Law and Strike],” Toplum ve Bilim 12 (1980): 50-64; Şehmus M. Güzel, “1871 
Ameleperver Cemiyeti [The 1871 Worker Charity Association],” Bilim ve Sanat 8 (1981): 43-45; Zafer 
Toprak, “1909 Tatil-i Eşgal Kanunu Üzerine [On the 1909 Strike Law],” Toplum ve Bilim 13 (1981): 
141-156; Şehmus M. Güzel, Türkiye’de İşçi Örgütlenmesi [The Workers’ Organization in Turkey], 
unpublished Ph. D. Thesis, Ankara University, 1982; Alpaslan Işıklı, “Wage Labor and Unionization,” 
in Irvin Schick and Ertuğrul Ahmet Tonak [eds]. Turkey in Transition, (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 1987); Dimitir Şişmanov, Türkiye İşçi ve Sosyalist Hareketi [The Worker and Socialist 
Movement of Turkey], Ayşe Zarakolu and Ragıp Zarakolu [eds.], (İstanbul: Belge, 1990); Yavuz Selim 
Karakışla, “The Strike Wave in the Ottoman Empire,” The Turkish Studies Association Bulletin XVI:2 
(1992): 153-177; Şehmus M. Güzel, Türkiye’de İşçi Hareketi [The Workers’ Movement in Turkey], 
(İstanbul: Sosyalist, 1993); Peter Carl Mentzel, Nationalism and the Labor Movement in the Ottoman 
Empire unpublished Ph. D. Thesis, University of Washington, 1994; Yüksel Işık, Osmanlı’dan 
Günümüze İşçi Hareketinin Evrimi [The Evolution of the Workers’ Movement From the Ottoman to 
Today], (Ankara: Öteki, 1995); Yavuz Selim Karakışla, “The Emergence of the Ottoman Industrial 
Working Class, 1839-1923,” in Donald Quataert and Erik J. Zürcher [eds.] Workers and the Working 
Class in the Ottoman Empire and the Turkish Republic, (London: Tauris, 1995); Yıldırım Koç, Türkiye 
İşçi Sınıfı ve Sendikacılık Hareketi Tarihi [The History of Working Class and Unionism of Turkey], 
(İstanbul: Kaynak, 2003); Peter Mentzel, “The Bulgarian Declaration of Independence and the 1908 
Oriental Railway Strike,” East European Quarterly 4 (2004): 403-419; Kemal Sülker, Türkiye’de Grev 
Hakkı ve Grevler [The Strike Right and Strikes in Turkey], (İstanbul: Sosyal Tarih, 2004); Şehmus M. 
Güzel, İşçi Tarihine Bakmak [Analyzing the Workers’ History], (İstanbul: Türkiye Sosyal Tarih 
Araştırma Vakfı, 2007). 
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“naturally” developed out of the industrial growth in the Ottoman Empire in the nineteenth 
century. Based on official statistics which show the number of workers in Turkey, trade union 
publications and the newspapers of the period which mention class actions, and the official 
documents of labor laws and regulations, Dereli and Ağralı assume a linear development for 
the trade unions of the late Ottoman Empire. By using sources, which were produced by the 
state officials or trade unions, Dereli and Ağralı miss the intricacies of class formation in 
Turkey, such as the influence of pre-capitalist relations on the working class, as well as the 
influence of culture or regional variations.16 
When socialism as a political project reached its zenith in Turkey during the 1960s 
and the 1970s, some scholars, such as Oya Sencer, Kurthan Fişek, Şehmuz Güzel, Kemal 
Sülker and Nikolaevich Rozaliev, began to question the assumptions of the Modernization 
School by focusing on industrial development and the accompanying political turning points 
to delineate the class action. The main goals of their studies are to prove the existence of 
classes and class struggles in their true forms in the Ottoman Empire, and to make 
connections between working class actions and the “inevitable movement” of Turkey towards 
socialism. In this way, they focused on the institutions and collective actions of workers to 
argue for class consciousness. Motivated by the growing influence of socialism in the 1960s, 
these scholars tried to find the historical roots of workers’ “natural inclination toward 
socialism” in Turkish history. In their works, the Marxist scholars depend on government 
documents, official statistics, trade unions’ and political party publications, and the major 
newspapers of the period. Due to their perspectives and sources, these authors analyzed the 
workers as “immature” in terms of consciousness when workers did not engage in collective 
actions; consequently, they missed the importance of continuities in the class formation and 
daily life strategies used by the workers in order to survive.17 They also assumed, like Ağralı 
                                                             
16 Ağralı, 1967; Dereli, The Development of Turkish Trade Unionism. 
17 Sülker, 100 Soruda Türkiye’de İşçi Hareketleri; Fişek, Türkiye’de Kapitalizmin Gelismesi ve İşçi 
Sınıfı; Sencer, Türkiye’de İşçi Sınıfı: Doğuşu ve Yapısı; Rozaliev, Türkiye’de Sınıflar ve Sınıf 
Mücadeleleri; Güzel, Türkiye’de İşçi Hareketi. 
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and Dereli that the working class and trade unions “naturally” come out of industrial 
developments in Turkey. 
The method of assuming a natural and unilateral class formation and analyzing the 
sects of the working class who engaged in collective actions was challenged by the 
development of the “history from below” approach, in the 1990s and 2000s, thanks to the 
works of Donald Quataert and his followers. Quataert, in his book Miners and the State in the 
Ottoman Empire and Sherry Vatter, in her article “Militant Textile Weavers in Damascus”, 
refute many of the assumptions of the Modernization School and teleological Marxist analysis 
by historically demonstrating that non-linear industrial developments created uneven working 
class formations in different parts of the Empire. Furthermore, they argue that urbanization 
processes, nationalist and Islamist movements, and old methods of production relations in 
urban and rural areas are all important in class formation, as well as industrialization. To this 
end, the writers benefit from sources through which they can integrate the voice of workers 
into their research, such as court records, grievance petitions, local newspapers, and memoirs, 
in addition to government documents, trade unions’ archives and national newspapers. 18 
Those sources give the writers an indispensable opportunity to penetrate into the actual social 
                                                             
18 Sherry Vatter, “Militant Textile Weavers in Damascus: Waged Artisans and the Ottoman Labor 
Movement, 1850-1914,” in Donald Quataert and Erik J. Zürcher [eds.] Workers and the Working Class 
in the Ottoman Empire and the Turkish Republic, (London: Tauris, 1995), 35-57; Donald Quataert, 
Miners and the State in the Ottoman Empire (New York: Berghahn Books, 2006). For the other 
important works of the history from below approach, see Donald Quataert, Social Disintegration and 
Popular Resistance in the Ottoman Empire, 1881-1908 (New York: New York University Press, 
1983); Donald Quataert, “Machine Breaking and the Changing Carpet Industry of Western Anatolia, 
1860-1908,” Journal of Social History 19/3 (1986): 473-489; Donald Quataert, Workers, Peasants, and 
Economic Change in the Ottoman Empire (İstanbul: Isis Press, 1993); Sherry Vatter, “Militant 
Journeymen in Nineteenth-Century Damascus: Implications for the Middle Eastern Labor History 
Agenda,” in Zachary Lockman [ed.] Workers and Working Classes in the Middle East (Albany: SUNY 
Press, 1994), 1-19; Donald Quataert, “The Workers of Salonica, 1850-1912,” in Donald Quataert and 
Erik J. Zürcher [eds.] Workers and the Working Class in the Ottoman Empire and the Turkish 
Republic, (London: Tauris, 1995), 59-74; Donald Quataert, “Zonguldak Maden İşçilerinin Hayatı, 
1870-1920 [The Life of Zonguldak Mine Workers],” Toplum ve Bilim 83 (1999-2000): 80-90; Donald 
Quataert, “Labor History and the Ottoman Empire, 1700-1922,” International Labor and Working 
Class History 60 (2001): 93-109; Donald Quataert, “A Coal Miner’s Life During the Late Ottoman 
Empire,” International Labor and Working Class History 60 (2001): 153-179; Cengiz Kırlı, “A Profile 
of the Labor Force in Early Nineteenth-Century İstanbul” International Labor and Working Class 
History 60 (2001): 125-140; E. Atilla Aytekin, Tarlalardan Ocaklara, Sefaletten Mücadeleye: 
Zonguldak-Ereğli Kömür Havzası İşçileri 1848-1922 [From Lands to the Quarries, Misery to the 
Struggle: The Workers of Ereğli Coal Basin], (İstanbul: Yordam Kitap, 2007); Birten Çelik, 
“Sweatshops in the Silk Industry of the Bursa Region and the Worker’s Strikes in 1910,” Turkish 
Historical Review 4 (2013): 26-56. 
 
 
12 
relations of workers and incorporate these social relations and the workers’ own experiences 
into larger historical transformations. These writers focus on the survival strategies and 
individual struggles, as well as the collective actions, to present a more integrated class 
history of the late Ottoman Empire. 
There are also very few studies of working class formation and action in the Early 
Republican Period (1923-1945) compared to the number of works on the late Ottoman 
Empire. From the Modernization perspective, Sedat Ağralı, Toker Dereli, Cahit Talas and 
Orhan Tuna focus on the 1922 İzmir Economy Congress and the 1936 Labor Law which puts 
the industrial conflict in a legal framework. By using the legal documents of the Congress and 
the 1936 Law and official statistics, these authors argue that the working class was the passive 
actor in Turkish history until 1945, when a change in the Association Law allowed the 
workers to organize.19  
Marxist scholars like Yüksel Akkaya, Şehmus Güzel, Kurthan Fişek, Zafer Toprak 
and Oya Sencer focus on analyzing individual collective actions in the different regions of 
Anatolia and the relations between the workers’ organizations, socialist-communist parties 
and the state, rather than workers’ experiences. These authors try to explain the reasons 
behind state suppression and the workers’ lack of response by focusing on the industrial 
development of the country, as well as the actual number of workers and the level of class 
consciousness among them, and by utilizing the works of the Modernization School in terms 
of changing legal frameworks. Although these schools and writers benefit from each other’s 
works, it is a stretch to say there is a good discussion between them in terms of their 
methodologies and assumptions. Once more, the workers who do not act collectively are 
perceived as the silent actors in Turkish history.20  
                                                             
19 Orhan Tuna, Grev Hakkı [The Right to Strike], (İstanbul: İstanbul Üniversitesi İktisat Fakültesi 
Yayınları, 1962); Cahit Talas, Türkiye’de Sendikacilik Hareketi ve Toplu Sözleşme; Ağralı, 1967; 
Toker Dereli, Aydınlar, Sendika Hareketi ve Endüstriyel İlişkiler Sistemi [The Intellectuals, Union 
Movement and the System of Industrial Relations], (İstanbul: İstanbul Üniversitesi İktisat Fakültesi 
Yayınları, 1975). 
20 Fişek, 1969; Sencer, 1969; Şehmus M. Güzel, “1919-1922 Dönemi İşçi Hareketleri ve Grevler [The 
Workers’ Movements and Strikes Between 1919 and 1922],” Mülkiyeliler Birliği Journal 89 (1987): 
34-38; Zafer Toprak, “Şirket-i Hayriye Amele Cemiyeti ve 1925 Grevi [The Association of Workers of 
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Even if the “history from below” approach, thus far, does not deal with the formation 
of the working class and labor action in the 1920s, there is an impressive and comparatively 
rich historiography of the social history of workers, which brings new sources to the table 
from the 1930s and 1940s. In that time period, Yiğit Akın, Nurşen Gürboğa, Murat Metinsoy, 
Can Nacar, Görkem Akgöz and Barış Alp Özden are the most important writers of this 
perspective. These writers criticize the Modernization and Marxist Schools by pointing out 
that these schools’ assumptions and limited sources resulted in them overlooking large groups 
of workers who did not get involved in collective action. The writers also overlooked 
continuities and some critical elements such as religious ties, the effects of migration, social 
formation in the urban areas and shop floor dynamics etc., in class formation.  
Therefore, those writers using the social history approach have begun to address the 
survival strategies of the workers, as well as the collective action in workplaces, especially in 
mines and urban areas. Accordingly, they use new and enriching sources such as workers’ 
grievance petitions, local newspapers, and reports from the factory inspectors, as well as 
memoirs, novels and oral history interviews.21 As a result, their work is able to present a more 
integrated and enriched picture of the class formation and action. 
                                                                                                                                                                              
Şirket-i Hayriye and the 1925 Strike,” Toplumsal Tarih 30 (1996): 6-14; Yüksel Akkaya, 
“Çukurova’da Sendikacılık ve İşçi Eylemleri, 1923-1960 [The Unionism and Workers’ Actions in 
Çukurova],” Kebikeç 5 (1997): 183-200; Yüksel Akkaya, “Türkiye’de İşçi Sınıfi ve Sendikacilik [The 
Unionism and Working Class in Turkey],” Praksis 5 (2002): 131-176. 
21 Can Nacar, Working Class in Turkey during the World War II Period unpublished M.A. Thesis, 
Boğaziçi University, 2004; Murat Metinsoy, “İkinci Dünya Savaşı Yıllarında Zonguldak Kömür 
Ocaklarında Ücretli İş Mükellefiyeti ve İşçi Direnişi [The Waged Compulsory Work Obligation and 
Workers’ Resistance in the Zonguldak Coal Basin During the Second World War Years],” in Kürşat 
Coşgun and Ahmet Öztürk [eds.], Zonguldak Kent Tarihi Bienali’nden Seçmeler (Zonguldak: ZOKEV 
AND TMMOB, 2006), 93-112; Murat Metinsoy, İkinci Dünya Savaşında Türkiye: Savaş ve Gündelik 
Yaşam [Turkey in the Second World War: The War and the Daily Life], (İstanbul: Homer, 2007); Can 
Nacar, “Ekmeğin Yokluğunu Bilirim, Kıtlığı Gördüm: İkinci Dünya Savaşı Yıllarında Kentsel 
Alanlarda Emekçiler [I Know the Lack of Bread and Saw the Dearth: The Laborers in the Urban Era 
during the Second World War Years],” Praksis 16 (2007): 195-217; Yiğit Akın, “The Dynamics of 
Working-Class Politics in Early Republican Turkey: Language, Identity, and Experience” in Touraj 
Atabaki and Gavin D. Brockett [eds.] Ottoman and Republican Turkish Labor History, (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2009), 167-188; Nurşen Gürboğa, Mine Workers, the Single Party Rule, 
and War (İstanbul: Ottoman Bank Archives and Research Centre, 2009); Nurşen Gürboğa, 
“Compulsory Mine Work: The Single-Party Regime and the Zonguldak Coalfield as a Site of 
Contention, 1940-1947,” in Touraj Atabaki and Gavin D. Brockett [eds.] Ottoman and Republican 
Turkish Labor History, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 115-142; Can Nacar, “Our 
Lives Were Not As Valuable as an Animal: Workers in State-Run Industries in World-War-II Turkey,” 
in Touraj Atabaki and Gavin D. Brockett [eds.] Ottoman and Republican Turkish Labor History, 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 143-166; Barış Alp Özden, Working Class Formation 
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The Modernization School, the Marxist analysis view, and the “history from below” 
approach both analyze the working class in the period of transition to the multi-party regime 
(1945-1950) and the Democrat Party’s rule (1950-1960) in Turkey as a single period. Related 
to this period, Robert Bianchi, Cahit Talas and Toker Dereli focus on how radical trade 
unions sprang up in 1945, as a result of the change in the Association Law, how these unions 
were oppressed by the state in 1946, and how alleged yellow-dog unions22 were enforced in 
the second half of the 1940s and the 1950s, in the context of the broader political changes in 
Turkey.23 For this period, the writers’ main focus of analysis is on the changing industrial 
relations and labor regulations/laws; therefore, they benefit from the analysis of legislations 
published in the relevant issues of the official state newspaper, the debates within the 
Parliament, the reports in national newspapers, articles presented by the professors employed 
in İstanbul University during the Conferences of the Social Politics, and relevant trade unions 
publications.24  
Likewise, Ahmet Makal, Yüksel Akkaya, Şehmuz Güzel, Mesut Gülmez, and 
Yıldırım Koç use the same sources to deal with spontaneous strikes, conservative trade 
unionism and new labor legislation. These scholars assume that the increasing pace of 
                                                                                                                                                                              
in Turkey, 1946-1962, unpublished Ph. D. Thesis, Boğaziçi University, 2011; and Görkem Akgöz, 
Many Voices of a Turkish State Factory: Working At Bakırköy Cloth Factory, 1932-1950, unpublished 
Ph. D. Thesis, Amsterdam University, 2012. 
22 Yellow-dog unions refer to unions thought to work in cooperation with employers or those founded 
secretly by employers themselves to undermine real trade unions. This definition was first used when 
French employers founded some unions to fight with real unions in the 1880s. 
23  Talas, Türkiye’de Sendikacılık Hareketi ve Toplu Sözleşme; Toker Dereli, Türkiye’de Sendika 
Demokrasisi [The Union Democracy in Turkey], (İstanbul: İÜ İktisat Fakültesi Yayınları, 1977); 
Robert Bianchi, Interest Groups and Political Development in Turkey, (Princeton: Princeton University 
Press, 1984). For the Marxist analysis, see Sülker, 100 Soruda Türkiye’de İşçi Hareketleri; Işıklı, 
Sendikacılık ve Siyaset; Yıldırım Koç, Türk-İş Neden Böyle, Nasıl Değişecek? [Why Türk-İş is Like 
That and How It Will Change?], (İstanbul: Alan, 1986); Yıldırım Koç, Türkiye İşçi Sınıfı Tarihinden 
Yapraklar [Pages from the History of the Working Class of Turkey], (İstanbul: Ataol, 1992); İlhan 
Akalın, İşçi Sendika Tarihi [The History of Worker-Union], (Ankara: Öteki, 1995); Yıldırım Koç, 
Türkiye’de İşçiler ve Sendikalar [Workers and Unions in Turkey], (Ankara: Türkiye Yol-İş Sendikası, 
2000); Mustafa Doğan Görkem Governmental Involvement in the Establishment and Performance of 
the Trade Unions during the Transition to Multi Party Politics unpublished M.A. Thesis, Boğaziçi 
Üniversitesi, 2003; Erdem Kocabaş, Political Change and Working Class Formation between 1945-
1960 in Turkey unpublished M.A. Thesis Boğaziçi Üniversitesi, 2006; Aziz Çelik, Vesayetten Siyasete 
Türkiye’de Sendikacılık [Unionism From Patronage to Politics in Turkey], (İstanbul: İletişim, 2010); 
Yıldırım Koç, Türkiye İşçi Sınıfı Tarihi [The History of Working Class of Turkey], (Ankara: Epos, 
2010). 
24 Cahit Talas, Türkiye Cumhuriyeti’nde Sosyal Politika Meseleleri [The Issues of Social Policy in the 
Turkish Republic], (Ankara: SBF Maliye Enstitüsü, 1960); Dereli, Aydınlar, Sendika Hareketi ve 
Endüstriyel İlişkiler Sistemi; Bianchi, 1984. 
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industrial development in Turkey created favorable conditions for working class activity. 
However, it should be noted that the state obstructed collective action through legislation. The 
state provided individual workers with opportunities to make their demands within the legal 
mechanisms, such as the Arbitration and Conciliation Mechanism and Regional Labor Courts. 
The state also oppressed the radical unions and controlled workers by allowing conservative 
trade unionism to function. As a result, according to these scholars, the working class was the 
silent actor of the multi-party regime and the Democrat Party rule, outside of a few 
spontaneous strikes or resistances.25  
Some of the works of the “history from below” approach cover the period of the 
multi-party regime;26 nevertheless, it is difficult to say if this approach is productive for 
analyzing the Demokrat Parti (DP-The Democrat Party) rule. Hakan Koçak’s articles, 
published in 2008, are provocative and impressive essays which analyze working class 
structures, for they depend on Ira Katznelson’s framework, a method that stresses analyzing 
class formation within the larger political, social and economic changes. By relying on 
memoirs, news in local and national newspapers, and articles presented in the Conferences on 
Social Politics, which were organized by İstanbul University from the early 1940s to the late 
1980s, Koçak successfully discusses how the working class defined itself in the 1950s in 
Turkey.27 In the same vein, Barış Alp Özden, in his well-written thesis, explores how the 
                                                             
25 Mesut Gülmez, “1961 Öncesi Türk Toplu İş İlişkilerine Bir Bakıs ve Değerlendirme [An Outlook 
and Analysis of the Turkish Collective Work Relations Prior to 1961],” TODAIE İnsan Hakları Yıllığı 
1983-1984 (1984): 98-122; Şehmus M. Güzel, “İsmet İnönü, Sosyal Politika ve Grev [İsmet İnönü, The 
Social Politcs and Strike],” Yapıt 10 (1985): 67-86; Şehmus M. Güzel, “1946 ve Sonrasında Türkiye’de 
Grev Tartışması [The Strike Debate in Turkey in 1946 and Its Afterwards]” Toplum ve Bilim 40 
(1988): 46-50; Yıldırım Koç, “1947 Yılında Sendika-Dışı İşçi Örgütlenmeleri [The Workers’ 
Organizations Other Than Unions in 1947],” Mülkiyeliler Birliği Journal 108 (1989); Yıldırım Koç, 
“1947 Sendikalar Yasası [The 1947 Trade Union Law],” Mülkiyeliler Birliği Journal 121 (1990): 10-
14; Ahmet Makal, Türkiye’de Çok Partili Dönemde Çalışma İlişkileri, 1946-1963 [The Work Relations 
in Turkey during the Multi-Party Period], (Ankara: İmge Kitabevi, 2002); Akkaya, Türkiye’de İşçi 
Sınıfi ve Sendikacılık; Yüksel Akkaya, “Demokrat Parti Döneminde Grevler [The Strikes in the 
Democrat Party Period]” Toplumsal Tarih 112 (2003), 60-66; Güzel, İşçi Tarihine Bakmak. 
26 Selin Dingiloğlu, The Statist Industrialization and the Formation of Industrial Working Class in the 
Early Republic, unpublished M.A. Thesis, Boğaziçi University, 2006; Yiğit Akın, “The Dynamics of 
Working-Class Politics in Early Republican Turkey”; Nurşen Gürboğa, Mine Workers, the Single Party 
Rule, and War and Nurşen Gürboğa, “Compulsory Mine Work: The Single-Party Regime and the 
Zonguldak Coalfield as a Site of Contention.” 
27 Hakan Koçak, “Türkiye İşçi Sınıfı Oluşumunun Sessiz Yılları: 1950’ler [The Silent Years of the 
Working Class Formation in Turkey: The 1950s],” Toplum ve Bilim 113 (2008): 90-126; Hakan Koçak, 
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workers defined themselves in the context of changes in their everyday living and working 
conditions. Özden successfully analyzes the ways in which the workers responded to their 
changing environment, the state’s labor policy, and the changing industrial regime in the 
everyday life of people. In the end, the author discusses a specific kind of class language the 
workers produced at the end of those interlinked processes.28 It is unfortunate that apart from 
Koçak’s and Özden’s studies, the working class historiography does not deal with class 
formation from the bottom up, but rather with the developments of trade unions and political 
parties for the post-war period. Moreover, their writing focus on those workers who were 
employed in state enterprises; therefore, their narratives and assumptions need to be revised 
through the experiences of the workers recruited in private industry which significantly 
developed through the 1950s. 
For the 1960s, Ağralı, Dereli and Talas point to growing industrial development, 
industrial relations and the increasing number of workers, as well as progressive changes in 
laws and political structure, and the increasing size of trade unions as the reasons for the 
workers’ collective actions.29 After putting forth these concepts, their work lists the strikes 
and resistances in several industrial plants and factories without demonstrating the causal 
links between the structural changes and those actions. Likewise, Şehmus Güzel, Kurthan 
Fişek, Yıldırım Koç, Kemal Sülker, Dimitir Şişmanov, and Nikolaevich Rozaliev account for 
the development of trade unions and their political stance with the increase in the size of 
industry and structural transformations in legal and political systems. Then, the scholars from 
both these theoretical frameworks present arguments based on several strikes and acts of 
resistance by focusing on the demands of workers and the narratives of their actions. Güzel 
and the others further examine working class collective actions for their potential to instigate 
                                                                                                                                                                              
“50’leri İşçi Sınıfı Oluşumunun Bir Uğrağı Olarak Yeniden Okumak [Re-Analyzing the 50s as the 
Threshold of the Working Class Formation],” Çalışma ve Toplum 3 (2008): 69-86. 
28 Barış Alp Özden, Working Class Formation in Turkey. 
29  See Ağralı, 1967; Dereli, The Development of Turkish Trade Unionism; Talas, Türkiye’nin 
Açıklamalı Sosyal Politika Tarihi. 
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socialist movements by merely looking at workers’ collective action in factories or street 
demonstrations.30 
To summarize, there are certain analytical problems in the historiography that address 
the 1960s: first of all, past scholars mostly analyzed the institutional and political history of 
the period, such as the 1961 Constitution which addresses strikes and trade unions, industrial 
structures which shape the relationship between workers and bourgeoisie, or the spread of 
socialism as a political force which radicalized workers’ movements. After discussing these 
institutional and political frameworks, they narrated the history of labor movement as 
“naturally” coming out of such institutional and political developments. The main deficiency 
of such a framework is that it does not provide us with any explanation as to why the workers 
in a particular industrial plant, sector or region – whether as an organized group or as 
individuals - participated in industrial actions.  
Even though some contemporary scholars, like Brian Mello, developed a more 
sophisticated approach by depending upon the contentious politics framework to analyze the 
collective actions within the scope of the historical developments, which occurred in a 
particular country, they cannot evade the top-down approach. Mello, whose goal it is to 
situate the working class movement into the larger political developments between 1960 
and1980, relies upon vast trade union archives, such as the DİSK archives, and the prominent 
national newspapers, such as Akşam, Milliyet and Cumhuriyet. Nevertheless, the voice of the 
working class itself is still lacking in Mello’s top-down analysis.31 
Another deficiency of these studies which deal with labor and labor movements 
between 1960-1980 is that they depended upon a concept of “an ideal worker” having “an 
                                                             
30 Sülker, 100 Soruda Türkiye’de İşçi Hareketleri; Fişek, Türkiye’de Kapitalizmin Gelişmesi ve İşçi 
Sınıfı; Koç, Türkiye’de Sınıf Mücadelesinin Gelişimi; Rozaliev, Türkiye’de Sınıflar ve Sınıf 
Mücadeleleri; Şişmanov, Türkiye İşçi ve Sosyalist Hareketi; Güzel, Türkiye’de İşçi Hareketi; Koç, 
Türkiye İşçi Sınıfı ve Sendikacilik Hareketi Tarihi; Sülker, Türkiye’de Grev Hakkı ve Grevler; Güzel, 
İşçi Tarihine Bakmak. For further examples, see; Işıklı Sendikacılık ve Siyaset; Kitaygorodski, Türkiye 
Komünist ve İşçi Hareketi; Işıklı, “Wage, Labor and Unionization”; Işık, Osmanlı’dan Günümüze İşçi 
Hareketinin Evrimi. 
31 Brian Mello, Evaluating Social Movement Impacts: Labor and the Politics of State-Society Relations 
unpublished Ph. D. Thesis University of Washington, 2006; Brian Mello, “Political Process and the 
Development of Labor Insurgency in Turkey, 1945-1980” Social Movement Studies 6/3 (2007): 207-
225. 
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ideal class consciousness” to analyze the labor movement and its participants, regardless of 
whether the workers had such consciousness or not.32 Moreover, workers do not just gain 
class consciousness as a result of their position in the economic structure in a particular 
country. Several other factors such as urbanization, family ties, and religious ties, may 
contribute to the advent of a class consciousness. Quataert’s and his followers’ research 
agenda focusing on the social and cultural transformations, as well as economic ones, was not 
acknowledged by the subsequent works on working class formation for the three decades 
between 1950 and 1980 which largely dealt with the development of trade unionism within 
the context of emerging industrial relations from a top-down perspective.33 
Yet, the labor history of the 1960s is currently making progress. Several scholars 
such as Zafer Aydın, Aziz Çelik and Hakan Koçak successfully narrate the social history of a 
few important collective actions or the history of factories by entwining the workers’ 
experiences with the social, political and economic-industrial developments. By drawing 
upon the local and national newspapers, available factory and union documents, literary 
sources and oral history accounts, those authors sketch the social history of the events and 
workers lives. More importantly, these authors focus on shop floor dynamics, and where the 
actual encounters of the classes occurs, such as between workers and owners/managers - a 
more opaque method to explain the industrial dynamics. In other words, those writers 
perceive the factory as an important site, where the daily individual or collective conflicts 
occur and contribute to the formation of the class relations and class consciousness.34 
Lastly, it is very interesting that the biggest labor upsurge in Turkey, the events of 
June 15-16th, have not yet become the subject of any scholarly work, except for some short 
                                                             
32  Dereli, 1967; Fişek, 1969; Güzel, “Tanzimat’tan Cumhuriyet’e İşçi Hareketi ve Grevler”; Koç, 
Türkiye’de İşçiler ve Sendikalar. 
33 For industrial relations, see Talas, Türkiye Cumhuriyeti’nde Sosyal Politika Meseleleri; Tuna, Grev 
Hakkı; Makal, Türkiye’de Çok Partili Dönemde Çalışma İlişkileri; for the trade unionism, see Ağralı, 
1967; Dereli, The Development of Turkish Trade Unionism; Koç, Türkiye İşçi Sınıfı ve Sendikacılık 
Hareketi Tarihi and Türkiye İşçi Sınıfı Tarihi. 
34  Aziz Çelik and Zafer Aydın, Paşabahçe: Gelenek Yaratan Grev [Paşabahçe: The Strike That 
Created Legacy], (İstanbul: TÜSTAV, 2006); Zafer Aydın, Kavel: Kanunsuz Bir Grevin Öyküsü 
[Kavel: The Story of an Illegal Strike], (İstanbul: Sosyal Tarih, 2010); Zafer Aydın, Geleceğe Yazılmış 
Mektup: 1968 Derby İşgali [The Letter to the Future: The Derby Invasion in 1968], (İstanbul: 
TÜSTAV, 2012); Hakan M. Koçak, Camın İşçileri: Paşabahçe İşçilerinin Sınıf Olma Öyküsü [The 
Workers of Glass: The Story of Paşabahçe’s Workers Becoming a Class], (İstanbul: İletişim, 2014). 
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articles written in popular history journals and left-wing newspapers.35 Other accounts about 
the incident were written by the workers themselves, or union leaders who participated in the 
events.36 The situation is a good example of the dearth of labor history in Turkey for the post-
war period. 
In short, while tinged with a certain teleological perspective, the Turkish labor 
historiography has long searched, albeit in a futile attempt, for genuine class relations like 
those it assumed to exist in the capitalist West, and true class consciousness which it assumed 
as being defined in classical Marxism, as well as revolutionary class struggles which would 
emerge out of socialist ideals. In this sense, those historical cases which do not fit with the 
true formation of class are seen as deviant. This perspective resulted in certain fallacies 
inherent to this manner history writing. 
First of all, this is a highly problematic approach to history: instead of conceiving 
history and historical processes as a complex web of relations and contingent combinations of 
different patterns, this approach takes historical developments as if the events appeared in 
compliance with the history that has a certain direction (towards socialism), a certain 
beginning and end, and therefore a certain aim, in and of itself.37 As a result, it sees historical 
developments in terms of class relations in Turkey each as exceptional and incoherent ones. 
However, as Somers argues, this incoherency is not one of any historical cause, but it rather 
stems from the theory itself. In her words: “the incoherency stems from inferring a 
                                                             
35 For such studies, see Hakan Koçak, “Tarihi Değiştiren İki Uzun Gün: 15-16 Haziran [Two Long 
Days That Changed History: The 15-16 June]”, BirGün, June 13, 2009 and Süheyla Algül, “15-16 
Haziran [15-16 June],” Toplumsal Tarih, 245 (May 2014). 
36 For example, see Kemal Nebioğlu, “15-16 Haziran [The 15-16 June],” Sosyalizm ve Toplumsal 
Mücadeleler Ansiklopedisi , vol. 7, İstanbul: İletişim, 1988, 2154-2155; Celal Alçınkaya, “Silahtar’da 
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15-16 Haziran [The 15-16 June From Tradition to the Future], (İstanbul: Sorun, 2008).  
37 By epistemology of absence, Somers mainly refers to a way of producing knowledge that analyzes 
any developments in any specific region in a time period, by depending on what lacked in them in 
terms of a general pattern of history. It is obvious that having a rigid perspective on how history must 
proceed, and what conditions there must be to follow the general and stable patterns, this methodology 
explains social or state formation in terms of absences, rather than what was really going on. The cases 
that do not fit with the general patterns in theory are expressed as deviant or anomalies. Margaret R. 
Somers, “Narrativity, Narrative Identity, and Social Action: Rethinking English Working-Class 
Formation,” Social Science History, 16:4 (Winter 1992): 591-593. 
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teleological prediction”. 38  This historiography fits well with an agenda shaped by what 
Somers calls an epistemology of absence. 39  Secondly, and it is ironic, but this kind of 
materialist history is marred by a sort of idealism in the sense that it stresses how the ideals 
and beliefs of leaders, but not the actual social relations or the beliefs of ordinary people, 
motivate people to get together and act. Thirdly, this method is based on a state and law-
centered approach, since it focuses on how the state and law unilaterally shape the 
institutions, and frame the actions and beliefs of ordinary people. Fourthly, this way of 
writing has over-simplified the economic determinist approach in which the economy fulfills 
its assigned role as creating classes. 
As a result, this viewpoint assumes that classes are simply the natural outcomes of 
industrial developments and “there should be a casual link between the societal and economic 
changes of the industrial revolution (class in itself) and the emergence of a revolutionary class 
consciousness (class for itself)”.40 In consequence, it misses the other important factors, such 
as state formation, religious or family ties, ethnicity, or the peculiar patterns of people’s own 
experiences in the working and living places. Lastly, and related to these previous arguments, 
teleological Marxism, through which the Turkish labor historiography has long progressed, is 
an institution-centered approach that concludes historical processes are largely the products of 
the institutions or the leaders who decided the institutional policies, and that ordinary people 
are the passive subjects of that history. Therefore, this is a history without human subjects. 
There is no doubt that the criticisms and studies made by Quatert and his followers 
constituted both an important challenge and contribution to the literature, since they 
attempted to bring the human subject back to the history of class in Turkey. On the other 
hand, is the agenda of social history, as it existed, (which brought significant and enriching 
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challenges to the labor history of the 1930s and 1940s) a viable option for the 1950s and 
1960s to explain class formation?  Is it possible to de-center the institutions, state or political 
parties, which held an important place in working people’s lives after the Second World War 
in our analysis?41 
Since that time, the enriched agenda of social history as proposed by the new 
generation of Turkish labor historians has had some problems regarding the class formation 
of the post-war era. First of all, the existing literature has thus far left the 1950s and 1960s 
almost untouched. Secondly, the literature rarely reflected shop floor dynamics - one of the 
important sites in which class relations are cemented. Although some studies analyzed how 
class relations played out on the shop floor, these were focused on factories constructed and 
managed by the state. There is simply no study of the private factories that were expanding 
during the 1950s and later. Thirdly, and related to this point, the existing literature on the 
social history of workers does not perceive the employers either as individuals or as a distinct 
social group. As a result, another important component of class relations seems almost 
untouched in those accounts. And lastly, due to their assumptions and the time-period, this 
literature did little to deal with working class organizations and movements that significantly 
contributed to the formation of class and class language itself. However, Michael Hanagan 
has reminded us long ago that class consciousness must be embodied in the institutions that 
mobilize class actors.42 
Certainly, I am not calling for a return to the agenda, methods or questions of the old 
institutional, essentialist and teleological writing. What I am proposing is to construct a viable 
perspective that will incorporate the history of institutions and collective actions in the 
narration of class formation without necessarily having an institution or state-centered 
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to the state”.  Ira Katznelson, “The ‘Bourgeois’ Dimension: A Provocation About Institutions, Politics, 
and the Future of Labor History,” International Labor and Working Class History, 46 (Fall 1994): 23. 
42 Michael Hanagan, “Response to Sean Wilentz,” International Labor and Working-Class History, 26 
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perspective, in order to successfully portray a more full-fledged image of the working class.43 
As Gerald Friedman claims: “Through slogans and common actions, workers become a 
class.”44 As a consequence, the social history of workers and class formation, as proposed by 
Donald Quataert and his followers, must be revised and enriched by those dynamics which 
shaped the workers’ experiences after the post-war era in order to have a more accurate and 
comprehensive history of workers. 
In 1994, one of the prominent labor historians, Ira Katznelson, made a call which 
ignited great debate amongst scholars in the field; to return to a state-centered approach in 
order to overcome the current crisis of the old and new social history. He acknowledged the 
need to incorporate some liberal assumptions, ones that were based mainly on the historical 
evolution of rights, into the theoretical framework. As a result, the state as an independent 
variable, and its liberal conceptualization, must be prioritized in labor studies to avoid the 
field’s imminent danger of trivialization.45 Although it was widely debated whether including 
the liberal perspective of the modern state, and/or hinging upon a statist approach leads 
scholars to neglect social context and action,46 other prominent figures, such as Geoff Eley 
and Gerald Friedman have long been calling for scholars to give the state and politics their 
deserved place in both social and labor historiography. Especially since state, state policies, 
intra-elite political competition and institutions, including both trade unions and state 
institutions, all matter to the lives of ordinary people and they do not one-sidedly determine 
social outcomes, but rather exert their many pressures on the path of class formation.47 Before 
                                                             
43 For a good study which links the changing political environments with the daily social life of 
workers, see: Lizabeth Cohen, Making a New Deal: Industrial Workers in Chicago, 1919-1939, 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993). 
44 Gerald Friedman, “Is Labor Dead?” International Labor and Working-Class History, 75 (Spring 
2009): 134. 
45 Ira Katznelson, “The ‘Bourgeois’ Dimension: A Provocation About Institutions, Politics, and the 
Future of Labor History,” 7-32. 
46 Michael Hanagan, “A Return to Liberalism in Labor History?” International Labor and Working-
Class History, 46 (Fall 1994): 51-57; David Montgomery, “From Scientific Socialism to Political 
Science,” International Labor and Working-Class History, 46 (Fall 1994): 63-66; Judith Stein, 
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them, Tony Judt had already criticized the negligence of politics in the works of social 
history.48 Similarly, collective actions, especially strikes as the most well known form of 
contentious politics between workers/their institutions and managers/bosses and their 
organizations, are significant events, which spur on unity and sometimes division within and 
between classes. 
The social history of the particular forms of class and class consciousness takes shape 
in interactions with those factors, and as response to those variables. Equally important is the 
historical pattern of relations that the different groups engaged in and how they influenced 
class formation in a particular locale: formation of social classes takes place out of the 
interrelations between various groups. Any social history of the working class must reflect on 
the actions and ideals of the other classes, and most importantly, on the managers and owners. 
In fact, workers and bosses/managers “were engaged in a process of defining their 
relationships, rather than acting on the basis of accepted premises”49 in post-war Turkey. Such 
a comprehensive perspective requires us to consider their institutions, if any existed, in order 
to explain the dynamics of class relations and consciousness. In conclusion, any social history 
writing of workers must be carried out by incorporating state, state policies, political 
competition and institutions, without being entrapped by the over-deterministic institutionalist 
and statist perspective. 
The modern world is characterized by the competing ideologies through which the 
political movements attempt to inculcate in people its ideas, value-systems and visions. 
Although it seems that socialism and liberalism appeared as the main modern ideologies par 
excellence in a post-French Revolution world, several other ideologies, including nationalism 
and conservatism (as generally taking the form of religious movements) offered alternative 
perspectives to people and they became even more successful than either socialism or 
liberalism in several cases in terms of getting popular consent about their validity in modern 
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49 Diane Koenker, “Skilled Workers and the Strike Movement in Revolutionary Russia”, Journal of 
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times. Authors and supporters of those ideologies constantly try to (re)define them in their 
clearest terms in a changing world in an effort to sketch out the current world and provide a 
viable alternative to it. The liberal ideology defines social relations as taking place between 
individuals who act through self-interests on one side, and the state on the other: it contends 
that while individual liberties, (freedom to have property being the most indispensable one), 
must be allowed to grow as much as possible, any state intervention which may limit those 
liberties must be scaled down. In a liberal ideology, natural rights are universal and sacred, 
never to be violated. It also defines a new relationship between state and civil society based 
on the law, wherein the state must act within the framework of law in its relationship with 
people who are bestowed with rights, basic freedoms, the freedom to private property, and the 
right to resist against tyranny. By contrast, socialism addresses social relations as being 
characterized by the conflict between classes, emerging out of the fact that while some people 
have the means of production, the others lack that advantage and property owners control the 
economic benefits created by the labor of property-less class. In socialist ideology, the 
struggles between owners and workers are inherent in the capitalist world, and this lays the 
basic foundation of any inequality; consequently, socialists spoke for the abolishment of 
private property. 50  As distinct from liberal and socialist ideologies, nationalist ideology 
emphasizes upon the very “reality” of the existence of nations and contends that national 
identities, rather than self-seeking subjectivities or class’ interests, are central to the definition 
of individuality. Therefore, nationalist movements attempt to inculcate in people an identity 
that denies any internal difference or conflict, including class differences, within a given 
society.51  Accordingly, it purports that the creation of an organic community, where the 
                                                             
50 For the basic tenets of liberalism and socialism, see David E. Ingersoll and Richard K. Matthews, 
The Philosophic Roots of Modern Ideology: Liberalism, Communism, Fascism, (Prentice Hall: New 
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interests of different groups would be common ones and state mechanisms would iron out any 
conflicts. At the same time, conservatism and religious movements typically emerged as a 
reaction to the main modern ideologist ideologies, namely liberalism and socialism, and argue 
that those ideologies and rapid social changes result in the dissolution of the bonds of society 
and the human soul, the very basic tenets of which could mostly be found in the religious 
identity of individuals. Therefore, conservatism and/or religious movements simply offered 
people a return to their old religious traditions to save themselves from the meaningless 
modern social life and destructive forces of the modernity.52 
Although these ideologies are all different from each other at the most abstract level 
in terms of how they understand and conceptualize the existing world, they often co-mingle at 
the practical level. Ideologies do not appear in the real world in their purest forms. This is not 
just due to the fact that their supporters yielded different and even conflicting definitions of 
ideologies over the years. This also stems from the fact that ideologies are embodied in 
political movements that have a political agenda to become successful. In fact, followers of, 
or leaders of, certain political movements revised those ideologies and theories in light of the 
interests of their movements. In this regard, there may exist distinct and sometimes 
conflicting tenets within a specific ideology. For example, a socialist, a nationalist or a 
religious leader, or an institution or party, may capitalize on the elements, which seemed to be 
embedded in one particular ideology for their practical purposes, such as mobilizing certain 
groups. It is well known that Joseph Stalin used some elements of Slav nationalism during the 
WWII to inspire Slavic people to fight against Nazi Germany. Similarly, an influential 
Islamic leader in Turkey, Necmettin Erbakan used some socialist inspired concepts in the 
early 1990s, and a very influential left-wing journal, YÖN, blended socialism with Turkish 
nationalism in the 1960s. Similarly, the Arab socialism of the post–world war era was a 
combination of socialism, statism, secularism and Arab nationalism.53 The Communists in 
Iran supported the nationalist and constitutionalist leader, Mohammad Mosaddaq in his 
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struggle against British imperialism. 54  An Iranian revolutionary and sociologist who 
published several books on the sociology of religion, Ali Shariati, tried to merge some 
elements of socialism with Muslim practices and beliefs before the Iranian Revolution in 
1979.55 Fidel Castro and his comrades also utilized a nationalist language, instead of a pure 
Marxist terminology, to demonstrate how American imperialism had exploited and oppressed 
the whole Cuban nation except for very few servants of imperialism within the country during 
the course of the revolution. 56  This element of blending ideologies is very relevant for 
ordinary people, such as workers, who are not necessarily related with any organization or 
party or are the rank-and-file of such organizations. For example, any worker inspired by 
socialism may see their labor as the foundation of the wealth of a country, but he/she may 
amalgamate such assumptions with a Muslim or Christian religious belief that the labor was 
already done in service of Mohammad or Jesus Christ. This approach is also applicable in the 
case of workers who engage in collective actions in an effort to legitimize their actions. A 
certain kind of conception of equality or justice inspired by the leftist ideas may be a 
motivating factor for a workers to join in the collective action, but at the same time, they may 
call for army or any state offices or officials, which they suppose as state institutions, to 
defend every groups' interests without bias toward their nationalist ideals. In brief, the 
ideologies are not necessarily exclusive of each other in practice. 
This was the case when a deadly struggle erupted between capitalism and socialism 
in the post-World War 2 era. The idea that the free market economy would flourish when 
liberated from state intervention has largely lost its influence on the organization of society 
due to the 1929 financial crises, rise of fascism during the 1930s and succeeding Second 
World War. As a result, in the aftermath of the war it was proposed that economic inequalities 
might be ironed over through the “good-will” of richer classes and necessary state 
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interventions; in fact, such a strategy to get rid of poverty had good economic reasoning: in a 
world where commodities were produced for mass consumption, the laboring classes as the 
most populous group in society had to earn well enough to purchase these goods. In a sense, 
the “idea of social justice”, which assumed a certain kind of fair relations between different 
classes, would be maintained over such an economic rationale following the war. Meanwhile, 
the socialist ideology gained credibility, especially in underdeveloped countries, as a method 
to curb poverty and overcome economic backwardness; however, socialism became an 
influential current in most countries in alliance with nationalism, and even in alliance with 
religious movements in some cases. In the age of imperialism, oppression and exploitation 
exerted by one nation over other(s) was a reality that people suffered from as they suffered 
from imbalanced class relations. After 1945, the political movements informed by those 
ideologies took a shape in such a world. The existence of liberalism, socialist, nationalist and 
religious ideologies and political movements must be understood within this context in 
Turkey after the war. 
Relying upon such a perspective and having such an agenda, I will focus on the 
particular social history of the metal workers, which took shape through their experiences, 
institutions, and collective actions. This history follows the pattern of the workers’ migration 
to İstanbul, their dwellings in a new city, the social structures in their poor neighbourhoods, 
their working experiences, their relations with managers, bosses and with their fellow 
workers, as well as their relations with their own collective organizations, and between 
organizations and the construction of the workers’ own collective subjectivity within these 
complex developments. Here, rather than centering the problem on collective consciousness, I 
am concentrating on the social relationships which workers established between themselves 
and with their own union(s), managers/owners and their organization and state and state 
policies. I am also integrating the idea of how workers situated themselves both individually 
and collectively in the larger organization of society. Of course, I am not totally neglecting 
class consciousness in this study, but following the important caution that Sean Wilentz made 
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to not confuse class consciousness with socialist consciousness.57 I am not trying to measure 
the workers’ mind with a properly designed ruler: I am not laying the workers of the after war 
period on Procrutes' bed.58 What I am doing instead is to understand and explain how a 
collective workers’ consciousness, at least among the militant metal workers, rose out of their 
collective experiences and acts of resistance, and how, in turn, such a collective 
consciousness influenced their actions which ultimately shaped the working class formation 
in the metal sector. 
In fact, the state was the main actor in the initiation of industrial growth for the 
second quarter of the 20th century in Turkey. By the 1950s, the private sector, nurtured by 
state enterprises, increased its influence and made particularly large investments in the 
metallurgy sector that, by and large, was located in İstanbul. In time, the metal sector 
broadened its scale and scope thanks to state aid, as well as cooperation with foreign capital 
investors, the rapid enlargement of cities, and the fact that the metal sector became a stalwart 
of the Turkish economy in the 1960s. Metal hardware production, in particular, became the 
most important branch of the sector; in fact, Barış Öz mentions a production boom of metal 
goods after 1963.59 More importantly, the metal bosses began to carry weight in political and 
social developments in Turkey. For example, Vehbi Koç became the role model for other 
capitalist entrepreneurs in Turkey, as he was the most well known social figure and the 
representative of the Turkish capitalist class. Furthermore, the metal bosses/managers were 
among the first class group to recognize their collective interests and to be unionized to 
defend them. Their organization, Madeni Eşya Sanayicileri Sendikası (MESS-Turkish 
Employers’ Association of Metal Hardware Industry) pioneered the establishment of Türkiye 
İşveren Sendikaları Konfederasyonu (TİSK-The Confederacy of Turkish Employers’ 
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Associations)60 and Türkiye Sanayici ve İşadamları Derneği (TÜSİAD-The Association of 
Turkish Industry and Businessman)61 and it became one of the most effective managers’ 
unions, albeit in a limited scale in the 1960s in comparison with the 1970s. 
Moreover, the metal workers constituted a significant sector of the workforce in 
İstanbul. They resided in different working class neighbourhoods, such as Alibeyköy, 
Gaziosmanpaşa, Eyüp, Sütlüce, Mecidiyeköy, Topçular, İstinye, Kartal or Pendik. A large 
number of those workers were unionized and their left-wing union, Maden-İş, –first founded 
as İstanbul Demir ve Madeni Eşya Sanayii İşçileri Sendikası [İstanbul Iron and Metal 
Hardware Industry Workers’ Union] in 1947 and then changing its name to Türkiye Maden, 
Madeni Eşya ve Makine Sanayi İşçileri Sendikası [Mine, Metal Hardware and Machine 
Industry Worker’s Unions of Turkey] in 1956 - was one of the most influential workers’ 
organizations from the 1950s through to the 1980 coup d’état. Despite its central role, the 
social history of the metal workers remained almost untouched in the Turkish labor 
historiography. 
Two works are an exception at this point. The first is the previously mentioned work 
of Zafer Aydın on the Kavel Strike in 1963, and the second is the master’s thesis of Barış Öz 
on the development of Maden-İş. In his thesis, Barış Öz explains the rise of unionism in the 
metal sector as hinging upon the rise of the sector itself. Although he situates the rise of the 
union in the context of economic and political developments, Öz fails in explaining why 
ordinary workers joined in the union, or how they framed their relations with the union. And 
although his thesis focuses on the establishment of the manager’s union, he does not explain 
the specifics of relations between workers and owners/managers in the factories. So, rather 
than the workers who filled the rank and file of the union and created the collective actions, it 
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was the union leaders, their ideology and important legal and political developments that 
influenced the activities of the union as a legal entity which came into prominence in the story 
of the union. The working class as the social actor and that class having an impact on those 
political, social or institutional developments remains an unanalyzed concept in Öz’s 
account. 62  While it is true that Öz’s account of Maden-İş gives important details on 
unionization in the sector, it is nonetheless highly problematic in terms of how it remains 
faithful to outdated modernist and Marxist assumptions and fallacies. Yet, Öz’s study is the 
first comprehensive history of the metal workers in Turkey. 
In consideration of that fact, I have attempted to further illuminate the workers’ 
experiences by including research from national newspapers such as Akşam, Cumhuriyet and 
Milliyet, and provincial newspapers such as Gece Postası, İşçi Postası, Son Saat, Son Baskı, 
Son Havadis, Yeni İstanbul, Öncü, and Türkiye Birlik, in order to track the workers’ factory 
life, the workers’ unionization attempts, and the broader political, social and economic 
developments in Turkey. I also studied the leftist journals of the period like YÖN, Sosyal 
Adalet, İşçi-Köylü and Türk Solu. For the metal sector, there was one union, Maden-İş, in the 
1950s and one more, Çelik-İş [Türkiye Çelik-İşçileri Sendikası, The Steel Workers' Union of 
Turkey], in the 1960s. 63  I consulted the Maden-İş, Nebil Varuy 64  and Kemal Sülker 65 
archives, which provided significant information on the workers and their unionization 
attempts, especially under Maden-İş. Although I reached out to the weekly journal of Çelik-
İş, this union does not keep an archival record. For my project, I also conducted oral history 
interviews. I interviewed eleven people in total, including ex-metal workers, Maden-İş’s 
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workplace representatives, from the Türk Demir Döküm, one of the most important and 
contentious factories of the metal sector in İstanbul and owned by Vehbi Koç, Maden-İş’s 
unionists and officers, and a MESS’s lawyer, a MESS officer and a factory manager. I failed 
to find a former Çelik-İş’s representative and officer as union was dissolved more than forty 
years ago. 
Although it is impossible to access the archives of some of the significant factories 
and those of the union of metal managers, I was able to obtain the managers’ speeches in the 
plenary meeting records of their unions in the 1960s through my research in the Orhan Tuna66 
archives, which are located in the building of the History Association in İstanbul. Moreover, I 
studied the articles and news in the MESS Bulletin, TİSK Bulletin and Sevk ve İdare that was 
published from the mid-1960s to give advice to the managers of the period on how to run an 
enterprise. I also interviewed a union lawyer, Nuri Çelik, 67  and an administrator, Ege 
Cansen,68  of the manager’s union, and the latter was also the personnel manager in an 
employer’s union of another big metal factory. 
To uncover the details of the state’s perspective and action, I looked at news reports 
of state officials’ speeches and actions related to resolving labor’ issues and adapting workers 
into Turkish society. I have also read the laws and legislations on regulating industrial life in 
Turkey. In addition, I studied the Çalışma, which has been published by the Ministry of Labor 
since 1945. 
Those combined sources provided me with sufficient evidence to analyze the 
complex interaction of institutions and social actors. However, I am aware of that all 
historical evidence is affected to a certain degree by the social position or ideological 
inclinations of the actors who produce that evidence. Therefore, I benefited from the broad 
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range of perceptions from each side; state, employers and workers, to reconstruct this history 
in a reasonably balanced manner. In incorporating my evidence, I paid particular attention to 
the way I used oral history. Social history, mostly from Marxist scholars, began to benefit 
from oral history interviews by the 1960s through the inclusion of the voice of oppressed 
peoples which cannot necessarily be extracted from conventional sources.69 As John Tosh 
argues: “Oral history tries to give social history a human face.”70 And the working class 
historians who aim to challenge the making of history “from above” frequently used this 
resource. Oral histories also provide the historian with a “different set of truths” than the 
“propaganda of the victors.”71 However, a significant problem arises in using interviews as a 
historical source. Among historians, this sort of source has long been received sceptically; 
however, British historian John Tosh states that, until the emergence and later hegemony of 
Rankean history in the mid nineteenth century, antique historians and Middle Age chroniclers 
and historians extensively used this source. In fact, several sources, such as those produced by 
Medieval chroniclers like William of Malmesbury, used by the contemporary historians are 
“word by mouth” in origin. Here, Tosh argues that the main problem, which arose out of 
interviews that are conducted by the contemporary researchers, is that oral evidence 
necessarily has a certain slant for the “principle of contemporaneity” that the historians do not 
want to give up.72 The interviews are based on memory, which can change over time, and thus 
are unreliable, by nature. 73  However, the reasons why oral history developed among 
historians mainly lie in the necessity of using such a source in several fields, like those of 
recent political history, history of everyday life, and history of pre-literate societies. Examples 
would be historians who are engaged in the history of recent political figures where some 
parties use other communication techniques rather than the written word, or in the case of 
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laboring classes who do not generally leave written documents. In situations like these, 
historians conduct interviews with people in several ways.74 Oral sources or interviews are 
particularly important for historians who excavate the life of ordinary people, since their 
voices, if they exist at all, are largely stamped out by the intuitional, dominant voice of others, 
such as state or union officials or journalists. 75  Therefore, personal interviews constitute 
significant sources for those who study recent social and political developments. So, this 
study is also predicated upon the oral sources with some reservations. In fact, I recognized 
during the interviews that workers might be confused when recalling particular events, or the 
names of their union’s representatives and managers. Some workers had also a natural 
tendency to exaggerate their own roles in the events. Another factor which limited more 
effective use of oral sources in this study is that the workers I met with began to talk about 
same stories in a same way; therefore, I realized that the narration of their stories became 
repetitive after several meetings. To overcome the above mentioned problems, my project did 
not take what is said in the interviews for granted, but examined the context of how it is said, 
why it is said and what it means, as well. 76 And the information distilled from the interviews 
will go hand in hand with careful analysis of the social events of the period. 
The different sources that I used for this study each contributed to a comprehensive 
narrative of class structure among the İstanbul metal workers within the said framework. In 
this regard, this study is largely based on daily newspapers that helped me to sketch out a 
worker's daily problems and grievances, his/her function and the role of the union for the 
workers in factories. It also included the development and progress of unions and collective 
actions, as well as public debates regarding the “workers’ issue” in Turkey. Accordingly, I 
was able to analyze how the metal workers collectively responded to the developments and 
changes imposed by political or economic shifts. Those sources, alongside state sources, also 
contributed to the examination of the state’s changing perspective, the discourse and efforts 
surrounding workers’ issues, and social justice and development in Turkey between 1945 and 
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1970. Furthermore, the widespread leftist journals of the 1960s provided me with important 
information about the collective actions of workers that gained momentum in that decade and 
enhanced my analysis of public debates, which the left has been influential in shaping. The 
union archives and journals complemented the story of workers’ daily problems and 
frustrations, and their collective actions.  
Additionally, I looked at how the militant workers perceived their position within the 
social order, their relations with bosses/managers and fellow workers, the unionization or 
their own collective actions, and briefly how they articulated their voices within a given 
socio-historical context through those sources. The union archives also helped me to debate 
how the unions functioned and their changing discourse in terms of an evolving socio-
political surrounding. In addition to those sources, this study significantly depended on oral 
history interviews, albeit within said reservations, to expose workers’ migration and 
socialization patterns in city and workplace life, their workplace problems, and their 
conceptualization of labor unity and social cohesion. In terms of oral history, I interviewed 
nine workers from the Rabak and Türk Demir Döküm factories and two ex-managers of the 
Arçelik Factory who were also active within the metal employer’s organization, MESS. The 
workers were involved in the Maden-İş activates as the worker’s representatives and district 
representatives. I also talked with the rank-and-file of Maden-İş. Most of them migrated to the 
city in the beginning or middle of the 1960s to find a job. For migration and socialization 
patterns, I hinged my conclusions upon secondary sources, which are composed of various 
surveys conducted in the 1960s among the İstanbul workers in different worker 
neighbourhoods. Those surveys were carried out by several physicians, such as C. T. Gürson 
and O. Neyzi, on public health, and sociologists and city planners, like Mübeccel Kıray, Tansı 
Şenyapılı, Erol Tümertekin, Ruşen Keleş, Turan Yazgan, Kemal Karpat, W. M. Charles Hart, 
who followed the progress of modern cities, with particular focus on the migration and 
development of suburban life in İstanbul from the perspective of modernization theory, in 
relation with several state institutions, such as Devlet Planlama Teşiklatı (DPT-The State 
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Planning Office)77 or universities, such as İstanbul University or the Middle East Technical 
University. Not just in Turkey, but around the world, sociological analysis of migration to the 
cities and newcomers’ integration to the city life flourished and the surveys those I 
incorporate into my dissertation were carried out to analyze to integration of immigrants to 
the assumed modern life in İstanbul. And lastly, the journals, which were published by 
several managers’ unions or independent management organizations, made it possible to for 
me to examine the managers’ perspectives about the ongoing public debates, their course of 
action, as well as the story of collective action from their own perspective. Of course, such 
sources narrated the events from their own perspective as mostly blaming the unions to 
conduct “illegal or excessive actions.” Therefore, I used those sources with a certain caution. 
Depending on different sources produced by state, employers and workers helped me to 
create a comprehensive analysis of relations of those different actors, through which working 
class makes itself, as contended in the famous Preface by E. P. Thompson in his the 
Making,78 in a given context. 
This study is handicapped with a certain imbalances especially in terms of my 
analysis on the discussions about Çelik-İş, which is one of the two significant unions in the 
İstanbul metal sector. Nonetheless, this came out of the current body of evidence. I had no 
documents for this union except its official journal. As a result, I had to rely on this resource, 
as well as other newspapers, which I cannot say were very sympathetic to this union, and the 
oral interviews that I conducted with the workers, Maden-İş organizers and the factory 
managers. Even the ordinary workers who were not active and militant members of Maden-İş, 
and the managers who experienced several conflicts with workers, portrayed a yellow-dog 
union image for Çelik-İş in our meetings. However, I need to state that there is no evidence to 
prove such allegations about this union. Accordingly, I tried to analyze the history of Çelik-İş 
                                                             
77 DPT was founded in September 30, 1960 by the military government which had overthrown the DP 
government on May 27, 1960. From the beginning of its foundation, DPT has been advising 
governments on the economic and social developments of the country and preparing the economic 
devlepment plans on the basis of five years. 
78 Edward Palmer Thompson, “Preface,” in his The Making of the English Working Class, (London: 
Victor Gollancz, 1965), 8-13. 
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based upon that evidence as fairly as I could manage, under the circumstances. And, again, I 
state the views of opponents of this union with a certain caution.  
Despite my findings, this study is also handicapped, to a certain extent, in its attempt 
to fulfill the perspective and agenda that I propose here, thanks to the condition of archives in 
Turkey. The archives of factories are very important in the analysis of daily life within 
factories, the individual responses to workers’ problems, social fragmentation, as well as 
solidarity between the employees and the processes of collective bargaining, etc., in the 
current literature of the social history of the working class. Unfortunately the employers, 
especially those in the private sector in Turkey, are quite reluctant to provide researchers with 
documents about their enterprises. As for the state archives, it is well known that the workers 
and unions reported their grievances to the official Regional Work Offices, which were 
founded after the Second World War by the state to deal with workers’ problems. But the 
current people who are in charge in these offices told me that these documents are discarded 
periodically due to legislations regarding the state archives. So, these relevant documents 
simply do not exist. Furthermore, the coup d’état in 1980 resulted in the destruction of most 
of the documents in the archives of Maden-İş. One of the other unions, Çelik-İş, joined with 
another federation in the middle of the 1970s; therefore, the people I have made contact with 
there do not even know where the archives are located. 
These problems with my archival research created some real challenges for the 
arguments made in this study. First of all, the existing data is scattered. It is, therefore, hard to 
find a pattern for any particular enterprise and the analysis should be made by looking at the 
sectoral dynamics, rather than individual factories. Such a generalization from less specific 
data, naturally, may result in missing the key dynamics unique to the individual enterprises. 
Secondly, since the information about managers in the 1950s is sparse when compared with 
the information for the 1960s, there may be a problem of disproportionality between the 
evidence used to support certain arguments. In some cases, I felt compelled to make general 
abstractions about the employers/managers without empirically supporting my claims well 
enough. Thirdly, although the existing data set provides good arguments for the dynamics of 
 
 
37 
solidarity between the workers, the absence of the factory and state archives results in some 
debate about the fragmentation between workers. 79  Thus, my analysis of workers, their 
representatives, as well as union leaders and union themselves, appears as if those people 
constituted unified and uni-dimensional social groups, rather than complex, and sometimes 
even contradictory ones who had internal divisions. I did my best to expose such internal 
divisions, but I must admit I failed in exposing certain dynamics that resulted in the 
emergence of those divisions due to the lack of evidence. The most obvious fragmentation in 
the metal sector seems to occur as a result of competition between the unions. That results in 
another potential flaw with such a study: I am dealing primarily with organized labor, 
although my initial aim was otherwise. There are basically three reasons for this; first of all, 
the available resources mention almost nothing about non-unionized labor after the war years 
in Turkey. And secondly, nearly eighty percent of the İstanbul metal workers joined unions, 
particularly after the introduction of the Trade Unions and Collective Bargaining Law in 
1963. Therefore, one of the defining features of the metal workers in İstanbul was their 
unionization during the Sixties. Thirdly, the tendency to be unionized among the İstanbul 
metal workers was very low before the 1960s. In parallel, the author of this dissertation does 
not neglect or see any irrelevancy between the individual, daily struggles and collective and 
organized struggles in the workplace; however, it is nearly impossible to sketch out patterns 
of such battles due to lack of documents. The absence of available documents also created a 
real challenge when analyzing the voice of “ordinary” workers who did not actively 
participate in the collective actions; as a result, my analysis had to depend on the language of 
the militant workers within the enterprises. For better or worse, this is the story of organized 
labor and their collective struggles. 
                                                             
79 For the imporance of analyzing fragmentation as well as solidarity between workers, see: Michael 
Hanagan, The Logic of Solidarity: Artisans and Industrial Workers in Three French Towns, 1871-1914 
(Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 1980), 309-327; Lizabeth Cohen, Making a New Deal. However, 
Oestreicher argues that unionization, and Elenaor claims that shared workplace, experiences may 
become a crucial factor in overcoming fragmentation between workers. Look at: Richard Oestreicher, 
“Introduction,” in his Solidarity and Fragmentation: Working People and Class Consciousness in 
Detroit, 1875-1900, (Illionis: University of Illionis Press, 1989), xv-xix; Susan Eleanor Hirsch, After 
the Strike: A Century of Labor Struggle At Pullman, (Urbana and Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 
2003), 24-25. 
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There is another problem that stems from the absence of information. I have very few 
sources about the daily life of the workers within their neighbourhoods; an important 
dimension of their social life which doubtlessly contributed in creating both the networks of 
solidarity and fragmentation. Researchers of the social history of labor in Turkey know that 
the majority of workers lived together in the districts of the squatter houses in İstanbul. 
Moreover, we know some of the general problems in these settlements, such as unreliable 
electricity, poor water quality, poor roads, etc. We also know that the major collective actions 
and strikes were supported by the people of the neighbourhoods who are mostly the relatives 
or friends of the workers. But there is a lack of evidence available to analyze the 
fragmentation, which may be the result of, for example, gender differences, divisions between 
informal and formal workers, and the influence of the original birthplaces of the dwellers, 
etc., within the neighbourhoods. For now, I can only hope that further studies and enriching 
discussions about the metal sector, as well as other sectors that may emerge out of comparing 
those future studies with mine will minimize those important disadvantages of this study.  
Despite all these drawbacks, I think the information about the workers’ common 
grievances and problems, their unionization attempts, the developments of the unions, the 
perspective and acts of both the state and employers, the narratives of work conflicts, and 
collective actions, will provide me with important background information, enough to shed a 
light on the social history of the metal workers who constituted a significant portion of the 
Turkish working class. 
I divided this thesis into three interrelated parts covering a time period which ranges 
from the post-war era to 1970, when the June 15th-16th labor upsurge took place. In the first 
part, I am situating the post-war experiences of the İstanbul metal workers into their historical 
context. To such an end, Chapter 2 shows how the private metal industry began to develop in 
İstanbul through state aid and started gaining momentum after the mid-1950s. I then debate 
how the metal employers/managers intended to run enterprises; such an outlook also brings us 
to discuss managerial methods to engender fidelity of employees to the workplace, and to 
organize and control worker relations. However, the managers were not the sole actors to 
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regulate industrial relations; the state intervened in organizing workplaces through its 
policies, laws and institutions, including trade unions and its particular discourse on industrial 
democracy. 
Chapter 3 outlines the workers’ experiences, which were shaped partly by the 
economic developments, managerial practices and legal and discursive framework of 
industrial relations in their living and working places. But those experiences were 
simultaneously shaped by other factors such as migration dynamics, migrants’ settlement in 
the city, their expectations, social formation in the new neighbourhoods and their problems in 
their living places. Their common grievances around work relations further built up their 
frustrations.  
Yet, the metal workers collectively responded to their common problems and strived 
to ameliorate their bitter experiences immediately after the Second World War through their 
union. On this topic, the first section of Chapter 4 of this study examines the organization and 
rise of the metal union. The metal union was quick to grasp the political opportunities of the 
post-war era and adopted the language of citizenship and workers rights into its official 
discourse. Inspired by union language, the militant metal workers defined their place in the 
larger social realms and formed their own class language, which oscillated between loyalty 
and insubordination to the existing factory regime and social order. Then, the chapter ends 
with the forms of collective actions in which a significant number of the metal workers 
participated; those actions fomented a certain legacy in the succeeding periods. 
In the second section, I mainly deal with the changing political context that provided 
workers with significant opportunities to make their demands heard. This part covers the 
period between 1960 and 1963. Although the development path of the metal sector, its 
geographical distribution, the migration dynamics, the pattern of workers’ social formation 
and tradition of their workplace experiences remained largely unaltered, the coup d’état and 
succeeding political and instructional transformations influenced the type of collective 
response of the workers. Chapter 5 reflects on those developments by considering how the 
bosses/managers and organized workers perceived these large scale structural changes. 
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Afterwards, the relations between bosses/managers and workers were significantly shaped 
through collective bargaining, talks that were mostly contentious. In this regard, Chapter 6 
analyzes the notorious Kavel Strike, the most well known and effective attempt of the metal 
workers to intervene collectively in shop floor dynamics. The Kavel Strike severed the 
already tense relations between bosses/managers, and workers and their union in this sector. 
And in the last section, I grapple with the increasingly strident workers’ collective 
struggle to apply their rights of free union choice that had been provided by the law. This 
struggle took place first in 1964 between metal workers and bosses, on behalf of their 
institutions. Chapter 7 deals with several strikes in the major firms of the sector. As a result of 
these strikes, the old left-wing union lost its authorization in various big plants and was 
replaced by the anti-communist union, Çelik-İş. Accordingly, this institution factored into the 
story of class relations by the year 1964. This requires studying the (changing) politics of the 
major institutional actors. Chapter 8, then, analyzes the institutional actors as Maden-İş, the 
bosses and Çelik-İş. The fight between those actors was to make themselves key players on 
the shop floor; therefore, Chapter 9 focuses on shop floor dynamics in the era of the collective 
agreement. Here, I am focusing on how the workers who experienced shop floor relations 
were supposedly regulated through the agreements between bosses/managers and workers on 
behalf of the both sides in a peaceful manner. However, those relations did not progress as 
expected and they resulted in widespread worker discontent and resistance towards the end of 
the decade. Then, Chapter 10 looks at the dynamics and forms of the collective actions as 
well as the prevailing characteristics of the language of the militant workers, which strongly 
emphasized the solidarity of labor to defend common interests against injustices stemming 
from the class relations, both on the shop floor and within the larger social order. Here, the 
militant workers imagined a different and just set of social relations in which labor would 
ultimately have its respected and deserved social place. And this language, importantly, 
emphasized the collective struggle to realize workers’ dreams. 
During my meeting with workers, I realized that nearly all of them often compared 
days gone by with the current conditions of workers in Turkey, and they emphasized how 
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great their collective power was and how their unity was a beautiful thing. They seemed to 
feel a certain pity for today’s worker due to the lack of solidarity and they clearly enunciated 
that they missed the old days, despite their bitter experiences and memories. Even the most 
militant workers recalled their workplace as a heaven, which they collectively constructed 
through their struggles. Of course, such a memory reflects only a small part of a larger reality; 
however, it does not come out of nowhere. The metal workers truly and collectively strived to 
(re)construct work relations. They objected to the natural progress of order and they 
demanded to be a respected and well-living group within the larger social life and to a certain 
degree, they succeeded in their goals, which taught them the importance of solidarity. This is 
the story of the metal workers’ collective struggle of writing their own fate. After all, “class 
itself is not a thing, it is a happening.”80  In this study, I, therefore, will portray how the metal 
workers shaped their own futures in the post-war Turkey. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                             
80 Edward Palmer Thompson, “The Pecularities of the English”, Socialist Register, 2 (1965): 357. 
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PART 1 
PROVIDING FOR FAMILY, OBTAINING THEIR RIGHTS: THE POST-WAR 
EXPERIENCES OF İSTANBUL METAL WORKERS (1945-1960) 
 
In 1948, the general secretary of the İstanbul Iron and Metal Hardware Industry 
Workers’ Union, Yusuf Sıdal, 81  declared in a press interview that the life of the metal 
workers, and of workers in other sectors as well, had to improve in order to increase 
productivity in Turkish industry, and that the issue was of significant national importance. In 
the interview, Sıdal promoted the so-called national purpose of creating an industrial society 
that would take its roots, according to the policy makers of the young republic, from its 
foundation in 1923, and grow as a result of the collaborative hard labor of both employees 
and employers. According to Sıdal, workers who were provided with a proper living and a 
respected place within such a society would more readily fulfill their national duties as loyal 
and diligent citizens. In other words, in the interview he stated that workers, who constituted 
one of the more significant forces behind creating an industrialized and developed country in 
all its aspects, should be treated well in terms of both material and social concerns.82 
Actually, Sıdal’s press statement is the reflection of a zeitgeist that was dominant in 
Turkey after the war years. The modernization of the country through industrialization had 
taken a place over and above the agendas of different governments from the start of the 
closing years of the Ottoman Empire; and the ultimate introduction of multi-party politics in 
194583 did not bring a fundamental change in this shared national goal. Whether state-led 
industrialization or expansion of private industry would sooner achieve this goal became a 
contentious issue among policy makers in the country; however, all sides agreed on the 
                                                             
81 Sıdal was born in 1904 and began to work in Halıcıoğlu Nail Factory in 1925. He was from the first 
unionist generations of the Turkish Republic. While working in Şakir Zümre Factory, he founded and 
then became the first president of the İstanbul Iron and Metal Hardware Industry Workers’ Union. He 
resigned his post in 1954. 
82 “Gece Postası İşçileri Dinliyor: Demir ve Madeni Eşya İşçilerinin Dertleri [The Gece Postası Listens 
Workers: The Troubles of the Workers of Iron and Metalwork]” Gece Postası, February 11, 1948. 
83 Turkey was ruled the Republican People’s Party (CHP) from the beginning of the foundation of the 
Republic in 1923. Although several opposition parties, such as the Progressive Republican Party (PRP) 
and the Free Party (FP), were founded and became influential in different time periods, they were 
closed by the state. From 1931 until 1945, CHP was the single legal party in the country. 
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necessity of development of private industry, especially in the context of changing world 
politics and economies following the war years. After obviously choosing sides with Western 
Bloc, there was nothing for Turkey to do but follow a capitalist development pattern of 
industrialization. The major concern shared by the actors in different parties was that such a 
development might not be possible without being exposed to the “bloody class struggles” that 
challenged European economies and their state structures in the initial decades of the 
capitalist development. In light of this concern, the competing major parties, the CHP and DP, 
hit on the idea that since all social groups, both workers and employers, would benefit from 
overall development of the industry and economy in the country, so they must work in 
cooperation to make this improvement real, rather than fighting which each other and thereby 
harming the greater economic structure. 
Therefore, both parties developed their strategies regarding industry and industrial 
relations dependent upon that basic assumption. It was true that the workers and unionists of 
the period were both caught up in this shared national goal; however, they skillfully 
developed ways to capitalize on this: if workers were expected to work diligently and loyally 
to improve the national economy, they must be, in turn, treated as respected citizens of this 
country. Mostly, the ex-peasants who migrated to the growing industrial areas and chiefly to 
İstanbul from different improvised areas of Turkey (primarily from the North East, Eastern 
and Central Anatolia) were motivated by the prospects of a good lifestyle and becoming 
esteemed citizens within Turkey’s social realms and national politics. These ideas were due, 
in part, to the above mentioned national goal which had such promise. They looked to benefit 
from the opportunities created by a growing and prospering society. However, they would 
realize in time that they had to develop a significant collective effort to achieve their aims. 
Sıdal’s statement is the best summary of the general frame of mind of the first 
unionized metal workers in the private metal sector in Turkey. The formation of such a 
consciousness stemmed from workers’ experiences, which passed through the complex maze 
of the rise of the metal sector and construction, and the subsequent installation of an industrial 
relation system. Add to this their migration to the city and engagement in city and work life, 
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their responses to economic and social conditions in their fight for their rights, their efforts to 
earn a respected place within society by being organized, and their realization of common 
interests as a distinct social group. This part of my study analyzes how the state of the private 
metal sector, the general social and political developments in the country, the legal 
organization of industrial relations and factory regimes, and the foundation of the metal union 
as an institution for achieving the workers’ common interests all shaped the historical pattern 
of class formation. In essence, this part will assess how the İstanbul metal workers 
experienced, comprehended and responded to the economic, social and political 
developments, which Turkey witnessed after the Second World War. 
Before studying the experiences of the metal workers, it will be necessary to 
understand the progress of the private metal sector in Turkey. That is not say that the 
development of the metal sector in post-war Turkey alone determined the formation of the 
working class. The metal workers rose as a community by also responding to migration 
dynamics, city life and political developments. But it is certain that industrial developments 
exerted pressure on the rise of the metal workers’ class. The story of the metal sector, 
therefore, must be analyzed first. To that end, Chapter 2 will discuss the general condition and 
slow development of the private metal sector in İstanbul and give some examples to explain 
why private entrepreneurs were so reluctant to invest in the industry, and how this situation 
shifted, albeit slowly, over time. Then, the chapter will focus on the metal bosses and the 
enterprise managers themselves, since the metal workers’ experiences were influenced by the 
strategies and activities of those who were assumed to run the workplaces. And lastly, since 
the legal framework of industrial relations and the factory regime molded workers’ activities, 
the chapter will touch on the progress of industrial relations, which the Turkish state pursued 
as a response to internal and external developments. 
In addition to the development of the sector and formation of an industrial relations 
system, the conditions of city and work life in the post-war era certainly molded workers’ 
experiences. Since most of the workers were new immigrants, Chapter 3 will examine 
migration dynamics and the motivations of prospective workers in coming to İstanbul; why 
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they migrated, especially after the mid 1950s, and what they encountered in the city’s 
residential districts and workplaces, which all factored in their experiences. The purpose of 
the chapter will be to investigate the most burning issues for the metal workers within city 
and work life in İstanbul. 
It would be wrong to assume that the post war metal workers were the innocent 
victims of the social or economic conditions under which they lived. On the contrary, they 
were proactive in transforming their living conditions and they attempted to find personal and 
collective agency within the legal constraints and dominant thoughts of the period. In other 
words, their own acts shaped the workers’ common experiences and consciousness, as well as 
the conditions to which they were exposed. Chapter 4 will analyze the primary dynamics of 
the metal workers’ actions, both on the shop floor and on an institutional level. Since trade 
unions were the significant instruments of the İstanbul workers and were used to improve 
their lives both in the workplace and in living spaces from the beginning of the development 
of private industry in the city, Chapter 4 will first focus on the formation and development of 
the metal union. The chapter will then reflect on how the union viewed the state and their 
bosses and by what means they gained rights for their members, and defended and enhanced 
their existing rights. 
Overall, studying the first experiences of metal workers in İstanbul through the 
development of the sector and polarization of the political landscape, as well as the workers’ 
own activates to improve their conditions, will effectively illuminate the historical patterns of 
class formation among metal workers. Notably, patterns formed after the war years would 
greatly influence every class activity, and the constantly changing and fragmented class 
consciousness by definition, in the 1960s. The legacy of the 1940s and 1950s, in brief, would 
be shared by, and sometimes revised by, future members of the class. Furthermore, this 
historical outlook will be important to contextualize the dynamics of class action in Turkey. 
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CHAPTER 2 
SETTING THE SCENE: THE RISE OF THE PRIVATE METAL 
SECTOR AND ITS MANAGERS 
 
I. The State and Slow Development of the Private Metal Sector in İstanbul 
From the first noted impacts of Western imperialism, the top of the both the Ottoman 
and Turkish state agendas the industrialization of Turkey was the formation of a bourgeois 
class to lead this economic development and modernization of the country. Literature which 
focuses on the pre-war history of the Turkish economy claims that the statist policies84 to 
                                                             
84 Although the 1930s in Turkey were characterized by the etatist economic policies, there were intense 
debates among the policy makers and authors who tried to build a Kemalist ideology about the content 
and scope of the state intervention in the economy. While Celal Bayar and influential high officers at İş 
Bank, that was established in 1932 to provide funds to private entrepreneurs those who were eager to 
engage in industrial activities, argued that etatism was a temporary measure to deal with the current 
crises of the Turkish economy, others, in particular ex-communists, such as Şevket Süreyya Aydemir, 
Vedat Nedim Töre, and well-known authors,such as Yakup Kadri Karaosmanoğlu of the famous Kadro 
journal, addressed etatism and state presence in the economic relations as a more permanent solution to 
regulate the side effects, i.e. class conflicts, of industrial development and maintain the so-called 
classless structure of the society. By appointing Celal Bayar as prime minister sometimes, and İsmet 
İnönü, who was the chief rivalry of Celal Bayar and who was influenced by opinions of Kadro at other 
times, Mustafa Kemal Atatürk followed a economic policy which went and forth between those two 
wings. In the context of the emerging Cold War, however, etatism as an economic model left the state’s 
agenda after 1945 with the introduction of multi-party politics and Turkey’s preference of taking sides 
with the Western capitalist world. Both of the major parties, CHP and DP, declared allegience to liberal 
ideals in the industrial development of the country. However, this must not be confused with the liberal 
ideas that would become dominant in the world as a response to the crisis of the 1970s. In fact, the First 
World War and the famous 1929 crisis that followed had undermined the viability of liberal ideals, a 
position defined by the notion of laissez faire. Then the United States, as the newly rising leading 
power of the capitalist world, adopted Keynesian policies which suggested state intervention as a 
regulatory force in economic relations within society, and also the state as an entrepreneur in industrial 
development. After the end of the Second World War, most major capitalist countries whose 
economies had been at the verge of collapsing between 1929 and 1945 followed this model. In parallel, 
neither CHP, nor DP totally abandoned the idea of state intervention in the economy after 1945; the 
number of state enterprises in the Turkish economy increased between 1950 and 1960, in spite of the 
fact that DP officials promised to privatize some state enterprises that had been established in the 
1930s. For some of the books which analyze the debates in the 1930s regarding etatism and end of the 
etatist policies in the context of the Cold War see: Doğan Avcıoğlu, Türkiye’nin Düzeni [The Order of 
Turkey] (Ankara: Bilgi Yayınevi, 1971); Çağlar Keyder, Dünya Ekonomisi İçinde Türkiye: 1923-1929 
[Turkey in World Economy] (Ankara: Yurt Yayınları, 1982); Charles Isaawi, The Economic History of 
Turkey (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1980); Korkut Boratav, Türkiye’de Devletçilik [Statism 
in Turkey] (Ankara; Savaş Yayınları, 1982); Yahya Sezai Tezel, Cumhuriyet Döneminin İktisadi Tarihi 
[The Economic History of Republican Era] (Ankara: Yurt Yayınları, 1986); Çağlar Keyder, State and 
Classes in Turkey (London: Verso, 1987); Bilsay Kuruç, Mustafa Kemal Döneminde Ekonomi [The 
Economy in the Mustafa Kemal Period] (Ankara: Bilgi Yayınevi, 1987); Yakup Kepenek, Türkiye 
Ekonomisi [The Turkish Economy] (İstanbul: Gerçek Yayınevi, 1993); Nevin Coşar ed. Türkiye’de 
Devletçilik [Etatism in Turkey], (İstanbul: Bağlam, 1995); Korkut Boratav, Türkiye İktisat Tarihi, [The 
Economic History of Turkey] (İstanbul: Gerçek Yayınevi, 1993). 
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industrialize Turkey grew from the economic necessities of the period, and from the existing 
statist economic perspective which was dominant, not just in Turkey, but in various countries 
during the 1930s. Therefore, using industrialization as a triggering force to set the grounds for 
modernization was a contentious issue among the policy makers after the establishment of the 
Turkish Republic in 1923. However, some politicians and the limited wealthy class of the 
period considered the increasing statist policies of the 1930s as temporary measures to 
efficiently deal with pressing economic bottlenecks. According to the memoirs of Can Kıraç, 
who was employed as a high ranking staff by Vehbi Koç85 in his companies for several years, 
Vehbi Koç saw the Republican principle of statism as a temporary solution required by the 
special conditions of the period. 86  Consequently, although some portions of the wealthy 
commercial classes benefited significantly from the statist policies of the decade, most 
demanded the state abandon some of those policies, such as price monopolies, etc., which 
might harm their businesses. 
Simultaneously, the state has never given up the idea of empowering a modern 
bourgeoisie that engaged in industry and, indeed, passed several laws to encourage domestic 
investors to engage in industrial activities.87 The Bank of Industry and Mines was established 
by the state in 1925. It provided 3.8 million Turkish lira to those who engaged in industry, 
and it also became partners with several enterprises, investing nearly 2 million Turkish lira in 
total. The Industry Promotion Law, ratified in 1927, assumed significant tax immunities and 
                                                                                                                                                                              
 
85 Vehbi Koç was one of the most famous businessmen of Republican Turkey. He was born in 1901. 
His father had engaged in commerce and had run several small businesses in Ankara. As he was 
financially supported by his father, Vehbi Koç began to involve himself in trade in his early twenties. 
After Ankara became the capital city of the newly founded Republic, the commercial opportunities for 
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state supports to the private enterprises. But the members of the traditional Turkish 
bourgeoisie, mostly composed of commercial groups, showed little interest in investing in the 
industrial sector in a country where the exports of consumer goods were regulated and the 
internal market was very limited. The available private capital was also limited, and it was 
possible to make a profit elsewhere with less risk.  A few entrepreneurs could not successfully 
run their factories and most of them were taken over by the state in the 1930s; Isparta Cotton 
Factory, Maraş Paddy Factory, Uşak Progressive Sugar Factory, Ankara Cement Factory, etc 
all fell to this fate.88 Therefore, industry was not seen as an advantageous investment area in 
terms of commercial interests at the time. A key contributor to this lack of interest was the 
desire of the traditional bourgeoisie to make quick and huge profits when these industrial 
activities would only provide long-term gains. According to a foreign scholar, R. W. Kerwin, 
who surveyed Turkish businessmen in 1951 to examine their worldviews, this class expected 
to make profits as quickly as possible and felt safer in trading activities rather than industrial 
ventures.89 And according to Doğan Avcıoğlu, who was the founder and editor of YÖN, the 
commercial groups were interested in imports and exports and wholesale trade, rather than 
industry in the first decades of the Republic. The İş Bank, which was founded in 1924 by the 
state, provided huge sums to commercial groups, supplying encouragement to them through 
such perks as railroad investments.90 For example, Vehbi Koç, who would later become one 
of the pre-eminent bosses in the metal sector, mainly involved himself in finished products 
and earned huge profits from such activities before and during the war years.91 As another 
example, commercial groups were interested in the transport and import of coals, which were 
extracted from state mines in the Zonguldak and Ereğli regions located in the northern part of 
the country. 92  In fact, the commercially-minded bourgeoisie, which benefited most from 
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credits distributed by the state, were not necessarily motivated to engage in industrial sectors. 
Therefore, the private industrial sector remained under-developed and weak until the mid 
1950s. By 1938, there were 1 098 private enterprises which benefited from state subsidies. 
However, approximately 90% of this number was composed of small enterprises or ateliers 
(workshops) in which an average of 2-3 people were employed.93 State-led factories were 
home to the majority of large-scale industrial labor in Turkey. 
In the post-war economic and political climate, the reluctance of commercially-
minded groups to invest in industrial activities slowly began to change. First of all, this group 
had accumulated a huge amount of capital by exploiting the conditions created by the statist 
economic policies in the 1930s. 94  Secondly, according to Esin Pars, the commercial 
bourgeoisie significantly benefited from the high inflation and black market activities, which 
are the frequent results of war.95 This class was also eager to demonstrate to the world a new 
commercial momentum after the war. For example, Vehbi Koç took over the responsibility of 
marketing the products of several major US companies such as Oliver, US Rubber, and 
Siemens, and he renewed his agreement with Ford.96  However, it must be noted that the entry 
of the traditional bourgeoisie into industrial activities was still very slow. A Turkish economic 
historian, Yahya S. Tezel, calculates that the profits earned in trade activities were quite high 
in comparison with those gained in industrial activities.97 Accordingly, even in 1951, most of 
those who took the risk of investing in industrial activities wanted to return to the commercial 
dealings to which they were accustomed.98  
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The effort to accumulate capital was further encouraged after the war by the 
availability of cheap and long-term credit provided by the state to entrepreneurs who invested 
in industrial activities. The new programme of the Republican government, accepted in 1947, 
meant all industrial activities, except public services and heavy industry, would be handed 
over to the private sector and the state would encourage the development of private 
entrepreneurship by supplying any necessary means to achieve this end. 99  This policy 
continued into the next decade, especially after Democrat Party took the power in 1950, the 
state facilitated such private sector endeavours. 100  The state further encouraged the 
development of the private sector by improving Turkey’s existing infrastructure to link the 
interior of Anatolia to the hinterlands of the country. Furthermore, Turkish entrepreneurs 
benefited from the cheapness of services and products, which were produced by state 
enterprises and used by private industry. Within this alliance of state industry and private 
enterprises, the latter were economically subsidized, too.101 Ultimately, the hesitations of the 
commercial bourgeoisie waned and real investments in industry began to take hold towards 
the middle of the decade. Sabahaddin Zaim used statistics provided by the Department of 
Economic and Social Affairs of the United Nations to show that overall support of 
industrialization by private companies increased in the first half of the 1950s.102 A private 
industrial sector was finally growing in Turkey. 
A well known economic historian, Necdet Serin, argues that the private industrial 
enterprises flourished with the support of the Industrial Development Bank of Turkey 
established by the state in 1950. Using official statistics, Serin also shows that fixed capital 
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investments made by the private sector increased from 36.4 million Turkish lira in 1950 to 
approximately 200 million in 1956, after a slight decrease in 1957 to 171.912 million. 
Investment then increased again to 285 143 million in 1959. Furthermore, the number of 
private workplaces increased from 2 515 in total in 1950 to 5 284 in 1960.103 The tendencies 
of the commercial bourgeoisie with regard to industrial investments can also be observed in 
the actions of different capitalist circles. Prominent business groups such as Koç, Sabancı, 
Çukurova, Yaşar, Akkök and Yazıcı Holding Companies, increasingly began to use their 
commercial accumulations, money earned from industrial interests after the war years with 
considerable financial support from the Industrial Development Bank of Turkey.104 According 
to the late Sakıp Sabancı, who was the biggest shareholder the Sabancı Holding Companies 
after earning a considerable amount of capital from the commerce, his father, Hadji Ömer 
Sabancı, began to establish industrial enterprises after the war. Likewise, the future Dinçkök 
Holding Companies diverted their capital to industrial area, mainly textiles, during the 1950s. 
Jak Kamhi, the owner of the Profilo Iron Rolling Factory, founded his enterprise in 1953.105 
By 1960, 59.7 percent of all available private companies were ones founded after the war.106 
The development of the metal sector in Turkey fits well within this narrative. Before 
explaining this story further, I need to note that the metal industry covers wide range of sub-
sectors from the production of metals, melting, filtering, milling, moulding and forming every 
kind of mineral ore, to steel production and the production of metal hardware, electric 
machines and tools. Most of the big metal factories such as the iron foundries, were rolled in 
Profilo, while the iron was cast in Demir Döküm and nails were produced in Halıcıoğlu Nail 
Factory, which was engaged in the primary metal production. However, some small ateliers, 
like those in Topkapı and Rami districts, produced secondary metals from scrap. There is no 
doubt that the big factories which were established to produce consumer goods and/or metal 
hardware became the leading sub-sectors of the metal industry in İstanbul, both in terms of 
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their sizable developments and the historical roles their owners played, which would become 
more crystallized over the next decade.107  As will described further, the most important 
reason for the expansion of this industry was the huge migration to cities and the development 
of modern cities after the war years in Turkey. Furthermore, the İstanbul metal sector was 
also characterized by private enterprises, which engaged in basic metal production. The most 
critical working class actions would take place in these factories, where the processing of iron 
and steel and other metals for metal casting took place. In several enterprises, such as Profilo, 
Türk Demir Döküm and Arçelik, both the processing of metals and the production of 
consumer goods were carried out within the same factory, in different sections. The factories, 
which were established to process metals, were also the major ones in the sector. Those which 
engaged in the production metal hardware, household electrical applicants or metal 
processing, or both, such as Kavel, OTOSAN, Demir Döküm, Rabak, İzsal, Şakir Zümre 
Factory, Horoz Nail Factory etc., would witness tense class conflicts at the end of the 1960s. 
The fixed capital investments made by the private sector in the metal hardware 
industry, including household electrical appliances, increased from 1 364 000 million TL in 
1950 to 16 532 000 million TL in 1960. Within the same time period, the number of 
workplaces in this sub-sector increased from 140 to 321, 108  dominated by the larger 
enterprises. In parallel with growth in the sector, the big enterprises in İstanbul were founded 
after the mid-1950s, and nearly 60 percent of them were established between 1952 and 
1964.109 Those companies which were established towards the end of the 1950s came to be 
influential in the overall Turkish economy, as they were in the metal sector and in industrial 
life. Furthermore, the big metal plants would witness tense and conflictual class encounters 
during the decade, just like the small workplaces in the sector. The owners and high-level 
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managers of the factories that produced consumer goods and metal hardware established 
MESS, a group that would later become the most influential member of TİSK. 
The development of the private metal sector in Turkey followed a general pattern: 
Before the war, the metal industry in İstanbul had been mostly composed of small ateliers 
with no more than ten workers.110 The number of workers per workplace increased over time. 
While the number of workers per workplace in the private metal sector, which constituted 
84.2 percent of the metal sector in İstanbul, was 27 percent in 1950; this increased to 29 
percent in 1952 and again to 37 percent in 1954.111 In the private sector, there were a few big 
plants in İstanbul such as Şakir Zümre in Sütlüce (within the border of Eyüp district), 
Emayetaş and Sıtkı Bütün in Bakırköy, and the Auto Scissor Lift Factory in Feriköy, the 
Süleymaniye Lighter and Hot Copper Wire Factories in Eyüp and Rami, and Nail Bolt 
Factories in Ayvansaray. Towards the latter part of the 1940s, the private businessman 
gradually began to invest in the metal sector; the most well known of these investors were 
Vehbi Koç and Jak Kamhi. In addition to Kamhi’s Profilo, Vehbi Koç founded the General 
Electric Bulb Factory in 1947, Arçelik factory in 1956, Türk Demir Döküm in 1958 and 
OTOSAN in 1959.112 After the mid-1950s, the private metal sector then leapt forward and, 
consequently, the number of workers in the sector increased.  
Upon this development, the Turkish state and its economic policies greatly 
contributed to the formation of the new enterprises in the metal sector between 1954-1960. 
According to Mustafa Sönmez, the state intensively supported the Koç Company, which 
would eventually become the most powerful group in the metal sector.113 For example, in 
addition to supplying credit for the establishment of OTOSAN114 Assembly Line Factory in 
                                                             
110 Yusuf Sıdal’ın Halıcıoğlu Şubesi Açılış Konuşması [The Opening Talk of Yusuf Sıdal at Halıcıoğlu 
Branch], TÜSTAV Kemal Sülker Archive, Box 2 Envelope 122; Türkiye Ticaret Odaları, Sanayi 
Odaları ve Ticaret Borsaları Birliği, Türkiye’de Makine ve Madeni Eşya Sanayii [The Metal Hardware 
and Machine Industry in Turkey], (Ankara: n.p., 1958); Hacer Ansal, “Demir-Çelikten Beyaz Eşyaya 
Metal İşkolu [The Metal Branch From Iron-Steel to White Goods],” 191. 
111 Necdet Serin, Necdet Türkiye’nin Sanayileşmesi, 167. 
112 Mustafa Sönmez, Kırk Haramiler, 198. 
113 Ibid, 203-204. 
114  The word “oto” is the abrevviation of the word “otomobil” (automobile) and “san” is the 
abrreviation of “sanayi” (industry) in Turkish. Thus, Otosan means otomobil sanayi (the automobile 
industry) in Turkish. 
 
 
54 
İstanbul, where different exported parts of automobiles would be assembled, the government 
funded the necessary foreign exchange to encourage factory growth for one year. 115 
Additionally, cooperation with several large foreign companies was an important resource for 
the development of the major metal factories in İstanbul. Despite limits on foreign trade, the 
DP government abolished all limitations on foreign capital and recognized equality of foreign 
capital investment with domestic ones through The Law of Fostering Foreign Capital, ratified 
in 1954. Consequently, several foreign companies, such as Siemens, invested in the metal 
sector in Turkey. Indeed, according to Esin Pars, most metal plants that operated as assembly 
line factories where foreign products were compiled and finished were founded through the 
cooperation of both foreign and domestic capital.116 In this regard, the profits accumulated in 
the sector were largely vulnerable to economic fluctuations not just in Turkey, but also in the 
global economy; therefore, there were different factors that might squeeze profits in the 
sector. This undoubtedly restrained the economic decisions and policy implementations of the 
factory owners.  
Apart from state support, internal developments created further links in the chain for 
the growing metal sector in the country. An increasing population rate, the urbanization and 
marketization of agriculture expedited the development of the industry in general, and the 
metal sector in particular.117 The growth of cities, which gained momentum beginning in the 
mid-1950s, and the expansion of state offices were all crucial factors in the strength of the 
metal sector, since the metal hardware items that were produced in these factories were used 
as building equipment, office materials, furnaces, stoves, elevators, or radiators. Ege Cansen, 
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the former manager of human resources in Arçelik Factory from the early 1960s to the late 
1970s, claims that the improvements in the construction sector also factored in the progress of 
the metal sector in the 1950s.118 The metal plants produced hardware for use by the expanding 
middle class in cities; items such as refrigerators, laundry machines, vacuum cleaners, or 
automobiles. The state-led improvement of the city infrastructure after the mid 1950s, in the 
areas like electricity and telephone wires, further contributed to this development.119 The 
improvement of some infrastructure facilities after this date, such as highways, also 
contributed to the progress of the metal sector, just as the development of roads facilitated the 
automobile sector. According to Bernar Nahum, an important high officer of Koç Holding 
Companies from the mid-1940s and the former general manager of OTOSAN, the demand for 
automobiles was on rise after the 1950s.120 Indeed, Vehbi Koç cited this demand as reason to 
establish an automobile plant in 1959.121 One notable difference in the period after 1954, 
according to several Turkish economic historians, was that the restraints exerted on foreign 
trade factored into the formation of an import substitution economic model, which suggested 
enhancing domestic industry for the sake of the development of internal markets.122 
As a result of all these developments, the private metal industry first slowly and then 
more rapidly expanded in Turkey in the mid 20th century. Although several scholars argued 
that such developments were still unfledged and that the commercial bourgeoisie was still 
more powerful than the industrial class, it was obvious that private interest in the metal sector 
was rooted in this period.123 For example, 59.7% of plants in this industrial branch were 
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established between 1946 and 1960.124 In fact, Can Kıraç defines the period of 1950-1960 as 
the formal institutionalization of the private industry for the Koç company.125 
In terms of the development of class relations within the context of plant 
development in those sub-sectors, the most important aspects were the administrative and 
managerial practices exerted by the owners/managers to regulate the production processes 
within factories. The practices implemented across an individual enterprise or the sectors 
itself defined the pattern of relations between workers and employers, out of which the 
contentious politics between these distinctive social groups arose. Therefore, the important 
questions in discussing the development of the sectors in a specific space, İstanbul, include; 
how did the new industrial bourgeoisie, who had formerly engaged in commercial activities 
and aimed to gain quick profits, run their plants in the 1940s and 1950s?126 What kind of the 
methods did they use on the shop floor to cultivate loyalty to workplaces? How did they 
increase productivity? Since the managerial and administrative practices were such important 
factors in shaping the class experiences, and since consciousness is shaped mainly as a 
response to what is really going on in workplaces, these are significant questions to be 
answered for the sake of this study. In Turkey, there were two primary mechanisms after the 
war years in regards to the regulation of social relations between workers and employers on 
the shop floor level: the administrative practices and state regulations which were put into 
effect in the developed capitalist world to smooth over class conflicts in industry and, 
simultaneously, increase capitalists’ profits as much as possible. 
 
II. Let’s Run Our Own Enterprises Freely 
So-called modern management techniques which were also assumed to develop 
democracy within the industrial enterprises had been practiced in the developed, capitalist 
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world from the beginning of the century in an effort to increase profits as much as possible, 
without paving the way for social conflicts within enterprises.127 Yet, it is debatable that those 
methods were ultimately successful in wiping out collective conflicts between workers and 
owners/managers completely; however, those ideas increasingly constituted the norm among 
the major industrial companies in the world, in order to increase production peacefully in 
their factories. It seems that the Turkish metal industrialists, on the other hand, barely applied 
those already developed methods in the fear that the changes might squeeze their profits. By 
depending upon the articles regarding industrial relations and workers’ rights and the 
complaints of state officers or workers, we can sketch a pattern showing metal managers, like 
employers in other sectors, were against any “outside intervention”- either the state’s or trade 
unions’- which might inhibit their profits. According to the workers’ complaints and a few 
findings that I have made, the characterizing feature of workplace relations between 
owners/managers and workers was discipline and close supervision of the work process. In 
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fact, Vehbi Koç would later admit that the owners or managers before the 1960s hardly used 
those modern management techniques that focused on providing the industrial democracy on 
shop floor; furthermore, he would claim that most owners were not aware of, or did not want 
to recognize, worker’s rights. It is possible that some owners and managers tried to utilize 
some incentives to commit workers to administration and to their workplaces. However, I 
encountered few examples of this throughout my study. 
In addition to having little evidence to show how the metal owners and managers 
attempted to derive the consent of workers, there exists scarce data to argue the world view of 
metal managers/ employers in terms of industrial relations, or the details of state intervention 
through the formalization of the industrial democracy and labor regime, and workers’ rights 
in Turkey. Therefore, my assumptions regarding discipline, control, and the consequent tense 
relations between those groups are open to any challenge and revision, which, I hope, would 
be made by the future studies. 
A well known means of controlling the labor force is to create divisions between 
skilled and unskilled labor, or to reinforce existing divisions through material incentives, or 
by creating hierarchies. In fact, there was a scarcity of skilled labor and an abundance of 
unskilled workers in the metal industry in the 1940s and 1950s. It is unfortunate that we have 
little knowledge about how the factory managers dealt with this problem. In Arçelik, a 
decision of the board management dated 1955 shows that a skilled technician would be 
invited to the factory to train moulders. According to another decision, four or five young 
workers would be sent Germany to be trained as moulders and press operators. In addition, 
several factory seminars were given regarding production measurements, and an apprentice 
course was opened in the early 1960s in the factory.128 The Türk Demir Döküm managers 
seemed to follow a different course of action; they recruited skilled workers from state 
                                                             
128 Koray R. Yılmaz, Mahalle Bakkalından Küresel Aktöre Arçelik, 257-258. 
 
 
59 
enterprises by promising them higher wages.129 However, we do not know whether such 
examples represent a meaningful pattern in the availability of scant evidence. 
It appears that the employers/managers randomly provided tangible rewards that are 
material incentives in a few instances. Additionally, they seemed intolerant to any affairs 
beyond their interests, such as workers’ objections to wages, unionization, or legal 
persecutions, any of which might decrease their profits. In the same vein, a foreign author on 
Turkish industrial relations asserted that most managers who pursued the notion of production 
and efficiency in workplaces did not concern themselves with worker relations. Rather, they 
were impatient with workers’ demands and grievances and did not want any intervention by 
the unions in shop floor affairs. Although a small number of bosses or managers attempted to 
imitate the industrial democracy that existed in the West, and sought to cooperate with unions 
on shop floor, most of them aimed simply for quick and significant profits. The tendency to 
not recognize unions was widespread among most employers/managers of the period. They 
saw unions as an obstacle to their profits and industrial growth. In this vein, they even seemed 
reluctant to fulfill their legal obligations to their employees.130 
Accordingly, Turkish entrepreneurs in the metal sector were willing to run their 
businesses under the conditions of so-called “free market” during the 1950s. For example, 
most of the metal plants did not prepare standard factory regulations, despite it being 
mandatory by the law, nor did they distribute the prepared ones to representatives or workers. 
And the existing few regulations were formulated without advice from, or consultation with, 
the union or workers.131 Furthermore, some metal bosses did not abide by existing laws in 
terms of industrial relations: in some cases they did not apply decisions reached by the 
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provincial arbitration councils in terms of working hours, overpayments, etc. 132  Those 
examples were received poorly by the metal workers who assumed that the metal managers 
did not want the state to intervene in industrial relations on the shop floor, and that the 
managers did not want such relations to be formalized. The metal workers often claimed that 
managers did not apply Labor Law on the shop floor and wanted to run enterprises 
completely at their own will. Maden-İş’s workplace representatives gave plenty of examples 
to disclose the bosses’ unlawful actions in their speeches and meetings, as well as in their 
talks with correspondents or petitions to the Ministry or Regional Work Office.133 
To reveal the bosses’ states of mind in terms of industrial relations, we can also look 
at how they attempted to earn the loyalty of workers, both toward themselves and toward their 
workplaces. What did the managers of the private metal enterprises do to enhance loyalty 
among their employees to workplaces? Unfortunately we, again, have very few documents to 
shed light on the management practices on the shop floor level; however, the documents we 
do have demonstrate that just a few metal plants applied modern management methods to 
keep workers on shop floor and keep them working hard. The biggest metal boss, Vehbi Koç, 
later confessed that the bosses ran their enterprises completely at their own will during the 
1950s: 
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“We freely recruited and dismissed workers, we freely gave wages to them, 
we did have rights, but they did not from 1950 until 1963.”134 
 
Can Kıraç who worked as manager in different Koç factories for several years and 
married one of the owner’s daughters spoke about the non-existence of any modern 
management knowledge among bosses in the 1950s. İlhami Karayalçın, who has taught 
courses about the factory management and industrial relations at İstanbul University and 
Bosphorus University between 1958 and 1979, and who worked in nearly 140 Turkish 
industrial enterprises as a councillor, touched on the same point.135 Whether the high level of 
unemployment encouraged bosses/managers to not utilize modern management methods, or 
their ignorance (not knowing modern management practices, sticking to traditional methods, 
or having a worldview that was not tolerant to any outside intervention in executing their own 
business) resulted in not providing inducement for workers on the shop floor level, it is 
apparent that those methods seemed to be rare in the sector. 
In fact, there are few available examples to show that the metal bosses provided some 
tangible rewards to the metal workers. The future president of the workers’ union, Kemal 
Türkler, expressed his concerns about the lack of any worker benefits in the sector.136 In 1956, 
Ayvansaray Bolt Factory supplied production and seniority bonuses to its workers and this 
created a certain solidarity, according to the owner, between his workers and himself.137 The 
management of the same enterprise divided workers to the groups composed of 5-6 people 
and rewarded the group, which was assumed to work the hardest.138 The Arçelik Factory 
management, in the same vein, decided to distribute bonuses to diligent workers in 1959 - 
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bonuses equal to two monthly salaries.139 The Demir Döküm Factory management provided 
some benefits from the beginning of production. In the first seven months of the work, 
management paid 5 000 TL in marriage and birth support to its 544 employees in total.140 It is 
plain that such rewards were targeted to increase productivity, as well as to encourage loyalty 
to the workplace. But those practices did not have any continuity, even within the factories 
where they were applied. 
It seems that although the metal bosses or managers seldom used tangible rewards on 
the shop floor, some of them at least applied a paternalist discourse to infuse a sense of family 
among workers. Following his survey of over two hundred entrepreneurs, Erdoğan Soral, the 
late scholar on industrial relations at İstanbul University, argued that being founder-
shareholder and manager, which nearly half of bosses were at this time, accounted for that 
paternalist, centralist and conservative attitude among Turkish employers, based on his 
surveys among the employers/managers of the private Turkish industry.141 In fact, a sort of 
paternalist discourse could be observed in several metal enterprises. Ahmet Binbir, who was 
the first general manager in OTOSAN, asserted that the workers of the factory called him 
“father” in the workplace out of his benevolence.142 Similarly, Ege Cansen revealed that Lütfü 
Doruk, who established Arçelik with Vehbi Koç, and who had been the long-time general 
manager of the factory, acted and more importantly as the workers perceived him as a 
paternalist figure in Arçelik.143 In such narratives, the bosses or managers might seem as 
benevolent figures who took care of their employees’ rights; however, it is unfortunate that 
we do not have much information about the extent of paternalism in the metal factories. 
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Nevertheless, in looking at the scholar’s observations on managerial practice in Turkey, the 
memories of important figures such as Vehbi Koç, and/or worker’s complaints, it seems there 
was not a widespread and effective “family soul” within the metal factories to inspire 
workers’ fealty to the factory administration. Furthermore, a paternalist boss could be very 
intolerant, sometimes to the extreme, in his disciplining of workers on the shop floor. 
In fact, the administrative practices in the metal sector were largely characterized by 
close control over the work process, which was overseen by the bosses/managers themselves. 
In his biography, Vehbi Koç described himself as a disciplinarian with a strict attitude 
towards work, and he defined the modern age as the era of work. Regarding workload, there 
was not even a spare minute during working hours.144 As Ege Cansen recalled that Burhan 
Günergun, the general manager of Türk Demir Döküm from 1958 to 1971, believed in strict 
discipline in running that enterprise.145 Likewise, the portrayal of Lütfü Doruk as a paternalist 
boss in Arçelik simultaneously presented him as a disciplinarian type: it was said that Lütfü 
Doruk, one of the biggest shareholders and the general manager of Arçelik, often tightly 
controlled the progress of work in the factory, even throughout the midnight shift.146 The 
memories of an ex-manager in Arçelik supports the strict work discipline in Arçelik, that each 
employee had to come to work at 8 a.m; the workers who arrived in the factory later than this 
would not be allowed to work and their Sunday wages were also held back.147 Regarding 
labor discipline in the shop floor, some managers admitted that they even controlled the 
clothes and visual appearance of workers. Ahmet Binbir recounted that he could not let 
workers with beards enter the workplace.148 The managers of Arçelik often checked male 
workers in terms of their shaving, hygiene or clothing.149 Those discipline mechanisms would 
actually be the part of a widespread intolerance that will be described in detail. Most workers’ 
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demands in the sector cited discipline and the low tolerance of the bosses as one of the main 
causes of workers ‘grievances in the decade.  
To summarize, the metal bosses or managers constructed very weak relations with 
their employees before the 1960s, as Ege Cansen mentioned, despite all the calls of state 
officials and unionists of the period.150 They ran their enterprises while making little effort to 
earn the loyalty of their employees; in addition, they were intolerant to any ‘outside 
intervention’ to their own business affairs. In the absence of any modern managerial methods 
to gain the workers’ loyalty and to keep them on workplace, the state, through its laws, 
institutions, personnel and unions, would attempt to fill the gap. The industrial order, which 
was also supported by unions, and the unions’ response to it on the shop floor on behalf of 
workers, shaped the workers’ experiences, as did the administrative practices. 
 
III. The Post-War Framework of Industrial Order and the Factory Regime 
Creating an industrial order based on industrial democracy constituted one of the 
most important items in the political agenda of the post-war Turkish governments. The party 
in power, the CHP, attempted to expand the boundaries of Turkish democracy to a certain 
extent in order to smooth over the social discontent of the war period; that discontent was also 
widespread in the industrial area and party officers were well aware of the fact.151 In terms of 
the legal industrial regime and labor relations, the government of the time had a bad 
reputation for its industrial policies; for example, it prohibited workers from leaving their 
workplaces without permission, it increased time at work without any extra payment, or it 
abolished the weekly rest day in order to maintain productivity and provide huge profits for 
the flailing Turkish bourgeoisie. There was also widespread discontent among workers 
because the economic burden of the war was on the shoulders of the laboring classes - a 
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burden that got heavier towards the end of the war.152 In addition, the regime’s main goal in 
this period was to be a part of the capitalist democracy led by the United States, and it 
imitated the Western legal institutions and laws, which were assumed to pave way for a stable 
capitalist democracy free from class conflicts. Accordingly, the area of industrial relations 
would be an important component of those institutions and laws. 153  Consequently, the 
government initiated a set of “democratization” attempts, including new industrial relations 
and social policies, in an effort to usher in a new regime that would incorporate the laboring 
masses.154 That means, in practice, the institutional channels through which a wider section of 
population, such as unionists, workers scholars, politicians of the opposition parties, might 
claim their opinions and demands in terms of the labor relations, were expanded after the war 
years in Turkey. 
The Turkish state attempted to control the workers and their unions and regulate work 
relations in unprecedented ways after the war.  Its laws and instructions primarily aimed to 
prevent the “side effects” of the industrialization, namely class conflicts, and force the unions 
to follow its specific political agenda. However, the state at the same time created important 
opportunities for the labor owners and trade unions by first of all recognizing worker’s rights, 
as well as responsibilities; the specific configuration of citizenship and the worker’s assumed 
position as producer provided firm ground for workers and unions to defend their rights. 
Furthermore, trade unions, as legal entities, constantly attempt to expand legal boundaries. 
They shape the labor process or labor struggles, but at the same time they are shaped, more or 
less one way or another, by the resistance occurring in the labor process itself, or by the 
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collective struggles themselves. Therefore, the operation of those laws and institutions does 
not completely depend upon predetermined rules; rather, their actual process is open to 
constant struggle between different actors, groups or classes. In this regard, based on the 
literature produced by the followers of contentious politics and collective movements, I am 
taking state, state policies, its laws or institutions as a contentious point of interest through 
which modern political progress and the progress of social relations cannot wholly be 
determined under the pressure of powerful groups, whether state officers or wealthy 
classes.155  In this study, I believe that the development of worker’s collective actions in 
Turkey after the war years is a fine illustration of this argument.  
In fact, the term “industrial democracy” became a important component of public 
debates after the war years: dealing with the problems of workers was seen as a national 
cause.156   Unionists, a few journalists and scholars and state officers participated in this 
debate. Just after the end of the war, the political officers of the regime argued for reform to 
the industrial complex in Turkey. In this effort, they were defined as one of the essential 
groups in transforming Turkey into a modern society. The basic rights of workers would be 
recognized and workers would ultimately have access to legal channels, at least in the state 
discourse, to make their demands known. In fact, by instigating arguments on the “very 
nature” of class conflicts in the Western countries, Sadi Irmak, the first Labor Minister in 
Turkey, defined the role of the state in the Çalışma Journal157  as one of protection for 
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employees who, according to him, were the as much the creators of this modern world and 
society, as were the employers. Rather than an antagonistic relationship, he painted a picture 
of solidarity between those two groups, and this solidarity would develop the greater country 
as a whole. In this picture, the Turkish state would act as a mediator to regulate industrial and 
social life, to prevent work conflict between employees and employers, and both of these 
groups would shoulder the task of creating a modern Turkey. The rules and regulations of the 
state would obviate the “side effects” of industrialization, namely class conflict, which was 
seen an inevitable result of industrialization.158  Such an outlook was also shared by the 
scholars of the period who studied industrial relations and social politics: 
“...But, the importance and content of the struggle (the struggle between 
classes) has changed. This change refers to that class struggle which aimed to 
destroy and eliminate a (an entire) social class in terms of the reality of social 
classes which takes place in every society and (one which) cannot be 
(relegated to) only words, writings or even party programmes, (one which) 
was replaced with the idea of struggle regarding economic interests between 
related classes.”159 
 
In other words, the government policy of settling Western democracy in the country 
saw industrial relations as a measure to prevent class conflicts, which might arise due to the 
growing numbers of workers seen in the process of industrialization of the country. In this 
regard, the state would prevent likely class conflicts by copying the laws, rules and 
regulations, which were launched in developed countries as a result of “bloody” class 
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struggles.160 Sadi Irmak pointed out that state approach to the work issue would be to improve 
the living conditions of workers, maintain health service and provide a bright future for 
employers. Those state efforts would increase productivity, which was necessary to catch up 
to the level of developed Western countries. In order to reach those goals, the state must have 
regulated work relations in terms of social justice and national interests.161 Therefore, the state 
regulations must have: 
“...brought jobs to workers and workers to employers, registered workers 
supplied ration cards to them, trained them to be qualified, opened day care 
centers for their children, enacted the Social Insurance Law [ratified in 1945, 
a.n.] by getting premiums from employers to provide compensation to those 
who deserved them, and to cure those who got sick because of work, etc.”162 
 
Likewise, scholars, politicians and columnists who reflected on social policy and industrial 
democracy during the period touched on similar problems to be dealt with by the state.163 
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To keep industrial peace, the arguments addressed workers’ positions in a democratic 
society. Above all, the state promised that workers would be a respected group within society. 
In order to feel this respect, the workers, whether employed in state or private enterprises, 
should be treated properly. Still, a lot of them argued that an employer, too, must greatly 
contribute to a peaceful workplace in which workers would feel safe, well-respected and well-
treated. To such end, industrial enterprises should be run through rational methods, which 
again had been devised in developed countries. State officials or scholars assumed that a 
rationally managed workplace should assign a certain amount of value to its employees, pay a 
fair amount for wages, provide opportunities to climb the job ladder, listen to the opinion of 
its employees, consider rules in a reasonable manner, and treat its personnel in a humane 
manner in order to keep a peaceful workplace and, thus, to maintain productivity.164 Then, to 
deserve this elevated position, the workers would be able to see themselves as an 
indispensable part of society and work more efficiently on the shop floor. Only such a 
rationale would make social and industrial peace possible.165 In turn, those who argued for 
industrial democracy assigned some responsibilities to workers in the development of the 
national economy and the assurance of industrial peace. Articles in newspapers or journals, 
speeches in the meetings of political parties or congresses, and the leaflets and brochures of 
various parties, called on laborers to work responsibly and resolutely in return for provisions 
and rights supplied by the state and employers.166  On this topic, several authors wrote on the 
importance of the education of workers to increase productivity and industrial democracy.167 
By working diligently and cooperating with employers, workers were assumed to fulfill their 
responsibilities and contribute to the development of a democratic and modern society. 
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The party in opposition in the second of half of the 1940s, the Democrat Party, shared 
this outlook with the regime. A founder of the DP and the future president of the country 
between 1950 and 1960, Celal Bayar, spoke in 1949 in a meeting in Zonguldak, saying that 
workers must have their rights recognized in a democratic society in which labor and capital 
embrace each other in solidarity.168 Moreover, a decrease in the cost of living and recognition 
of the right to strike without destroying social order and economic harmony were among the 
items of the new government program, which was declared in May 29, 1950.169 Additionally, 
after winning the election in 1950, the Democrat Party continued to share this perspective on 
industrial democracy and citizenship with the CHP. In fact, Adnan Menderes made a press 
statement in May 1950 and said that the relations between employers and employees would 
be regulated in a peaceful manner in terms of social justice. The living conditions of 
employees, he added, would be improved in parallel with the economic capabilities of the 
country.170 Despite all those common points, the public debate was not free from controversy; 
the debates around the right to strike created a significant division between those who 
participated in the public discussions.  
The right to strike was prohibited by the 1936 Labor Law in Turkey. Although the 
1939 Associations Law was amended in 1946, the right to found unions was recognized and 
the Trade Union Law was ratified in 1947, those decisions did not include the right to strike 
and make collective agreements. And although the Democrat Party did not show even the 
slightest disagreement with the Republican People Party about the general framework of 
industrial democracy and industrial citizenship, either when in opposition or in power, it was 
a vocal proponent of the right to strike during its opposition years.171 The party in power, the 
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CHP, and the authors, columnists and unionists who supported the CHP line, all supported the 
argument that the right to strike was not necessary for Turkish working class, since the 
Turkish state was already established and existed as a state of a unified populous, rather than 
that of particular classes. The state, they argued, already paid attention to the interests of all 
its citizens, regardless of their class. 
In 1950, the Republican Ministry of Labor published a book, called Strike Incidents 
and Our Country, which was a compilation of several articles and news reports about how 
strikes harmed the national economy, how they accounted for social disturbances and unrest, 
and how the communists exploited such incidents in other parts of the world. As industrial 
democracy progressed all over the world, such a right became unnecessary. In fact, developed 
countries gradually began to limit this right, which was seen as harmful to economies, to 
social harmony, and to workers themselves. Furthermore, Turkish industry was still in a state 
of infancy; therefore, any incident to inhibit its growth would be destructive.172 In the same 
manner, the Labor Minister, Tahsin Bekir Balta, had claimed in 1948 that the compulsory 
arbitration mechanism was in place to end work disputes in Turkey; as a result, the right to 
strike was not necessary. 173  The uncompromising attitude of the CHP regarding strikes 
actually represented the limits of its tolerance in the expansion of industrial democracy. The 
DP would prove to be not much different than its rivals in the long run by not legislating this 
right during its government period between May 1950 and May 1960. However, the very 
existence of such a public debate created an opportunity for workers to introduce their current 
problems, plus their social position issues and demands, into the public agenda in the late 
1940s. 
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The DP’s defence of the right to strike was the most significant principle, which 
distinguished it from the CHP in terms of industrial relations during the late 1940s. To 
understand the DP’s firm defence of the right to strike it is necessary to look at the party’s 
ideological position, however pragmatic it was, versus that of the CHP. Since its foundation, 
the DP’s policies and criticism towards the CHP took shape around its discourse of populism. 
That is to say, the main criticisms of the DP towards the party in power were the high cost of 
living, anti-democratic laws and oppressive mechanisms of state control of the masses. In 
brief, the ranking officers of the DP claimed that although the main founding principle of the 
Republic had been to give sovereignty to the people, the CHP neglected the lower classes, 
both in terms of providing a sustainable life to them and in having them participate in the 
political decision-making processes. A future DP government, they assumed, would be the 
voice of demands of the workers and peasants. Indeed, the political motto of the party during 
the election period was ‘Enough is Enough! The Nation Speaks!’ Most Turkish historians 
analyzed the ending of the single party regime as the beginning of a period in which larger 
groups of people in Turkey demanded to become a social actor in their own lives, and in a 
political scene. The foundation of the Democrat Party provided such social segments with the 
hope of putting their fates into their own hands.174 Seeing hope, larger sections of society 
increasingly participated in the public debate concerning their social, economic or political 
demands after 1945. 
In fact, the majority of the Turkish people were introduced to issues on the national 
scene through this party, or through its populist discourse. For example, the DP administrators 
in the different regions of Turkey visited industrial enterprises and talked with workers about 
their problems and complaints.175 Furthermore, the DP spokesman declared that unions would 
act independently from any political pressure and they would be devoted the right to strike 
under their rule. Celal Bayar defined strikes as the most essential right of workers in a branch 
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congress of the party.176 Therefore, the party became successful in garnering the support of 
impoverished social groups in Turkey. The existing literature on the DP agrees that peasants 
in rural areas and workers in cities constituted the social base of this party. Most workers in 
İstanbul voted for the DP in the 1946 election because the DP defended the right to strike.177 
The DP and its largely unfulfilled promises transformed the climate of the war years, which 
had been mainly characterized by widespread despair due to the large scale poverty, into 
flourishing hopes for a brighter future. 
The broad support of this party among İstanbul workers did not wane before, during, 
or after the 1950 elections. In the early days after the DP’s election victory, the news about 
enacting the right to strike made the headlines of all the newspapers, and the statement of the 
DP officers after the elections stirred up the hopes of workers. In the opening speech of Grand 
National Assembly in November 1950, Celal Bayar re-emphasized the promise that the new 
government would recognize the right to strike soon enough.178 The right to strike took centre 
place in the programme of the first DP government in 1950.179 But several succeeding DP 
governments did not recognize this right at all and, later on, followed the CHP’s old argument 
that this right had become unnecessary since the government had already taken precautions to 
improve workers’ lives. However, the unions, scholars and columnists who had defended 
those rights in the late 40s, were determined to pursue their demands, mainly the strike right, 
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in the DP period.180 The trade unions in İstanbul clamoured for the strike law and exerted 
pressure on the government to keep its promise. They claimed this right in statements to 
newspapers, their meetings, and conferences or congresses. 181  Consequently, such actors 
increasingly withdrew their support from the DP party and although they did not openly 
challenge this party in the decade, they accused the party of founding a dictatorship in Turkey 
after the government dissolution by the military intervention on May 27, 1960. In spite of 
this, several other laws were introduced and institutions were established, such as the 1947 
Labor Law, the 1945 Law of Work Accidents, Occupational Diseases and Maternity Security, 
and the Workers Security Organization founded in 1946, through which workers could find 
their voices and feel themselves to be important and respected citizens in their work and city 
life. 
The important question here is how all those promises, of both the CHP and DP 
would be kept. What were the instruments of creating a society in which workers would see 
themselves as a respected social group, and what instruments created a workplace in which 
workers would labor in a peaceful and efficient manner? Because metal workers of the period 
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exploited those newly created institutional and political tools, which would recognize the 
rights and importance of workers within the industry and society, at least in discourse, this is 
an important question to be answered. 
 
IV. Creating Industrial Democracy: Laws, Institutions and Unions 
Both the CHP and succeeding DP governments attempted to establish an industrial 
regime through institutions, laws and trade unions. Nevertheless, the boundaries of such 
system were very restricted for both governments, which denied the antagonistic 
characteristics of classes in capitalism and assumed the solidaristic and assiduous work of 
classes would improve Turkish society and the economy. The CHP and DP governments, 
therefore, did not see the need to construct mechanisms through which different classes 
collectively and contentiously endeavour to solve labor disputes; rather, they desired 
individual solutions for such problems. They allowed collective mechanisms to exist, but only 
to a limited extent. Nevertheless, this created the legal mechanisms on which workers both 
might stand against, or cooperate with, employers. Through these limited legal mechanisms, 
workers could, and would indeed, realize and define their common interests as a distinctive 
social group having different interests. In other words, the legal mechanism created by the 
Turkish state ironically factored into the workers’ realization of shared interests. 
In fact, the state’s attempts to create an industrial mechanism to solve labor disputes 
had begun even before the war. The Labor Law introduced in 1936 was an important 
legislation that also influenced similar post-war attempts at regulation. The Law prohibited 
strikes and lockouts, which, it assumed, would function against the interests of the weaker 
sector, namely industrial workers. Instead, it envisaged an arbitration mechanism to solve 
labor disputes.182 In 1938, the CHP government passed a regulation called The Conciliation 
and Arbitration Regulation of Labor Disputes, a statute which defined the mechanism by 
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which workers’ representatives would deal with labor disputes in workplaces. According to 
this law, representatives who were responsible for maintaining peace would act as 
conciliators for both sides. In case of any failure to conciliate the dispute, the workers would 
appeal individually to the state or collectively through their representatives. It was assumed 
that the provincial arbitration board and then the superior arbitration board, on which workers 
and employers would be represented by one member each, would discuss the disputes.183  
But this mechanism did not function effectively before and during the war years. First 
of all, the workers were afraid to utilize it since they had to write their names openly during 
the election of workers’ representatives. They worried about a backlash if they voted for a 
representative whom employer/managers were not fond of, plus they were under the threat of 
being punished by several means. Secondly, the regulation did not recognize any protection 
from dismissal for the representatives, who were sometimes seen as disobedient or 
troublemakers by employers. As a result, workers before and during the war years rarely 
resorted to this mechanism. For example, between the years of 1941-1946, only seven cases 
were brought to the arbitration courts. 184  Still, the arbitration law did actually create a 
workers’ mechanism through which workers had the chance of declaring their demands and 
aspirations on the shop floor. In summary, the state constructed a corporatist mechanism that 
included the workers and gave them more or less a chance to be an actor in the progress of 
work relations before the war.  
From the beginning of the 1950s, the mechanism began to function more effectively 
and there were several reasons for this. First of all, the DP government revised the existing 
Conciliation and Arbitration Regulation of Labor Disputes in 1951. In the new regulation, the 
important point was that unions’ rights to be involved in labor disputes were clearly defined 
and the legal boundaries of collective actions were somewhat extended by the new regulation. 
The inclusion of unions in the mechanism can account for the rise of the number of labor 
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disputes brought to the arbitration mechanism since unions, and union representatives who 
undertook the functions of workers’ representatives now had more knowledge about legal 
frameworks and opportunities. Consequently, the arbitration mechanism dealt with 103 cases 
in 1953, alone. In the 1950s, the Regional Work Office of İstanbul estimated that 30 000 
workers were affected by the outcomes of labor disputes in 1953.185 The workers applied this 
mechanism mainly in order to increase their wages. Despite these changes, the representatives 
were still under the threat of being fired due to the absence of any protective legal measures 
for them.186 Therefore, this constituted one of the most important aspects of the workers’ 
grievances and was a key item in legal conflicts. 
For the sake of industrial democracy, the labor courts were seen as another 
mechanism to create industrial peace and social peace.187 The labor courts were founded 
during the last period of the CHP government in 1950, but actually became functional during 
the DP government. Both individual workers and unions were given the right to apply to the 
courts, and both the workers’ and employers’ representatives would become the members of 
the courts.188 The labor courts considered the disagreements between individual employers 
and employees in terms of contracts between employer and employee, conflicts that were 
defined in the Labor Law, or disagreements between the Worker’s Security Organization and 
insured workers. In the end, those turned out to be important mechanisms for workers to 
grapple with their problems on the shop floor. For example, in the first ten months of 1953, 1 
061 cases in total and in the last four months of 1955, 596 cases were considered by those 
courts.189 
Another important step in creating an industrial democracy was the establishment of 
the Ministry of Labor in 1946, with the expectation of protecting workers, improving their 
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living conditions and health, increasing productivity and regulating work relations that fell 
under the scope of social justice.190 Inspired by the British case, the Ministry opted for a 
tripartite structure composed of state officials, workers and employers, to prevent possible 
class struggles and to solve work problems under state supervision.191 From this day forward, 
the Ministry would regulate all matters regarding work life and the Ministry invited workers 
to air their grievances to the related branch of itself.192 The scholars of the period supported 
this corporatist structure from the beginning of its foundation. They advised unions to act in 
cooperation with the Ministry to get workers’ rights, or columnists called openly for the 
Ministry to deal with labor problems.193 Conversely, the Labor Ministers met with unions to 
listen their complaints and problems.194 Furthermore, workers individually sent their petitions 
about their problems: in 1953 alone, more than 9 000 petitions were sent to the Ministry and 
the Ministry resolved most of them on behalf of the workers.195 The Employment Agency 
under the Ministry of Labor, founded in 1946 to regulate the labor market and to serve for 
example to unemployed people to find a work and employers to find workers,196 and the 
Social Security Organization, founded in 1945 to compensate laboring class in case of the 
social, physical, economic and occupational hazards during the work,197 were other important 
institutions in terms of the meetings they held in which workers and unions had the right to 
participate and declare their opinions. 198 Another government effort was to organize Work 
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Sendikalaşma Meselesi.”  
194 “İşçi Dertleri ve Çalışma Bakanının İncelemeleri [The Workers’ Problems and Inspection of the 
Labor Minister],” Gece Postası, March 2, 1948; “Çalışma Bakanının İşçilere Konuşması [The Labor 
Minister Talks with Workers],” Gece Postası, March 3, 1948. 
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196 Makal claims that the institution found jobs for 20 912 people in 1946 and this figure has increased 
to 574 170 in 1960: Ahmet Makal, Türkiye’de Çok Partili Dönemde Çalışma İlişkileri: 1946-1963, 
214. 
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1963. Ahmet Makal, Türkiye’de Çok Partili Dönemde Çalışma İlişkileri: 1946-1963, 395.  
198 Ibid, 207-216. Also look at: “9 Kişilik Bir İşçi Heyeti İstanbul İşçilerinin Görüşlerini Belirtmek İçin 
Ankaraya Gidiyor [A Workers’ Committee of 9 Persons Is Going to Ankara to Declare the Opinions of 
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Assemblies in which the state, and employers’ and employees’ representatives would gather 
and discusses the important matters of industrial life and relations, with the goal of creating 
an industrial democracy. To that end, the Assembly would give advice to the Ministry of 
Labor about employer-employee relations. Work Assemblies were one of the key ways to 
include workers as a partner in industrial life. In the First Work Assembly in 1947, the 
representatives discussed several issues regarding industrial life. Improving workers’ wages, 
establishing labor courts, enacting the weekly rest day, providing housing near to workplaces, 
making the provision of food on the shop floor obligatory, and establishing close relations 
with unions of both managers and employees were all items introduced to in a report of the 
First Work Congress which the CHP government organized in 1947.199 The Second Assembly 
was organized in 1954.200 Although we do not know whether those assemblies reached their 
goals in the 1940s and 1950s, it is obvious that this mechanism, through which workers tried 
to impose their views on state officers and employers, can be counted as a significant 
opportunity for workers to voice their troubles and demands. Both the CHP and DP 
governments also passed several laws regarding social policy, such as The Law of Work 
Accidents, Work Diseases and Maternity Insurance in 1945, the Law of Weekly Day Rest, 
Payment on National Rest Days, The Law of Severance Pay in 1952, and The Law of Lunch 
Break in 1954.201 These laws constituted a firm legal ground on which workers could make 
their demands. However, there is no doubt that the most significant post-war mechanism for 
workers was the trade union.  
                                                                                                                                                                              
İstanbul Workers],” Gece Postası June 10, 1950; “İşçi Sigortaları Kurumunun İki Yeni Tesisi ve 
Faaliyetler (Two New Facilities of the Social Security Organization and Their Activities),” Gece 
Postası, June 11, 1951; “Sigorta Genel Kurulunca Tesbit Edilen Mühim Dilekler Nelerdir (What are 
the Significant Demands Inspected by the General Assembly of the Security Organization),” Gece 
Postası, July 8, 1951; “İşçi Sigortaları Kurumunun Son Bir Yıllık Çalışmaları [Activities of the Social 
Security Organization in the Last Year],” Gece Postası, November 7, 1952. 
199 “Çalışma Meclisi Gündemi [The Agenda of the Work Congress],” Çalışma, year 2, no. 17 (April 
1947); “Çalışma Meclisi Raporu [The Report of the Work Congress],” Çalışma year 2 no. 17 (April 
1947). 
200  Perihan Sarı, “Çalışma Meclisi [Work Assembly],” in Türkiye Sendikacılık Ansiklopedisi, vol. 
1(İstanbul: Kültür Bakanlığı and Tarih Vakfı, 1996). 
201 İ. Hakkı Yeniay, “Çalıştıranlar ve Çalışanlarla İlgili Bir Konuşma”; Ahmet Makal, Türkiye’de Çok 
Partili Dönemde Çalışma İlişkileri, 72-73. 
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In the post-war industrial regime, the government defined trade unions as another 
significant institution to bring about the formation of an industrial democracy and peaceful 
workplaces. The scholars, authors, unionists and party and state officers of the period hit upon 
the idea that trade unions were indispensable for creating a social and industrial peace, and to 
obstruct the destructive class struggles in modern and capitalist societies. 202  These 
associations were also crucial in creating an industrial discipline that would contribute to 
productivity and educate workers to ensure industrial peace. To this end, unions were also 
expected to cooperate with employers in the interests of harmony. Scholars and unionists 
defined unions as shields of the weaker classes; weak in terms of their social and economic 
standing against the more powerful classes of society.203 To lend credence to their idea of the 
importance of unions in a democratic society, they gave the examples of unions from 
developed capitalist countries, such as those in the United States, by pointing out that foreign 
unions did not apply revolutionary methods or demand too much share from the national 
wealth in these countries, and those unions contributed to the overall progress of a democratic 
society.204 In summary, their foundations were explained on the grounds of bringing peace 
between the disparate classes. 
However, the actual story of the foundations of unions in Turkey demonstrated a 
deviation from this ideal model. The foundation of trade unions had been banned in 1938 by 
the proclamation of the Association Law; however, the CHP government, which assumed an 
important role to trade unions to regulate industrial relations, abolished, de facto, the ban on 
                                                             
202 Sadi Irmak, “Çalışma Bakanı Sadi Irmak’ın Radyodaki Demeci [The Press Statement of Labor 
Minister, Said Irmak, in Radio],” Çalışma year 1 no. 12 (November, 1946); Sadi Irmak, “Çalışma 
Meclisi Açılış Nutku The Opening Speech of the Work Assembly],” Çalışma, year 2, 1947. 
203 Orhan Tuna, “İşçi Sendikalarının Mahiyet ve Vazifeleri [The Importance and Duties of Workers’ 
Unions],” Sosyal Siyaset Konferansları, no. 3 (1950): 131-141; Ekmel Zadil, “İşçi ve Sendikacıların 
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level. Look at; Raşit Öymen, “Meslek Eğitimi ve Vatandaşlık Terbiyesi [Trade Education and 
Citizenship Training],” Çalışma year 1 no. 3 (January, 1946); Ekmel Zadil, “İşçi ve Sendikacıların 
Eğitimi.” 
204 Esat Tekeli, “Birleşik Amerikan Sendikalizmi [Unionism in the United States],” Çalışma year 1 no. 
6 (May, 1946); Orhan Tuna, “Memleketimizde Sendikacılık Hareketlerinin Gelişmesi ve İşçilerimizin 
Sendikalaşma Meselesi.” 
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establishing trade unions by revising the Association Law in 1946. Capitalizing upon this, 
several unions with direct or indirect ties with socialist parties sprouted up in İstanbul. The 
literature on 1946 unionism claims that these unions successfully organized a significant 
portion of İstanbul workers. This independent development backed by socialists was 
unacceptable for the authorities; thus, the unions founded in 1946 were prohibited in 
December 1946.205  Then, the CHP attempted to control unionism by enacting the Trade 
Union Law in 1947. In fact, the reports prepared by the Internal Affairs and Justice 
Commissions within the National Assembly206 regarding the draft of the law pointed out that 
the unions founded in 1946 had been controlled by “foreign elements”207 and thus had begun 
to be characterized by politics; therefore, a trade union law was needed to obstruct such 
possible and harmful developments. Those preambles would be reiterated by the government 
representatives who prepared the draft in their Assembly speeches.208 As a result of this law, 
the unions were prohibited from engaging in any kind of politics and could not act against the 
“nationalism and national interests” of the country. In order to join with international 
confederacies, trade unions would be required to get an approval from the Council of 
Ministers. In addition to not providing the right to strike, this law even laid out several 
punishments to union leaders or union officers who engaged in strike acts.209  With this law, 
the CHP aimed to use unions as one of their control mechanisms for industrial life and 
relations.210  To maintain control and penetrate into the unions, the CHP also supplied a 
significant amount of money to trade unions between 1947 and 1950. Therefore, independent 
unions leaned towards the line of the DP in the political sphere, and declared their support for 
                                                             
205 Aziz Çelik, Vesayetten Siyasete Türkiye’de Sendikacılık, 84-114. 
206  The commissions played a significant role in the progress of the Grand National Assembly 
throughout its history. The commissions were constituted by the certain number of the deputies who 
were assigned to meet, discusse and write reports on the drafts of the legislation within the commission 
and present the reports to the Assembly itself.  
207 By foreign elements, those who prepared the report mainly referred to the communist elements. 
208  Bahir Ersoy, “Türk Sendikacılığının İnkışafına Mani Olan Bazı Sebepler”; Orhan Tuna, 
“Sendikacılık ve Siyaset.” 
209 Makal, Türkiye’de Çok Partili Dönemde Çalışma İlişkileri, 225-238. 
210 Fatih Güngör, “1946-1960 Döneminde Türkiye’de Sendikacılık Hareketi ve Demokrasi,” 148-154; 
Ahmet Makal, Türkiye’de Çok Partili Dönemde Çalışma İlişkileri, 228-229 and 234. 
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this party in the elections during the late 1940s.211 Nevertheless, the DP government followed 
the same line of the CHP government in weakening unions, which acted independently, 
promoting other unions, which toed the political line of the party in power.212 Both parties 
shared a common goal of preventing the development of independent unionism. 
Despite all the restrictions and deficiencies that existed in the law, a significant 
amount of workers became members of unions in Turkey. According to Makal, the number of 
organized workers significantly increased starting in the late 1940s. And according to Orhan 
Tuna, 30 percent of workers who were covered by the Labor Law joined unions. Kemal 
Sülker claims that 54 499 workers out of 111 197 workers in total were organized in İstanbul 
by 1954.213 And despite oppression, several unions chose to determine their own way instead 
of becoming a voice of either the CHP or the DP. In fact, Maden-İş that was founded in 1947 
in the metal sector by some former workers in the sector, such as Yusuf Sıdal, Nizamettin 
Babaoğlu, and Cafer Değirmenci, after the law was enacted. It’s true that this union was 
founded by the workers who were close to the CHP, such as Yusuf Sıdal, and they defined the 
main interests of the union to be those of defending the country’s national interests.  The 
union engaged mainly in political lobbyism to defend the rights of its members, and although 
it did not develop easily in its first years, it became one of the militant supporter of the right 
to strike (and here it is unfortunate that we do not have evidence to show the union’s policy 
about this issue during the late 1940s), and the figures of its membership would considerably 
increase.  
 So, both the CHP and DP governments attempted to create harmony between 
workers and bosses to bolster the existing order. But the progress of industrial relations, 
industrial citizenship and factory regimes did not completely coincide with their goals. The 
discourse, rhetoric, or mottos they used to legitimize industrial democracy, and the 
                                                             
211 Alpaslan Işıklı, Sendikacılık ve Siyaset, 359. 
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213  Orhan Tuna, “Memleketimizde Sendikacılık Hareketlerinin Gelişmesi ve İşçilerimizin 
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instructions they founded to create the mechanisms of peaceful work relations, provided 
significant political opportunity for workers and their workers’ organizations to publically 
declare and attain their goals. In their fight to use these opportunities created by the state, 
workers eventually realized their common interests against their bosses and saw the necessity 
of acting together. The state had promised to meet their demands and hopes through the 
enactment of laws and state regulations if they were loyal and hardworking citizens. 
However, workers actually experienced rather a different picture than expected with harder 
work, poorer working conditions and lower earnings after the war years. They also 
experienced widespread oppression exerted by bosses/managers when they objected those 
conditions. Consequently, they tried to convince state officers of their rights in state 
institutions or in the public sphere, and called for the state to intervene in the unfair situations 
in social and factory life. Workers also sought ways of cooperating with owners in return for 
being treated well, having their complaints heard, and providing with them enough money to 
sustain their lifestyles. When they failed to produce the desired results, workers acted 
collectively without transgressing the legal framework enacted by the state. In the end, they 
learned that they had to struggle together in their own organizations for a decent lifestyle and 
to be a well-respected group in Turkish society. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
84 
CHAPTER 3 
BETWEEN TWO WORLDS: WORKERS’ TROUBLES  
IN THE CITY AND IN THE WORKPLACE 
    While the post-war political and industrial regime assumed a democratic society in 
which the prosperity of worker citizens would flourish with the industrial development of the 
country, the İstanbul metal workers did not experience a prosperous life in terms of providing 
for themselves and their families. Both the established workers of İstanbul and newcomers 
came across widespread poverty in the city. The living and work conditions of the older metal 
workers who had suffered under the circumstances of war, like other workers in the city, did 
not considerably improve after the war years. The newcomers who arrived from rural areas 
looking for a better life and who resided in the outer limits of the city faced the most hardship 
in simply finding a proper and steady job. Those immigrants who were able to find a 
relatively permanent job in the sector earned a meagre amount of money to sustain 
themselves, and they rarely benefited from the opportunities of city life, or they were exposed 
to difficult and dangerous work conditions. Most significantly, they faced extreme intolerance 
to any objection. In order to combat those hardships, the more established metal workers 
launched trade unions to pursue common interests within modern society, defining their 
solidarity as their most powerful weapon in the struggle to sustain a proper life. Over the 
years, the new, younger metal workers would join the union and would realize through their 
common experiences that they had to stand together and take direct action to defend their 
livelihoods and rights within city and work life. In addition to their unionization experience, 
their common hardships in city and work life shaped how they perceived state, laws, 
institutions and bosses/managers as a distinct social group with their own and different 
interests. 
 
I. Preface: The Migration to İstanbul and the Locations of the Metal Industry 
Post-war Turkey witnessed a considerable change in terms of the country’s 
demographic composition: an increasing number of rural people, who constituted the 
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overwhelming number of population, began to migrate to the cities. The main factor behind 
the migration was the social polarization between the large landowners, small landowners and 
landless peasants due to a population growth. This population growth also resulted in the 
further fragmentation of land holdings as peasant families could no longer retain their 
properties. As a result, the young male members of families began to migrate to cities. The 
mechanization of agriculture, albeit less importantly, was another factor dictating migration to 
cities. These combined forces pushed poor peasants into urban areas in the 1950s. According 
to surveys, the slow development of industry in Turkey and the scarcity of permanent and 
high salaried jobs also accounted for the migration to cities after the Second World War. 
Unfortunately, the migrants could not be easily absorbed by the city economy. 214  After 
coming to cities in the hopes of finding a job and sustaining a better lifestyle, poor migrants 
had to face the difficulty of finding a job immediately after their arrival, just to survive. 
İstanbul, where it was believed that opportunities were greater, became the focal point of the 
migration after the war years. 
In terms of their original birthplace, migrants displayed considerable variation: while 
some of them immigrated to Turkey from the former Yugoslavia, the majority of the migrants 
arrived in İstanbul from different places in Anatolia, especially from places where there were 
high unemployment rates such as North East, Eastern and Central Anatolia. Whether 
relocating from abroad or coming from the East of İstanbul, the most important impetus of 
immigration was an economic one. 215 A survey conducted by a city planner, Tansı Şenyapılı, 
                                                             
214 Richard D. Robinson, “Turkey’s Agrarian Revolution and the Problem of Urbanization,” The Public 
Opinion Quarterly, vol. 22 no. 3, Special Issue on Attiude Research in Modernizing Areas (Autumn, 
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Movements in Turkey and Cities],” Türk Coğrafya Journal no. 20, (1960): 29; Ruşen Keleş, 
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86 
among inhabitants who were recruited in large numbers into the industry in Kağıthane, a 
working-class district next to the Golden Horn in İstanbul, in the 1970s indicated that 63 
percent of them left their original birthplaces due to problems with basic subsistence.216 
In terms of geography, nearly 50 percent of all industrial enterprises by 1955 were 
located in the Marmara Region -Turkey was geographically divided to seven regions - and 
nearly 65 percent of the plants in the Marmara Region were concentrated in İstanbul. 
According to Serin, the larger market opportunities, the availability of a work force, and 
access to, and transportation of, raw materials and electricity were the dominant factors in 
such a geographic distribution.217 Indeed, according to a survey conducted over a total of 1 
367 workplaces in 1961, proximity to raw materials, transportation, availability of the cheap 
land and proximity to the workers’ neighbourhoods were the main factors in choosing the 
location of enterprises. Tansı Şenyapılı indicates that the migration to İstanbul gained 
momentum after the war years. In 1950, more than 130 000 people migrated to the city. Most 
of those people settled in squatter areas, which were founded by the long-term, poor residents 
of İstanbul around their workplaces. For example, the population of Alibeyköy – another 
working class district near to the Golden Horn in İstanbul - went from 2 150 to 12 809 
between 1950 and 1965.218 As Tansı Şenyapılı indicates, the regions where the industrial 
plants were erected were typically surrounded by squatter areas. For example, Silahtarağa 
(also near to the Golden Horn), Kağıthane or Alibeyköy districts were bursting with industrial 
plants, as well as squatters’ communities in which the workers and their families dwelled. 
When the industrial plants sprang up in Kağıthane after 1955, Gültepe, a neighbourhood in 
Kağıthane, came to be an important living place for workers. By 1970, nearly 70 percent of 
Kağıthane’s population were recruited into the industrial sector.219 The migrants also lived in 
Zeytinburnu, Eyüp, Rami, Taşlıtarla and Topçular districts, all of which were located to the 
                                                             
216 Tansı Şenyapılı, Bütünleşmemiş Kentli Nüfus Sorunu, 86. 
217  Necdet Serin, Türkiye’nin Sanayileşmesi, 173-174. Also look at: Erol Tümertekin, İstanbul 
Sanayiinde Kuruluş Yeri, 56. 
218  Tansı Şenyapılı, Bütünleşmemiş Kentli Nüfus Sorunu [The Problem of Non-Integrated City 
Population] (Ankara: Orta Doğu Teknik Üniversitesi, 1978), 66-69. 
219 Ibid., 66 and 69-72. 
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south of the Golden Horn. Similarly, half of the Zeytinburnu population worked in the 
surrounding factories by 1962.220 In brief, the development of İstanbul as an industrial city 
attracted new immigrants who left their villages in Eyüp, Rami, and Topkapı districts on the 
European side of the city, and Kartal district, on the Anatolian side. Those regions also 
overlap with the geographical distribution of the metal sector.221 
 
 
Map 1: Squatter Settlements in İstanbul (Source: Kemal Karpat, The Gecekondu, 67).  
 
                                                             
220 Nephan Saran, “İstanbul’da Gecekondu Problemi,” 386. 
221 It should be stated that the number of immigrants who would, at least potentially, make up the 
industrial workforce was not very high when compared with the number of the immigrants who came 
to İstanbul during the succeeding periods. See Ahmet Ali Özeken, “Türkiye Sanayiinde İşçiyi 
Barındırma Problemi [The Problem of Housing for the Workers in Turkish Industry],” Sosyal Siyaset 
Konferansları, no. 3 (1950): 103-130. 
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Map 2: Distribution of the Metal Sector on the European Side, the Golden Horn (Source: Erol 
Tümertekin, İstanbul Sanayiinde Kuruluş Yeri, 85). 
 
The geographical distribution of immigrants displayed some parallels with the 
geographical distribution of the metal sector. Comparing Map 1, which shows the distribution 
of the squatter areas in İstanbul in below, with Map 2 and Map 3, which show the 
geographical distribution of the primary and secondary metal production as stated below, 
easily shows that Eyüp, Rami, Sağmalcılar, Alibeyköy, Silahtarağa and Kağıthane districts on 
the European side of the city, and Kartal and Maltepe districts on the Anatolian side, were 
home both to the squatter regions and metal factories. In fact, for the metal sector, nearness to 
the workers’ neighbourhoods was the first factor for choosing locations. The former human 
resources manager of the Arçelik Factory and economist, Ege Cansen, stated during our 
interview that the Eyüp region, including Silahtarağa, Gaziosmanpaşa, Kağıthane, Alibeyköy 
and Taşlıtarla neighbourhoods, were flush with cheap and unqualified labor.222 Eyüp was the 
most crowded district in terms of number of workers in İstanbul.223 Indeed, the big metal 
hardware and metal processing factories, for example, Arçelik, Türk Demir Döküm, 224 
                                                             
222 Ege Cansen, interview by author, Kızıltoprak, İstanbul, August 29, 2012. 
223 Eyüp Karadayı, İstanbul’un Sanayi Potansiyeli. 
224 Both Arçelik and Türk Demir Döküm were established by Vehbi Koç and his friends respectively in 
1954 and 1958. In their first years, while the office furnaces from the iron and steel were produced in 
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Rabak,225 Şakir Zümre,226 etc., were all located in Eyüp district as it is also obvious from Map 
3.227 
In addition to cheap labor, laws and regulations have a significant role in the 
locations of industrial plants. In Turkey, despite the Act for the Preservation of Health in 
1930, many metal hardware and processing plants had remained within the city due to the 
rapid development of İstanbul at that time. But the Act had prevented the founding of the 
larger metal plants within the city. Afterwards, the Nazım Plan (Regulatory Plan) of 1937 
selected the Golden Horn as well as the northern part of the city as locations of industry, but it 
can’t be said that the historical development of industry followed the framework of that plan. 
Rather, industry seems to have expanded into the city in a random manner. The plants 
developed in any part of the city as were seen suitable by the owner. 
Yet, the location of the metal factories showed a certain pattern, as the small 
workshops where the secondary metal production was made were concentrated in Rami and 
Topkapı and the bigger ones were located at the Golden Horn. The Golden Horn, which is a 
unique natural urban port and the primary inlet of the Bosphorus in Istanbul, was filled with 
industrial plants from the beginning of the industrialization period in Turkey. The port was a 
perfect choice for the water transport of finished goods since it is close to the city center, and 
the Golden Horn was also a good place in terms of marketing. Moreover, the presence of the 
Silahtarağa Power Station, established in 1914 to provide electricity to the city, enabled the 
plants to enjoy easy access to this energy source.228 In this regard, the early bigger metal 
                                                                                                                                                                              
Arçelik, the raw iron was cast, and cast iron radiators and enamel pots and pans were produced in Türk 
Demir Döküm. The production scale would considerable vary in the nex decade in both enterprises. 
225 Rabak was founded in 1957 in Kağıthane by Fuad Bezmen who had also invested in the textile 
sector after the foundation of the Republic. Copper was processed in this factory and electrolyte 
copper, composite aluminium stranded conductor, aluminium casting and steel wires were also 
produced in this enterprise. 
226 Being a close friend to the founder of the Republic, Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, Şakir Zümre founded a 
factory in 1925 with his name to produce armament and sell his products to the Turkish army. Since 
the United States supplied armament to Turkey after the Second World War, the factory began to 
produce stove with 1947. 
227 Koray R. Yılmaz, Mahalle Bakkalından Küresel Aktöre Arçelik, p. 367; Mamulattan Markaya 
Arçelik Kurum Tarihi. 
228 Erol Tümertekin, İstanbul Sanayiinde Kuruluş Yeri; Asu Aksoy, and others. Silahtarağa Elektrik 
Santrali’nin Hikayesi [The Story of Silahtarağa Power Station], (İstanbul: n.p., 2007). 
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plants were concentrated around Golden Horn, chiefly to the north of Atatürk Bridge229 and 
continuing up to the Kağıthane and Alibeyköy streams as shown in the Map 2.230 Towards the 
1960s, the major metal enterprises continued to be established in Topkapı, Sağmalcılar, and 
Rami where cheap labor was available.231  
Throughout the late 1950s, however, there was a shift in terms of the geographical 
distribution of the sector. This was because conventional areas were already full of industrial 
plants in the city. Accordingly, any new metal enterprises had to be launched on the 
Anatolian side of İstanbul, mainly in the Kartal district, which is shown in Map 3 below. 
Tümertekin claims that another important reason for the geographical shift of the metal 
industry was the official Industrial Plan of 1955, according to which, workplaces engaged in 
the metal sector were considered to be hazardous to the population’s general health. 
Consequently, new enterprises began to be launched in the outer city regions towards the end 
of the 1950s. Nevertheless, some regions such as Kağıthane and Alibeyköy, which was 
considered the outer city, continued to be the key locations of the metal hardware, electrical 
household appliances and metal processing.232 By 1970, 60 percent of the metal industry was 
still located in the European side including Eyüp, Rami, Ayvansaray and Topçular districts. 
Therefore, newcomers mainly settled in such places where these industrial zones emerged and 
developed into the city. The interrelated process of the geographical distribution of the 
industry and that of the squatter settlements factored into the distribution of new migrants. 
 
                                                             
229 The older name of the Atatürk Bridge was the Unkapanı Bridge which had been established to link 
the historical peninsula to the European side of the city. When the bridge was torn down by a storm in 
1936, the Atatürk Bridge was built in the same year. 
230 “Eyüplülerin Terkos Suyuna İhtiyacı Var [The People of Eyüp Needs Fresh Water],” Gece Postası, 
November 19, 1952. 
231  Faruk Özbakan, Faruk İstanbul Madeni Eşya Sanayii [İstanbul Metal Hardware Industry] 
Unpublished Graduation Thesis, İstanbul University, The Institute of Geography, 1970.  
232 Erol Tümertekin, İstanbul Sanayiinde Kuruluş Yeri, pp. 80-87. 
 
 
91 
 
Map 3: Distribution of the Metal Sector on the Anatolian Side (Source: Erol Tümertekin, 
İstanbul Sanayiinde Kuruluş Yeri, 86). 
 
The young male peasants who were newly arrived to İstanbul usually resided with 
their relatives at first. After finding a job and getting married, they mostly continued to live 
within the same district. Although we lack documents which would illuminate the exact 
development of neighbourhoods that influenced so much of a workers’ experiences in city 
life, and more importantly, culminated in the possible fragmentation between communities, 
we can argue that the development of communities, the worker’s shared experiences in the 
community life, their socialization patterns factored in the class formation. In the same vein, 
we do not have any information on how the growth patterns of communities were reflected in 
daily shop floor relations between workers, but the neighbourhood’s support was an 
important factor of the worker’s collective actions. We can assume that the common problems 
of workers in terms of the city life in İstanbul, regardless of which groups they belonged, 
must have factored in the perception of their common interests. 
 
II. The Post-War Experiences of the Metal Workers in İstanbul 
The immigrants who increasingly came to İstanbul after the Second World War in 
order to find a job and alleviate the misery of rural life had to tackle some common problems 
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that mostly arose from their condition of poverty within the city. It is true that most of them 
strived to deal with those problems through the help of the communities within which they 
were socialized through inter-community marriages, or established socialization places such 
as coffee houses; at the same time, these community ties helped newcomers to find jobs. 
Those who were recruited into an industrial job also worked on those problems by joining 
together in their workplaces. Furthermore, most industrial plants were an integral part of the 
community that surrounded them; as a result, any problem the workers faced within the 
workplaces was also the problem for the community. In fact, community support was one of 
the important aspects of the collective struggles in the metal sector, as would be seen in the 
following decade, before all the shanty towns that surrounded the factories were occupied by 
the workers’ families and the workers had taken over the responsibility of providing for them: 
the concern of providing for the family was one of the motivating factors behind unionization. 
In this regard, work and community life, and work and community problems, constituted two 
sides of the same coin.   
The newcomers to İstanbul also constituted the bulk of the work force required for 
the metal plants. A union seminar book shows that significant portion of the metal workers 
arrived in the city after 1945 while they were around late teens and/or early twenties.233 The 
metal workers were largely composed of young, single, male migrants. In fact, Karpat 
mentioned that those who had previously migrated to make some money, and then planned to 
return their villages in the 1950s, were often young, single male migrants who ended up 
seeking permanent jobs to settle in big cities.234 The workers that I conducted interviews with 
in this study confirm those findings. For example, an ex-Demir Döküm worker named 
Mustafa Türker claimed that since there was no work opportunity in his home town, he came 
to work instead in İstanbul in 1959, when he was an adult.235 Similarly, another ex-Demir 
Döküm worker, Celal Akıl, came to İstanbul, when he was 12 to escape the miserable 
                                                             
233 1970 Seminer Kayıt Defteri [The Seminar Book of Record], TÜSTAV Maden-İş Archive, Envelope 
9. 
234  Kemal Karpat, The Gecekondu: Rural Migration and Urbanization, 55. 
235 Mustafa Türker, interview by author, Yıldız Tabya, İstanbul, August 29, 2012. 
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conditions of his original birthplace. Before being recruited into a big metal plant, he had 
worked as a gardener in Alibeyköy.236 The young prospective workers conjured images of a 
settled life in İstanbul, and they longed to be respected citizens of the larger city community. 
According to scholars who conducted surveys in the many squatter settlements of İstanbul 
during the 1960s and 1970s, from the perspective of modernization, the people of these 
regions hoped to be a part of city life; in other words, they aimed to sustain their lives in a 
way similar to that of the established city dwellers. Most immigrants came to İstanbul to settle 
in the city and maintain a good lifestyle rather than simply accumulating sufficient funds to 
provide for their families back in their villages, or stay engaged in other activities in rural 
areas.237 Many of the population of Zeytinburnu stated as a response to a survey question in 
1961 that they were not considering returning to their original birthplaces since they had 
nothing there to help them maintain a good life. 238  They ultimately became permanent 
laborers within the industrial complex of the post-war period. 
In fact, Kemal Karpat observed during his study that the residents of the squatter 
areas were highly optimistic people who aspired to reach a higher standard of living in 
İstanbul.239 They further dreamed of climbing the ladders of social hierarchy if possible. For 
example, they wanted to have their own small shops.240 In fact, nearly half of the population 
in Gültepe said that they hoped to have their own business in the future. It can be argued, 
based on Karpat’s survey, that the same desire was shared by the settlers in other squatter 
settlements in İstanbul.241 Nevertheless, the prospective workers who had newly arrived to 
İstanbul experienced a different life from what they had expected to find. They had hoped to 
have a good and permanent job, earn sufficient money to provide for themselves and their 
families, have access to the unique opportunities created by city life such as education, and 
                                                             
236 Celal Akıl, interview by author, Yıldız Tabya, İstanbul, June 20, 2012. 
237 Ibid. 
238 Nephan Saran, 403. 
239 Kemal Karpat, The Gecekondu: Rural Migration and Urbanization, 25 and 34-35. 
240 Even in the 1970s, most factory workers wanted their sons to have their own small shops. This 
demonstrates that the idea of having their own shops was a deep rooted intention of the factory 
workers. See, Tansı Şenyapılı, Bütünleşmemiş Kentli Nüfus Sorunu, 113.   
241  Kemal Karpat, The Gecekondu: Rural Migration and Urbanization, 112; Tansı Şenyapılı, 
Bütünleşmemiş Kentli Nüfus Sorunu, 103. 
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special consumer goods, and to become a respected citizens within the society and construct 
their own business if possible. In this regard, being respected citizens means for the metal 
workers to be loyal, assiduous and productive citizens of the nation and obtain their rights, 
earn sufficient money to provide for their families, and be treated well in workplaces. 
Nevertheless, they would soon understand that being a loyal and hard working citizen would 
not be enough to realize their dreams. Rather, they had to struggle, individually or 
collectively, in an effort to reach their personal goals.  
The single metal workers would be expected to marry soon after finding a job and 
they were expected to become a member of the family economy, in which they would act as 
provider for their extended family. 242  The single young men would typically marry the 
daughter of either their one of relatives or neighbours, soon after arriving. This meant the 
metal workers were concerned about providing for their families as well as themselves, and 
those pressures, plus the inter-community nature of marriages, must have enhanced the 
solidarity networks in the workers’ districts, as well. 
The sociological surveys about the migration generally agree that a significant 
portion of village traditions, beliefs and life-styles has survived amongst the immigrants in 
modern cities.243 A traditional sexual division of labor was in effect within the squatter areas 
in Turkey: as Karpat argues, family life was still regulated by village customs during the 
1950s and 1960s. His study shows that majority of women that he had interviewed had no 
outside employment; furthermore, about 83% percent of women who had outside jobs worked 
as servants. While the ratio of women who were recruited into private firms was 6%, the same 
ratio for men was 57%.244 (Interestingly, Şenyapılı’s studies among Gültepe and Kağıthane 
residents disclose that while the number of male heads of the family was 336 out of 350 in 
                                                             
242 Tansı Şenyapılı, “Cumhuriyet’in 75. Yılı Gecekondunun 50. Yılı [The 75th Year of the Republic and 
the 50th Years of Squatter],” in Yıldız Sey [ed.] 75 Yılda Değişen Kent ve Mimarlık (İstanbul: Tarih 
Vakfı, 1998), 311. 
243  Nephan Saran, “İstanbul’da Gecekondu Problemi [The Squatter Problem in İstanbul]”; Ahmet 
İçduygu; İbrahim Sirkeci, and İsmail Aydıngün, “Türkiye’de İçgöç ve İçgöçün İşçi Hareketine Etkisi 
[The Internal Migration in Turkey and the Influences of Internal Migration on Working Class 
Movement]”; Mübeccel Kıray, Kentleşme Yazıları, Kemal Karpat, The Gecekondu: Rural Migration 
and Urbanization; Tansı Şenyapılı, Bütünleşmemiş Kentli Nüfus Sorunu. 
244 Kemal Karpat, The Gecekondu: Rural Migration and Urbanization, 96-102. 
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total when he conducted surveys, this figure was only 14 when the questions were asked by 
female interviewers.) 245  Industrial life in İstanbul was also male dominated. Within the 
family, the male partner was traditionally accepted as the provider of the family. They were 
expected to find steady and well paid jobs. And according to village traditions, the function of 
women in the squatter areas was to take care of children and domestic chores.246 In fact, 
Şenyapılı argues that while the heads of the families in the squatter areas began to be 
recruited into more permanent jobs, their family members gradually began to act more as 
consumers in a modern city in the 1950s and 1960s.247 A health survey conducted in Rami 
indicated that the fathers of families who were socially accepted as the head of the family and 
who were recruited in the industrial plants were the sole providers for those families, and they 
were most readily recruited in the industrial plants while very few mothers were employed.248 
It is unfortunate that we do not have clear evidence to show the effect those traditional 
patterns had on the workers who were recruited into the metal plants, and their families. 
However, a survey conducted in 1970 shows that the metal plants which were located in the 
European side of the city249 included only 768 female workers out of 36 648 workers in 
total. 250  Based on those figures, we can conclude that the metal sector in terms of the 
traditional sexual division of labor was not an anomaly. We can also suggest that the male 
metal workers wanted to supply their families with a good wage to maintain a healthy 
lifestyle, purchase consumer goods such as refrigerators, radios or laundry machines for their 
wives, and support their children with a solid education to elevate the next generation within 
the social hierarchy. Indeed, providing for the family constituted an important dimension of 
                                                             
245 Tansı Şenyapılı, Bütünleşmemiş Kentli Nüfus Sorunu, 82-83. 
246 Kemal Karpat, The Gecekondu: Rural Migration and Urbanization, 130-132. 
247 Tansı Şenyapılı, Gecekondu: Çevre İşçilerin Mekanı [The Squatter House: The Space of Peripheral 
Workers], (n.p.: Orta Doğu Teknik Üniversitesi Mimarlık Fakültesi, 1981), 43-47. 
248  C. T. Gürson, C. T. and O. Neyzi, İstanbul’un Rami Gecekondu Bölgesinde Çocuk Sağlığı 
Konusunda Araştırmalar [The Researches Regarding the Child Health in the Rami Squatter Regions in 
İstanbul] (İstanbul: İstanbul Üniversitesi Tıp Fakültesi, 1966). 
249 The city of İstanbul is geographically divided: while some land is situated in the continent of 
Europe, the other parts are located in the Asian continent, in Anatolia. 
250 Faruk Özbakan, İstanbul Madeni Eşya Sanayii. Also look at: Turan Yazgan, Şehirleşme Açısından 
Türkiye’de İşgücünün Demografik ve Sosyo-Ekonomik Bünyesi [The Demographic and Socio-
Economic Structure of the Labor Force in Turkey Regarding Urbanization] (İstanbul: İstanbul 
Üniversitesi İktisat Fakültesi, 1968), 5 and 25. 
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their language about unionization of the metal workers.251 It is also important to note that the 
above mentioned surveys by Tansı Şenyapılı and Kemal Karpat were conducted in the 
districts where a lot of the metal hardware, household electrical appliances and metal 
processing factories were established. 
For the metal workers who were recently married and wanting to escape from their 
relatives’ shared accommodation, the most burning issue was housing. It is obvious that the 
prospective workers had to first put a roof above their heads in order to advance themselves 
and their families. The single metal workers often resided with their immediate families or 
close relatives in the squatter houses. But the married ones built their own houses as close to 
their workplaces as possible, or bought one which had been built seemingly overnight. The 
same problem was an irritating issue for most workers in İstanbul. Orhan Tuna called 
attention to the housing problem in İstanbul in 1955.252 In fact, the workers of the Silahtarağa 
Power Plant said that their one of the biggest problems was housing.253 A metal worker, Basri 
Karagöz, from Şakir Zümre reflected on the necessity of employers to provide housing for  
workers in order to increase workers’ productivity.254 To rectify this problem, the workers 
built squatter houses, mostly in areas surrounding their workplaces. Some of these structures 
were simply shacks built overnight while others looked like simple houses.255 And for those 
                                                             
251 Kemal Sülker, “İşçi Çocuklarının Okutulması İçin Sigorta İhdası [The Gift of Insurance Regarding 
the Education of the Workers’ Children],” Maden-İş year 2 no. 23 (25 January 1958), 2; TÜSTAV, 
Kemal Sülker Archive Box 14 Envelope 760. For the scholars of the period, providing for the family 
was seen as an important discourse for claiming workers’ rights or setting down the basics of modern 
industrial relations Adnan Laykım, “Asgari Ücret ve Muhtelif Ücret Sistemlerinde Garanti Ücretler 
[The Minimum Wages and Guaranteed Wages in the Different Wage Systems],” YODÇE Bulletin, no. 
2 (May 1958); 44. 
252 Orhan Tuna, “Asgari Geçim Haddi Meselesi [The Issue of Minimum Maintenance Level],” Son 
Saat, January 20, 1955. Also look at: Köylüye Toprak Verildiği Gibi İşçilere de Ev Verilmelidir, 
TÜSTAV Kemal Sülker Archive Box 40 Envelope 1856. 
253  “Silahtarağa Elektrik Fabrikası İşçileri İdareden Şikayetçi [The Workers of Silahtarağa Power 
Plants Complain about the Management],” Gece Postası, November 26, 1950.  
254 “Basri Karagöz Tahakkukunu İstediği İşçi Davalarını İzah Ediyor ve Üzüntülerini Belirtiyor [Basri 
Karagöz Explains the Workers’ Causes Which He Wanted to Handle and Expresses His Griefs],” Gece 
Postası, July 24, 1951. 
255 Ekmel Zadil, “İstanbul’da Mesken Meseleleri ve Gecekondular [The Housing Problems in İstanbul 
and the Squatter Houses],” Sosyal Siyaset Konferansları, no. 2 (1949). Also look at: Tansı Şenyapılı, 
Bütünleşmemiş Kentli Nüfus Sorunu; M. Şehmus Güzel, “Capital and Labor During World War II”; 
Ahmet Makal, Ameleden İşçiye: Erken Cumhuriyet Dönemi Emek Tarihi Çalışmaları. 
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metal workers who did not own a house, the rents were too high in İstanbul.256 The metal 
workers also lashed out about insufficient housing in the city and the high cost of housing.257 
It was a problem to be overcome through their common struggles in the union. 
The inner city workers of İstanbul had to confront other serious hardships, too. 
Lifestyle conditions had deteriorated during the war years for the lower classes in İstanbul. 
Osman Şevki Uludağ, who worked in several health institutions as a medical doctor during 
the 1940s, admitted that the living conditions of the lower classes were poor; the people were 
ill-fed and ill-dressed.258 Uludağ’s statements were also verified by several academic works. 
For example, Boratav, states that the burden of state-led industrialization had been on the 
shoulder of peasants, especially the small wheat producer, and upon the shoulders of workers 
in cities during the pre-war era. This burden got even heavier during the war years. The 
following table prepared by Boratav shows the deterioration of wages and the concurrent 
increase in the cost of living during the war years: 
 
Table 1: The Basic Indicators of Distribution of Wealth in 1938-1939 and 1944-1945 
 1938-1939 1944-1945 
Industrial Production Index 100 78 
Industrial Price Index 100 357 
Wheat Production Index 100 63 
Wheat Price Index 100 568 
Tobacco Production Index 100 105 
                                                             
256 “Ortaköyde Teneke Kutu Fabrikası: 2 [The Tin Box Factory in Ortaköy],” Şehir, January 8, 1959. 
257 “General Çelik Eşya Fabrikasında İşçi-İşveren Arasında Tesanüt [The Solidarity Between Employee 
and Employer in General Steel Good Factory],” Gece Postası, 20 July 1958.  
258 Osman Şevki Uludağ, “İş ve İşçi [Work and Worker],” Çalışma year 1 no. 1 year 1 (September, 
1945). 
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Tobacco Price Index 100 490 
Cotton Production Index 100 88 
Cotton Price Index 100 356 
Real Wage Index 100 51 
Share of Wages in National 
Income 
8.4 8.2 
Wholesale Price Index 100 449 
Real National Income Index 100 75 
Source: Korkut Boratav, Türkiye İktisat Tarihi, 69. 
 
 
From the table, it can be inferred that industrial production numbers decreased by a 
considerable amount between 1938-1939 and 1944-1945. Between those same years, while 
the production of wheat and tobacco decreased, the production of some other goods 
flourished. In the meantime, overall prices of those goods significantly increased; 
consequently, as it can be seen from the table, the wholesale price index escalated. However, 
real wages, the share of wages in national income and real national income all decreased at 
the same time period. In a nutshell, the cost of living considerably increased during the war 
years in Turkey. Another table shows the increase the price of some basic goods before and 
during the war: 
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Table 2: The Changes in the Price of Basic Goods (1939-1943) 
Goods 
Prices (Turkish kuruş) 
Ratio of Price Increases % 
1939 1943 
Wheat 6 110 1733 
Flour 15 110 966 
Rice 35 185 428 
Egg 1.5 9 500 
Source: Murat Metinsoy, İkinci Dünya Savaşı’nda Türkiye: Savaş ve Gündelik Yaşam, 63. 
 
In brief, the two tables clearly disclose that the prices of the basic goods, which 
constituted the essential diet of Turkish society, markedly increased in Turkey before and 
during the war years. In his masterfully written book, Metinsoy also argues that bread, which 
is the most important food staple for Turkish people, deteriorated in terms of its taste and 
nutritional value, despite the increases in price during that time.259 Similarly, Orhan Tuna 
sized up the living conditions and wages and asserted that while the wage index increased 
from 100 to 157 between 1938 and 1943, the price index of basic goods increased from 100 to 
300-400 over the same time interval.260 Furthermore, between 1938 and 1947, the cost of 
living index in İstanbul rose from 100 to 419, a more than fourfold increase. 261 Sabahaddin 
Zaim, in the same vein, argued that the purchasing power of wages decreased by half from 
1938 to 1945 and it could reach 1938 levels by 1952. For the same period, the cost of living 
                                                             
259 Murat Metinsoy, İkinci Dünya Savaşı’nda Türkiye: Savaş ve Gündelik Yaşam, 64. Also look at; M. 
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Dönemde Çalışma İlişkileri: 1920-1946 [The Labor Relations in the Single Party Period in Turkey] 
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260 Orhan Tuna, “İş Piyasası ve Ücretler [Job Market and Wages],” Çalışma no. 5 year 1 (April 1946). 
261 “Memleketimizde Geçinme, Gıda Masrafları Endeksleri [The Cost of Living and Food Indexes in 
Our Country],” Çalışma, no. 25 year 3 (January-February-March 1948). 
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index in İstanbul rose from 100 to 389. 262  These statistics allow us to claim that the 
purchasing power of waged labor was notably low before 1945 in Turkey. 
The numbers also show us that low earnings and high food prices did not 
significantly change after the war, but wage increases in the early 1950s slightly ameliorated 
the conditions of workers’ families.263 A report of the First Work Council in 1947 admitted 
that the average wages in some regions were below even the minimum amount to sustain 
life.264 Similarly, Orhan Tuna also stated that, according to unions in İstanbul, real wages 
decreased, rather than increased, between the years 1950-1954 and life for İstanbul’s workers 
did not improve in parallel with the increase in national average income rates.265 In fact, the 
newspapers of the period were dotted with reports about the high cost of living in İstanbul in 
1953 and 1954; for example, the headline of Gece Postası on August 19, 1953 declared that 
the government was not taking any measures against the high cost of living.266 Nearly one 
month later, the same newspaper mentioned that basic foods such as meat, milk, fruits and 
vegetables were too expensive in İstanbul.267 The cost of living was also a frustrating matter 
for people of Eyüp. In 1953, 140 citizens sent a letter to the provincial newspaper, Gece 
Postası, saying that the price of fruits and vegetables were too high in the district. The letter 
was as follows: 
“Eyüp is a region of poor people who are laborers and have low incomes. It 
may not be a big issue for the people of Taksim that the price is 15-20 
Turkish kuruş per one kilo; on the other hand, this amount is very high for the 
                                                             
262 Sabahaddin Zaim, “Türkiye’nin İktisadi Gelişmesinde Ücret Siyasetinin Önemi [The Importance of 
Wage Politics in the Economic Development of Turkey],” Sosyal Siyaset Konferansları no. 19 (1968): 
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263 Ibid, 334. Also look at: Korkut Boratav, “1950-1965 Döneminde Tarım Dışındaki Emekçi Gruplar 
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Bilimler Fakültesi Journal vol. XXIV no. 1 (March 1969): 216. 
264 “Çalışma Meclisi Raporu [The Report of Work Council],” Çalışma, year 2 no. 17 (April 1947). 
265 Orhan Tuna, “Memleketimizde Sendikaların Üzerinde Durdukları Meseleler [The Issues on Which 
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people of Eyüp. The municipality should sell those foods themselves at a 
subsidized price to make us happy.”268 
  
The existing documents about living conditions in İstanbul are full of complaints 
from workers about their despair and anger regarding their lifestyles despite all the promises 
given to workers that they would have a decent life if they agreed to be a part of an 
established factory regime. A worker of Silahtarağa Power Plant narrated his misery as 
follows: 
“Although we lived well until 1939, afterwards the increasing cost of living 
destroyed us. Today, while we are working more than 12 hours, we earn 100 
Turkish liras at most. After yielding 20 liras of this amount to rent, it is 
impossible to sustain 4 people at home. For this reason, I fought a lot with 
my wife; she ultimately left the house. One of my children has passed away 
out of our misery. My family has been torn apart. After building a squatter 
house from plywood in order to keep the rent at my pocket, the officers of 
municipality demolished my home...How we are supposed to live? In sum, 
the workers’ wages must be increased to save our future.”269 
 
A metal worker Hüsamettin Dinç, in the metal union congress in 1951, stated that 
despite the increases in the cost of living, the workers’ wages hardly changed, and didn’t live 
up to the promises.270 Likewise the workers of Halil Sezai Bed Factory stood up for an 
increase in their wages in 1954 in order to deal with the trying conditions and high cost of 
living. 271  In the same year, the workers of Auto Scissor Lift Factory, Ayvansaray Bolt 
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Factory, Topçular Copper Wire Factory, Topçular Esat Ketenoğlu Copper Wire Factory, 
Balat Copper Wire Factory, Aker Nail Factory, Bahariye Hot Wire Factory, and Zeytinburnu 
Enamel Factory all pressed their bosses with similar demands for the same reasons.272 
The conditions inside squatter residences in İstanbul continued to deteriorate after the 
mid-1950s. In reviewing news reports, 1954 seems to be an important turning point regarding 
living conditions in İstanbul. The headlines of provincial newspapers, indeed, pointed towards 
these unsupportable price increases in the city.273 In 1954, it was stated that the price of 
potatoes, onions, beans, and eggs, which were the basic diet of low income groups, had 
simply risen too much.274 Orhan Tuna claimed in 1955 that the living conditions of workers 
would become unbearable if the price increases went on in the same manner. He also claimed 
that wages were slipping, contrary to what the Labor Minister said in September 1955.275 On 
this issue, Zaim argues that although the official statistics which compared living indices with 
wage indices in İstanbul showed the purchase power of workers rose to a certain extent 
during the 1950s, those numbers could not reflect the same upward changes in buying power. 
This was because the average wage did not illustrate the true income of workers. To put it 
more clearly, the monthly incomes of semi-qualified or non-qualified workers were far below 
the average wages estimated by published statistics. In spite of the increases in real wages in 
the early 1950s, he commented, the increases in the price of domestic staples eradicated wage 
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All Food are Increasing Further],” Gece Postası, July 7, 1954; “Bütün Malların Fiyatları Yükseliyor 
[The Prices of All Goods are Increasing],” Gece Postası, December 14, 1954. 
274 “Kuru Gıda Madde Fiyatları Çok Yüksek [The Food Prices Are Too High],” Gece Postası, February 
4, 1954. Also look at: “Pahalılık İstanbulu Kasıp Kavuruyor [The High Cost of Living Rages 
İstanbul],” Gece Postası, March 31, 1954.  
275 Orhan Tuna, “Asgari Geçim Haddi Meselesi [The Issue of Minimum Maintenance Level],” Son 
Saat, January 20, 1955. Also look at:  Kemal Sülker, “Her İstatistik Hakikati İfade Kabiliyetinde 
Değildir [Not Every Statistic Explain Truth],” Gece Postası, September 21, 1955; Kemal Sülker, “İşçi 
Ücretleri Son Beş Yılda Arttı mı, Azaldı mı? [Did the Workers’ Wages Increase or Decrease in the 
Last Five Years],” Gece Postası, September 22, 1955.   
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increases to a certain extent.276 The struggle for sustenance became much harder towards the 
end of the decade. The price of fruits and vegetables, the latter category being one of the most 
basic food groups for workers’ families, rose sharply in 1957. In June 1958, the government 
again increased the price of basic goods in İstanbul. In 1959 alone, the index of wholesale 
prices rose 20 percent.277 The local newspapers in İstanbul dedicated their headlines to how 
life had grown so much more expensive in the last months.278 Kemal Sülker, in 1958, told of 
the deterioration of workers’ living conditions on the basis of increasing food prices. He 
added that basic foods, which workers mainly consumed, got more expensive, but not luxury 
food items.279 In fact, it’s clear these high prices adversely influenced whole impoverished 
social groups, including metal workers in İstanbul, throughout the 1950s. 
After the middle point of the decade, the deterioration of living conditions in İstanbul 
were definitely felt and expressed by the metal workers. One worker in the Halıcıoğlu Branch 
Congress of the union asserted that, despite significant increases in the basic food prices and 
rents, workers could not get sufficient wage increases to balance out those price increases.280 
The metal workers of the Profilo enterprise claimed in 1956 that their wages were eroding 
day by day, on the basis of increasing prices in the city; as a result, the workers argued, they 
could not provide for their families.281 In parallel with the increases in price indices, the 
boisterous complaints of the metal workers about the costliness of life in İstanbul increased 
                                                             
276  Sabahaddin Zaim, Türkiye’de Metal Sanayinde Ücretler: Ücret Seviyesi, Ücret Bünyesi ve 
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Profiteering],” Gece Postası July 30, 1957; Esin Pars, Türkiye’de İşveren Sendikacılığı, 160; “Resmi 
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Workers After the Latest Increases],” Gece Postası June 14, 1958. 
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Insurance],” Son Saat, April 9, 1956. 
281 “Profilo İşçileri %50 Zam İstedi [The Profilo Workers Demand a 50% Wage Increase],” İstanbul 
Demir ve Madeni Eşya İşçileri Sendikası News Bulletin year 2 no. 8 (28 January 1956). Also look at: 
“İş İhtilafında Dikkati Çeken Karar Alınıyor [An Important Decision is Taken in the Work Dispute],” 
Gece Postası April 25, 1955. 
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towards the end of the 1950s. Indeed, the administrative board of the one of the biggest metal 
enterprises in İstanbul, Arçelik, acknowledged the increasing cost of living in 1958, and again 
in 1959. 282  The head representative of the Tin Box Factory in Ortaköy, İbrahim Kurt, 
admitted that he earned more money than his fellow workers; nevertheless, his salary was still 
insufficient to provide for his family.283 Likewise, the other workers in the factory complained 
about the level of their incomes being too low to take care of the needs of their families. The 
İstanbul workers asserted that they could not even purchase school books for their children.284 
The huge gap between the actual earnings of the metal workers and the high prices of even 
basic goods constituted the most significant motivator for the workers to get together under 
union flags. Indeed, the most widespread issue of work conflicts at that time was low wages. 
How the metal workers suffered from the cost of living in İstanbul was illustrated in the pages 
of the Maden-İş’s newspaper that portrayed the monstrous hands of the cost of living causing 
a worker to tremble out of his/her fear. 
 
                                                             
282 Mamulattan Markaya Arçelik Kurum Tarihi, 38 and 42. See also: Sabahaddin Zaim, “Türkiye’de 
Metal Sanayiinde Ücretler: Ücret Seviyesi, Ücret Bünyesi ve Sistemleri,” 11 and 21. 
283 “Ortaköyde Teneke Kutu Fabrikası: 2 [The Tin Box Factory in Ortaköy],” Şehir, January 8, 1959. 
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Demand a 40 Percent Wage Increase],” Maden-İş year 2 no. 8 (23 March 1957), 1; “İstihsal Primi 
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Figure 1: -The Cost of Living and Workers (Source: İstanbul Demir ve Madeni Eşya İşçileri Sendikası 
News Bulletin, year 2 no. 9 [September 1956], 5). 
 
The problems of the metal workers were not only about the high cost of living in 
İstanbul: the conditions made it difficult to sustain a decent life in the shanty towns. The 
newspapers of the period are full of articles about the problems in squatter regions where 
mostly factory workers and the city’s impoverished resided. For example, the road 
infrastructure problems were quite severe in the neighbourhoods where laboring class 
dwelled. Additionally, the conditions on public buses were awful and they often came late.285 
The workers of the Silahtarağa Power Plant claimed that, due to lack of any public 
transportation, they had to travel to their workplaces on foot. 286  The Eyüp workers also 
complained about the terrible condition of the drinking water in the region. In fact, there was 
no domestic water system at most houses; consequently, residents of the region had to use 
well water for their daily needs. Usually, there was just one well for each neighbourhood in 
the district and some of them did not run properly. However, the most frustrating problem for 
the residents of the poorer districts was the health issue. 
                                                             
285 “Eyüplülerin İki Dileği [Two Wishes of People of Eyüp],” Gece Postası, March 2, 1948; “Eyüp 
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1956; “Rami,” Gece Postası, December 29, 1956; “Eyübe Dolmuş Bulunamıyor [Dolmuş Cannot be 
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286 “Elektrik Fabrikası İşçileri Dün Bir Protesto Toplantısı Yaptı [The Silahtarağa Power Plant Workers 
Organized a Protest Gathering],” Gece Postası, November 24, 1950.  
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Two doctors, C. T. Gürson and O. Neyzi, conducted a health survey among children 
in Rami, which was a primary residential place for the metal workers, in 1966. This study was 
a fine illustration of the problems, which the residents of the squatter houses experienced in 
Turkey. According to the survey, most houses were bereft of the basic infrastructures such as 
water or proper sewer systems. The families were also poorly fed due to their low income. 
The survey concluded that all these points factored into the serious health problems evident 
among children.287 Similarly, the people of Eyüp also expressed their concern about the filth 
and poor-looking appearance of their district.288 
In addition to health problems, whether as a result of improper feeding or poor 
infrastructure, the metal workers of İstanbul also suffered from the lack of attention in the 
hospitals of the Social Security Administration289 in several cases. The workers complained 
that the hospital in Halıcıoğlu, which is located near to the Golden Horn, did not begin to 
examine workers until 11am and the building was inadequate to give a good care to the sick. 
Furthermore, most of the hospitals did not employ a midwife, who helped workers’ wives 
during childbirth.290 The workers in the Eyüp and Kalafat workplaces complained about the 
state hospital in the region, too.291 Discouragingly, the subpar treatment provided in those 
hospitals continued to be a major concern for the metal workers who inhabited shanty towns 
over the subsequent decades. 
                                                             
287 C. T. Gürson and O. Neyzi, İstanbul’un Rami Gecekondu Bölgesinde Çocuk Sağlığı Konusunda 
Araştırmalar [The Research Regarding Child Health in the Rami Squatter Regions in İstanbul] 
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In order to alleviate the particular problems of life in the city, the migrants applied 
mainly political tools to their purpose. During the election periods, they utilized their rights to 
vote as political leverage, preferring to vote for candidates who either promised to solve 
problems in the squatter regions, or who were perceived by the residents as a candidate 
working on behalf of the poor. Conversely, the political parties visited the workers’ districts 
to demand votes from the people by promising to deal with their many problems.292 Some 
recent works, which debated class formation during the post-war era, assume that involving 
themselves in political activities fostered solidarity among the İstanbul workers in the 
1950s.293 Unfortunately, there exists no data to show to what extent those activities influenced 
the metal workers, or whether metal workers even participated in the political life of the 
country by being involved in a party.  
Similarly, there are few documents to infer what other methods the residents of the 
squatter areas resorted to. There were some associations, such as the Association of 
Improving Silahtarağa, set up in the squatter areas to improve conditions.294 It is another 
unfortunate problem that we lack documentation about the actions or influences of this 
organization among the metal workers. Nevertheless, we have abundant evidence to argue 
that the union was a critical mechanism for the metal workers to ameliorate their living 
conditions and overcome their common problems in work and city life. Conversely, the 
frustrations caused by their experiences at work and in the community motivated them to get 
together under the umbrella of another organization, namely Maden-İş. 
 
III. The Workplace Experience: Wages, Discipline and Work Conditions 
A) Metal Workers’ Earnings 
As noted, the most essential reason for the metal workers to be unionized was that 
wages in the sector were too low to provide for themselves and their families in the city. In 
                                                             
292 Tansı Şenyapılı, ‘Cumhuriyet’in 75. Yılı Gecekondunun 50. Yılı,” 307. 
293 Hakan Koçak, Camın İşçileri: Paşabahçe İşçilerinin Sınıf Olma Öyküsü [The Glass Workers: The 
Story of Paşabahçe Workers Being a Class], (İstanbul: İletişim, 2014).  
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Silahtarağa],” Maden-İş year 1 no. 16 (10 August 1957), 3. 
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fact, Sabahaddin Zaim related in one of his seminars that the most contentious and significant 
issue in Turkish industrial relations was the issue of wages. According to his calculations, 
Zaim claimed that the wage increases in the metal sector throughout the 1950s were well 
below consumer price increases.295 The union and provincial newspapers were full of news 
about the workers’ wage complaints.296 This battle was at the top of the agendas of nearly all 
the union congresses and workers’ meetings held over the decade. 
Additionally, the metal workers of İstanbul often suffered through wage cuts, troubles 
in incorrect bonus payments of certain workers, or improper piece rate bonuses. 297  The 
existing applied trade regime, namely the import regime, and the absence of raw materials 
forced the metal employers to lower labor costs through wage cuts or worker dismissals. For 
example, because of an influx of nail imports from Yugoslavia in 1953, some nail factories in 
İstanbul cut the daily wages of workers.298 In some cases, the daily wages of workers who 
stayed home due to an illness or an accident were not paid.299 The workers of Bakırköy 
Enamel Factory asserted in 1951 that the bonus pay of workers in the strenuous and 
dangerous work areas was doled out at 25 percent instead of 50 percent as indicated in the 
regulations of the factory. In the same petition, workers claimed that most of the fines given 
to workers did not comply with the allowable reasons given under the law.300 A news article 
in Gece Postası in 1954 stated that at the Kalafat workplace, where secondary metal 
production was done, the workers’ overtime fees were not paid; however, the small 
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Kemal Sülker Archive, Box 2, Envelope 134. 
 
 
109 
workplaces there were famous for forced overtime work.301 The scarcity of raw materials 
became yet another excuse for the bosses to force employees to accept only half of their 
wages. 302  Additionally, the metal bosses did not pay Sunday fees, bonuses or overtime 
payments in several cases.303 For example, the Demir Döküm management did not pay some 
workers’ fees for Sundays, even though these workers had not even been contractually 
informed that they had to work in the factory those days.304 In cases of such wage cuts, it 
became naturally much harder for the metal workers to sustain their lifestyles and provide for 
their families.  
Another important problem was the threat of dismissal. Not just the metal workers, 
but the workers in the other sectors, too, always worked under threat of being fired from their 
jobs after the war period. In fact, one of the hottest issues that workers brought to the 
consideration of the Labor Ministry was the arbitrary expulsion of workers by factory 
bosses.305 Similarly, in their meeting with the Minister of Labor, Tahsin Bekir Balta, the trade 
unions in İstanbul lashed out at high numbers of workers’ dismissals in 1948.306 This problem 
was widespread among the metal workers. In 1948, a non-unionized metal work plant 
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dismissed all of its workers.307 The boss of Sıtkı Bütün Enamel Factory fired its 13 employees 
in 1952 without citing any reason.308 One of the reasons for workers’ layoffs was to decrease 
labor costs in the industry. In order to do that, some metal employees fired older workers and 
recruited new ones at lower wages. 309  As stated earlier, the workers’ dismissals were 
widespread due to a dearth of raw material in the sector.310 But sometimes the bosses fired 
workers in order to replace them with low waged workers and used the excuse that the 
scarcity of raw materials was forcing them to make cuts.311  
In brief, there was no job guarantee for the İstanbul metal worker. The pages of the 
union newspaper and provincial newspapers were full of analyses and stories about 
widespread unemployment among the metal workers.312 Due to the scarcity of raw material, 
unemployment became a problem in the metal sector by 1954.313 In 1955, the Eyüp branch of 
the metal union detailed the unemployment issue found among the metal workers in the 
region in its working report.314 Unemployment rose in the sector again in 1958 due to a 
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further scarcity of raw material.315 At that point, most prospective metal workers, as well as 
workers in the other sectors, had to compromise and work for lower than expected wages.316 
Those who were lucky to (re)find a job in the sector also had to compromise and fall in line 
under the demands of bosses/managers. 
 
B) Factory Discipline 
The difficult life of the metal workers on the shop floor was added to the list of 
grievances and it motivated them to stand together in an organization. Upon their arrival to 
the city, the first thing the young male migrants did was to seek out a job; however, those 
workers were uneducated and unqualified for any industrial job. According to Şenyapılı’s 
survey on Gültepe district where significant amount of metal workers lived, the average age 
of fathers in any given household was in between 25 and 44, and approximately 60 percent of 
them had finished only primary school. The Karpat survey demonstrated a similar social 
structure, in terms of age and education, among the settlers in the northern hills of İstanbul.317 
These migrants had difficulty of finding a job in the city during the lean years of the 1950s. 
Unemployment had already been a critical issue for the older residents of İstanbul in the 
1940s. The newly emerged private industry could not absorb the considerable number of 
migrants who continued to stream into İstanbul throughout the 1950s. 318  The young, 
uneducated and unqualified migrants who were considered lucky to even find a job 
constituted the majority of the work force in the metal sector. Such a demographic must have 
been attractive for the metal bosses, since those poor sections of the labor market constituted 
a cheap labor force that had no specific qualities and accordingly could be recruited at low 
wages. In fact, one of the reasons why the metal bosses choose Eyüp or Kağıthane districts 
was the abundance of such an unskilled labor force in those regions as Ege Cansen 
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admitted. 319  An uneducated and unqualified workforce allowed the bosses/managers to 
control easily labor on the shop floor, as it was easy to make them obedient as threatening 
with dismissals.320 This is the main reason why the metal bosses/managers could easily fire 
workers during the 1950s as stated above.   
Such a ruralized and unqualified work force came face to face with a relatively 
qualified and already urbanized work force in the city. However, the number of unqualified 
workers was very high when compared to those of qualified ones. In the absence of 
unemployed older craftsmen, one of the biggest problems for industrial enterprises, including 
the metal ones, was to find skilled workers, despite all the attempts to train new arrivals on 
shop floor. It is quite possible that the high number of unskilled workers and semi-skilled 
workers resulted in a lack of general fragmentation on the shop floor, since there weren’t 
enough skilled workers to create a meaningful social divide.  
The informal organization of neighbourhoods according to the birthplace of migrants 
could also have been reflected in shop floor dynamics as a type of social division between 
workers. Nevertheless, one study conducted in 1970 argues that the cohesion of metal 
workers inside the factories did not reflect their geographic origins; rather, workers from 
widely different regions were recruited in the metal enterprises. There were few factories 
where significant numbers of workers from the same birthplaces labored together. 321 
Moreover, it does not seem that any important division happened during the collective actions 
that was based on the worker’s neighbourhoods and/or original birth of place: metal workers 
from different origins would join together in the collective actions and play equally important 
roles during the 1960s. While there might have been minor fragmentation between the metal 
workers depending upon their original birthplaces in their daily life on shop floor, there is not, 
unfortunately, sufficient evidence to debate this possibly important aspect of class formation. 
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Similarly, we do not know whether such fragmentation influenced the organizational attempts 
of the metal workers during that period. Therefore, we can assume that being organized in 
union abolished the possible fragmentations between workers in terms of their original birth 
places. 
Nonetheless, whether coming from different ethnic or religious roots, or having 
different job qualifications, the overwhelmingly close supervision was seen as another 
common problem for workers in the sector. Discipline in the workplace referred to the control 
of any movement of the workers from the beginning of the work period. For example, one can 
obviously see in the factory regulations, which were very sparse in that period that 
bosses/managers assumed a strict control over punch cards in the entrance of the factory. 
These regulations claimed that punching the card of another worker was a reason for 
dismissal. Furthermore, the regulations declared that even the slightest delay on the job would 
not be tolerated. According to the rules, managers were free to cut off the wages of workers 
who were not able to arrive on time. They had also complete authority to determine when and 
how the work would proceed. According to the regulations, managers were free to assign 
workers to any shift, and workers had to obey management decisions. It was another a 
common and strict rule that workers could not wander within workplaces. Managers asked for 
loyalty and respect toward their supervisors, too. This control was even assumed when 
workers left their plants; for example, the regulations asserted that the packs or bags of 
workers would be checked in the factory gate.322 
In fact, close supervision and time discipline was effectively maintained in several 
metal plants. For example, a manager from the Arçelik factory narrates: 
“The work tempo was more serious in Sütlüce [the place where the factory 
was located, a.n.] than today. Everyone put up his/her signature at 8am. If 
anyone arrived at 8.10am, they were not allowed to sign. Your Sunday wage 
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was cut as well, as you were not allowed to work on that day. There was a 
very strict work discipline.”323 
 
Such time and movement discipline became excessive in some cases. A metal 
worker, Mehmet Ağdeviren complained that the workers had to ask to leave their duties even 
when they were going to toilet.324 Similarly, the workers of the Metal Endüstrisi Factory in 
Taşlıtarla neighbourhood, located in Gaziosmanpaşa districts, expressed that the management 
did not allow them to go outside to meet their needs, such as for drinking water or urinating, 
until the lunch break at noon.325 The Türk Demir Döküm workers claimed that management 
did not let them go out during the lunch break at all.326 Moreover, the workers, who were 
provided one hour food and rest according to in-house rules and regulations complained that 
the managers and foremen pressed them to return to work in only 30 minutes.327 During this 
decade, the intense control over work constituted one of the important experiential aspects in 
the factories for metal workers. 
Falling under the term “simple control”, it seems that the labor process was arbitrarily 
regulated in most metal plants, which means that even the existing law could be neglected by 
the bosses/managers.328 The metal workers also experienced strict discipline on the shop floor 
over the issue of work hours. For example, the İstanbul workers complained about forced 
overtime during the post-war era. Indeed, employers in İstanbul had grown accustomed to 
augmenting working hours by exploiting the National Protection Law and the irregular and 
scarce state inspection of factories during the war years.329 The employers’ misuse of already 
ineffective state intervention on the shop floor affairs went on after the war. The workers of 
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one steel factory complained in 1948 that they were forced to work longer than the Labor 
Law suggested.330  The workers of a metal factory in Bakırköy complained in 1951 that 
employers pushed employees to work for up to 12 hours in the nitric acid section where 
working more than 8 hours was prohibited by the law.331 Another plant in Kalafat demanded 
nearly 60 hours in a week from its workers, without any overtime pay.332 Indeed, one of the 
burning issues for employees in the 1950s was the arbitrary extension of work hours without 
overtime payment.333 There is no doubt the arbitrary decisions of bosses/managers concerning 
work time put a certain distance between employers and employees in the sector; therefore, it 
is no coincidence that the metal workers’ union strived to regulate work hours through 
collective bargaining and collective agreements by the late 1950s, so that bosses/managers 
could not force workers into situations whenever and however they desired. While discussing 
the term “simple control”, Richard Edwards also argues that this type of control refers to 
direct supervision of work activity by the factor owners themselves.334 In several cases, the 
Turkish metal entrepreneurs themselves controlled the work within the factories. For 
example, an important shareholder and general manager of the Arçelik factory often visited 
sections within the factory to check the progress of the work.335 However, it should be noted 
that we do not have sufficient evidence to show the widespread behaviour of this sort in the 
enterprises. 
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In fact, once cannot say that the existing laws benefited workers at all, in terms of 
overtime pay during the 1950s. The factory management had the right to require overtime 
work without extra payment by law, and the metal managers frequently used this power. The 
Appeal sent on the behalf of Türk Demir Döküm Joint-Stock Company to the İstanbul 
Regional Work Office in 1958 stated that overtime work pay was already applied to wages in 
the factory. According to this document, the management utilized and would utilize overtime 
work within the limits of the existing laws and according to needs of the market and the job in 
the factory. Moreover, the document claims that the management provided 50 percent bonus 
for the longer hours.336 However, in most cases the metal bosses refused to pay extra money 
to workers who were forced to work beyond their normal shifts. Widespread forced work, 
thus, was an important aspect of the metal workers’ grievances after the Second World War. 
The metal workers also frequently complained that it was very difficult to get a leave 
of absence from workplaces due to illnesses or accidents. Such workers would run the risk of 
being dismissed or having their wages cut.337 According to factory rules and regulations of 
1958 in Demir Döküm, the workers who went to the regional office of the Social Security 
Administration of Turkey for any reason, including any kind of illness or accident, could not 
demand any money for the time that they were away.338 And lastly, the workers lashed out at 
the substandard treatment in the workers’ hospitals located around their neighbourhoods.339 
The Demir Döküm management also decided the duration of workers’ recovery from any 
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illnesses and accidents. According to Clause 51 of the Rules and Regulations of 1958, the 
workers who could not attend work due to illnesses or work accidents longer than ninety days 
could be fired.340 Based on this clause, a Türk Demir Döküm worker, Ali Osman Yiğit was 
fired from the factory after having an accident.341 
The same metal workers who earned insufficient money to sustain themselves in the 
city and experienced close and arbitrary supervision on shop floor were also exposed to 
unhealthy and dangerous work conditions. The poor working conditions inside metal plants 
were yet another crucial factor stimulating workers to respond to their problems through their 
union.    
 
C) Work Conditions in the Metal Sector 
There is no doubt poor working conditions magnified the grievances of the metal 
workers, since their health and even their lives were at stake in the metal plants. The workers’ 
common problem of unhealthy/unsafe conditions constituted a significant portion of their 
formal complaints. First of all, they complained about not being well fed due to their low 
earnings, and that this problem affected their overall workers’ health.342 Furthermore, some 
workplaces, including both big and small plants, did not supply any food such as lunch or 
supper to their employees, or they supplied low quality foods. Those complaints were 
common for especially Şakir Zümre and Türk Demir Döküm Factories.343 Additionally, the 
workers bemoaned the fact that most metal plants were bereft of necessary health and safety 
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considerations. Şakir Zümre Factory workers asserted that they were moulding irons in the 
foundry section twice in a day and the high temperatures there aggravated their illnesses. The 
same workers claimed that the boss did not provide any work clothes or shoes to protect 
workers from the dangers of the job. 344 The Türk Demir Döküm was another factory where 
the workers worked under dangerous and unhealthy conditions: Ege Cansen admitted that the 
foundry was a very dangerous job; additionally, the workers easily got sick due to inhalation 
of dust and chemicals in the job.345 In the same vein, Sıtkı Bütün Factory workers in 1951 
sent a bill to the union and claimed that the employer did not supply any work clothes, that 
the cafeteria and bathroom were filthy, there was no aspirator in the nitric acid section in 
which workers labored without any protection, that workers in the painting section worked 
without any protective clothes and others were assigned dangerous and strenuous jobs without 
taking any necessary job safety precautions.346 The workers of Ayvansaray Nail Factory also 
voiced discontent with the high sound levels and high temperatures in the workplace.347 The 
metal workers in Kalafat, which was composed of smaller ateliers, spoke of the poor health 
conditions in the workplace, which made people sick.348 A metal worker, Muzaffer Gürün, 
said: 
“We do not have any safety measures in Kalafat workplace. When we get 
sick, we are not treated well due to lack of money. However, we should have 
our lives insured. We do not have any changing room. We will be ruined if 
we have a work accident. Employer grants leaves of absence for two days at 
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most...We carried too heavy a load; as a result, most of us have lumber disc 
herniation.”349 
 
Fourthly, workplace accidents, whether due to workers’ ignorance or insufficient 
precautions, often took place in this sector. In fact, the union newspaper presented a lot of 
examples of work accidents.350 It was reported that two workers, Kutay Altıntaş and Mehmet 
Altan, lost their eyes on the job in 1957.351 In the same year, Hüseyin Geçkaldı, Şükrü Aydın 
and Hüseyin Yılmaz, Eyüp Yalçın lost their fingers in the press machines in the different 
factories.352 There were frequent accidents in the press machines of the Türk Demir Döküm 
Factory. In late 1958, inexperienced workers were recruited for the press machines, which 
resulted in some serious work accidents. Several of the workers lost fingers or hands.353 In 
1959, Ali Osman Yiğit had a work accident in the factory.354 The Demir Döküm workers even 
killed an animal as a sacrifice in the hopes of preventing work accidents, in 1958.355 In 
addition to the high number of work casualties, some accidents were fatal.356 The worst of all 
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accidents was the explosion at the Nuri Kıllıgil Factory in 1949, which left 21 workers 
dead.357 In this sector, the metal workers’ very lives were at stake. 
Low income, close supervision of the work process and dangerous work conditions 
all combined to create a sense of unfairness and resulted in widespread grievances and 
complaints among the metal workers. The worker who raised his voice against unfairness and 
fought for his rights, on the other hand, encountered deep resentments of either bosses or the 
managers. The widespread oppression against dissident workers, which was common in other 
industrial sectors as well, was another reason to standing together in their own organizations. 
 
D) The Oppression of Dissident Workers 
 Bosses’ intolerance to any objection on the shop floor resulted in various forms of 
oppression of any workers who were either worker-union representatives, or an ordinary 
worker who raised his voice against unfairness in the workplace. Systemic oppression was 
especially felt by union members or representatives who were assumed to stand for the 
workers’ rights and who struggled to solve those workers’ problems in cooperation with 
employers. Nevertheless, employers attempted to destroy every means through which workers 
would voice their demands and rights. 
To this end, the metal bosses promoted several methods to quash the channels of 
protest and dissent. The most important mechanism for discontent workers was the legal 
institution of their workers’ representatives. To render this institution powerless, few 
bosses/managers did not allow the election of workers’ representatives from taking place in 
their enterprises. In Berec Cell and Battery Factory the managers did not allow the workers to 
make elections to select their representatives in 1956. This happened in a metal factory in 
Kağıthane in 1958.358 But, it appears that this was not a pattern in the sector: more than this, 
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the metal bosses/managers used several other tactics to keep the representative workers under 
control. For example, they prevented select “undesired workers” from running for elections, 
or they nullified the election if an undesired worker won.359 Others forced workers to choose 
from only the men who were loyal to employers.360 In some cases, the metal bosses forced 
workers to sign a covenant in which the workers promised not to engage in any activities, 
which were determined to be to the detriment of bosses.361 Despite such methods, the efforts 
to be unionized in the sector flourished towards the late 1950s in the sector. 
In addition, the union’s newspaper and provincial newspapers both gave the abundant 
examples of punishments for dissident workers. The practice of dismissing outspoken 
workers was especially common. According to the narratives of the metal workers of the 
period, metal bosses did not allow anyone to have a say in running their enterprises and 
tolerated no opposition. In the Kalafat workplace, İsmail Özçelik, who wanted his employer 
to reduce work hours from 58 to 48, was fired without any severance pay.362 In one case 
where workers refused to work without any overtime pay for their 60 hours in a week, the 
employer used abusive language against them and then fired three workers.363 In some cases, 
bosses fired most of the workers as a result of losing any labor dispute in the Regional Work 
Offices.364 Hamdi İnağ, who was laid off after getting a leave of absence due to visiting a 
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doctor, considered his dismissal to have been rooted in his activities as a member of the union 
and not keeping his tongue still against injustices.365   
In addition to the oppression of workers’ representatives, private employers, 
according to the trade unionist of the period, did not want any unionized worker in their 
workplaces and expelled these workers from the job. There was just one union in the metal 
sector until the 1960s, the Union of the İstanbul Iron and Metalwork Workers, founded by the 
older and experienced metal workers of the time. According to Kemal Sülker, the first worker 
who was laid off due to his trade union activities had been the president of the Union of the 
İstanbul Iron and Metalwork Workers, Yusuf Sıdal.366 Indeed, the union in 1953 released a 
press statement in which it mentioned the common practice of dismissing unionized workers, 
humiliating union representatives and withholding any rights and benefits from them.367 In 
1954, similarly, the Enamel Factory in Bakırköy fired 137 workers, including the President, 
General Secretary, and the other high-ranking union staff, along with the head representative 
of the workplace.368 The metal bosses especially tended to fire representatives. Even Kemal 
Türkler, the president of the union, was fired in 1955 from M. Sıtkı Bütün Factory.369 Nurettin 
Kalpcan, for example, lost his job in 1956 due to his activities in a plant located in Topçular. 
In 1958, Kemal Türkler, who was the chair of Maden-İş, issued a declaration to the workers 
of Türk Demir Döküm and he said that as a result of the work conflict which Maden-İş 
representatives reported to the Regional Work Office in 1958, the general manager of the 
factory, Burhan Günergun, and his fellow might work to pressure the unionized workers.370 
Kemal Türkler was proven right. Kenan Duman, who was one of the workers representatives 
in the factory, was fired after the work conflict.371 It was also reported in 1959 that the Demir 
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Döküm management fired 30 workers due to their membership in Maden-İş.372 Similarly, 
another plant in Silahtarağa fired 28 unionized workers. 373  The metal bosses especially 
dismissed unionized workers when the workers’ disputes were being settled in the arbitration 
committees.374  Another news source stated that the chair of the Topkapı Branch, Adnan 
Arkın, and the chair of the Şişli Branch, Tevfik Aktürk, were both fired in 1960 for the same 
reason.375 
In some other cases, the wages of dissident workers were cut. Nurettin Kalpcan, who 
was permitted to return to work following a decision of the arbitration committee, was not 
given a portion of his salary.376 Some employers refused to pay social benefits specifically to 
unionized workers. The trade unionists claimed that some employers assigned tasks to them, 
which would bring in only lower wages for unionized workers in order to force them to leave 
their jobs. For them, such attitudes of the employers stemmed from their perception of the 
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trade unions as dens of mischief intent on usurping their rightful profits.377 The Demir Döküm 
management in particular cut the wages of unionized workers. And although the İstanbul 
Regional Work Office decided on a 20 percent wage increase effective from September 1, 
1958, the unionized workers were not paid their wage increases for a long time after that 
date.378 Some metal bosses or managers insulted the unionists on shop floor.379 In some cases, 
employers even beat unionized workers.380  Furthermore, the dissident workers were then 
assigned more dangerous and arduous jobs.381 
Despite all the miserable conditions portrayed in the above chapter, it would be 
wrong to see metal workers as the powerless victims of these economic, social or political 
conditions. Indeed, some of them decided to act collectively to improve conditions in the 
workplace and living places. There were two options for the metal workers to respond such an 
industrial and city life: firstly, the workers might attempt to ameliorate their families’ status 
and become respected citizens in the society through individual or collective actions. It is 
unfortunate that we do not have available documents to demonstrate the pattern of those 
individual actions. We have only a little information about the cases brought to the labor 
courts through the assistance of the union. For collective actions, the metal workers had two 
formal means in the period. Either they might join a political party to benefit from the 
populism as the hegemonic ideology in the 1950s, or they might become a member of the 
union and struggle with their fellow workers. Again, we have little knowledge about whether 
the metal workers utilized the first means. Yet, we do have abundant evidence of them 
utilizing the metal union as a leverage to have a better life. 
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Trade unionism, therefore, was the main means to ameliorate the life conditions and 
earn a respectable in an assumed democratic and modern society. The metal workers who 
founded and organized the unions were determined to stay within the existing political and 
social order and law; moreover, they preferred to improve their union by exploiting the 
fissures within the political system, and to reform the existing legal framework on behalf of 
workers rather than fighting in their workplaces. They also aimed to create a workers’ 
community in which the metal workers of İstanbul would realize, declare and resist as one 
voice in support their common interests. Although the union approach towards the methods of 
battle was revised to a certain extent and the union began to lend more importance to 
conducting fights within workplaces over time, the framework of the first unionists, which 
was to involve themselves in the political sphere and remain within the imposed legal system 
to make workers a respected group in the modern system, left a significant legacy for unions 
to follow in the succeeding periods. Therefore, we must analyze the foundation of the union, 
and the assumed political and industrial system at their early roots.  
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CHAPTER 4 
BETWEEN LOYALTY AND INSUBORDINATION: THE FORMATION AND 
FURTHER PROGRESS OF THE UNION 
 
Trade unions were the significant instruments of the İstanbul workers to improve 
their lives, both in workplaces and communities, throughout the period covering the post-war 
years. Although the history of unionization in Turkey went back to late nineteenth century, it 
does not follow a steady and progressive linear development, largely due to state oppression. 
Finally, the 1938 Association Law prohibited the foundation of organizations based on the 
class.382 After the Second World War, led by the experienced and old workers, trade unions 
emerged in İstanbul in several sectors. The unions, which had been founded in 1946 
considerably flourished without being controlled by the government, were prohibited; yet, the 
government, as debated above, would make the foundation of trade unions possible with the 
1947 Trade Union Law albeit with important reservations to control the development of 
unionism. 
One of the unions founded after the Union Law in 1947 was the Union of İstanbul 
Iron and Metal Hardware Workers. From this date onwards, the metal union became more 
influential, albeit slowly, among the metal workers especially after the mid-1950s. The union, 
which was established by the older skilled workers in the sector, shared the state’s perspective 
about industrial relations and social justice and applied lobby activities to defend the rights of 
its members in its first years. The union’s policy about the industrial framework of the labor 
relations in Turkey would not considerably change in the future, as the relatively young 
workers began to join in the union and this young generation took over the administration of 
it; however, the new administration which took power in 1954 began to conduct several work 
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actions that fell within the defined legal framework of the time to defend its members rights. 
Through application of the collective labor dispute mechanism, the worker’s representatives 
and unionized workers would often experience tense relations with the bosses/managers in the 
sector. It is also important to note that the union strived to form several solidarity mechanisms 
within itself as it expanded among the metal workers after the mid-1950s to empower 
worker’s unity to stand against any laws contrary to workers’ interests, and against any bosses 
who were assumed to attempt to exploit workers “greedily and unlawfully”. 
Consequently, the metal workers’ experiences on city and work life and their 
collective responses on the shop floor contributed to the improvement of a labor language 
which focused on the importance of being together to defend their rights and which oscillated 
between loyalty and insubordination to their bosses/managers in workplaces. However, this 
language was still tempered with the idea of a paternalist state and the existence of common 
interests between workers and employers. In the end, these unionization efforts and a 
common language left an important heritage for the more widespread collective conflicts that 
took place during the 1960s between the metal workers and the bosses/managers. 
 
I. The Formation and Progress of the Union 
Unfortunately, there are few documents that shed light on the activities of the Union 
of İstanbul Iron and Metal Hardware Workers in the late 1940s. The union was formed in July 
1947 by the initiatives of Yusuf Sıdal, who worked as a fitter machinist in Şakir Zümre 
Factory, and other experienced workers.383 Sıdal borrowed 400 Turkish Lira from the Union 
of Textile Workers in Golden Horn Region to establish the group.384 It is important to note 
that some of these older and skilled workers were ex-communists or ex-unionists and they 
were influential in the foundation and progress of the union. One of the founders was 
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renowned Üzeyir Kuran (alias Father Üzeyir) who had been a significant figure in union 
activities of the 1920s. Üzeyir Kuran, who had been trained in a vocational school, had also 
been a member of the Turkish Communist Party at the same time interval.385 Although we do 
not have any document to argue to what extent Üzeyir Kuran socialist legacy has helped in 
the shaping of the union’s policy and worldview of the early metal unionists, we know that 
Father Üzeyir was an influential figure in the union’s activities. First, he was the general chair 
of the union between 1950 and 1954. Then, he was actively involved himself in union 
conferences and made speeches in order to defend the workers’ cause. Despite his socialist 
legacy, Kuran’s ideological stance and approach to workers’ causes was politically 
ambiguous and pragmatic. He utilized the concept of class more often than his counterparts in 
his speeches and talks in several union activities; still, he believed, at least in his discourse, in 
the peaceful solution of workplace conflicts or defended the solidarity between classes 
regarding the development of Turkish industry as a national cause. There is no doubt that his 
ambiguous stance inspired other influential figures and policies of the metal union. 
Yusuf Sıdal, another union founder, was also an experienced and skilled metal 
worker. Like Üzeyir Kuran, he had actively engaged in unionization movements in the 
1920s.386 There exists no document to show that Sıdal was a member of the communist party, 
but Sıdal and Kuran knew each other from those days. Like both these figures, all of the other 
founders of the metal union were skilled workers in the private metal factories in İstanbul, 
such as Ayvansaray Nail Factory, Şakir Zümre Metal Hardware Factory, and Türmasan Nail 
Factory. For example, Nizamettin Babaoğlu, another important figure within the union, had 
attended a vocational high-school and was recruited into a metal factory.387 Similarly, Basri 
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Karagöz honed his skills during work.388 One advantage of a founders’ position in the job 
hierarchy was that the union, from the beginning of its foundation, acted mainly to improve 
the skills and lifestyles of its members. Providing financial help to its members was defined 
as one of the duties in its founding statutes in 1947.389 Leading by the skilled workers might 
make the foundation of the union easy, and in this sense, the history of the 1947 unionism in 
Turkey fits well within the labor history in the world. However, being a skilled worker does 
not seem to give a privilege in involving in the union affairs, at least in the eyes of 
bosses/managers as it is being proven by that Yusuf Sıdal as the general chair of the union 
was fired in 1948. 390  Therefore, the oppression on unionized workers, either skilled or 
unskilled, was severe in the metal sector. 
Despite being founded by the older and skilled workers, the founders did not attempt 
to exclude unskilled workers; rather, they aimed to develop the union core which they 
assumed would be constituted of mainly skilled workers. This would prove unfruitful, 
however, due to the scarcity of skilled workers in the sector, and both unskilled workers, as 
well as skilled ones, would later become the active members of the union. In this regard, it 
seems that there was no division between the organized metal workers in terms of their skills; 
for example, both of these groups would be workers’ representatives in the future and/or act 
as the active and militant members of the union. In fact that there were six unskilled workers 
as well as skilled ones such as a fitter, a moulder, two turners, a caster, a press operator and a 
welder among the members of the executive committee who were selected in 1957.391 This 
would enhance the solidarity between workers, especially when they collectively encounter 
with bosses/managers on the shop floor. 
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In fact, the post-war unions, as the actors of the industrial democracy and as 
significant institutions to provide worker loyalty to the factory regime, were not effective in 
achieving their initial goals and they had difficulty attracting particularly the young and 
unskilled worker in their first years. Indeed, the scholars of the period claimed that workers 
were indifferent to the unions in the late 1940s. 392  Üzeyir Kuran bemoaned workers’ 
ignorance of the importance of being organized in the union in 1950.393 Distrust of the legal 
framework can account for some of the workers’ indifference to unions – a framework that 
often failed in its promises due to legal constraints. But the main reason for the weakness of 
trade unions was employer oppression of unions and workers’ representatives. Even the 
Labor Minister of the DP government, Hasan Polatkan, admitted such oppression on those 
who sought workers’ rights on the shop floor.394 Yusuf Sıdal put employers’ oppression in the 
spotlight to explain workers’ ignorance or reluctance to being unionized.395 In fact, Yusuf 
Sıdal himself was the first union leader to be dismissed from his job in 1948 due to his 
involvement in union affairs.396 In the future, Kemal Türkler who became the general chair in 
1954, would be dismissed from the Sıtkı Bütün Enamel Factory. Similarly, the metal workers 
of Şakir Zümre Factory confessed that they could not fight for their rights out of the fear of 
losing their jobs. They also noted that the employer established a relief fund for non-
unionized employees in the factory to prevent workers from being drawn into union 
organization.397 As discussed above, there is an abundance of news reports, which show how 
often the worker’s representatives lost their jobs in the metal sector during the 1950s. 
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Consequently, the metal union could not flourish in terms of membership figures in its 
earliest period. 
In fact, the union made no huge leaps forward in the beginning of the 1950s. In a 
general meeting in 1954, it was stated that the number of organized metal workers in the 
union was over one thousand members. But according to the officers, the union was still in its 
infancy.398 It seems that with the foundation of the new metal plants and increasing numbers 
of prospective metal workers coming into the city, the expansion of the metal union would 
later become more feasible, after the mid-1950s. In parallel with the coming of the young and 
uneducated migrants, a young and more militant unionist generation, which was often 
accused of being communist, began to rule the union. In the 1954 congress, Kemal Türkler, 
who had become the chair of the Bakırköy Branch in 1952, and his friends, Ruhi Yümlü, 
Cabir Metilli and Kazım Narmanlı, took power in the union and followed a more militant 
route on the shop floor.399 Due to the intense efforts of these young metal workers and their 
pragmatic stance to benefit from political opportunities, the union would significantly expand 
towards the 1960s. In the 1956 congress, the union decided to act on a national scale and 
changed its name to Maden ve Madeni Eşya İşçileri Sendikası-Maden-İş (Mine and Metal 
Hardware Workers’ Union). By 1957, branches had been established in the four different 
districts of İstanbul which covered the area of the most important metal plants, and the 
number of organized metal workers rose to 6 708 in the city.400  By 1961, the total number of 
their district branches was 7 in İstanbul and the number of union members had reached to 28 
000.401  The numbers suggest that after the mid-point of the decade, Maden-İş showed a 
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considerable growth and it became an influential organization among the İstanbul metal 
workers.  
It may be assumed that clear that the development of the union was the result of the 
stubborn and militant struggles of the top officers of the union, who were representatives at 
the same time on the shop floor and worker’s representatives. Despite oppression and losing 
their jobs more than once, as discussed above, the new generation did not give up fighting for 
the rights of the union members. More importantly, they would continue to work in the plants 
and they never severed their relations with the workers. That means the union officers had 
close relations with the rank and file. In fact, the union spent considerable effort to return the 
dismissed representatives to their workplaces.402 As a result of their struggles, a significant 
number of workers related to the cause of the union and learned to act together on the shop 
floor. Furthermore, a young unionist generation arose in both the rank and file of the union 
and on the shop floor level as union representatives. This generation, which earned the trust 
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of the workers in the 1950s, would be significant actors of the more severe struggles during 
the next decade. 
Provincial newspapers and union journals of the 1950s readily show us that Maden-İş 
was improved on the shoulders of representatives on the shop floor. The worker’s 
representatives who were chosen by the workers were given the task of bringing the worker’s 
demands to management, and presenting the complaints of workers and managers while 
trying to solve those problems through negotiation. This model had been established by the 
Labor Law ratified in 1936. The existing law already provided workers with the chance of 
selecting their own representatives, who was shown also by Maden-İş at the union’s 
representative on the shop floor, or the union attempted to make their own representatives 
selected as the worker’s representatives at the factory. Nearly all worker’s representatives 
inside the workplaces, where the union was organized, were at the same time the union’s 
representatives.403 The representatives, who worked cooperatively with their colleagues and 
dealt with even the smallest, day to day problems brought to them, were the key figures in the 
organization of the union.404 With a lack of written evidence, it is hard to draw conclusions on 
how the worker’s and/or union’s representatives functioned in the internal organization of the 
union; yet, since nearly all high officers of the union, such as Kemal Türkler, Kazım 
Narmanlı, Cabir Metilli and others were at the same time the worker’s and union’s 
representatives, there must have been close relations between rank and file and the people 
who were at the top positions of the union hierarchy at the same time. For the workers, the 
union, rather than being an abstract, complex entity, was embodied by the worker’s 
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representatives who were working beside them on shop floor. Therefore, representatives were 
the most essential element of the union to bridge the gap between union and workers. 
The importance of the representative mechanism after the war years may further be 
understood from the intense and widespread boss’/manager’s oppression of representatives, 
as will be described in detail below. The metal bosses/managers utilized several tactics, 
including not allowing elections to take place, and forcing workers to select the bosses’ own 
“man” (representative), or dismissing the elected workers, etc., all to prevent the union 
gaining strength on the shop floor level. The metal union actually had a difficult struggle 
against their bosses to have unionized workers’ representatives, or to have their own chosen 
members selected in workplaces as representatives. The choice of “man” was important since 
they would be the most significant actors in dealing with workers’ problems and grievances 
through the law, and there were assumed to act as fair mediators between workers and 
managers/bosses.405 The most significant function of representatives in the workplace was to 
carry workers’ problems to managers. The metal representatives chose to meet with managers 
directly as a first step in solving shop floor issues. The union often emphasized the 
importance of compromising with employers to create peaceful working conditions on the 
shop floor level. 406  But due to the widespread oppression of both representatives and 
organized workers in the sector, the relations between bosses and representatives was 
antagonistic from the beginning. In fact, the representatives were the most oppressed groups, 
a fact that clearly attracted the rage of the metal employers. Yet, the metal representatives 
would largely try to fulfill their duties during the 1950s and would faithfully execute union 
policies on shop floor level. In this regard, they would become the most significant group for 
the union by providing steady relations between the union and the workers, themselves. The 
union officers who were at the same time metal representatives, such as Kemal Türkler, 
Kazım Narmanlı, Ruhi Yümlü, Cavit Şarman, Hilmi Güner in the 1950s, would be most 
important actors during the more intense struggles of the 1960s. 
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II. The Union, Bosses and State 
İstanbul Iron and Metal Hardware Union had shared the general ideological and 
nationalist political framework of the post-war industrial democracy in Turkey to leverage its 
demands. In its first statute, which was immediately published after the 1947 Trade Union 
Law, it was stated that the union would elevate the social status and lifestyles of its members 
only by working within the boundaries of the law. Furthermore, the statute also claimed that 
anyone who was known to harbor ideas that might damage the “high interests of the state and 
nation” would not be accepted as a member.407 The statute designated that the aim of the 
union was to cooperate with employers to increase productivity in the workplace, and to 
improve relations between employers and employees. This would result in the development 
of national industry and wealth, which the workers were assumed to get their deserved 
share.408 However, the actual progress of relations with the metal bosses/managers after the 
Second World War would compel the union to fight with the employees, rather than 
cooperating with them, in a combined effort to improve the lives of its members in that 
decade. The ensuing fight clearly influenced the language of union’s officers and worker 
representatives. In this regard, following the national development discourse that promised a 
good life in case of working in solidarity with employers limited the activities of union which 
could easily be indicated as harmful to the development of national industry; however, this 
nationalist discourse, at the same time, provided a strong ground to the union activists who 
hinged their demands for worker’s rights based on the employees being loyal and hard 
working citizens of the country. In fact, when they felt that worker’s rights were not provided 
either by bosses/managers or state, the union officers and worker’s representatives utilized the 
nationalist ideology to leverage their demands. 
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A) Ideological Framework of Union Policies 
Following the dominant nationalist discourse of the post-war years in terms of 
national industrial development, the organized metal workers of İstanbul supported the idea 
of working in cooperation with their employers to improve national productivity and industry 
in Turkey. Thus, the metal union hit upon the idea of promoting this solidarity between the 
classes as a way to develop the whole society without falling into “destructive class 
struggles.” The union seemed to take responsibility for engendering loyalty among workers to 
their workplaces, in the absence of any employer’s strategy to do so. In return for cooperating 
with employers, the metal workers would demand a reasonable, modest income to sustain 
their families and provide a good lifestyle for them, as well as expecting decent treatment in 
the workplace. They also wished to be recognized as helpful citizens who contributed to 
development of society in their minds and therefore to be given a respected place within the 
broader social hierarchy. 
In order to foster the union position after the war years, the early union ideology 
defined workers as an indispensable group of an assumed democratic society. It stated that the 
society could not live in prosperity unless workers got their deserved rights and shares: the 
interests of the metal workers could not be separated from the interests of the whole nation. 
Under this ideal society, neither bosses nor workers should be greedy, or demand more than 
they deserved.409 In a speech during the opening of Halıcıoğlu Branch in 1953, Yusuf Sıdal 
stated that the unionized metal workers constituted a significant section of the army of 
production in the land; therefore, the union had to develop, despite all hardships, to fulfill its 
national duties.410 On the front page of the union’s newspaper dated April 1954, it was stated 
that the prosperity of workers was strictly tied with Turkey’s future. The paper went on to 
define the role of workers’ representatives on the shop floor as a “national” duty.411 And it 
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seems that the coming of the new young unionist generation barely changed this ideological 
stance.  
Indeed, the arguments in the union journal asserted that the development of modern 
society all over the world was the product of workers’ efforts. Furthermore, the working 
class, according to Maden-İş, was the most significant social group in the maintenance of a 
peaceful and healthy society. To not recognize workers’ rights and to not respect to them as 
citizens would be to jeopardize whole system.412 In fact, Turkish society would improve on 
the shoulders of hard working and loyal Turkish workers. The national economy, similarly, 
would be promoted by workers who were supplying products. 413  The president, Kemal 
Türkler, asserted that the metal workers were specifically proud of being a group of Turkish 
workers.414 To encourage this sense of pride, the union routinely advised its members to work 
hard on the shop floor and be loyal citizens. Being diligent workers, indeed, was expressed as 
a national duty. To disseminate its ideology amongst the workers, the union representatives 
distributed leaflets advising workers to work hard toward increasing national productivity. 
These leaflets put forth that worker’s assiduous work would, in turn, result in the 
development of the national economy. 415  The union defined its very existence and main 
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function as being an entity, which facilitated an increase of productivity in the workplace. In 
parallel with this, Maden-İş expressed its intention of contributing to peaceful relations on the 
shop floor, creating a peaceful work order and helping to increase productivity, rather than 
destroying the harmony between employees and employers and inhibiting the proper running 
of enterprises.416  The union presented the interests of workers as the interests of whole 
society. They felt that recognizing workers’ rights and improving their life and work 
conditions would contribute to the development of Turkish society as a whole. To make such 
a society possible, Maden-İş sought to establish good relations based on mutual respect and 
understanding with bosses.417 However, it would be wrong to argue that such a nationalist 
ideology which might cloud, or cover up, the inequalities based on the class differences in a 
capitalist society that completely restricted the union activities; rather, the union was 
successful in making its demands through the nationalist ideology. Since the union’s 
nationalist ideology demanded a fair return for its members’ hard work, from the state, 
society and employees. In fact, when this request fell on deaf ears, the union discourse would 
adopt a more rebellious tone. 
After reminding employers of the importance and functions of workers for the benefit 
of society and country, the metal workers listed their demands in the congresses of the union 
and legal work disputes after the war years. They wanted their hard-earned rights and shares 
to be recognized. Since the most important industrial resource was the willingness of the 
labor force, the workers argued they had the right to make such demands of their bosses.418 
The seditionary language of the union emerged from that point. Not only was the assumed 
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industrial regime of the existing political structure shared by the metal union, but also the real 
experiences of their city life and work life which also contributed in shaping the ideological 
framework of the union. The real, daily experiences, which were very different from the 
idealized picture as sketched by the industrial regime, did not shake the roots of the union 
ideology; nevertheless, the gap between that ideal and reality was clearly pointed out by 
union officers or representatives. For example, Üzeyir Kuran claimed that although the 
workers constituted the most honored group of the society as the producers of wealth, they 
still could not win their rights. 419  According to the Kemal Sülker notes on the eighth 
congresses of Maden-İş, most members stated that workers did not have a respected place in 
social life and were despised by other social groups.420 The future chair of the union, Kemal 
Türkler, had already normalized this type of social structure in his speech to a union 
conference in 1952, based upon the idea that the social dichotomies were embedded in human 
beings from the beginning of the time; nonetheless, he warned the upper class must not 
oppress the lower class for their own interests; otherwise, if the oppression in Turkey did 
continue, social peace and justice would be in jeopardy.421 To maintain social peace and 
industrial democracy, bosses and state had to fulfill their roles properly, just as much as 
workers. However, the shop floor experiences of the metal workers proved that the metal 
bosses were far from fulfilling their assumed “national” duties.  
  
B) Bosses/Managers and the Union 
As noted previously, the union ideology valued cooperative and peaceful relations on 
the shop floor level. There were two primary actors for union relations in the workplaces: 
bosses and managers. If the bosses/managers would realize the common interests between 
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themselves and their employees, and the common good of workers’ rights on the shop floor, 
the union argued there would be no reason for conflict within workplaces to occur, and 
peaceful relations on shop floor would result in the development of national productivity and 
wealth from which all social groups could fairly benefit.422 According to Basri Karagöz, if 
enterprises and bosses acceded workers’ rights and ran their enterprises in a proper manner, 
hard-working employees would increase productivity in those workplaces, in turn. So, both 
sides would benefit from this cooperative relationship.423 Nevertheless, their actual relations 
gave the metal workers reason to complain that the metal bosses did not realize the common 
benefits between employees and employers in Turkey. Actually, most of the metal bosses 
exploited their workers without recognizing the rule of any law. They oppressed workers on 
the shop floor, were intolerant to any workers’ demands or objections, and they inhibited 
workers’ solidarity, which took the shape as unionization. 424  The opinions of the metal 
workers about their employers, therefore, developed as a mixture of their ideals and real 
experiences. 
Despite sharing the ideological framework of the period, which stood for the 
solidarity and cooperation of employees and employers, the language of the metal workers 
evolved to be negative toward their employers. Although, in several cases. Maden-İş officers 
or news reports in the union journal spoke positively about the metal bosses who were seen to 
be taking care of their employee’s interests. In one case, the union hailed the owner of the 
employer at Ayvansaray Nail Factory when he compromised with workers’ demands in terms 
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of wages, social benefits and unionization. In return, the employer’s representative at the 
Ayvansaray Nail Factory claimed that factory management was aware of the benefits of 
workers’ unionization within the factory. He described the union as one of the main factors 
behind developing an enterprise. According to him, workers and employers needed each other 
for the sake of mutually supporting national interests. This enterprise, which also paid the 
workers’ insurance premiums without any cut, was held up by the union as an ideal one.425 In 
fact, the union representatives succeeded in fulfilling workers’ demands by directly meeting 
with the bosses in some cases. The union journal presented such figures positively, declared 
workers’ gratitude towards them, and discussed the satisfaction of both sides. Furthermore, 
they touted such well-intentioned bosses as an ideal example for the “intolerant and greedy” 
ones to follow.426 In one case, the union sent a letter of thanks to an employer who gave 
bonuses to the employees.427 The union and representatives put forth that the sympathetic 
bosses who took pains with the development and improvement of the country than their own 
pocket would more readily tolerate workers’ moderate demands. However, since most bosses 
could not shake off “old habits and practices,” the metal union complained that its attempts to 
establish good relations with bosses mostly failed. 428  When they were in direct conflict, 
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whether in the political sphere or on the shop floor, the metal workers defined their interests 
and employers’ interests as opposing viewpoints. 
Nonetheless, such examples were very few in comparison with the examples of 
bosses who were assumed to frown upon workers’ demands. In most cases, the metal workers 
had to utilize the full weight of their lawful rights and conduct collective actions to even get 
their legal rights, as they were generally not adhered to by the bosses/managers in the 
workplaces. These legally bounded collective actions in which workers, mostly 
representatives, clashed with bosses left an important legacy for the succeeding periods in 
terms of how workers related to bosses as a different social group. At the core, the metal 
workers experienced their relations with bosses as contentious, a point made obvious from the 
narratives of their experiences on shop floor and from the increasing number of the work 
disputes brought to the arbitration committees in İstanbul. According to the metal workers, 
the metal employers did not want the state to intervene in industrial relations on the shop floor 
and, further, they did not want such relations to be formalized. They also claimed that 
employers did not apply Labor Law on the shop floor and that the bosses wanted to run 
enterprises completely by their own rules. For them, the bosses appeared reluctant to be 
limited by law, both in terms of administration practices and profits. The union leaders gave 
plenty of examples to disclose bosses’ unlawful deeds in their speeches in the conferences 
and meetings, in their talks with correspondents, or in petitions to the Ministry or Regional 
Work Office.429 The metal workers also protested such employers in their meetings.430 Kemal 
Sülker, who was a famous journalist and high officer in the metal union, described such 
employers as follows: 
“Some employers cannot stomach the workers’ rights which were recognized 
by the law. They only aimed to earn excess profit and run their workplaces at 
their own will. They wanted workers to work from the early morning to the 
late evening. They wanted to dismiss workers when they get sick. The 
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employers did not want any wage increase. They will not give out Sunday 
wages to employees who do not work on Sundays. Let alone two daily 
wages, they do not desire to give one daily wage on Republican Holidays.”431  
 
Consequently, the language of most metal workers defined Turkish employers, who 
were not eager to provide for worker rights, as having bad intentions, being greedy in terms of 
profits and intolerant to workers’ rights.432 Such employers, the workers argued, still applied 
“Middle Age methods” to increase their profits.433 These employers generally interpreted the 
union as if the union would act against the benefit of the enterprises; therefore, they attempted 
to destroy the union at every turn.434 As a result, the union officers accused most Turkish 
metal bosses of being bent on the inhumane exploitation of their workers. The metal bosses 
were disrespectful to their workers, they insulted workers and they even treated workers as 
slaves, which they pretended to have purchased. The union claimed that although workers 
worked hard to fulfill their national duties, the metal bosses acted selfishly about workers’ 
demands to take what was rightfully theirs.435 Those “greedy and exploitative” behaviours of 
the metal/bosses were discussed as harmful to the “national” interests: the metal unionists and 
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representatives, thus, applied the nationalist ideology in order to present their fights with 
bosses/managers as legitimate one. 
This perception facilitated the workers’ motivation to fight when their rights were not 
recognized. One experienced metal worker, Father Üzeyir, called upon workers to not be 
afraid of the bosses’ oppression, and the bulletin of the metal workers also called on workers’ 
representatives to resist oppression. Some employers, the metal workers argued, were 
opposed even to the existence of unions. On the other hand, the union argued, workers who 
were exposed to the arbitrary decisions of employers constituted the foundation of the 
country. Consequently, employers had to abandon their oppression of union members and 
representatives in order to fulfill their duties to the nation. 436  Those experiences and 
perceptions undoubtedly encouraged the metal workers to define themselves as “us” as 
against the bosses, which were expressed as “them.”437 But it must be argued that such a 
dissident language alone did not define the nature of relations between the workers and 
bosses/managers as a contentious and antagonistic one arising out of the distinct position of 
those two social groups within the capitalist mode of production; rather their actual unfair 
relationship could also be traced to the “profit greedy” characteristics of the Turkish metal 
bosses. Consequently, either new laws or the “good-will” of the metal employers might have 
ameliorated those inequities.  
Despite workers sharing a common outlook with management for national economic 
improvement, the contentious encounters on the shop floor fostered the idea of fighting with 
bosses when necessary, using appropriate legal mechanisms. That is, the union had faith in 
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the state and the existing laws to regulate industrial relations and restrain “greedy” bosses on 
behalf of workers. Although several other unions and workers collectively went on strike 
during the period, and thereby transgressed the relevant law in effect, neither the metal 
workers nor their union initiated such an attempt. The metal workers’ efforts to draw bosses 
into the preset framework of the law were an important legacy to be inherited by the union in 
the following years. 
On this subject, the available documents disclose that both the union ideology and 
common language of the workers oscillated between insubordination and loyalty to their 
employers based upon the nationalist ideology of the post-war years. Although the union’s 
ideology stood for peaceful relations with the metal bosses, when the workers felt widespread 
and intense unfairness and exploitation, they easily shifted to a language, which spoke against 
employers and made a clear division between workers and bosses. In such cases, a significant 
portion of the metal workers declared their support in the fight for their rights. 
 
C) The State and Union 
The union’s ideology reflected a pragmatic approach to its relations with the state 
mechanisms in place at the time. Yusuf Sıdal claimed in 1948 that the standard of living had 
to improve in the name of developing productivity and the industry as a whole. To such an 
end, he added, the government had to implement new rules and regulations.438 That is to say 
that, in line with the hegemonic framework of the industrial democracy, the metal workers 
assigned a vital place to the state to regulate the workplace and industrial relations in the 
country. By being careful to remain within the law and simply revise the boundaries of it, it 
can be said that the metal workers struggled to formalize industrial relations and the labor 
regime as much as possible in order to overcome the so-called “arbitrary nature” of 
employers. 
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Above all, the union’s discourse analyzed state power as an intermediary force 
between employers and themselves. In other words, it saw state, governments or laws as the 
protector of workers as against the “exploitative and greedy” attitudes of bosses. The workers, 
who were loyal citizens to their country and state, would only be beneficial and diligent 
members of society when their rights had been granted. After reminding everyone that the 
workers were the indispensable group of economic life, an army of production, the union 
officers and representatives called the state officers, bureaucrats, ministers or deputies in the 
parliament  “elders.” The metal workers who espoused such a paternalist discourse requested 
the “elders” provide workers’ rights in industrial and economic spheres.439 In this discourse, 
the union and workers’ representatives defined a kind of industrial citizenship, which had to 
be framed by laws and be accepted by employees. Only then would industrial democracy and 
social peace improve on the shoulders of citizen workers. In fact, recognizing workers’ rights 
and providing a good life to them would, in turn, result in an increase in productivity. In sum, 
recognizing workers’ rights would improve the economy and society as a whole in Turkey.440  
Following such an argument, the union called the state officers and institutions to intervene in 
the labor disputes between workers and bosses/managers on behalf of the former group. 
Thus, such an approach to state explains why Maden-İş mainly battled in the political 
sphere to get their promised rights, as well as to revise laws and regulations. Until the 1960s, 
Maden-İş applied two primary methods to tackle the problems of the metal workers: one was 
to improve close relations with the political actors, that is lobbyism, and the other one was to 
conduct resistance actions on the shop floor level. The union mainly chose to act in the 
political sphere to protect workers’ rights in the late 1940s. A union member, Basri Karagöz, 
had argued that the metal workers founded the union in order to get their rights, which were 
defined by laws. He added that as a result of intimate relations with high state officers the 
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union would able to gain some rights.441 We do not know whether there was an organic 
relationship between the union and the party in government, CHP, in the period, nevertheless, 
Yusuf Sıdal was a supporter of this party. Furthermore, the union got some 5 000 Turkish 
Lira from the fund that was provided by the government to the İstanbul unions in 1948.442 The 
unionists also tried to be active in the political scene, itself. One metal workers and union 
member, Nizamettin Babaoğlu, became an independent candidate in the 1950 general 
elections to represent workers and seek their rights in the National Assembly.443 As we know, 
Babaoğlu failed in this attempt. The union, moreover, began to challenge with legal collective 
disputes, especially after the middle of the decade, in addition to persuading deputies, 
political parties or governments to grant workers’ rights. 
 
III. The Union Acts I: Exerting Pressure on State  
In spite of its trust in the state and laws, the union found the boundaries of existing 
laws too limiting and consequently it attempted to expand them. Furthermore, the union 
exerted its pressure on state institutions like the Labor Ministry or the Provincial Labor 
Office, to force bosses to apply laws on shop floor properly. And lastly, the union benefited 
from the mechanisms of labor courts and work conflicts where the union representatives 
openly challenged bosses albeit under the supervision of state officers. 
From its foundation to the 1960s, Maden-İş mainly acted to benefit from the laws and 
institutional channels, which were provided by the state. Such a strategy was their main way 
to overcome workers’ concerns in city and work life in the late 1940s, due to their ideology 
and the relative weakness of the union itself. The union leaders, therefore, participated in the 
meetings of some official groups, which were created to regulate industrial life in the nation. 
For example, Yusuf Sıdal was the representative of the İstanbul metal hardware workers in 
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the Social Security Administration where he struggled to gain workers’ rights.444  In order to 
realize their goals, the metal unionists were involved in the Work Assemblies of 1947 and 
1954, which were undertaken to provide an industrial peace mechanism to bring the state, 
employers and employees together and reach some decisions on regulating the labor regime, 
and to push the state officers to accept their demands. 445  Conversely, the state officers 
attended and gave speeches in the meeting of the metal workers. 446  In fact, lobbyism 
constituted the main method of the union for a long time. 
The metal workers also attempted to use the Labor Ministry or the İstanbul Regional 
Work Office for solving problems. They wired their grievances about industrial life, such as 
troubles about laws or complaints in the workplaces, to the Labor Ministry or Regional Work 
Office in İstanbul.447 In 1948, the İstanbul unions, including the metal union, wrote a report 
about the unions’ troubles for the consideration of the Labor Ministry.448 Similarly, when 50 
workers were dismissed from a factory in April 1948, the union applied legal means to solve 
this problem, which the union defined as a national cause, and called for the Regional Work 
Office and Social Security Administration to deal with the issue.449 
It is unfortunately not clear to what extent this method was successful during the late 
1940s. However, a change in political atmosphere with the introduction of the multiparty 
politics after the war years encouraged not just the metal unionists, but nearly all organized 
workers in Turkey to capitalize on opportunities which might possibly come out of the rivalry 
between parties. In fact, following up on the DP’s promises to provide rights and prosperity to 
workers, the İstanbul unions pressed on the demands they had declared in the previous period, 
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immediately after the 1950 elections. The increasing hopes triggered by the new government 
were reflected on the shop floor, too. The newspapers of the first days of the DP’s 
government were bursting with news of how the workers raised their voices after the 
government revised some items in the Labor Law. One significant aspect of the amendments 
was to recognize unions’ right to engage in collective labor disputes in workplaces. As a 
result, unions would have a chance to become more powerful and effective. When workers 
were dismissed in several sectors, unions and workers’ representatives in the workplace 
maintained the legacy of calling state institutions and officers to their aid in August 1950.450  
The metal union was one of the most hopeful workers’ organizations of this new 
epoch. In the words of general chair of the union, Yusuf Sıdal, the metal workers paid close 
attention to the news from Ankara where the government was supposed to enact important 
laws to protect workers and improve their lives.451 In all, the tide of events for the metal 
workers further changed, at least in the imagination of the unionists, with DP’s coming to 
power in May 1950. One metal worker, Basri Karagöz, said that he actually became hopeful 
after the change in the political balance in 1950. 452  After the DP’s victory, a workers’ 
representative from the Silahtarağa Power Plant cried that the workers had waited a long time 
for the enactment of the worker-friendly laws and regulations to protect employees, and he 
said they did not aim to transgress any laws.453 By reminding the public of the workers’ 
importance as a social group within the society, and the state’s duty to protect this group’s 
interests to the new government, the metal workers continued to depend on the legal 
framework to meet their goals. In comparison with the previous periods, we have more 
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documents to shed a light on metal workers’ demands and efforts in terms of the legal 
framework regarding the industrial relations and factory regime in the 1950s.  
As with the period before 1950, the metal workers spoke in the congresses of the 
union that their struggle had to depend on the existing legal framework; but they were also 
aware that they had to fight to change and revise the laws which worked against to their 
interests even after the DP’s coming into power.454 They demanded several new items and 
revisions in the Labor Law from the new government, such as the enactment of the law to 
strike, or analysis of the minimum wages in the sector.455 The union wired petitions to the 
Grand National Assembly or Labor Ministry in Ankara in several cases to ask about the 
progress of these laws, especially the right to strike and a minimum wage, which the new 
government had promised long ago.456 
It seems that during the 1950s, Maden-İş firmly defended the strike right. Rather than 
being a contentious issue, the union perceived strike as a regulatory activity to balance the 
interests of two different groups, namely workers and bosses, whose interests were assumed 
to be common in the “natural order of society.” Without a strike law, the much desired 
industrial democracy and social peace would become impossible. Through strikes, workers 
would get their deserved and fair share from the national wealth. Otherwise, the problems of 
creating a wealthy and happy minority would jeopardize the social peace. In this regard, 
rather than being a destructive activity, strike would maintain peaceful relations and 
cooperation between workers and bosses. As a result, Turkish industry and the economy 
would greatly benefit from the strike right. The assumed nationalist workers and unions of the 
                                                             
454 “Üzeyir Kuran’ın İşçilere Verdiği Öğüt ve Ötedenberi Üzerinde Durduğu Fikirler [The Advice and 
Opinions of Üzeyir Kuran],” Gece Postası, September 9, 1951. 
455 “Basit Sebepler Yüzünden İşten Çıkarılan İşçilerin Durumu [The State of Workers Who Were 
Dismissed For Trivial Reasons],” Gece Postası, September 1, 1951; “İşçi Mevzuatının Tamamen 
Değiştirilmesi Lazımdır [The Regulations Regarding Workers Must Be Wholly Changed],” Gece 
Postası, September 29, 1951; “Fabrikalarda Çalışan Bütün İşçiler Sendikaya Girebilmeli [All Young 
Workers in Factories Must be Recognized with the Right to be a Member of Unions],” Gece Postası, 
November 4, 1951; “İş Kanununun 22nci Maddesi İşçileri Müşkülata Uğrattı [Item 22 of the Labor 
Law Caused Troubles Among Workers],” Gece Postası, March 18, 1952. 
456 Pek Muhterem Mebuslarımız [Our Esteemed Representatives in the Grand Assembly], TÜSTAV 
Kemal Sülker Archive Box 3 Envelope 147; “Mebuslara Mektup Yazıldı [A Letter Written to the 
Deputies],” İstanbul Demir ve Madeni Eşya İşçileri Sendikası News Bulletin year 2 no. 7 (14 January 
1956); “Başvekil ve Çalışma Vekiline Tel Çekildi [A Letter Wired to the Prime Minister and Labor 
Minister],” Maden-İş year 1 no. 16 (10 August 1957), 1. 
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Turkish industry would never utilize the strike right for enabling chaos within the Turkish 
economy or society.457 In brief, the union successfully applied nationalist ideology in order to 
defend the strike right. 
 
Figure 2: - The Strike According to Maden-İş. –Wage Increase, Wage Increase, Wage Increase. –
Everything... (Source: İstanbul Demir ve Madeni Eşya İşçileri Sendikası News Bulletin, year 2 no. 5 
[19 March 1955], 3). 
 
In the same vein, the union firmly defended the implementation of minimum wage. 
After minimum wage came to be enforced in the sector, the metal workers found the level of 
it to be insufficient for the workers to provide for their families. One of the reasons for the 
low level of the minimum wage, according to the workers, was that they were settled over the 
expenses of other workers in a family. However, they felt minimum wage should have been 
determined by averaging over a multi-worker family, which included at least three employed 
                                                             
457 “Grev Hakkı Kampanyası [The Strike Right Campaign],” İstanbul Demir ve Madeni Eşya İşçileri 
Sendikası News Bulletin year 1 no. 5 (12 March 1955), 2; Kemal Sülker, “Demir ve Madeni Eşya 
İşçileri Bugün Kongre Akdediyor [The Iron and Metal Hardware Workers Are Holding A Congress 
Today],” Gece Postası, July 17, 1955; “İşçi Sigortalarına Sert ve Ağır Hücumlar [Fierce and Severe 
Criticism of the Workers’ Insurance],” Son Saat, April 9, 1956; “Grev Hakkı Tartışmaları [The 
Debates on the Right to Strike Right],” İstanbul Demir ve Madeni Eşya İşçileri Sendikası News 
Bulletin, 14 September 1956, 8; Yeni İstanbul Gazetesi Müdürlüğüne [To the General Office of Yeni 
İstanbul Newspaper], TÜSTAV Kemal Sülker Archive Box 3 Envelope 149; Madeni Eşya İşçileri 
Kongresinde İthamlar [The Accusations on the Congress of Metal Hardware Workers], TÜSTAV 
Kemal Sülker Archive Box 40 Envelope 1856; Kemal Sülker, “Maden-İş ve Tahkim Müessesinin 
Aksaklığı [Maden-İş and the Defect of the Arbitration Order],” Gece Postası, May 7, 1957; Kemal 
Sülker, “Maden-İş’in XI. Büyük Kongresi [The Eleventh Grand Congress of Maden-İş],” Gece Postası, 
December 15 1957, “Maden-İş Başkanı Vergi Adaleti İstiyoruz Dedi [The President of Maden-İş Said 
We Want Justice on Taxes],” Gece Postası, February 14, 1959; “Eyüp Semt Şubesi Kongresi Yapıldı, 
İstekler Belirtildi [The Eyüp District Congress Were Done and Demands Were Claimed],” Maden-İş, 
20 July 1959, 1 and 3-4. 
 
 
152 
persons.458 Maden-İş also asked to revise existing laws regarding the annual leave of absence 
with payment, the payment of daily fees during the off-days instead of half fees or severance 
pays, and the regulation of the arbitration committee. In fact, the government legislated 
several laws on these issues during their time in power.459 If such rights were not provided by 
the government, it would be very hard to keep the national life stable. 
In parallel, the union officers applied their old method of establishing perpetual 
relations with the state institutions and officers.460 In addition to the Labor Ministry or the DP 
government, the metal union and workers applied to the Provincial Labor Office in İstanbul to 
resolve labor grievances on the shop floor. The metal union defined the office as the “Marko 
Pasha” 461  of the workers, the place where all workers had the chance to state their 
problems.462 While the union pushed the Ministry to legislate new laws or revise the existing 
ones on behalf of workers, they applied to the Provincial Offices to solve their urgent 
problems, such as oppression of unionized workers, dismissals of the workers’ or union’s 
representatives, management refusal to apply laws and legislations, or the resolution of work 
disputes brought to the arbitration committees on workplaces, arbitrary wage cuts, forced 
                                                             
458  “Madeni Eşya İşçileri Kongresinde İthamlar [The Accusations on the Congress of the Metal 
Hardware Workers],” Gece Postası, April 16, 1956; “Madeni Eşya İş Kolunda Asgari Ücretin Yeniden 
Tesbiti İçin Çalışmalar Başladı [The Endevaours Were Reinitiated in the Metal Hardware Branch to 
Re-Detect the Minimum Wage],” Şehir, October 10, 1958; “İşçilerin Çalışma Bakanından İstediği Belli 
Başlı Hakları [The Basic Rights Which the Workers Asked from The Labor Minister],” Maden-İş year 
2 no. 31 (28 October 1958), 1 and 3; “Hususi Sektörde Çalışan İşçiler Zam Alamıyormu [Does not 
Workers in the Private Sector Get Wage Increase],” Şehir, February 14, 1959. 
459  Kemal Sülker, “Tahkim Nizamnamesinin Bariz Aksaklıkları [The Obvious Defects of the 
Arbitration Regulation],” Gece Postası, November 11, 1955. For the list of the rights provided by the 
DP government, see: The Ministry of Labor İşçiye Sağlanan Faydalar [The Benefits Provided to 
Workers], (Ankara: n.p., 1957); Ahmet Makal, Türkiye’de Çok Partili Dönemde Çalışma İlişkileri. 
460 “20.000 Madeni Eşya İşçisi Pazar Günü Toplanıyor [20 000 Metal hardware Workers Are Gathering 
on Sunday],” Gece Postası March 24, 1954. 
461 Marko Pasha was an Ottoman doctor with Greek origin. He was a famous doctor and also a deputy 
in the first Senate of the history of the Ottoman Empire that was founded in 1878. Since he was a 
patient doctor and tried to take care of his patients in every matter, his fame was widespread among the 
common folk. Accordingly an idiom “go, and tell your troubles to Marko Pasha” appeared among the 
people. In fact, the journal, Marko Paşa, published by the famous humorists and writers, Sabahattin 
Ali, Aziz Nesin, Rıfat Ilgaz and Mustafa Mim Uykusuz, was very influential between 1946-1947 and 
reached a circulation of seventy thousand, a number that was difficult for many publications to achieve 
at the time. 
462 Kemal Türkler, “Yasak Kalkmalı [The Prohibition Must Be Abandoned],” Maden-İş year 1 no. 4 
(20 December 1956), 1. 
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overtime work, etc.463 The union further participated in some of the general meetings; such as 
the meetings to decide the minimum wages of the branches in the metal industry, in the 
Provincial Office.464 In fact, the workers appreciated some of the efforts of the Provincial 
Office, which resolved most issues on behalf of workers towards the end of the 1950s. 
However, in most cases the union reports spoke poorly about the role of the Provincial Office, 
as almost all issues brought to this institution were left unresolved, and the officers ignored 
most complaints. The union found the work of the Provincial Office unsatisfactory due to the 
shortage of qualified personnel, an insufficient budget, and the office’s insufficient authority 
over factory bosses.465 The union published a protest statement, which accused the Provincial 
Arbitration Court of being unable to protect workers’ rights in January 1953. According to the 
statement, the committee, which did not undertake “scientific” methods to deal with labor 
disputes, was indifferent to the labor disputes in İstanbul. The union also complained that the 
committee did not reach decisions in a timely fashion, and cited the fact that it took 15 days to 
reach a decision on regulations. As a result, the actual wage increases, the union argued, did 
not keep pace with the increasing cost of living.466 The metal workers complained that the 
work inspectors of the Provincial Office would take the side of employers instead of 
                                                             
463 “Hakem Kurulu Kararını Dinlemeyen İşveren [An Employer Who Does not Care About a Decision 
of the Arbitration Committee],” Gece Postası, November 11, 1955; “Bir İşçi Mağdur Edildi [One 
Worker Was Preyed On],” Şehir, July 12, 1958; “Bir İşveren İşçilerini İstediği Tarzda Cezaya 
Çarptırıyor [An Employer Punishes His Workers Whatever Ways He Finds Suitable],” Şehir, April 5, 
1959; “İstinye Kablo Fabrikasında da 12 Saat Çalışma Var [There Are 12 Hours, too, Work in Wire 
Factory in İstinye],” Maden-İş year 4 no. 39 (15 November 1959), 1; “Tekrar İşe Alınanlara Yeni 
Muamele Yapılıyor [The Returned Workers Are Treated As if They Are New Workers],” Gece 
Postası, Februay 17, 1960; “Bir Fabrikada Çalışan İşçilere Pazar ve Genel Tatil Yevmiyeleri 
Ödenmiyormuş [The Sunday and Holiday Fees of Workers in Factory Were not Paid],” Son Saat, May 
9, 1960. 
464 “Madeni Eşya İşçilerinin Ücretleri Konuşuldu [The Wages of the Metal Hardware Workers Were 
Discussed],” Şehir, August 26, 1958; “Kablo ve Radyo İşçilerinin Asgari Ücreti Esasa Bağlanıyor [The 
Minimum Wages of Wire and Radio Workers Are Being Decided],” Şehir, January 9, 1959. 
465 Maden, Madeni Eşya ve Makina Sanayii İşçileri Sendikası Faaliyet Raporu, 25; Türkiye Maden-İş 
Sendikasının İstanbul Bölge Merkez Şubesinin 9-Ekim-1960 Tarihinde Yapılacak İlk Normal 
Kongresine Sunulmak Üzere 1.1.1959 Tarihinden 30.09.1960 Tarihine Kadar Faaliyet Raporu, 3; 
“Hakem Kurulları [The Arbitration Committees],” Şehir, December 20, 1958.  For cases in which the 
Provincial Office resolved on behalf of workers, see: “İşine Son Verilen İşçi Mümessili İşine İade 
Edildi [The Worker Representative Who Had Been Dismissed Were Returned to His Work],” Şehir, 
July 28, 1958; “Kenan Dumana Yeni Güçlükler Çıkartılıyor [New Difficulties Are Created for Kenan 
Duman],” Gece Postası, November 3, 1958. 
466 İl Hakem Kurulu Protesto Beyannamesi January 1953. 
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employees.467 According to most workers, the wage increases provided as a result of the labor 
disputes were also too low.468 Furthermore, the provincial newspapers and union journals 
spread news about employers who did not apply the decisions of the arbitration committee, or 
matter of law, on the shop floor, despite all the warnings of the Provincial Office.469 Clearly, 
this office was not an efficient mechanism or method for the metal union to solve the 
problems of their members. In a cartoon, it was claimed that the work inspectors were 
actually working on behalf of employers: 
 
 
Figure 3: -What is the use of the Labor Office? -The office recruits people as inspectors but it educates 
them as legal advisors and mentors for employers... (Source; İstanbul Demir ve Madeni Eşya İşçileri 
Sendikası News Bulletin, year 1 no. 3 [20 November 1954], 3).  
 
The İstanbul workers also complained about the slow progress of labor courts, as well 
as that of the work office and provincial arbitration committees. Those complaints varied 
from the lack of effective methods and cooperation among the different committees for 
analyzing work disputes, to the low numbers of, and insufficient authority of, the inspectors. 
                                                             
467  Türkiye Maden, Madeni Eşya ve Makina Sanayii İşçileri Sendikası Faaliyet Raporu, 24; İş 
Müfettişlerinin İşçi Haklarına Karşı Olan Titizlikleri Azalıyor [The Meticulousness of Work Inspectors 
Towards Workers’ Rights Are Waning], TÜSTAV Kemal Sülker Archive Box 37 Envelope 1792; 
“Bölge Çalışma Müdürlüğünde [In the Provincial Work Office],” Maden-İş 23 March 1957, 1. 
468 Orhan Tuna, “Memleketimizde Sendikaların Üzerinde Durdukları Meseleler,” 110-111. 
469 “Maden-İş Bir İşvereni Mahkemeye Verecek [Maden-İş Will Sue an Employer],” Gece Postası, 
September 17, 1958; “İki İşveren Savcılığa Verildi [Two Employers Were Sued],” Maden-İş year 4 no. 
43 (14 May 1960), 1. 
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Add to these problems, loopholes in the law, the long wait for decisions, illegal cooperation 
between inspectors and bosses, and unfair decisions made on behalf of employers, etc.,470 it 
became obvious that neither the current government would legislate the rights demanded by 
the union, nor could the Provincial Labor Office and labor courts function effectively on 
behalf of the workers, so Maden-İş began increasingly to apply another legal mechanism: 
collective work actions. 
It is unclear whether the political lobbyism of the union, as well as other trade unions, 
succeeded in their aims. However, it is clear that, over time, demands made by workers to the 
DP government proved fruitless. Towards the end of the decade, most unions who had 
previously supported the DP government withdrew their support from this party since it did 
not legislate most union demands, including the right to strike. Though they did not openly 
challenge DP while it was still in power, most Turkish trade unions, on the other hand, would 
hail the coup d’état after the military intervention on May 27, 1960, and accused the old 
government with impoverishing Turkish workers. 
 
IV. The Union Acts II: Work Conflicts 
In the available body of documents, it can be seen that the metal workers were not 
content with the state’s intervention to improve work conditions. The union began to utilize 
the mechanism of arbitration committees more effectively, throughout the 1950s, and the 
arbitration mechanism was, in fact, the only legal mechanism for workers to claim their 
demands collectively. To put the argument succinctly, in addition to the political struggle, the 
early metal workers, collectively or individually, fought on the shop floor by using the legal 
methods designed by the state after the Second World War. 
                                                             
470 Türkiye Maden-İş Sendikasının İstanbul Bölge Merkez Şubesinin 9-Ekim-1960 Tarihinde Yapılacak 
İlk Normal Kongresine Sunulmak Üzere 1.1.1959 Tarihinden 30.09.1960 Tarihine Kadar Faaliyet 
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Increase],” Son Saat, April 5, 1955; “Toplulukla İş İhtilafları Sürüncemede Kalıyor [The Collective 
Worker Disputes Left Hang in the Air],” İstanbul Demir ve Madeni Eşya İşçileri Sendikası News 
Bulletin year 2 no. 8 (28 January 1956); “İl Hakem Kurulu Tarafsız Değil mi? [Was the Provincial 
Arbitration Committee not Neutral?],” Son Saat, February 14, 1956. 
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It is true that this mechanism was not an open challenge, nor as effective as strikes or 
other forms of collective action conducted against bosses/managers, such as work stoppages 
or factory invasions. Yet, applying collectively to a legal mechanism and demanding certain 
changes in the ongoing relations with bosses must have fostered solidarity between workers. 
Furthermore, the sense of exercising their own rights, rather than waiting on the benevolence 
of employers, enriched the idea of the undeniable rights of workers. This was actually an 
important heritage for the metal workers of the succeeding period to adopt, and conducting 
collective labor disputes would later flourish among the metal workers. 
The workers in İstanbul had rarely used this mechanism collectively in the 1940s due 
to employers’ oppression of the representatives and organized workers, and also due to the 
general malfunctioning of the legal mechanism; for example, the indifference of the officers 
in charge, or the lingering over the decision-making process.471 On the other hand, due to the 
DP’s rise to power and their revisions of the Labor Law, the İstanbul workers, in general, 
gradually applied this method more effectively. In 1950, they conducted seven collective 
labor disputes. In 1951, the total number considerably increased to 51. In 1952, this reached 
70 and, in the succeeding year, the İstanbul workers applied this method 89 times. In using 
the arbitration mechanism, the metal workers followed the same pattern as the workers in 
İstanbul. The metal workers had never applied to the arbitration council in the late 1940s. 
Then, they very slowly began to benefit from the arbitration mechanism to solve their 
problems by 1950. 472  Eventually, the method would become one of their mainstays, 
particularly after the middle of the decade. 
The important question to be raised here is; what was the reason behind the 
infrequent use of the arbitration mechanism in the late 1940s and early 1950s? In addition to 
their preferences for battling in the political sphere and their distrust of the legal mechanism, 
                                                             
471 Ferit H. Saymen, İş İhtilafları ve Hal Yolları [Work Conflicts and Means to Solve Them] (İstanbul: 
İstanbul Üniversitesi İktisat ve İçtimaiyat Enstitüsü, 1948). 
472 “Demir ve Madeni Eşya İşçileri Niçin Toplulukla İş İhtilafı Çıkarmıyor [Why The Iron and Metal 
Hardware Workers Do Not Call For Collective Labor Disputes],” Gece Postası, September 4, 1951; 
“Demir ve Madeni Eşya İşçileri Başkanının Sözleri [The Words of the General Chair of Iron and 
Metalwork Workers],” Gece Postası, December 13, 1951.  
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which Father Üzeyir explained, the oppression of metal employers over the workers’ 
representatives, who were afraid of losing their jobs, or of being punished in some other way 
by employers, should be counted as another reason for this reluctance to resort to arbitration. 
Indeed, the scholars or state officers of the period confessed to the oppression of those 
workers who sought their rights in their workplace. They claimed that it was not rare for 
employers to call up workers or workers’ representatives who were involved in the disputes to 
their offices, to force them to abandon their applications. In some cases, they fired workers 
after the disputes were closed. Some employers refused to apply the arbitration committee 
decisions on the shop floor, too, by firing the workers who won these cases. Moreover, some 
employers forced workers to choose those who were closely affiliated with bosses as their 
representatives; as a result, such representatives were not keen on using this mechanism. 
Some bosses also did not attend the meetings of the arbitration committee in order to delay 
the decision-making processes. In some cases, they bribed state officers on the committee, or 
the inspectors who were in charge of writing a report on the dispute after inspecting the 
workplace.473 Such employers’ attitudes were widespread among the metal enterprises in the 
1950s. 474  Consequently, the union and most metal workers were reluctant to use this 
mechanism for several years. 
It’s obvious, then, that oppression and malfunctioning of the legal system obstructed 
the metal workers as they conducted collective labor disputes, to a certain extent. This would, 
however, change by the beginning of the 1950s. Firstly, amendments in the law allowed 
unions to nominate their own candidates in the election of workers’ representatives, and 
representatives supported by unions became more consciousness of their rights, as well as 
                                                             
473  Ekmel Onbulak, “Mümessil İşçilerin Himayesi [The Protection of Workers’ Representatives]” 
Çalışma Bakanlığı Journal, vol. 1 no. 1 (March-April-May 1953); Bahir Ersoy, “İşçi Gözü ile İşçi ve 
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legal procedures. Therefore, they became more willing to use those rights for the benefit of 
workers. Moreover, the metal union gained strength with expansion of the sector after the 
mid-1950s, and with the participation of new and young workers in the union. Although the 
new generation was not so different from the old one in terms of ideology, they were more 
militant in the fight. When those factors combined with the perception that the current 
government would not recognize workers’ demands, the metal workers gradually applied this 
mechanism.  
For example, the metal workers conducted labor disputes with the employer of Sıtkı 
Bütün Enamel Factory in 1952; Ayvansaray Bolt Factory, Mihran and Artin Haçadoryan 
Metalwork Factory, Bakırköy Sıtkı Bütün Enamel Factory in 1953; Eyüp Hot Wire Factory, 
Ayvansaray Nail Factory, Develi Enamel Factory in Zeytinburnu, Rami Copper Wire Factory, 
the Can Factory in Ortaköy, the Süleymaniye Lighter Factory, the Korozo Button Factory, 
Esat Ketenoğlu Copper Wire Factory and Feriköy Auto Scissor Lift Factory, in 1954.475 
Those actions would greatly increase in number after the middle part of the decade. 
After the mid-1950s, Maden-İş gradually used the collective action mechanism more, 
one, which it rarely applied during the first half of the decade. As a general trend, workers in 
other sectors also utilized arbitration more often towards the end of the 1950s. Between 1956 
and 1957, the union conducted 33 work disputes, and won the majority of them.476 From 1957 
to 1961, the union conducted 116 disputes in İstanbul.477 In nearly all the larger workplaces, 
workers conducted collective labor disputes, such as in Kavel, Berec, Nur Metal, Auto 
                                                             
475 “Bir İş İhtilafını Yüksek Hakem Kurulunun Süratle Neticelendirmesi İstendi [The Union Asked For 
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Scissor, Şakir Zümre, Ayvansaray Bolt, Profilo, Arçelik, Türk Demir Döküm, Emayetaş, 
Rabak, Sungurlar, and General Electric, etc. These plants were located in the most populous 
workers’ neighbourhoods. It is important to note here that most of the work disputes ended in 
a decision favouring the workers. Through these disputes, workers attempted to solve their 
most troublesome problem; that is, the issue of wages. In fact, most disputes were about 
increases in pay.478  Furthermore, food issues, work conditions, the provisions for public 
transportation to the factory and late payrolls were all likely to become other issues brought to 
the arbitration committee. 
We do not have records of meetings in those arbitration committees; therefore, we do 
not have a chance to analyze the language that was utilized by the worker’s representatives at 
that time. It is also very hard to measure how those limited collective encounters were 
reflected in the language of workers. After all, the metal workers were using a mechanism, 
which was designed by government in order to increase labor productivity and prevent the 
development of contentious industrial relations. Nevertheless, we know from several of the 
above mentioned narratives that most of the labor dispute process did not go on smoothly 
between workers and bosses/managers. It would not be wrong, therefore, to conclude that 
those disputes factored in the definition of worker’s collective interests as being in direct 
opposition to those of the metal bosses.  
 
V. Solidarity and Creating a Workers’ Community 
In addition to the collective labor disputes, which improved solidarity, and the idea of 
having common interests between metal workers, the union attempted to form a metal 
workers’ community, which would enrich the notion of togetherness. Union officers 
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contended that this community would foster solidarity among the workers and would, 
therefore, further empower them in their fight against the inequities and injustices to which 
they were widely exposed. In addition, the union organized several social events to further 
promote it. 
As opposed to the so-called “greedy and intolerant” bosses, the metal workers felt it 
important to act together through sharing the burden of their experiences in city life and at 
work, and they started cooperating in their responses to their common problems. Indeed, they 
claimed that no bosses could stand against the workers’ rightful demands if they resisted 
collectively.479 This type of unity was also emphasized in the written declarations that were 
distributed in workplaces.480 The workers’ representatives from several enterprises defined 
bosses as having different and conflictual interests with workers, and recounted some of the 
bosses’ attempts to shatter workers’ unity in the shop floor. To garner unity among the 
workers, the union had to train them to eschew individual opportunism, which would prevent 
the formation of a community consciousness, in favour of a general understanding of the 
necessity of common action to pursue common interests.481 The union began to publish a 
news bulletin, The Bulletin of the Union of İstanbul Iron, Metal and Metal Hardware 
Workers, which claimed to be the voice of the metal workers in 1954, to train its members 
about being effective workers and union members. The bulletin also advised metal workers, 
who were assumed to be the creator of the modern world, to fight together for their rights.482 
There is no doubt that the union itself would become fertile ground for such unity to be 
cultivated. 
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To enhance the solidarity of workers, the union was portrayed as a home base where 
workers could fight for their rights and feel safe amongst other metal workers.483 The first 
issue of the bulletin stated that the metal workers could not earn anything by being silent and 
simply begging. The metal workers had to be unionized to get their rights.484 The union 
assumed that any workers who did not actively join in the union’s actions and did not make 
themselves a force in the push for worker solidarity had no business asking for their natural 
rights.485 Articles in the union journal gave examples of how the union was run for the benefit 
of metal workers.486 The workers would realize their lawful and common rights only through 
fighting for them, alongside their unions. The bulletin also praised the formalization of 
industrial relations and the labor regime, which would each protect workers against the 
“arbitrary” actives of bosses.487 Accordingly, the metal union tried to endow their members 
with a consciousness of being part of a social group. In fact, members of the union even 
published poems, which praised their jobs, their labor, or their working tools, in the 
bulletin.488 
The union called for the metal workers to embrace their unions and be an 
undefeatable group against injustices through the poems, drawings and articles published in 
its newspaper. While in the first part of a cartoon published in 1954, a fat boss who was 
sitting on an end of a teeter-totter weighs on individual skinny workers was illustrated, in the 
second part he was moved upward on the same tool as those workers came together and sat as 
a group on the opposite part of the tool. It undoubtedly emphasized the importance of 
solidarity between laborers. The union distributed leaflets, which touched on the importance 
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of keeping up solidarity and defending their union, on the shop floor. Those calls resonated to 
a certain degree with the metal workers. During union meetings, several organized metal 
workers touched on the importance of the union and union’s representatives to bolster 
solidarity between workers, regulate relationships with employers and control the proper 
implementation of laws on the shop floor.489 
 
 
Figure 4: -(Source: İstanbul Demir ve Madeni Eşya İşçileri Sendikası News Bulletin, year 1 no. 2 [16 
October 1954), 3]. 
 
A metal unionist from Ortaköy claimed that workers without unions were individuals who 
were alone and weak in their battles with their employers. Therefore, the metal workers 
should all be joined together in unions. 490  Indeed, another cartoon published in 1956 
demonstrated the union as the worker’s palace of justice. 
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Figure 5: -Mıstık, my brother, I am illiterate. What is this place? – Hey, come on, this our place of 
justice...(Source: İstanbul Demir ve Madeni Eşya İşçileri Sendikası News Bulletin, year 2 no. 6, [7 
January 1956], 5). 
 
The ties between the metal workers were not lauded merely in discourse, or by 
emphasizing the importance of solidarity within laboring classes. Maden-İş handed over some 
tangible benefits to its members, too. To this end, the union founded a relief fund in 1956, to 
which members would all contribute. With the help of this fund, the union supplied financial 
aid to its members to ease their daily problems and foster their commitment to the union. For 
instance, in cases of birth, death or conscription, the union provided cash to the metal 
workers.491 Maden-İş also launched another cooperative in which the workers had a chance to 
purchase cheap food, clothes, heating requirements and household items.492 The union then 
founded a building cooperative, which would provide its members with low cost housing.493 
                                                             
491 Türkiye Maden-İş Sendikasının İstanbul Bölge Merkez Şubesinin 9-Ekim-1960 Tarihinde Yapılacak 
İlk Normal Kongresine Sunulmak Üzere 1.1.1959 Tarihinden 30.09.1960 Tarihine Kadar Faaliyet 
Raporu; Maden-İş Faaliyet Raporu: XIII. Genel Merkez Kongresi, 167-168; “Madeni Eşya İşçileri İçin 
Sandık Kuruldu [The Metal Workers Founded a Relief Fund],” Gece Postası, September 13, 1956; 
“Develi Emaye’de Bir İşçi [A Worker in Develi Enamel Factory],” Gece Postası, December 29, 1956; 
Kemal Sülker, “Yardımlaşma Şuuru, Maden-İş’in Yardımlaşma Sandığı [The Consciousness of 
Solidarity and The Relief Fund of Maden-İş]” Gece Postası, October 14, 1956; “Yardım Sandığı 
Hizmete Devam Ediyor [The Relief Fund İs Contınuing to Serve],” Maden-İş year 4 no. 38 (1 October 
1959), 1 and 4. 
492 “Maden-İş İstihsal ve İstihlak Kop. Faaliyette [Maden-İş Purchasing and Consuming Cooperative is 
on Duty],” Maden-İş year 4 no. 40 (9 February 1960), 1. 
493 “Maden İşçileri İçin Yapı Kooperatifi Kurularak Ortak Kayıtları Başladı [The Building Cooperative 
Has Been Founded for the Metal Workers and Registrations Have Begun],” Maden-İş year 3 no. 32 (31 
January 1959), 1; “Türkiye Ölçüsünde Yapı Kooperatifi Hazırlığı Başarı ile Sona Erdi, İşe Başlanıyor 
 
 
164 
Through these activities, the union aimed to spread its influence and ideas of solidarity among 
the metal workers during the decade. 
With this goal in mind, the metal union also held Khitan (circumcision) feasts for the 
male children of the metal workers. According to the report presented to the General Council, 
nearly 4 000 members participated in circumcision feasts in 1960, as they were communal 
celebrations. The union also organized balls and picnics to get members to socialize together. 
To further garner loyalty, the union arranged lottery drawings and distributed union badges in 
workplaces. It hired religious men to sing prayers to the souls of deceased metal workers and 
their late relatives, to meet some of the religious and spiritual needs in the community. It is 
obvious that by hiring a famous singer, organizing festivals downtown and serving up luxury 
items such as champagne, which is known as the drink of the upper classes, the union wanted 
their members to feel a part of modern city life.494 Indeed, an ex-lawyer of several trade 
unions, including Maden-İş and DİSK, Sina Pamukçu, portrayed the unionists of the 1950s, 
including the unionists in Maden-İş as being determined to have a respected place in 
society.495 It is unfortunate that we lack any document to debate how such activities were 
influential in fostering solidarity among the rank and file. In the absence of the workers’ 
voices, it is impossible to pursue such a debate. However, it can be speculated by the way 
those activities continued to be held over the next decade that the practices were more or less 
widespread among the metal workers during the 1950s. 
Moreover, Maden-İş put an emphasis on the education of their members. A union 
report claimed that the workers had to be well informed, both about the technical details of 
their jobs to get a better position in workplaces, and about the details of their social and 
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economic rights to a better life at work and at home. Education, moreover, strengthened the 
ties between the union and the workers, and amongst the workers themselves. To bolster unity 
between the metal workers, the union organized several seminars to inform the 
representatives of the legal rights of workers and their own rights, as well. The union also 
attempted to elevate the technical knowledge of their members regarding their jobs, to further 
promote them in the workplace hierarchy. A report on the actions of the union in 1959 stated 
that, despite few being in number, workers greatly benefited from such educational courses.496 
Seminars and courses also aimed to nurture worker commitment to their jobs and workplaces, 
which in turn would increase productivity. Again, we do not have any documents to allow us 
a window into the actual influences of such seminars on the rank and file. Those educational 
drives must have been effective, however, at least for the union’s representatives who took 
part, since several old representatives would become the pioneers of the union’s activities 
during the more contentious times, namely in the 1960s. 
 
VI. Conclusion: The Legacy of the Post-War Years 
Except for very few examples, the existing labor history literature analyzes the post-
May, 1960 era as a completely new period characterized by the large scale development of 
trade unionism and significant changes in related legislation. While it is true that such 
transformations significantly factored into the formation of the working class in Turkey 
during the 1960s and 1970s, especially by paving the way for a considerable increase in the 
collective actions of workers, such an approach, on the other hand, ignores the patterns which 
left an important legacy to the succeeding period, after the Second World War. I would 
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therefore argue that the existing literature must largely be revised in terms of the discussions 
of continuities and ruptures which the 1960s and 1970s inherited, to better sketch a 
comprehensive picture of class formation in Turkey after 1945. 
It must be noted that the rising consciousness which emphasized the necessity of 
unity among the metal workers towards the end of the 1950s should not be confused with 
class consciousness in the Marxist sense. First of all, there is little data about the scope of 
members’ participation in union affairs at that time. The number must not be high, since we 
do know about the leaders’ frustration over the indifference of the workers, especially until 
the mid-1950s. Secondly, the general ideology of the union did not reach beyond the general 
framework of the industrial democracy and factory regime, which was designed by the state. 
Rather, the metal union contributed to the formation of that general democratic framework 
and supported it. For example, the union often warned workers that to be unionized did not 
simply mean to oppose bosses, or even gang bosses, in every case, nor it did mean to be 
manipulative of employers. On the contrary, every union member had to contribute to 
productivity in the workplace, and to the national economy, by working hard in order to earn 
their rights and benefits. 497  In this sense, the available class consciousness must be 
comprehended within the hegemonic discourse of the industrial democracy of the period. 
Nonetheless, we can still argue that this is a brand of class consciousness, since it 
encompasses the bulk of common interests among workers and defends them together under 
the umbrella of a defined organization. Despite having the ideal of cooperation between 
workers and bosses, it touches on the real contentious experiences between these groups. 
Considering the broad scope of such a consciousness, it is even more disappointing that we 
lack the relevant documents to argue about the extent of rank and file comprehension of union 
ideology, although we can claim that the union representatives, which governed relations 
between Maden-İş and the rank and file, shared a common consciousness with workers to a 
great extent. Therefore, we can speak of the effectiveness of class consciousness, at least 
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among the metal workers who would lead the workplace resistance movements during the 
1960s.  
In fact, in spite of its weakness and the dominance of its solidaristic and state-
centered ideology, a generation of unionists led by Kemal Türkler and his friends sprouted up 
from the rank and file of the union and, more importantly, they were the workers’ or union’s 
representatives. In addition to dealing with union affairs, they continued to do their jobs in the 
workplaces; therefore, they must have had had close relationships with the metal workers on 
the shop floor. These metal workers’ representatives were very eager to pursue workers’ 
causes, despite all the troubles they encountered, such as threats of losing their jobs, or being 
accused of being communists. And they would leave an important legacy, which would be 
reflected in the wider and harsher struggles of the 1960s. 
In terms of the metal sector, its patterns of growth did not show a considerable 
change in the new epoch: the private metal industry in İstanbul improved through state aid 
and in cooperation with foreign capital investment. In addition, most bosses/managers would 
show little tolerance to workers’ demands for change, and resented the existence of Maden-İş 
due to small profit margins in the sector, as well as the apparent scarcity of skilled labor 
force, and their world view of “my business and my rules”. Although it is true that some 
important enterprises strived to implement a few modern techniques to bind workers to the 
workplace and smooth over discontent, those efforts were very limited in terms of their scope 
and were not common in the sector. Largely as a result of this, relations between 
employers/managers and workers did not significantly improve in the private metal sector in 
İstanbul during this time. 
Moreover, patterns of migration to the city, community structures, the composition of 
the labor force, and the frustrating common experiences of the metal sector, which were 
compounded after the war years, did not significantly transform the sector in the new era. 
Except through some periods when wage increases exceeded price increases in the city, the 
foremost problem of the metal workers was still being unable to provide for their families. In 
addition, employers’/manager’s oppression of the unionized and dissident workers did not 
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relent. Therefore, contentious relations between workers and bosses/managers remained. In 
this regard, the main mechanism for the metal workers was still their solidarity under their 
union, and this was the main means to reach their goals within the existing social hierarchy. 
The new governments’ approach to the general framework of industrial relations, and 
the assumed role of the trade unions, were also unchanged after the coup d’état; however, 
they largely expanded the legal mechanisms through which unions could collectively make 
claims on behalf of their members in the 1960s. But the rise of contentious policies over the 
distribution of available resources made relations between workers, and employers and the 
organizations of both groups, more strained. Therefore, the 1960s would witness intensified 
conflicts and collective struggles between those two different social groups; and the most 
militant collective battles would take place in the metal sector. 
Inspired by promises made by the new governments, Maden-İş’ policies would also 
remain the same until a more fundamental change occurred in 1967, with the foundation of a 
second workers’ confederacy, namely the Confederacy of Progressive Trade Unions (DİSK), 
as will be described in detail later. The union continued to exert pressure on several state 
apparatuses to legislate new workers’ rights. In the meantime, it applied the available 
collective mechanisms to get its members’ rights on the shop floor level: Maden-İş 
extensively used the arbitration mechanism between 1960 and 1963, as it had done especially 
after the midst 1950s. Therefore, common language and consciousness existed among the 
organized metal workers through a combination of their relations with bosses/managers, their 
common experiences, and the union’s ideology, which still oscillated between loyalty and 
insubordination to the existing social order, and negativity towards the general organization 
of workplace order in the first years of the decade. 
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PART 2 
THE CHANGING FORM OF COLLECTIVE ACTION: THE METAL WORKERS IN 
THE AGE OF SOCIAL JUSTICE, 1960-1963 
 
It would be an exaggeration to debate the Sixties as a completely new epoch in terms 
of the metal workers’ collective experiences and struggles. The 1960 coup d’état, which 
dissolved the DP government, did not completely transform the ideological framework of 
industrial relations, which had taken shape in the climate of the post-war years in Turkey; 
nonetheless, it substantially widened the political and institutional channels through which 
workers and unions could voice their demands. At first, the new regime reiterated the old 
promises of the right to strike, collective bargaining and social justice for workers. More 
importantly, it revived the old attempts, which had largely been halted in the mid-1950s, to 
institutionalize those rights. At the same time, the İstanbul unions, including Maden-İş, 
exerted pressure on the politically powerful for legislation of workers’ rights during the new 
decade; furthermore, they continued to benefit from new and old institutional methods to 
improve their member’s work and life conditions. While the pattern of collective struggle 
created after the war remained almost unchanged in the first years of the 1960s, the metal 
workers, however, realized that the state intervention in labor dynamics was not as influential 
as they’d expected, and the metal bosses were still reluctant about instilling industrial 
democracy on the shop floor. So, the workers began to stage more effective collective actions, 
that is strikes, to enforce their demands on both the state and the employers. In fact, the 
famous strike of metal workers at the Kavel Factory in 1963 demonstrated the first sign of 
coming changes in terms of workers’ collective responses to the social, political and 
institutional developments in the 1960s. The metal workers, who were aware of the new 
political opportunities provided by a new regime, were more determined than ever to shape 
their own fates during the 1960s. To this purpose, they waged bitter fights to organize their 
own, trusted unions in the new decade. 
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The term “social justice” as used herein must be understood within the context of the 
historical transformations that occurred in the state and economy in the capitalist world. The 
two World Wars, the collapse of liberal economy, which was marked by the 1929 crisis, 
social upheavals in between the war years and the rise of socialism as an alternative to 
capitalism enabled policy makers in the western countries to reflect on creating a better 
mechanism in which a capitalist economic model would progress without causing significant 
economic recessions and social conflicts. In order to save the economy from collapse and 
alleviate labor disputes, the Roosevelt government (1932-1945) in the United States 
implemented the New Deal Policy, which included relief programs to poor people and 
provided several rights, such as collective bargaining to workers. The main assumption 
behind the policy was that improving the lifestyle of poor people and labor would develop 
internal markets by turning them into consumers; as a result, the economy would be stabilized 
without both causing a significant decrease in the profits of entrepreneurs and a decrease in 
social disturbances. After the war years, most European states began to implement more or 
less same program after getting considerable amount of aids from United States in order to 
recover the economy, which, as a result of both the 1929 crisis and the Second World War, 
was on the verge of total collapse. The so-called welfare state promised social justice to poor 
sections of society who would justly, albeit not equally, benefit from the national wealth 
produced by the cooperation of labor and capital: in fact, the European states created the 
mechanisms for making social justice possible; the public expenditures made by the states 
rapidly increased, especially in the health and education sectors. Furthermore, the 
governments began to recognize social rights such as leave of absence with pay, the maternity 
leave, etc. They recognized trade unions as legal entities and bargained with them, under the 
name “social dialogue” to control labor in return for providing welfare to employees. 
Accordingly, the social justice and welfare state became a norm in nearly all Western 
capitalist countries to create a more stabilized society. 498  The term “social justice” was 
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heavily informed by the economic prescriptions and development plans offered by the 
officers of the United Nations and United States to Third World countries to recover their 
economic underdevelopment and stabilize the societies. However, it was successfully 
articulated by the national liberation and/or socialist movements, and states, which followed a 
non-capitalist path of development, to their programs in the regions where people have long 
been suffered from the colonialist rule or imperialist exploitation.499 Thus, “social justice” 
turned into a contentious term around which different political and social actors took a 
position, as happened in Turkey during the 1960s. 
The new laws, the most important of those undoubtedly being the 1961 Constitution 
and the 1963 Trade Union Law, would accompany the public debate around “social justice” 
in Turkey. In spite of those changes, the development of the private metal sector, the 
residential patterns of the new immigrants, and the factory conditions, which contributed to 
shaping the collective perception and responses of the metal workers, did not significantly 
transform themselves in the new decade. Chapter 5 will firstly take a brief look to those 
stagnant processes, the most important of which was the bosses’ inclination to be the sole 
administrator of work relations; something that manifested itself in lasting enmity towards 
unionism and unionist activities in the workplace. Then, the chapter will further analyze the 
institutional advances of the new regime, the public debate around the term social justice, and 
the rise of leftist movements which had largely been oppressed by the both the CHP and 
succeeding DP governments; how the state officers, union leaders and bosses understood 
social justice, just income distribution, and even socialism, as a better way to create a 
democratic and modern society. 
Alongside those debates, the chapter will reflect on the position of the metal bosses 
and unions, as both employers and workers, in this period. We have only scant evidence of 
how the metal bosses, specifically, perceived and reacted to the developments that took place 
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in the first years of the 1960s. However, they attempted to be more effective through their 
organization – MESS - in political and social realms, when the growing influence of the ideas 
of fair income distribution, social justice and socialism, and institutionalization of workers’ 
rights overlapped with the Kavel Strike in 1963. Maden-İş was also an important actor of 
those debates: the union and its officers were right in the middle of the public debates on the 
social justice. In this regard, it is important to tackle an important question; how did the 
organized metal workers respond to the new zeitgeist? 
It would appear workers arrived on scene as soon as they realized that, unless they 
collectively acted, the enlarging political and institutional channels would not automatically 
bring them the social justice which were promised by the state. Consequently, an increasing 
number of metal workers engaged in collective actions to exert their influence in order to 
either obtain those rights promised by the state but not recognized by bosses/managers in 
workplaces, or to foster new ones. Accordingly, Chapter 6 will analyze the metal workers 
who staged a famous strike, the Kavel Strike in 1963, on the verge of the right to strike 
meetings in the National Assembly. As well as leaving important marks on the legacy of 
workers’ collective struggles against the bosses, and being an important landmark on the 
formation of strike culture in Turkey, the Kavel strike and succeeding strikes during the 
following year at the big metal plants of İstanbul severed the already tense relations between 
the metal workers and bosses.  
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CHAPTER 5 
SOCIAL JUSTICE AND THE METAL WORKERS: 
EXPANSION OF POLITICAL OPPORTUNITIES 
Theseus: “...There is nothing worse for a city than a 
sovereign, when first no laws are common, and he 
rules alone, taking himself for law. That way nothing 
is equal. But when the laws are written, the poor man 
and the rich have equal rights. Then, when a wealthy 
citizen does wrong, a weaker one can criticize, and 
prevail, with justice on his side. That’s liberty.”500 
 
“Struggle my brother, struggle” cried metal worker, Ahmet Arslan, in his poems 
published in the Maden-İş newspaper in 1969. He expressed another sentiment in the same 
poem that while bosses were accumulating huge amounts of money and landlords were 
increasing their land holdings at the expense of poor peasants, workers who were “earnestly” 
working for their country and families were expected to maintain their lives under very 
difficult conditions.501 To contend with those social injustices, Ahmet Arslan called his fellow 
workers to get together under a trade union banner and fight for their rights. In fact, his voice 
was echoed among many metal workers in the Sixties: the 1960’s was characterized by 
collective action for the metal workers in Turkey. These collective struggles were no doubt 
one of the most influential aspects of the metal workers collective experiences and common 
consciousness in the decade. 
The changing zeitgeist in the new decade must be accounted for one of the most 
important reasons for the rise of collective actions during the 1960s. Partially inspired by the 
rise of leftist and/or national liberation movements in the so-called Third World, the public 
                                                             
500  Euripides, “Suppliant Women” in Peter Burian and Alan Shapiro [eds.], Rosanna Warren and 
Robert A. Brooks [trans.] The Complete Euripides, vol. 3, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010): 
211. 
501 Ahmet Arslan, “Struggle”,  Maden-İş, no. 22 (May 1969). 
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debate was increasingly characterized by discussions on the underlying reasons of social 
inequalities, widespread poverty, economic development and the methods to solve those 
urgent problems. The different actors of industrial relations, mainly the state officers, 
employers and labor unions, thus, began to reflect on “the social justice”, a term which even 
took place in the new constitution after the coup d’état, as a magic touch to salvage Turkey 
from its underdevelopment. 
 
I. Constants 
  In certain aspects, the new decade represents significant continuities of pattern in 
terms of the growth of the İstanbul metal industry, migration to the city, composition of the 
labor force in the sector, and workers’ common experiences in working and living places. The 
new decade witnessed the expansion of the metal sector, which followed the same patterns 
that existed in the post-war era. The first civil government, after the coup d’état, prepared a 
Development Plan in 1963 that concluded in supporting private entrepreneurship to improve 
the domestic market, so that the whole of the national economy would develop. To this end, 
the new governments continued to assist private industry through several promotions and 
tariff policies. Furthermore, with the steady expansion of cities and enlargement of the 
housing sector, the need for durable consumer goods significantly rose in the 1960s. In turn, 
the big private enterprises multiplied, both in terms of their numbers and their influence on 
industrial life. Moreover, the existing ones, such as Arçelik, Demir Döküm, Profilo, Şakir 
Zümre etc., diversified and expanded the scope of their production.502 For example, Bernar 
                                                             
502 Eyüp Karadayı, İstanbul’un Sanayi Potansiyeli [The Industrial Potential of İstanbul] (İstanbul: 
İstanbul Sanayi Odası, 1964), 9; Erol Tümertekin, Manufacturing and Suburbanization in İstanbul 
(İstanbul: İstanbul Üniversitesi Coğrafya Enstitüsü, 1970), 10; Mustafa Sönmez, ’75 Yılın Sanayileşme 
Politikaları [The Industrial Policies of 75 Years]’ in Oya Baydar [ed.] 75 Yılda Çarklar’dan Chip’lere 
[From Machine Wheels to Computer Chips in 75 Years], (İstanbul: Tarih Vakfı, 1999), 10-11; “Demir 
Çelik’ten Beyaz Eşya’ya Metal İşkolu [The Metal Sector From Iron-Steel to White Good],” in Oya 
Baydar [ed.] 75 Yılda Çarklar’dan Chip’lere [From Machine Wheels to Computer Chips in 75 Years] 
(İstanbul: Tarih Vakfı, 1999), 192; Mehmet Altun, Ortak Aklı Ararken [In Search for the Common 
Reason] (İstanbul: Doğan Kitap, 2008), 23-30; Özgür Öztürk, Türkiye’de Büyük Sermaye Grupları: 
Finans Kapitalin Oluşumu ve Gelişimi [The Big Business Circles in Turkey: The Formation and 
Development of the Financial Capital], (İstanbul: Sosyal Araştırmalar Vakfı, 2010), 83-92. For the 
increasing number of workers in the metal sector, look at: Başbakanlık Devlet İstatistik Enstitüsü [The 
State Statistic Institute], 1964 Sanayi ve İşyerleri Sayımı Broşürü [The Leaflet of Industry and 
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Nahum recounts this detail the actual development of OTOSAN as it took place between 
1960 and 1970.503 Similarly, the other important metal plants, such as Arçelik and Demir 
Döküm grew during the 1960s. In parallel with the growth of private metal plants, the number 
of metal workers multiplied in İstanbul. In a letter to Vehbi Koç, Bernar Nahum stated that 
the number of employers also had to be increased, thanks to the expansion of production in 
OTOSAN.504 By 1970, the total number of workers in the metal sector located in İstanbul was 
32 052 in total.505 The İstanbul metal industry blossomed into one of the biggest sectors 
owned by private individuals. 
The metal sector was also diversified in terms of its spatial distribution during the 
1960s. Since the old regions, Eyüp, Topkapı or Zeytinburnu, where the already established 
industry did not leave room for new industrial enterprises, the new establishments had to be 
located in other areas and the metal industry began to take hold on the Anatolian side of the 
city. Towards the end of the 1950s, the metal plants, like Otosan, had already been 
established on the Anatolian side and in the new decade many more plants were built there. In 
parallel, new migrants from the regions of Black Sea, Eastern and Middle Anatolia began to 
reside in those places. As a result, the metal workers could soon settle and work in nearly all 
the major working class districts of the city. 
These residential patterns followed old traditions. That is, the squatter areas again 
sprouted up around the factories located on the Anatolian side, such as Kartal, Pendik, 
Maltepe or Gebze. 506  Labor’s spatial distribution remained the same, with communities 
focused around the perimeters of the factories and the population of both old and new squatter 
                                                                                                                                                                              
Workplaces Census in 1964], (Ankara: Devlet İstatistik Enstitüsü Yayınları, 1964), table 5 and table 
19.  
503 Bernar Nahum, Koç’ta 44 Yılım [My 44 Years in Koç], (İstanbul: Milliyet, 1988), 72. For Arçelik, 
look at: Mamulattan Markaya Arçelik Kurum Tarihi, 1955-2000 [From Product to Brand: The 
Institutional History of Arçelik], (n.p: Arçelik Anonim Şirketi, 2001), 61. Also, look at: 
Demirdöküm’de 50 Yıl [The Fifty Years in Demirdöküm], (n.p.: Türk Demirdöküm Fabrikaları Anonim 
Şirketi, 2004). 
504 Nahum, 134. For the increasing number of workers in Demirdöküm, look at: Demirdöküm’de 50 Yıl. 
505 Erol Tümertekin, “İstanbul ve Çevresinde Sanayi Özellikleri ve Dağılış [The Characteristics and 
Distribution of Industry in İstanbul and its Surroundings],” in his İstanbul: İnsan ve Mekan [İstanbul: 
People and Place] (İstanbul: Tarih Vakfı, 1997), 39. 
506 Tümertekin, Manufacturing and Suburbanization in İstanbul, 28-30 and Tümertekin, “İstanbul ve 
Çevresinde Sanayi Özellikleri ve Dağılışı.” 
 
 
176 
regions grew significantly, thanks to an increasing number of rural people coming to İstanbul 
during the 1960s from the various cities, such as Rize, Trabzon, Sivas, Kars. The newcomers 
arrived at the city for similar reasons to those who had come during the previous decade. An 
ex-Demir Döküm worker, Mustafa Türker, claimed that he came to İstanbul in 1959 since 
there was no job and no promising future in his home town.507 Another familiar pattern was 
that most prospective workers, who constituted the cheap labor force for industry, were still 
young, uneducated male migrants. Moreover, they were still largely dependent on the 
incomes, which they earned in the city; they did not bring with them any extra money, food or 
household goods from their rural homes. Those men, most of whom would marry soon, were 
the sole providers for their families. A mother-in-law of one Kavel worker stated that her son-
in-law, Murat, was the only provider to supply bread at home.508 It is apparent that the metal 
workers considered their struggles to be in the interest of their communities, which were so 
closely formed around their families inside the workers’ neighbourhoods. 
There was no doubt that leaving their birthplaces, and arriving at a new city that the 
migrants barely knew, made them vulnerable. Their main survival mechanism was to 
participate in the social networks, which their relatives had previously established in the 
workers’ neighbourhoods, and to reside in the squatter areas where their close relatives or 
people from the same birthplace settled.509 During the 1960s, most workers and workers’ 
families still lived out their lives in the squatter areas and participated in the already 
established social networks, which often developed according to commonalities of 
birthplace.510 In the squatter areas, the workers who, along with their families, constituted the 
majority of the regions’ population, socialized together. Maden-İş’s former district chair of 
                                                             
507 Mustafa Türker, interview by author, Yıldız Tabya, İstanbul, August 29, 2012. The other metal 
workers recounted the same reason for coming to İstanbul: Ali Can, interview by author, Yıldız Tabya, 
İstanbul, June 20, 2012. 
508 Selma Tükel, “Grevcinin Bileğinde Kelepçe [The Cuffs at the Ankle of the Strikers],” Sosyal 
Adalet, year 1 no. 5, (16 April 1963): 7. 
509 Ibid; Charles W. M. Hart, Zeytinburnu Gecekondu Bölgesi [The Squatter Area in Zeytinburnu], 
(İstanbul: İstanbul Ticaret Odası Yayınları, 1969), 62-63 and 94-95. 
510 Ibid, 82; Ruşen Keleş, 100 Soruda Türkiye’de Şehirleşme, Konut ve Gecekondu [The Urbanization, 
Residence and Squatter Houses in Turkey in 100 Questions], (Ankara: Gerçek, 1972), 135-136; 
Michael D. Danielson and Ruşen Keleş, “Urbanization and Income Distribution in Turkey,” in Ergun 
Özbudun and Aydın Ulusan [eds.], The Political Economy of Income Distribution in Turkey, (New 
York: Holmes&Meier, 1980), 274. 
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Silahtarağa, Hüseyin Ekinci, said during our interview that the metal workers were 
neighbourly to each other and they came and went into their neighbours’ houses for nightly 
visits. They were married to each other’s daughters or sons and they had common problems 
with their living places. Some other metal workers, with whom I conducted interviews, 
similarly claimed that after arriving to the city in the 1960s and dwelling in the Kağıthane and 
Alibeyköy squatter areas, they, as a group, attended picnics, concerts and film demonstrations 
organized in their neighbourhoods.511 In the same vein, the male metal workers mostly went 
to coffee houses to spend their leisure time after finishing their work for the day. There, they 
played either cards or backgammon and discussed the latest sporting events, as well as their 
personal or common problems within the neighbourhood and factory. 512  Those types of 
socialization patterns must have tightened their bonds.513 For example, the coffee houses had 
a special status as a place of socialization for the workers, so much so that the unions 
conducted their meetings with their members at those locations. In fact, the factory invasions 
and strikes that accelerated towards the end of the 1960s became an issue for whole 
neighbourhoods, which surrounded the industrial plants. People in those areas, who were 
mostly the close relatives of workers, supported collective actions by every means at their 
disposal.  
The most burning problem of the metal workers in the city was still to provide for 
their families. According to a survey conducted in 1968 by Kemal Karpat, nearly half of the 
squatter dwellers who settled in the northern hills of İstanbul complained about insufficient 
income to meet their increasing economic needs.514 Similarly, one metal worker claimed that: 
                                                             
511 Hüseyin Ekinci, interview by author, Sarıyer, İstanbul, June 19, 2012; Seçkin Amca, interview by 
author, Yıldız Tabya, İstanbul, June 19, 2012; Ali Can, interview by author, Yıldız Tabya, İstanbul, 
June 20, 2012; İsmet Amca, interview by author, Yıldız Tabya, İstanbul, June 21, 2012; Mustafa 
Türker, interview by author, Yıldız Tabya, İstanbul, August 29, 2012.  
512 Seçkin Amca, interview by author, Yıldız Tabya, İstanbul, June 19, 2012; Yellow Mehmet Kul, 
interview by author, Yıldız Tabya, İstanbul, June 21, 2012; İsmet Amca, interview by author, Yıldız 
Tabya, İstanbul, June 21, 2012. 
513 Hüseyin Ekinci, interview by author, Sarıyer, İstanbul, June 19, 2012. In fact, the other participants 
talked about the nightly visits as one of the social activities in the squatter areas: Aziz Amca, interview 
by author, Yıldız Tabya, İstanbul, June 19, 2012; Seçkin Amca, interview by author, Yıldız Tabya, 
İstanbul, June 19, 2012. 
514  Kemal Karpat, The Gecekondu: Rural Migration and Urbanization (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1976), 111. 
 
 
178 
“My hourly wage is 80 kuruş. My net income is 160 Turkish Lira per month. 
I am providing for five people: mother, father and three sisters. There is no 
worker in the family, but just me. I am paying 50 lira for rent and another 50 
lira for shopping by installments. I am ashamed to say but, after paying 
electricity and water bills, I am left with 50 lira for meeting our monthly food 
expenses. What else can I say? You can estimate the rest...”515 
 
A similar hardship was emphasized by a mother of one Kavel worker: 
“My son has been working in the factory for eight years. He is a masterman. 
But he has a big family to sustain. They were barely supporting 
themselves...”516 
 
A journalist who visited the house of a Kavel worker described the house and 
surrounding area as follows: 
“The house, where the family pays 150 lira for rent, is indeed one large room. 
They are using the kitchen and toilet together with two other families. 
Mefharet Sarsar made use of a table, which she put in the corner of the room, 
as a kitchen. Gas range, stew pots and plates (...) 7 people are sleeping in a 
single room (...) The squatter houses, located at the İstinye hills where the 
Kavel and Türkay Match Factories are located, are mostly composed of one 
room homes and they were run down...”517 
 
                                                             
515 “Bir Ayda 160 lira Alan Bir Kaynakçı Hayatını Anlattı [A Welder Who Monthly Earns 160 Lira 
Narrated His Life],” Türkiye Birlik, 26 July 1962, 1 and 4. Also look at: “İşçi Gündelikleri Son Derece 
Azdır Geçinmeye Yetmiyor [The Daily Fees of Workers Are Very Few, They Are not Enough For 
Living],” Maden-İş, year 4 no. 53 (15 August 1961), 3; “Hayat Pahalılığı Aile Düzenini Tehdit Ediyor 
[The High Cost of Living is Threatening the Family Structure],” Öncü, June 28, 1962; “Hayat Her Gün 
Pahalılaşıyor [Life Becomes More Expensive Every Day],” Öncü, August 31, 1962; “Bir Gecekonduyu 
Ziyaret Sırasında Dinlediklerimiz [The Conversation During a Visit to a Squatter House],” Gece 
Postası, September 16, 1962; “İşçiler Çok Güç Duruma Düştü [Workers are in Great Trouble],” 
Maden-İş, year 4 no. 69, (21 January 1963): 1 and 8. 
516 Quoted from Selma Tükel, “Kavel mi? Kader mi? [Kavel or Fate?],” Sosyal Adalet, year 1 no. 3, (2 
April 1963): 7. 
517 Ibid. 
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The official statistics further affirm the workers’ complaints. For example, the cost of 
living index between 1956 and 1963 demonstrates the level of workers’ incomes as follows: 
 
Table 3: The Average Wages in Industry and Cost of Living Index in İstanbul,  
1956-1963 
Years Average Wages (TL) The Ratio of 
Increases (%) 
The Cost of Living 
Index in İstanbul 
1956 12.32 - 100 
1957 12.20 -1 111.9 
1958 14.36 18 121.4 
1959 19.62 13.66 159.7 
1960 18.11 -9.23 170.1 
1961 18.39 1.5 176.1 
1962 19.14 4.08 184.4 
1963 20.64 11.7 204.1 
Source: Ertuğrul Soysal, “Madeni Eşya İş Kolunda Toplu Sözleşme Tatbikatından Doğan Bazı 
Meseleler [Some Problems Caused By the Practice of Collective Bargaining in the Metal Sector],” 
Sosyal Siyaset Konferansları, 19 (1968): 69. 
 
 It is plain from the figures available in the Table 8 that while the living index in 
İstanbul multiplies more than two times between 1956 and 1963, the increase of the average 
wages in the industrial sector was well below to this ratio. From 1956 to 1957, while the cost 
of living index increased from 100 to 111.9, average wages demonstrated an increase, too. 
From those years until 1959, the average wages significantly increased, especially between 
1958 and 1959; and the cost of living index more or less increased in parallel with the wage 
increases. Nonetheless, while the average wages decreased between 1959 and 1960, the cost 
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of living index continued to increase. Until 1963, both the wages and cost of living index 
continued to improve approximately in the same range. That means, the huge differences 
which had emerged between wages and prices during the war years did not still close in the 
first years of the 1960s. The problem of poverty among the workers were often emphasized in 
the worker’s papers of the time: 
 
  
 
 
Figure 6: The headline says that the workers got through the Sacrifice Feast without any money 
(Source: İşçinin Sesi, 6 May 1963). 
 
 
Therefore, it is natural that workers applied every means, including unionization, for 
securing their benefits and attaining their desired lifestyle. 518  Regarding the everyday 
problems they all shared, squatter areas were still bereft of infrastructural services during the 
decade; that is, the area suffered from water, road, transportation and drainage problems.519 
The actual living places of the metal workers had many more problems, which made workers’ 
lives even more unbearable. 
In an effort to overcome those issues, there were several available mechanisms to 
help the new migrants adjust to life in İstanbul. As in the 1950s, social networks hinged upon 
                                                             
518 Karpat, 43. 
519 “Eyübte Birçok Vatandaş Susuzluktan Kıvranıyor [A Lot of Citizens Suffer From Lack of Water 
System in Eyüp],” Gece Postası, July 16, 1962; “Yol Yapımı Hızlandırılmalı [The Construction of 
Roads Must Be Facilitiated],” Gece Postası, July 20, 1962; “Kağıthaneköyünün Giriş Yerindeki Tahta 
Köprü Ne Zaman Tamir Edilecek [When the Wooden Bridge At the Entrance of Kağıthane will be 
Repaired],” Gece Postası, August 27, 1962; “Silahtarlılar Hiç Olmazsa Bir Çeşme İstiyor [Silahtar 
People Asks For a Fountain At Least],” Gece Postası, August 30, 1962; Celal Akıl, interview by 
author, Yıldız Tabya, İstanbul, June 20, 2012; Ali Can, interview by author, Yıldız Tabya, İstanbul, 
June 20, 2012; İsmet Amca, interview by author, Yıldız Tabya, İstanbul, June 21, 2012; Seyfi Çağan, 
interview by author, Alibeyköy, İstanbul, January 15, 2013. 
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family relationships in the communities that helped immigrants to find jobs during the new 
decade. Almost all the workers I interviewed said that they had found work in the metal 
plants through their relatives.520 Hasbal Kayalı, an ex-Kavel worker, claimed that most Kavel 
workers found a job within the factory through the help of their relatives, who were foremen 
or mastermen in the factory. 521  These family ties must have facilitated the workers’ 
participation in social networks at the shop floor level. However, in the absence of evidence, 
it is impossible to debate the extent of solidarity in these networks, or the social divisions in 
neighbourhoods, which may have been drawn along lines according to the people’s original 
birthplaces. We don’t know how these elements reflected on the daily relations between 
workers on the shop floor. Did managers or bosses capitalize on those social divisions and 
ties to organize shop floor relations on their own behalf? In the same vein, did the new union, 
Çelik-İş, attempt to benefit from any local social division due to neighbourhood structures, in 
order to undermine Maden-İş? There is insufficient material to ask these important questions 
about social network fragmentation, as well as solidarity dynamics.  
Based on the oral history interview that I conducted with the metal workers and 
managers, this study argues that the social division between dwellers of the squatter areas did 
not reflect on the union activities on the shop floor in a meaningful manner. At least within 
the bigger plants, the workers from different birthplaces acted together to defend their 
common interests.522 According to Ege Cansen, although there was a social division between 
workers according to original birthplaces in Arçelik, those divisions did not culminate in a 
schism in terms of unionization.523 Indeed, the list of metal workers who participated in the 
seminar of Maden-İş in 1970 showed that people from many different birthplaces were the 
                                                             
520 Aziz Amca, interview by author, Yıldız Tabya, İstanbul, June 19, 2012; Celal Akıl, interview by 
author, Yıldız Tabya, İstanbul, June 20, 2012; İsmet Amca, interview by author, Yıldız Tabya, 
İstanbul, June 20, 2012; Mustafa Türker, interview by author, Yıldız Tabya, İstanbul, August 29, 2012; 
Seyfi Çağan, interview by author, Alibeyköy, İstanbul, June 20, 2012. 
521 Quoted by Zafer Aydın, Kanunsuz Bir Grevin Öyküsü: Kavel 1963 [The Story of an Unlawful 
Strike: Kavel, 1963], (İstanbul: Sosyal Tarih, 2010), 21. 
522 Mustafa Türker, interview by author, Yıldız Tabya, İstanbul, June 20, 2012; İsmet Amca, interview 
by author, Yıldız Tabya, İstanbul, June 21, 2012; Hüseyin Ekinci, interview by author, Sarıyer, 
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members of the same union.524 Those social networks must have, in some way, influenced 
workers’ daily life in the workplace, but we again lack documents to sketch a meaningful 
pattern for this important issue in the formation of the working class. 
The composition of the labor force in the metal sector remained almost the same in 
the new decade. In parallel with the expansion of the sector, the enterprises were made up of 
uneducated and young male workers. Indeed, the seminar book proved that most metal 
workers had attended only primary school, and their ages were between 25 and 40.525 During 
the decade, the majority of the metal workers remained non-qualified and semi-qualified. The 
ratio of qualified work force in the sector was only 16 percent by 1964.526 According to Ege 
Cansen, most bosses at the Demir Döküm Factory were unqualified.527 The composition of 
the work force was a great advantage for the metal bosses since they did not have to pay high 
wages to uneducated workers. To meet their quotas of necessary qualified workers, the bosses 
applied a strategy of training non-qualified workers on the job. Indeed, the qualified workers 
employed at the Demir Döküm claimed that they did not know anything about the job before 
being recruited; they learned their technical skills while on the job.528 Consequently, there 
was no weighty social division between qualified and non-qualified workers to factor into 
work disputes; in fact, most qualified workers, according to Sabahaddin Zaim, sided with 
workers during the collective actions. 529  In conclusion, it seemed that generational or 
educational differences did not create a division between workers on shop floor. In fact, the 
majority of the militant workers who would conduct collective actions at the end of the 1960s 
were young and inexperienced. 
                                                             
524 1970 Seminer Kayıt Defteri [The Seminar Book of Record], TÜSTAV Maden-İş Archive, Envelope 
9. 
525 Ibid. 
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The tense relations between workers and managers/bosses in terms of intolerance to 
workers’ demands, strict management control over work processes, insufficient workers’ 
income, strenuous and dangerous work conditions, and oppression of dissident workers, also 
remained unchanged during the first half of the 1960s. Despite attempts of the managers on 
some workplaces to settle on a type of industrial democracy530 based on mutual understanding 
between employers and employees, the grievances of the metal workers did not decline in the 
period. Even so, some big metal enterprises began to develop and apply new managerial 
methods to earn the loyalty of employees.531 The managers of a very few metal plants put a 
job evaluation system into effect within the workplace to provide a sense of fairness among 
its employees. Indeed, it seemed successful in some plants to a certain degree, but just for 
brief periods.532 In addition, Arçelik, for example, founded an apprentice training school in 
the early 1960s to create its own qualified labor force. The managers aimed to train the young 
laborers with the idea of being highly valued Arçelik personnel; consequently, the problem of 
labor commitment to their workplace would be resolved. 533  Furthermore, some metal 
enterprises even provided extra benefits, such as annual bonuses, or child or marriage 
                                                             
530 As described above, the term industrial democracy developed in the United States and then in 
developed Western capitalist countries, albeit with some reservations as stated by Marcel Van Der 
Linden, to regulate the labor process and smooth over the labor disputes on shop floor. While it began 
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ve İdare Derneği-The Turkish Management Association). In this regard, the industrial democracy 
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Endüstriyel Demokrasi Semineri [The Seminar on Industrial Democracy] held in the Faculty of 
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Gelişme Semineri held in 1967, and scholarly books, such as Orhan Tuna, Toplu İş Sözleşmesi 
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allowances to maintain commitment and peace on the shop floor.534  A famous manager, 
Şahap Kocatopçu stated in 1962 that Turkish management in general had become less 
oppressive in terms of labor policies on shop floor, in the 1960s. 535  Furthermore, some 
managers joined in TSİD (Türk Sevk ve İdare Derneği-The Turkish Management 
Association), which was founded to train managers in the methods of running industrial 
plants based on modern management techniques.536 However, those attempts were mostly in 
vain due to its shallowness of scope. Significantly, employer’s/manager’s efforts to 
undermine the union continued unabated in this period. 
Most metal bosses and managers strived to restrict the range of the union’s activities 
and constrain its influences on workers. In other words, the approach of most 
bosses/managers (“my business, my rules”) to running enterprises was still dominant in the 
sector. In fact, most of them were both bosses and managers at the same time, and reacted 
negatively to any intervention on running their own business.537 Ege Cansen, who was a 
director of personnel relations at Arçelik, said that the metal employers of the period showed 
disdainful attitudes towards any workers’ demands.538 Nuri Çelik, who worked in Arçelik as a 
lawyer, stated that: 
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“...those times were the age of employers. They were extremely unyielding to 
workers’ demands. They were stern bosses.”539 
 
Even the most well-known enterprises in terms of workers’ rights did not allow the 
union or workers to be a part of management.540 That is, the metal bosses’ attitude towards 
workplace relations were the same as those of the previous decade in the beginning of the 
1960s; the metal workers still suffered through the same despotic factory regime in the metal 
sector. Furthermore, the work time and work discipline on the shop floor intensified in several 
metal plants due to expansion of production in these en enterprises.541 This reflected on the 
shop floor as more careful surveillance during work hours, forced overtime work, or with the 
bosses not recognizing the right to workers’ annual leave of absence. 542  To remain 
competitive in the sector, the firms had to curb any actions of dissent and increase their profit 
margins as much as possible. In fact, workers’ complaints, which were grim in the 1950s, 
about low wages, arbitrary wage cuts, dangerous and strenuous work conditions, poor quality 
foods, forced overtime work, overtime work without no payment, dismissals, etc., continued 
into the first years of the 1960s.543  As noted, the oppression of the dissident, unionized 
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workers and workers’ representatives did not diminish in the decade. 544  The majority of 
İstanbul metal workers were still frustrated over their work experiences. 
In the same manner, the legacy of the 1960s, which referred to the Maden-İş strategy 
of solving its member's grievances through political means, or by suing bosses or conducting 
labor disputes at the İstanbul Regional Work Office, stretched on into the new decade. In the 
Maden-İş Congress, assembled in 1961, it was asserted that the number of cases brought to 
the labor courts exceeded 3 000 that same year.545 The issues brought to the Regional Work 
Office and the arbitration committee ranged from low wages, poor quality foods and lack of 
wage premiums, to the reduction of benefits, arbitrary wage cuts, or incorrect application of 
minimum wages. The labor disputes affected most big enterprises; such as, General Electric, 
Singer, Bereç Battery, Rabak, Elektro Metal, Demir Döküm, Emayetaş, Dever Metal 
Hardware, Şakir Zümre, etc., in the sector.546 But the union often complained that the existing 
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legal mechanism for overcoming workers’ problems did not function well.547 As a result, 
Maden-İş would make its first attempts to transgress the existing legal framework following 
certain institutional and political developments; namely, the metal workers would go into 
strike at Kavel in 1963 before the law was enacted.548 Transgressing the legal framework 
would become an important legacy to be passed down, one imitated at the end of the decade 
when workers would decide that they were left without any other choice. 
 
II. Changes 
A) The 1960 Coup D’état and Beyond 
Although it is true that neither the historical pattern of the establishment of the metal 
sector, nor the formation of workers’ neighbourhoods and workers’ grievances themselves on 
the shop floor went through significant changes in the new decade, the political and 
institutional life which contributed in shaping the workers’ collective responses and collective 
consciousness was, itself, transformed to a great extent. The 1960 coup d’état, which 
overturned the DP government on May 27, 1960, was the main political development in the 
new era in terms of overhauling political opportunities for workers. 
The military regime established after the coup d’état reiterated the old promises of 
industrial democracy as an aspect of social justice and the development of national wealth, 
from which all social classes would, it was assumed, benefit fairly. The military and then the 
civil governments all accused the former DP government of not giving the necessary attention 
to social and economic problems on behalf of the lower classes, especially for workers. For 
them, the workers’ rights were still unrecognized and they also suffered from miserable work 
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and life conditions under DP rule. In the new era, they insisted, industrial development would 
take place in parallel with the principle of social justice and fair income distribution. 549 
Furthermore, they made several attempts to fulfill those promises.  
After taking power, the military government assigned one of his members, Numan 
Esin, to conduct talks with the unions. In his statements, Numan Esin claimed that although 
he was not a Marxist, he accepted the existence and power of the working class in a modern 
society. During his meetings with the İstanbul unions in 1960, he promised that the 
government would soon recognize the right to strike.550 Furthermore, the military regime 
attempted to include famous unionists as the spokesmen for workers in Turkey: it asked the 
labor unions to send six representatives to the Constituent Assembly to contribute to the 
planning of a new constitution. 551  The İstanbul unions would quickly comprehend those 
developments as the emergence of new political opportunities, through which they could 
work more effectively to navigate the changing tides surrounding industrial relations: the six 
worker’s representatives from TÜRK-İş joined in the meetings to prepare a new Constitution 
in the Constituent Assembly.552 According to the memories of the general chair of TÜRK-İş, 
Nuri Beşer, the confederacy was influential in those meetings.553 
To ease industrial conflicts, the military regime appointed as Labor Minister, Prof. 
Cahit Talas, who had been known as a firm defender of the right to strike in the previous 
decade. Talas did not change his position in the new epoch: he defended the right to strike in 
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every speech he made during the 1960s.554 For Talas, one of the main goals of the May 27th 
Revolution was to provide sweeping social justice which would be the underlying factor in 
the transformation of the Turkish society.555 He also argued that providing a just income to 
workers, whose wages were truly quite low, would also contribute to overall industrial 
development. Indeed, Talas reiterated the post-war discourse; for him, the employers and 
employees had to work together to improve the national economy and wealth. To accomplish 
this, the unions had to be strong enough to impose their demands on employers.556 Another 
benefit of the cooperative relations between workers and employers was that the construction 
of a democracy based on social justice would obstruct the spread of harmful class conflicts in 
Turkey.557 In summary, Talas considered social justice as a way to eradicate the polarizations 
caused by fractured class relations in Turkey. His appointment augmented the hopes of the 
İstanbul unions in the new regime. 
Similarly, the civil governments continued to utilize the discourse of social justice, 
fair income distribution and industrial democracy, which the military regime had pioneered 
after the first elections in 1961. In fact, the rights of workers and the goal of ending workers’ 
misery was emphasized on the programme of the first, and then the second, coalition 
governments.558 The Prime Minister of the first civil government, İsmet İnönü,559 promised 
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social justice and fair income distribution in his speeches.560 But the most prominent figure of 
the new area was certainly the Labor Minister, Bülent Ecevit. He often emphasized the duty 
of the state to improve the low wages of workers and ameliorate the bad working conditions 
in his press interviews. Therefore, Ecevit asserted, the CHP-AP (Adalet Partisi-The Justice 
Party) coalition government, which believed in social justice, would re-evaluate the minimum 
wages and take every measure to improve workers’ living conditions; as a result, all citizens 
would fairly benefit from the development of the national economy.561 Similar to Cahit Talas, 
Bülent Ecevit often argued about the necessity of the right to strike in order to heal the social 
wounds in Turkish society. After getting the right to strike, Ecevit said, workers would 
assiduously labor to make their enterprises profitable, which in turn would increase workers’ 
income. This was the only way to improve national industry - on the basis of social justice.562  
Ecevit followed the old industrial democracy discourse by claiming that rather than 
being antagonistic groups, both employers and employees constituted indispensable parts of 
the whole of industrial life. They would both capitalize on the development of national 
industry, since their interests were actually in common, rather than in conflict. For this to 
happen, Ecevit reflected, both groups had to abandon their selfish interests and consider the 
economy of the Turkish nation as a whole. Social justice, including the industrial democracy 
that was the only way to abolish the possibility of struggle between labor and capitalists, 
would also inhibit the growth of communist ideology in Turkey.563 Further, social justice, 
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according to Ecevit, would add up to an increase in the profits of private capitalists, in the 
sense that since workers would always exert pressure on owners for higher wages, the owners 
would have to create new ways to improve their enterprises and augment profits. Therefore, 
rather than diminishing in importance, the idea of social justice would prevail and grow along 
with the significance of private capital in a democratic society.564 Both Talas and Ecevit 
strived with this rhetoric to comfort employers and workers at the same time, in order to drum 
up support for the new regime. 
But the primary difference from the previous period was that the governments of the 
new decade greatly expanded the scale of post-war discourse on social justice. Like their 
predecessor, the military and civil governments took important steps to realize their promises 
in the 1960s. The first act here was to roll out the 1961 Constitution. The initial draft of the 
new constitution, in which the unionists took a part, put forth that the state would protect the 
economically weak, particularly the workers and other social groups who had limited income. 
The same document asserted that any democracy that was bereft of social aspects was 
doomed to become extinct. Specific items regarding social justice also took their place in the 
1961 Constitution. Item 40 stated that economic and social life had to be regulated on the 
principles of social justice. Furthermore, Item 45 claimed that the state would take necessary 
measures to provide fair wages for its people, in order for them to have a decent life.565 
Regarding industrial relations, the most important development was undoubtedly the 
inclusion of the right to strike in the new constitution. The National Assembly rolled out the 
right to strike on April 1961; however, it would not be fully legislated until 1963.566 In fact, 
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the future debates about the directions of the constitution on social life, social justice, and 
property rights would influence the political and industrial struggles of the 1960s. 
In addition to the 1961 Constitution, the new CHP-JP government organized the 
Third Work Assembly in 1962, and as noted previously, the governments of CHP in 1947, 
and DP in 1954 organized the first two of the assemblies where the employer’s, worker’s and 
government’s representatives would discuss the important issues in terms of the industrial 
relations in order to reach peaceful solutions. The idea of social justice and fair income 
distribution would also take place in the First Five Year Development Plan,567 prepared in 
1963.568 However, the most important legislative development was the legislation of the right 
to strike in 1963. In the climate of the famous Kavel Strike which began at the late January 
1963 and increasing pressure of unions, the Law of Strike, Collective Bargaining and Trade 
Unions was brought to the National Assembly on April 1963 and legislated on July 12, 1963. 
Bülent Ecevit hailed the legislation as the beginning of a new era in which the social balance 
between labor and capital would finally be reached. Consequently, the Turkish worker, Ecevit 
added, would have a say in the industrial, social and economic development of the country.569 
In addition to recognizing the right to strike, the new law exerted strict rules over employers 
about workers’ dismissals, overtime payments, unionization rights and workers’ 
representatives. In fact, it reorganized shop floor rules on behalf of workers.570 
In addition to taking a part in the new Constitution, the state and TÜRK-İş alliance in 
the early 1960s could be observed acting on the political scene. As noted above, TÜRK-İş 
and several other unions within the confederacy like Maden-İş, supported the coup d’état with 
public declarations. The general chair of TÜRK-İŞ participated in a meeting that was 
organized by the members of the military government and the representatives of the political 
                                                             
567 Before the foundation of DPT in 1960, the CHP governments, in fact, had prepared two 
development plans in during the 1930s on the basis of five years. Another plan was prepared after the 
war years in 1947, but it was never put into practice. After the foundation of DPT, this institution had 
begun to prepare development goals again on the basis of a five-year plan. 
568 “Kararname [The Decree],” The Official Gazzette, 11329, February 8, 1963, 18. Also look at: M. 
Nihad Ay, Türkiye’de Toplu Pazarlık Düzeninde Ücret Oluşumu [The Formation of Wages Under The 
System of Collective Bargaining in Turkey] (İzmir: İktisadi ve Ticari Bilimler Fakültesi, 1969), 14. 
569 Bülent Ecevit, “İşçinin Yeni Hak ve Sorumlulukları [The New Rights and Responsibilities of 
Worker],” İşçi Postası, July 25, 1963. 
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parties in 1961. Furthermore, several ministers in the cabinet had begun to organize meetings 
with TÜRK-İş about labor problems by 1962. Other than this, the confederacy backed the 
state policy about the Cyprus issue571 and attempted to explain the opinions of Turkey to 
international organizations, such as AFL-CIO (American Federation of Labor-Congress of 
Industrial Organizations) and ILO. 572  Those developments would naturally irritate the 
entrepreneurs of the period. 
 
 
Figure 7: Bülent Ecevit (third from left, front row) and the workers’ representatives in İzmir (Source: 
İşçi Postası, August 12, 1963).  
 
Accordingly, Ecevit simultaneously tried to comfort the employers who were irritated 
by the new developments by asserting that the Turkish workers and unions had to take the 
interests of the whole society into account, rather than just considering their own. Actually, 
both workers and employers, Ecevit stated, must not abuse the rights recognized by the new 
law; otherwise, social order would be in jeopardy.573 To relieve the worry of employers, the 
1963 Labor Law included the right of lockout to ensure “balance” between employees and 
                                                             
571 Cyprus was leased to the British Empire by the Ottoman Empire in 1878. After this date, the United 
Kingdom began to rule the island and the population, primarily composed of Greeks and Turks, who 
lived on it. The population on the island earned their dependence after long conflicts with the British 
rule in 1960. After that, the conflict between Greeks and Turks escalated. In 1963, Turkish elements 
withdrew from the government and the Cyprus issue reached its climax on the international political 
scene. 
572 Aziz Çelik, Vesayetten Siyasete Türkiye’de Sendikacılık, 420-428, 455-456. 
573 Bülent Ecevit, “İşçinin Yeni Hak ve Sorumlulukları.” Also look at: Bülent Ecevit, “Türkiye’de Bir 
Sınıf Savaşı Olmayacak [There Will be no Class War in Turkey],” İşçi Postası, July 25, 1963. 
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employers.574 Ecevit’s arguments showed that the state institutions or officers had their own 
limit regarding social justice, fair income distribution and industrial democracy. The limit 
was, indeed, the limit of a capitalist democracy; the workers’ struggles should not target the 
existing social order, which was based on the profit and private property. On all occasions, 
Ecevit and his colleagues assured employers that the new laws did not pose any threat to their 
profits or property rights. 
Indeed, the military regime and succeeding governments supported the growth of 
private capital. For example, the 1963 government program declared support for private 
industry by all available means.575 Moreover, the state officers attempted in their meetings 
with industry to alleviate the fears and grievances of employers, which had reached a peak 
due to the expansion of workers’ rights. According to Ecevit, there was no need for 
employers to be afraid of the right to strike since it was recognized even in countries where 
private capital had complete freedom to act. 576  In this regard, a Turkish scholar, Ergun 
Özbudun seems right to say that the 1961 Constitution involved egalitarian values; on the 
other hand, the principles were not imbued with a radical content.577 Indeed, Ecevit urged 
workers and unions by saying that the acts to maintain the principles of social justice and fair 
income should not obstruct capital accumulation, or restrict the economic activities of private 
capital, which were indispensable elements of a democratic society.578 Furthermore, Ecevit 
argued that if the right to strike was not used responsibly, it would harm both sides. As a 
result, before calling for a strike, the unions had to iron out problems by meeting with 
                                                             
574 For the debates at the Constitution Comission and National Assembly on whether the lockout was a 
right or not look at: Kemal Sülker, Türkiye’de Grev Hakkı ve Grevler [The Strikes and the Strike Right 
in Turkey] (İstanbul: Gözlem, 1976), 234-266. 
575 Esin Pars, 65. Also look at: Bülent Ecevit, “Çalışma Bakanı Bülent Ecevit Konfederasyonumuz 
Genel Kurul Toplantısında Bir Konuşma Yaptı [The Labor Minister, Bülent Ecevit, Talked in the 
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576 Bülent Ecevit, “Çalışma Bakanı’nın Radyo Konuşması [The Speech of the Labor Minister on the 
Radio],” İşveren, vol. 1 no. 2 (August 1963): 5-7. 
577 Ergun Özbudun, “Income Distribution as an Issue in Turkish Politics,” in Ergun Özbudun and 
Aydın Ulusan [eds.] The Political Economy of Income Distribution in Turkey, (New York: 
Holmes&Meier, 1980), 55 and 72. 
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employers first.579 For example, when the Kavel workers walked out in 1963, Ecevit publicly 
accused Maden-İş of preferring a contentious method rather than a peaceful one. Ecevit 
claimed that the union had made a great mistake by resorting to illegal measures in the 
absence of relative laws. 580  Ecevit’s stance on the Kavel Strike would cause great 
disappointment amongst the unionists who largely supported the strike in the 1963. 
Although the state attempted to define the framework of social justice, it could not 
completely control how it was affected by different social groups. In this regard, the decade 
witnessed a class war on the very definition of social justice: while unionists of the period 
were largely inspired by state attempts to define this notion for the sake of the interests of the 
workers, and thereby holding bosses to account for exploiting poor people, the well-known 
bosses publicly declared how they actually worked hard to provide social justice by 
improving the national wealth the country, and recognizing workers’ rights. 
    
B) Taking Sides: The Unions, Bosses and the Idea of Social Justice 
Nearly all famous unionists of the period supported the idea of social justice. In the 
fifth general congress of Türk-İş in 1964, the chair, Seyfi Demirsoy, spoke of profit greedy 
employers, whom he saw as a “happy minority” in that group, saying that if they continued to 
pursue their old habits, the working class would resist them by all possible means. In his 
speech, Demirsoy presented employers as a social group which inhibited social justice, fair 
income distribution and overall national development in Turkey.581 Demirsoy’s speech and 
definitions were a meaningful example of how union leaders comprehended bosses, despite 
all official discourse of mutual cooperation and common interest between workers and 
employers. 
It’s clear that the 1960s in Turkey witnessed widespread contentious debates on 
social justice. It is also true that the idea of social justice became a norm in the capitalist 
                                                             
579 Bülent Ecevit, “Açış Konuşması [The Opening Speech],” III. Çalışma Meclisi, 22-29 January 1962, 
Ankara, 30. 
580 “Çalışma Bakanı Sendikaları Suçlu Buluyor [The Labor Minister Finds Unions Guilty],” Gece 
Postası, February 16, 1963. 
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countries through the development of welfare state to consolidate the system and realize 
labor-capital accord. However, in Turkey this notion created a firm ground on which the 
reasons behind social inequalities and the different methods that could be employed to 
overcome them were publicly debated. In fact, the Turkish left efficiently benefited this 
ground to enlarge its influence within the Turkish society; for example, the name of monthly 
journal of the Marxist Turkish Labor Party was The Social Justice, in which not just the party 
members, but also the prominent public intellectuals of the time, discussed the possible ways 
of building socialism in Turkey. 
During the 1960s not only the Turkish left or union leaders, but also employers, 
famed journalists, university professors and intellectuals all touched on the importance of 
social justice, just income distribution, social harmony between different classes, and the 
social principles of the 1961 Constitution in their speeches, articles or books. Çağlar Keyder 
claims that the bureaucrats and intellectuals of the 1960s became the firm defenders of the 
idea of development intermixed with social justice. 582  Most of those socially influential 
figures defined a common interest between labor and capital in terms of it being necessary for 
the development of national economy; at the same time, they plainly accepted the unfairness 
of the existing social order in Turkey. For them, the workers could not get their fair share in 
return for their labor under such a system. Furthermore, there was nearly a common 
consensus that bosses in Turkey were greedy and exploitative in their behaviours and did not 
heed workers’ rights. It was assumed that a minority of employers had greedily exploited the 
workers and natural resources up until that time, for their own selfish interests. Consequently, 
a significant number of scholars, columnists or bureaucrats emphasized the fact that social 
and economic relations, which had progressed without significant attention to the workers’ 
cause thus far, had to be regulated to level the unfair playing field between labor and capital. 
Indeed, the development of Turkey would be possible if, and only if the workers’ conditions 
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could be improved.583 To summarize the point, there was a general idea that the existing 
degenerated social system had to be revised, or completely replaced with a moral and just 
one, in which everyone would fairly benefit from national wealth. 
 
 
Figure 8: The headline states that the Turkish workers were on radar for the first time. The placard over 
the head of the woman says that the Turkish workers are the guardians of the Constitution (Source: 
İşçinin Sesi, year 1 no. 8, (8 May 1963) ). 
 
Inspired by the widespread consensus on the necessity of social justice, both 
employers and employees declared their wish for a democratic society in which every citizen 
would have a chance to sustain a proper lifestyle. However, the problem was the definition of 
the limits of a fair society. In other words, the employers’ and employees’ organizations 
declared their definitions of the term “social justice” as something that would make Turkish 
society one of the developed nations in the world; nonetheless, there was no common further 
agreement on the implications of the term. The boss’ and workers’ organizations, which were 
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often in the public spotlight, saw the definition of social justice quite differently due to their 
own social positions and classes. Consequently, they both conducted a class war over the true 
meaning of the social justice. 
The İstanbul unions had celebrated the May 27th coup d’état and exerted pressure on 
the new regime to fulfill their promises to workers quickly. Indeed, just after the coup , union 
leaders began to demand the right to strike and an end to the restrictions on union freedoms 
and attacks on social justice. The right to strike, especially, the union leaders said, would 
balance out the unfair social relations between workers and employers. In this regard, they 
welcomed the appointment of Cahit Talas, who was known by unions as the firm defender of 
this proposed legislation, as Labor Minister. Then, the 1961 Constitution, according to 
unions, brought in a new era that provided a social and legal framework to create and 
maintain the rights of laboring classes. 584  To conclude the point, national political 
developments augmented the hope of the unions in the beginning of the new decade. 
Encouraged by the widespread debates about injustice, the unions directed a public 
assault against employers by accusing them of being responsible for the huge social and 
economic gaps between social classes. The workers’ current conditions in Turkey were 
utterly miserable; workers, who labored in cooperation with employers to improve the 
national economy could not get their deserved share of the national wealth, and they could 
barely sustain themselves due to the unfair income distribution and unjust social and 
economic relations. However, the unions briefly stated, workers must be provided with a just 
income and the principles of social justice had to be accepted in order to obstruct a bloody 
class war. They called for fair income distribution, nationally. In essence, the unions argued 
for the workers and employers, both, to be able to take benefit from the national wealth.585  
                                                             
584 Türkiye İşçi Sendikaları Konfederasyonu Adına Ömer Ergün’ün Radyo Konuşması [The Radio 
Speech of Ömer Ergün on behalf of The Workers’ Confederation of Turkey], TÜSTAV Kemal Sülker 
Archive, Box 20 Envelope 1089. 
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In order to secure workers’ rights, the unions followed their old strategy of backing 
the state, which had already promised to provide a decent life and respected place for 
workers. In this regard, unions defined the current regime as the protector of laboring classes. 
For example, Demirsoy argued that since the existing social system made the rich richer and 
the poor poorer, the state had to take sides with the weaker social groups, namely workers. In 
return, he promised that workers would do their best to maintain social peace by staving off 
harmful and excessive collective acts. In fact, by saying that workers would walk out only if 
they felt unfairness, Demirsoy urged the regime to promote social justice, lest the workers 
would make it happen on their own terms. In essence, Demirsoy’s comment was a threat to 
the regime. In fact, to reach their goals, the union leaders tried in this manner to be vocally 
influential on the policy-making processes of the new era. As an example, they demanded the 
right to representation in the preparation stages of the new economic plan by arguing that the 
plan had to reflect the principles of social justice.586 Moreover, union leaders insisted that the 
right to strike and high minimum wages were being encouraged by the new regime discourse 
on social justice and the new constitution.587 On those demands, they were more bold and 
determined than they had been in the previous decade. 
While it is true that the union leaders still defined cooperative relations with 
employers in theory during the 1960s, their actual portrayal of Turkish employers was quite 
different from such an idealized picture. According to the unions, the actual relations between 
workers and employers in Turkey were conflictual due to the employer’s “greediness and 
intolerance” of any workers’ rights. In order to create a fair society, the union leaders publicly 
                                                                                                                                                                              
National Assembly],” Öncü, February 27, 1961; Türkiye İşçi Sendikaları Konfederasyonu Adına İsmail 
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accused employers, as a distinct social group, of striving to prevent the development of 
unionism and social justice in Turkey.588 Furthermore, they claimed that most entrepreneurs 
still did not believe in social justice, and that they did not heed any law regarding relations 
with workers.589 In defining the actual relations between workers and employers in Turkey, 
the unions presented employers as having been engaged in an exploitative behaviour. Seyfi 
Demirsoy, who hailed the strike law as an end to the exploitation, stressed the exploitative 
reasoning and attitudes of the Turkish employers.590 In essence, although the unions did not 
define a contentious relationship as being intrinsic to the social order itself between labor and 
capital, famous unionists pegged workers and employers as two different social groups, and 
more importantly their relations were, in fact, conflictual in Turkey. The union’s definition of 
employers as a distinct and exploitative social group would further radicalize relations 
between workers and employers in the decade. 
To emphasize the unequal class relations in Turkish society and raise their voices to 
promote the end of injustice, workers became more visible in the public eye. In the first years 
of the decade, unions organized several meetings and demonstrations to make their demands; 
mainly for higher wages and the right to strike. Workers also called for an end to exploitation 
in those meetings and took an antagonistic approach against employers, at least until the their 
rights were be recognized.591 The most well known of their public demonstrations was the 
Saraçhane Mitingi which took place on December, 31, 1961, in İstanbul. Several İstanbul 
trade unions including Maden-İş and others who would later establish DİSK decided to 
organize a nation-wide protest meeting to claim the right to strike, better wages and several 
other workers’ rights. For this meeting, the workers rushed into İstanbul from the different 
cities of Turkey, such as Eskişehir, Adana, Zonguldak, Afyon and Erzincan. About 150 000 
                                                             
588 Kemal Sülker, “Sendikalar Tehlikede [Unions are in Jeopardy],” Türkiye Birlik, July 20, 1962. 
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workers in total participated in the demonstration. The posters that workers carried demanded 
strike legislation, an end to workers’ misery, and support for higher wages. In the meeting, 
the union leaders emphasized that they were not against the government, but  they demanded 
the state keep its promises about social justice. 592  The meeting must have been an 
encouragement for İstanbul workers to act collectively for asking their rights. The meeting 
was also an important sign that if the state did not keep its promises and employers did not 
give up their old habits of intolerance and greed, workers would not hesitate to fight, with the 
help of their unions, to get their demands met.  
 
 
Figure 9: The workers in the Saraçhane Demonstration. The placard held by the woman states: ‘Salary 
is 120, house rent is 150 Turkish Lira (Source: Aziz Çelik, Vesayetten Siyasete Türkiye’de 
Sendikacılık, 364). 
 
How did employers react to those kinds of public assaults by the union? At this point, 
it would not be hard to argue that the employers of the period took a defensive position in 
order to prove that they actually supported workers’ rights, stood for social justice, or were 
concerned about social poverty. The social and political aura of the 1960s emphasized social 
justice, decried the corrupt social order and unfair employer-employee relations, and thereby 
greatly damaged the credibility of private entrepreneurs. The statements of the employers 
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pointed out the loss of employer credibility during the 1960s.593 As a result, the big bosses of 
the era felt the necessity to be more visible on the public scene in order to increase the 
public’s sense of their reliability and trustworthiness. To this end, employers often reminded 
the public through speeches, books and conferences, of the importance of private capital for 
national development. They also portrayed their businesses as being beneficial for the whole 
country. In the absence of strong private capital, employers and managers argued, democracy 
would be doomed in any society. Moreover, some employers declared that they stood for 
social justice, and they engaged in charity activities in response to public support for the need 
for social equality. The employers often made these attempts to soften their reputations in 
order to engage in cooperative relations with workers or workers’ unions. 594  They even 
argued that any plan for economic development must consider social repercussions at first.595 
Some employers further acted to maintain much demanded social justice on the shop floor.  
In this regard, prominent bosses of the period founded TSİD or engaged in relations 
with official institutions, such as the MPM (Milli Prodüktivite Merkezi-The National 
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Productivity Center).596 According to the narratives of Şahap Kocatopçu,597 some prominent 
employers of the period established TSİD in 1962 upon the advice of an American committee 
that came to Turkey to conduct seminars on management of industrial enterprises.598 Both of 
these institutions organized conferences, seminars or courses for managers on how to 
maintain peace on the shop floor, or how to establish a modern management structure within 
enterprises to satisfy employees or to increase productivity without sacrificing social justice. 
In these events, the engineers and professors, who were mostly trained in Germany and 
England, expressed the importance of industrial democracy and modern management 
techniques, such as a wage system based on an impartial evaluation of workers’ performance 
and seniority, in order to both increase productivity and provide a sense of fairness among 
employees. 599  It is impossible to debate to what extent those seminars or conferences 
influenced the employers’ approaches to shop floor dynamics or social relations, due to the 
absence of related documents. But inferences can be derived from the regular complaints 
within those organizations that most employers did not actually heed the advice of 
management experts and were inclined to pursue their old motto; “my business, my rules”. 
Moreover, one can argue that the employers’ stance on the concepts of social justice or fair 
income distribution was quite different, even conflictual, from that of unions and workers. 
The two surveys which were conducted in 1961 and 1974 among the entrepreneurs of 
the period give us some idea about how they defined social justice. According to a survey 
conducted in 1961 by Arif Payaslıoğlu, who was a professor of economics in the Middle East 
Technical University, nearly 65 percent of employers were against the workers’ right to 
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strike.600 In 1974, a political scientist from the Ankara University, Erdoğan Sora, conducted 
another survey among the Turkish employers. This survey shows that the employers accepted 
the strike right, but they wanted unions to be strictly governed by laws due to their excessive 
demands. They also objected to the application of the strikes; for them, the problems between 
workers and employers could be solved through mutual understanding, cooperation and 
sacrifices. 601  In fact, most employers comprehended social justice, industrial democracy, 
modern management techniques, etc., in a very restricted manner. The scholars of the period 
admitted that most employers saw any workers’ demands as harmful to their profits and to 
their “natural right” to rule their own enterprises.602 Indeed, the employers mentioned that the 
demands of unions, which were “excessive”, created unease amongst themselves. These 
excessive demands might threaten the business of employers and they, in turn, could not 
provide high salaries for their employees.603  
The employers also expressed their concerns about social justice. First of all, the idea 
and practice of social justice as understood by unions must naturally threaten the prestige and 
profit of private capital. Secondly, employers objected to the idea of social justice in terms of 
the redistribution of wealth and the resulting decrease of private profit. Lastly, they said social 
justice had to be understood as the fair distribution of national wealth, but only according to 
knowledge, talent and the education of citizens, rather than as an generalized, equal 
distribution. 604  Essentially, the employers of the period approved of the distribution of 
national wealth and social justice, but in a limited manner. They accepted those notions as 
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long as their profits would keep increasing and their right to rule their own business would 
not be impinged. At this point, it was impossible to reach an agreement with unions since 
employers comprehended unions’ arguments on the excessive profits of private capital as a 
direct assault against private capital, itself. 
Furthermore, the perceived unionist assault fostered the idea of being organized 
among the employers. Bosses of the period often emphasized unity to combat the increasing 
organization of workers and their growing influence in political spheres. In fact, the 
employers of the period founded their own organizations, or tried to empower the existing 
ones, to defend their rights collectively.605 As a result, the workers and employers came face 
to face collectively through their organizations. In this regard, the workers’ and bosses’ 
debates became much more contentious when they encountered each other on the public 
scene. For example, both those social groups met during special meetings held to determine 
minimum wages, in December 1961. There, employers argued against the level of minimum 
wage put forth by workers’ representatives in İstanbul. In reply, workers’ representatives 
accused employers of being reluctant to stand for a fair minimum wage. For workers, the 
employer’s representatives seemed single-minded on the issue of low minimum wages in the 
meetings, and this was yet another an example of their “bad intentions” and “greed.”606  
As another example, the employer’s representatives called upon significant reserves 
during the debate over the right to strike in the Third Work Assembly organized in 1962. 
Their stance was that strikes could harm the national economy if they were to happen in 
several crucial sectors. The workers’ representatives firmly objected to the proposals of 
employers’ representatives on this issue, and asserted that employers aimed to sabotage the 
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congress by objecting to nearly every one of the workers’ demands.607 In fact, the headlines of 
the newspapers reflected the harsh debates over the right to strike that took place in the 
Assembly.608 The contentious relations between workers’ and employer’s representatives did 
not subside in the next Work Assembly, which was held in 1965. The workers’ delegations, 
as an example, loudly objected to an offer by the employer’s delegation, which argued for 
strike restrictions, and the delegates then left the meeting.609 To summarize, these encounters 
between collectives further severed workers’ and employer’s relations during the decade. 
Another repercussion of the encounters was that when representatives or union officials began 
to deal with employers as a collective entity rather than individuals, their view of the current 
class divisions and differences in society was made more clear. 
The rise of socialism in the 1960s would further cause strained relations between 
unionists and employers. Unlike the governments, which presented private capital as an 
indispensable actor in economic and democratic development, the leftist discourse 
approached the private sector as a “parasitic entity” that grew unfairly and relentlessly by 
“exploiting” poor people in Turkey. While union officers did not adopt such a language to 
openly challenge the very roots of capitalist relations in Turkey, they did, however, address 
inequitable relations and their attitude towards Turkish bosses as more or less inspired by the 
leftist discourse, which considerably increased its influence in the country at that time. 
 
C) Rise of the Left 
The 1960s were truly a golden age for the leftist movement, which had been brutally 
oppressed by the state in Turkey in the previous periods. With the chance of pursuing its 
activities legally, the leftist movements became a considerable political force, influencing the 
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political debates and daily life of Turkish society throughout the decade. The left, which 
benefited from the above mentioned political developments and opportunities created by the 
new regime, would be a significant actor in the widespread public debates regarding social 
justice and income equality. It would propagate the idea of social justice by taking workers’ 
side and emphasizing socialist ideology as the only viable method by which to rule the 
country. 
The 1960s’ leftists stamped their mark on the era through their political party 
organizations, as well as through the work of their intellectuals, their publications, university 
organizations, cultural activities, and anti-imperialist campaigns, etc. The most influential of 
those mediums was a monthly journal, YÖN, and a political party, the Turkish Labor Party. 
Both YÖN and the TİP were able to organize a considerable number of Turkish and Kurdish 
intellectuals, student movement leaders, unionists, bureaucrats, journalists, and university 
professors. As a result of these combined voices, the movement became very influential on 
the political and social life of the country. 
YÖN started publication in 1961 after 1042 intellectuals signed a declaration. YÖN 
was originally founded by the initiative of six influential intellectuals of the time: Mümtaz 
Soysal (1929-), İlhami Soysal (1928-1992), İlhan Selçuk (1925-2010), Cemal Reşit Eyüboğlu 
(1906-1988), Hamdi Avcığlu (d. 1986), and Doğan Avcıoğlu (1926-1983). The circulation of 
the journal reached unprecedented figures in Turkey: it sold more than 20 000 copies weekly. 
A foreign scholar defined this as an impressive number for a political-ideological periodical 
at those times.610 The journal was a iconoclast periodical, in particular due to its emphasis on 
socialism, a word that had long been taboo to even be expressed aloud. It touted socialism as 
a political and economic model to “save” Turkey from its backward position in the 
international order.611 The name of the journal can literally be translated as direction: indeed, 
the editors, in fact, published it to give direction to Turkey. It was an Ankara weekly paper 
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and comprised twenty-four pages in large format. According to a survey conducted between 
Ankara university students in 1965, the journal was widely read by students who were at the 
top of the journal’s demographic with about 40.4 percent of total readers. The first issue was 
published on 20 December 1961 and it was suspended to be published on 30 June 1967, on 
the proclamation that it had completed its mission.612  
 According to a Turkish scholar, Yalçın Küçük, YÖN was one of the most influential 
journals in the history of Republican Turkey. 613  The YÖN declaration emphasized the 
unfairness found in society, and declared the stance of its signators as being for the rights of 
just income distribution, industrial development within a statist economy, and economic 
planning based on social justice.614 The journal brought the idea of socialism within such a 
framework to the attention of Turkey’s social and political groups. According to authors who 
penned articles about the workers’ causes, the Turkish workers who were oppressed by 
employers and lived under miserable conditions were slowly recognizing their common 
interests.615 In terms of a class war, the debates in the journal were in parallel with the regime 
discourse; that is, only social justice might obstruct the rise of class conflicts in Turkey.616 
Further, its criticisms of employers were even more severe. YÖN called out employers as 
members of a “happy minority” in Turkey and argued that they exploited the labor and 
national resources of the country only to fill up their own pockets. For example, the journal 
portrayed Vehbi Koç as one such problematic employer in Turkey.617 The wide use of this 
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term, ‘happy minority’, would be adopted by several union’s officers, leftist movements and 
other publications of the period.618 
Another influential political current of the period was the TİP. The unionists of the 
1950s, who had believed in influencing party politics in order to get workers’ rights, began to 
reflect on founding a workers’ party just after the coup d’état. The relatively militant union 
leaders such as Kemal Türkler, Kemal Nebioğlu, Basri Karagöz, İbrahim Denizcier, and Avni 
Erakalın reached an agreement to establish the Turkish Labor Party in 1961. According to 
Sedat Ağralı, Maden-İş and Lastik-İş, which would later be the most militant unions of DİSK, 
were the most determined unions in creating a workers’ party.619 The unionists had decided 
the aim of the TİP was to defend the interests of the long-oppressed working class and carry 
them to the seats of the National Assembly where workers could use their voices more 
effectively. Although the TİP was nearly invisible on the political scene in its first years, it 
would become much more influential organization, especially after the unionists invited the 
leftist intellectuals to the executive committee. Despite the (sometimes physical) attacks at the 
party meetings or congresses, and accusations of communism, the TİP widened its influence 
and sent 15 deputies to the National Assembly after the 1965 elections. More significantly, its 
discourse, such as the “right to resist”, “anti-imperialism”, “the end of exploitation”, and 
“calloused hands to the parliament”, was infused widely into Turkish society. The TİP’s 
policies had major effects on political life in Turkey.620 Since the party came from a leftist 
interpretation of the concepts of social justice and just income distribution, the TİP’s political 
line clashed with employers who were already uncomfortable with the state’s policies on 
industrial relations. 
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One of the most significant repercussions of the inclusion of Marxist intellectuals in 
the party was that the TİP became more affiliated with the Marxist discourse and, over time, it 
consequently leaned towards a more clear-cut, anti-capitalist position. Regarding the current 
income distribution, Aybar stated in his first press bulletin that the widespread injustice and 
unfair income distribution accounted for the misery of the laboring classes in Turkey. In order 
to overcome this, the national wealth must be fairly distributed and the laboring classes must 
get their deserved share from the national economy.621 Moreover, the succeeding party leaders 
and political cadres adopted the word “class” into their lexicon, in a specifically antagonistic 
use of the term. Future party documents would clearly state that the laboring classes, not just 
workers, would rule the country. In other words, the party openly expressed its intention that 
the working class should have had a decisive word on the future of Turkey. The party 
documents also argued for shrinking the influence of private capital in the Turkish economy. 
Instead, state enterprises would be expanded and private capital would be forced to follow the 
principles of a new economic plan under the TİP power. 
Although the TİP claimed to provide room for private capital under its planned statist 
economy, it defined an inherently antagonistic relationship between workers and employers. 
According to the TİP, the interests of laborers and wealthy classes were conflictual rather 
than cooperative in nature. The party defined the wealthy classes, who had control of the 
means of production, as groups, which inhibited the development of social justice and just 
income distribution in Turkey. Thus, the TİP identified the existing social order as an 
exploitative system622 and emphasized the class distinctions in the society by hailing the 
people as workers, (noble) peasants and sharecroppers during the election campaign in 1963. 
More importantly, the party called on those segments of the society to awaken and fight for 
their common rights and interests. In its public meetings and declarations, the party promised 
to rid the country of the “tyranny of exploiters” whom they said dominated the existing social 
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and economic order in Turkey.623 The TİP was one of the most influential parties, which 
openly criticized the fundamental roots of the existing social order, namely capitalism, 
throughout the Turkish history. 
After M. Ali Aybar became the party chair, TİP’s socialist stance became more 
obvious and the idea of socialism found its place in society in Turkey, throughout the 1960s. 
The first programme had not included even a word “class” and emphasized rather the Atatürk 
reforms in the single-party period, and the principle of social justice took its place in the 1961 
Constitution. After being leader of the party, Aybar assigned a commission which would pen 
a regulation defining the party as the political organization of the working class and those 
who get together under the democratic leadership of the working class. Subsequently, the 
1964 program, which was produced by the party members as well as non-party members of 
some intellectuals, was ratified in the First Congress at İzmir in 1964. This document ran for 
more than three editions in the same year when it was accepted at the congress.624 
In fact, the new program clearly included the main assumptions of Marxism. In the 
same vein, in 1964, party officers inserted the word socialism into the party programme, 
prominently emphasizing the features of the 1961 Constitution. In order to foster the spread 
of socialist ideas in Turkey, it analyzed the Constitution as the main defender of workers’ 
rights and held the position that the document implicitly supported the idea of socialism 
because it included items about social justice and just income distribution. Accordingly, the 
party defended the constitution in its program, declarations, and debates within the parliament 
and public meetings.625 To summarize the point, the TİP strived to insert an antagonistic 
definition of class into the idea of social justice, which was one of the hegemonic discourses 
of the period. 
There is certainly a paucity of material to debate the specific influence of socialism 
amongst Turkish metal workers. Since the union did not want its members to be divided along 
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party lines, and since it defined the function of unionism as the defense of the common 
economic and social interests of the metal workers, Maden-İş, (the leader of which being one 
of the founders of the TİP), did not follow any obvious party politics among its rank and file. 
Hüseyin Ekinci, the chair of the Silahtarağa District Branch of Maden-İş, described Kemal 
Türkler as a socialist; however, Türkler, he claimed, was aware of the fact that unions were 
mass organizations, which included a people with a variety of ideas. According to Ekinci, 
Kemal Türkler preferred not to become one of the public faces of the party in order not to lose 
the support of metal workers. 626  Kemal Türkler interpreted the duty of unionists to be 
defenders of other members who were ignorant of their true political inclinations, by all 
means possible. In this regard, the union did not exclude diligent, well-respected and 
trustworthy workers and representatives who, at the same time, refuted socialist ideology. 
Those representatives, in turn, did not mind the ideological stance of the union officers, since 
they saw Maden-İş as the true defender of metal workers’ rights.627 In fact, anyone who 
searches among the journals of Maden-İş barely encounters news about the TİP, or the 
declarations and opinions of party politicians. Because of this, it is nearly impossible to 
evaluate the influence of this growing socialist ideology on the metal workers. Yet, since 
Maden-İş was one of the founders of the TİP and Kemal Türkler was the member of the party, 
the metal bosses and rival union, Çelik-İş, would accuse Maden-İş of being a “puppet” of the 
so-called communist TİP, especially when the struggles between MESS, Maden-İş and Çelik-
İş were at their peak. Both MESS and Çelik-İş would blame Maden-İş for “ideological 
strikes” which were assumed to be conducted for political gain, rather than actually aiming to 
improve the conditions of the metal workers. In fact, some union members, and some factory 
representatives or the district representatives, such as Hüseyin Ekinci, İlyas Kabil, were the 
active members of the TLP. Those people worked for the party during election times and 
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spread the seeds of socialism amongst the public.628 Moreover, some active party members 
worked in the union as expert lawyers or contributed articles to the journals. At this time, 
socialist ideology became influential among some high-ranking officers of the union, and 
amongst district representatives who also acted as diplomats between the rank and file and 
high union officers. 
The new laws and regulations, the features of the 1961 Constitution, the official 
discourse on social justice and income distribution, and the rise of the left as an influential 
political current all accounted for the new, widespread public debates on social justice in 
Turkey during the 1960s. The employers, who were irritated by the increasing power of the 
left and increasing state intervention on shop floor issues and industrial relations, would 
eventually respond in kind. Employers and their organizations, and workers and their 
organizations, would each attempt to define social justice and other related concepts 
differently, and even in a contentious manner. In other words, the idea of social justice which 
was actually first brought to wide attention by the state, would only add up to further 
polarization between workers and bosses during the 1960s. 
 
III. Conclusion 
The military intervention overthrew the DP government, which lasted nearly 10 years 
in Turkey in part by accusing this party of creating important social and political cleavages to 
divide the Turkish society. However, neither the military nor new civil governments did, or 
could, resolve the widespread worker’s grievances, which were assumed to be products of the 
ignorant policies of the old government. But at same time, workers’ and unions’ demands 
became one of the most important issues of public debate in Turkey. Through government’s 
promises, legal texts and rise of the left in the period, the idea of social justice became the 
defining feature of zeitgeist of the Turkish society. As a result, the 1960s witnessed a 
formation of a solid foundation on which workers and unions would articulate their demands. 
The concept of social justice, first formulated in the developed capitalist countries in order to 
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ensure the survival of the existing social and economic relations through conciliating the 
interests of capital and labor, became a contentious area in Turkey through which the basic 
foundations of social order were highly debated. 
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CHAPTER 6 
INTERVENTION: THE KAVEL STRIKE, 1963 
The new political opportunities created by the state and encouraged by the unions, 
and the resulting public debates over social justice including industrial democracy and income 
distribution, would radicalize the relationships between metal employers and workers whose 
grievances about work and city life continued. In fact, the İstanbul metal workers, who were 
quick to grasp these political opportunities, would become more bold and determined to get 
their rights and earn their much desired place within the social order. Towards the end of the 
1962, the union decided to act on the shop floor to get their members’ rights recognized – 
rights which the state seemed uneager to provide, so the union fought for them through 
collective actions. The fight between metal workers and bosses would culminate in the 
famous Kavel Strike. These collective actions in the form of strikes would substantially 
change the working relationship between the metal employers and their workers. Through the 
widely supported Kavel Strike, the metal workers would take an important step to win their 
rights when they were not provided by the state or their bosses. 
In the last days of January 1963, the metal workers at the Kavel Factory, which was 
owned by two prominent metal bosses, Vehbi Koç and Emin Aktar, went into one of the most 
famous and influential strikes in Turkish history. The strike lasted 36 days and ended with 
victory for the union. It was such a pivotal moment in public life of the country that there 
were drawn out, heated debates held between famous journalists, columnists, the well known 
intellectuals of the country, the employees’ and employers’ organizations, and the parties and 
representatives in the National Assembly. During the strike, critical meetings about the labor 
law were being conducted in the National Assembly. The walkout also created a division 
within the Assembly, between those who supported the strike and those who did not. The 
supportive representatives emphasized the unlawful acts of the employers on the shop floor 
and the miserable conditions that the workers suffered through. In contrast, the others claimed 
that the strike itself was unlawful and such acts might culminate in anarchy and social 
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disorder, which might well pave way for communism. 629  In fact, it would not be an 
exaggeration to say that not just the higher state organizations, but also the whole of the 
Turkish public was divided between two camps; those opposed to the strike and its 
supporters.630 The Kavel Strike was the most significant collective attempt of the workers up 
until that time to settle the social justice on their own behalf. The Kavel and its repercussions 
would also radicalize the already tense relations between metal workers and bosses on shop 
floor. 
İstanbul’s metal workers, whose old shop floor grievances did not fade in the new 
decade, were quick to grasp the soul of the new age and were ready to actively respond to the 
political and institutional developments that were occurring in the country. They immediately 
adopted the new discourses of the period into their language. These notions; such as social 
justice, fair income distribution, and “happy minority”, or the new mottos; such as, an end to 
the exploitation, the maintenance of workers’ rights, and implementation of the social 
principles of the Constitution, were inscribed on the minds of the metal workers. The 
workers’ representatives, who were considered by the workers to be their own voices, utilized 
the new notions and mottos in their encounters with the metal bosses and managers. At first, 
officers of the metal union trusted the relevant state organs and officers to realize the goals 
behind these notions. However, when the new regime, in which the union’s officers often 
declared their faith, was late to fulfill its promises, the workers and unionists became more 
determined to intervene in the ongoing developments. In addition to Maden-İş’s efforts to 
secure workers’ rights on the institutional level, the workers would collectively push the 
limits of the industrial framework through their own efforts. Their collective actions in the 
forms of strikes would prove that the metal workers were determined to transgress the laws, if 
necessary, to achieve their demands. It’s apparent that the metal workers attempted to 
capitalize on current political developments, which, indeed, provided significant opportunities 
from the beginning of the 1960s. 
                                                             
629 Aydın, 94-100. 
630 Zafer Aydın gives a detailed account and provides a well-written analysis of the strike in his book, 
Kanunsuz Bir Grevin Öyküsü. 
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I. The Road to Kavel 
As in the 1950s, the workers’ and/or union’s representatives of the Sixties were the 
most important figures to pursue the union’s policy and align the rank and file with the union 
on the shop floor. The representatives, who had acquired considerable experience and pursued 
their duties despite the bosses’ oppression during the previous decade, continued to provide 
communication between workers, employers and the union. One ex-Kavel worker, Hasbal 
Kayalı, claimed that: 
“There were workers’ representatives. Nobody did see any boss. We told our 
every need to representatives. Then, they conveyed our demands to the 
boss.”631 
 
The importance of the worker’s-union’s representatives can also be understood from the 
incidents at Kavel: here the Kavel workers refused to work when the general manager did not 
re-hire the dismissed representatives who had been fired in the beginning of the strike in 
January 1963. Although nearly all high officers of the union had been the worker’s and 
union’s representatives at the same time during the 1950s, it was impossible to determine how 
those figures had functioned in the organizational structure of Maden-İş in the previous 
decade. On this issue, Maden-İş imitated the United Automobile Workers’ (UAW) model in 
terms of its internal structure. It is impossible to determine when exactly Maden-İş began to 
apply the organizational model of the UAW; however, an union report dated 1959 claims that 
this model would be applied soon.632 It can be concluded that the representatives would be 
important in the internal organization of the union by the beginning of the 1960s.633  Like the 
                                                             
631 Quoted from Aydın, 18. 
632 Türkiye Maden-İş Sendikasının İstanbul Bölge Merkez Şubesinin 9-Ekim-1960 Tarihinde Yapılacak 
İlk Normal Kongresine Sunulmak Üzere 1.1.1959 Tarihinden 30.09.1960 Tarihine Kadar Faaliyet 
Raporu [The Annual Report of Deeds Between 1.1.1959 and 30.9.1960 to the First Congress of 
İstanbul District of Turkey Maden-İş Union in 9 October 1960], TÜSTAV Kemal Sülker Archive Box 
2 Envelope 80, 1. 
633 Maden-İş, particularly, had close relations with the United Automobile Workers (UAW), one of the 
militant worker’s unions at the United States. Founded in the 1930s, this union had launched many 
strikes between 1930 and 1945 and flourished in the relevant sectors. Although it expelled many 
communists who had constituted the most militant fraction within the union until the end of the Second 
World War, UAW continued its militant and uncompromising policy after 1945. The UAW initiated a 
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stewards of UAW, the representatives on shop floor were chosen by the votes of the rank and 
file as the one representative for each twenty workers. It was not written as a rule but 
according to the worker’s narratives that each section and atelier, such as assembly, press 
atelier, rectify atelier, quality control atelier etc. within a factory chose one representative for 
each section. Those local representatives selected a local head representative as the union’s 
head representative within the factory. The local representatives were assumed to solve 
worker’s problems and complaints by firstly negotiating with the chief of each section within 
the laws and valid collective agreement. In case of a disagreement, they were responsible for 
taking those problems to the head representatives who were then to present the problems to 
the high administrators of factories. The local representatives were also responsible for taking 
worker’s demands in each factory section during the period of collective agreements and 
preparing an agreement with the head representative. They directly represented the worker’s 
during the meeting. The union’s lead representatives constituted the head representative 
assembly within a district branch and this assembly selected the executive committee and 
chair of the district branch. They, in turn, chose the executive committee of Maden-İş.634 In 
                                                                                                                                                                              
shop steward system, through which the union pursued its activities at the shop floor level. The union 
organized on the basis of significant work groups within enterprises who generated organic leadership 
during the production process: those leaders would coincide with extensive shop steward system. 
Therefore, “the dense network of stewards were in fact the cornerstone of the union organization” in 
workplaces. Those stewards were elected by the rank and file and thus, there was a strong trust 
mechanism between union organization and rank-and-file. This led to the fact that the real power of 
UAW laid on the departmental level within individual enterprises. See Nelson Lichtenstein, “Auto 
Worker Militancy and the Structure of Factory Life, 1937-1955,” Journal of American History, vol. 67, 
no. 2 (September 1980): 335-353. Also look at: Nelson Lichtenstein, The Most Dangerous Man in 
Detroit: Walter Reuther and the Fate of American Labor, (Urbana, III.: University of Illionis Press, 
1995) and Jonathan Cutler, Labor’s Time: Shorter Hours, the UAW, and the Struggle for American 
Unionism, (Philadelphia, PA: Temple University Press, 2004). Maden-İş attempted to imitate this 
organizational model of UAW especially after the mid-1950s. There were some articles in the Maden-
İş journal to define the organization of unions in the US and this union in particular. Even, Walter 
Reuther, the general president of UAW, arrived in Turkey in the early 1960. Kemal Türkler severally 
visited the US to participate in the congresses of UAW. See: “Amerikada Sendikalar Nasıl Çalışıyor 
[How Unions Work in America]”, Maden-İş, year 4, no. 41 (5 March 1960), 5; “Beynelmilel 
Fedrasyona Üyeliğimiz [Our Membership to the International Federation], Maden-İş, year 4, no. 46 (8 
October 1960), 1 and 4; “Kemal Türkler, Amerikadaki İnceleme Gezisini Tamamlayarak Yurda Döndü 
[Kemal Türkler Returned to the Country Upon Finishing His Visit To America]”, Maden-İş, year 10, 
no. 20 (25 June 1966): 1. For the impressions of an American unionist about the relations between 
unions and workers in Turkey, see: Kenan Öztürk, Amerikan Sendikacılığı ve Türkiye, 10-11. 
634 Sendika Temsilcisi ve Görevleri [Union Representatives and Their Duties], TÜSTAV Nebil Varuy 
Archive Envelope 673; Sendika Temsilcisinin Görevleri [The Duties of the Union’s Representatives], 
(İstanbul: Türkiye Maden-İş Sendikası Yayınları, no. 3, 1966), TÜSTAV Library. 
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this sense, Maden-İş argues that the administrators of a trade union should have directly and 
democratically been selected by worker’s themselves.635 
In the absence of sufficient evidence, it is very hard to assess to what extent a certain 
framework, such as the strict hierarchy of the organization of Maden-İş, actually functioned 
in a democratic manner on the shop floor. Nonetheless, anyone who searches among the 
pages of Maden-İş Journal can see the lists of the workers’ representatives and their tallied 
votes cast by workers’ themselves in different metal plants. Furthermore, no workers with 
whom I conducted interviews did claimed otherwise: in each section within factories they 
selected their Maden-İş representatives without coercion; men who, in turn, honestly dealt 
with the workers’ problems and asked their opinions during the collective agreements. It must 
be noted that such a scene might be illusionary in reflecting upon the actual progress of the 
representative mechanisms on the shop floor, and drawing conclusions based only upon 
worker’s memories might overlook some important dynamics. The argument here is open to 
be challenged by further studies. 
But it can be generally concluded that the metal representatives derived their 
legitimacy to act as the workers’ own voices from a democratic election system. At this point, 
the union focused on the training of representatives on the shop floor in the new laws, the 
union’s interpretation of social justice, fair income distribution, the importance of the 1961 
Constitution, the strike and collective agreement rights, and finally, the methods of 
conducting a successful strike or signing a good collective agreement. In 1962, more than 100 
metal representatives from the biggest metal plants joined in the educational courses of 
solving the union member’s problems in terms of worker’s rights defined in the 
Constitution.636 Invited foreign unionists also gave lectures about the methods of collective 
struggles during the union’s seminars. Moreover, the unionists conducted meetings with 
                                                             
635 İşçiler Sendikalı Olmalı [Workers Should Be Unionized], (İstanbul: Türkiye Maden-İş Sendikası 
Yayınları, no. 4, 1965), 15. 
636 “Maden-İşin Semineri [The Seminar of Maden-İş],” Türkiye Birlik, February 2, 1962. Also look at: 
“Beraber Öğrenelim [Let’s Learn Together],” Maden-İş, year 4 no. 51, (7 March 1961): 3; “Eğitimde 
Yenilik [The Revisions in the Education],” Maden-İş, year 4 no. 51, (23 September 1961): 1 and 4; 
“Berec’te Sohbet Toplantısı [The Meeting at Berec],” Türkiye Birlik, February 22, 1962. 
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workers in the metal plants about unionism and workers’ rights.637 At the same time, in those 
seminars the representatives learned legitimate ways of fighting injustices on the shop floor. 
Those courses and seminars, as well as the ongoing public debate, must have factored in how 
the metal workers conceptualized the social justice in the early 1960s. 
In this regard, the available evidence demonstrates that most workers’ representatives 
on shop floor were using the term social justice to raise worker’s demands. The metal 
workers’ representatives on the shop floor, who had gathered significant experience from the 
work conflicts in the previous decade, and who had been influenced by the new political 
developments, immediately comprehended the character of the new age. Yet their view of the 
bosses and their brand of social order, in fact, still went back and forth between loyalty and 
insubordination. Rather than seeing it as a radical break from the past, the metal workers saw 
the widespread influence of the idea of social justice as an affirmation of their old 
assumptions and arguments; for them, as in the previous decade, the interests of employers 
and employees in Turkey were common ones. In fact, the metal workers sometimes adopted 
quite conciliatory and paternalistic expressions in their relations with employers. The head 
representative of Türk Demir Döküm workers, Şinasi Kaya, wrote a letter to Vehbi Koç in 
1963 and called him the “big brother” and “father” of workers. In his letter, he talked about 
the low level of workers’ wages and stated that managers, who were blamed for oppressing 
workers, were responsible for this situation. 638  So, Şinasi Kaya adopted a much more 
contentious discourse towards the general managers of the enterprises, as was obvious during 
the Kavel Strike when most representatives put the general managers on the spot in their 
accusations. In another written statement, Şinasi Kaya accused the general manager of being 
involved in unlawful acts, contrary to workers’ rights in the factory. In the rest of his article, 
                                                             
637 TÜSTAV Nebil Varuy Archive, Envelope 664; “İşçilere Filmler Gösterilecek [The Movies Will Be 
Displayed to Workers],” Son Saat, April 22, 1962. 
638 Şinasi Kaya, “Vehbi Koç’a Mektup [A Letter to Vehbi Koç]’ Maden-İş, year 4 no. 65 (21 January 
1963): 1 and 4. 
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Kaya asserted his determination to fight against such incidents.639 However, based on their 
shop floor experiences, most representatives, unlike Kaya, assumed not just managers, but 
also bosses to be a different social group who care about nothing but filling their own pockets 
by exploiting workers. According to them, social justice and democracy did not exist in 
Turkey, since the wealthy classes continued to increase their wealth by exploiting workers, 
while poor people had to slave away just to sustain their lives in the country. For the metal 
workers, the malevolent attitudes of employers were the main reason for the of lack of social 
justice in Turkey.640 For a worker representative from the Rabak Factory, Nurettin Kalpcan, 
the bosses in Turkey had gotten used to exploiting workers. He compared the living situation 
of workers and employers and said that, while the employers sustained a very decent lifestyle, 
workers suffered under several difficult conditions. Nurettin Kalpcan also claimed that 
income distribution in Turkey was unfair. Under such circumstances, Nurettin Kalpcan stated, 
it was impossible to talk about social justice in Turkey. 641  For the workers, the current 
conditions on shop floor were not in compliance with the idea of providing the decent life that 
was imagined in the Constitution.642 The representatives took a stand against those hardships 
and declared their determination to get workers’ deserved place in society.643 It appears that 
social justice meant, for workers’ representatives at least, being able to provide for one’s 
family, realizing one’s deserved place in the social hierarchy, obtaining rights such as 
unionization, and other rights which were defined by the law and which came from the very 
                                                             
639 Şinasi Kaya, “TCDDY Fabrikaları Gl. Müdürü Sayın Bayına Bir Sözümüz Vardır [We Have a 
Word To Say to The General Manager of TCDDY Factories],” Maden-İş, year 4 no. 57, (23 October 
23 1961): 3. 
640 “Çavdargil Bu Memleketi 56 Ağaya Bırakmayacağız Dedi [Çavdargil Said That We Will not Leave 
This Country to the Mercy of 56 Aghas],” İşçinin Sesi, (4 November 1962): 1 and 4; “Türkiye’de 
İşçiler Emeğinin Karşılığı Ücreti Alamıyor [The Workers in Turkey Cannot Get a Fair Wage],” İşçi 
Postası, July 13, 1963. 
641 Nurettin Kalpcan, “İşveren Hükümranlığı [The Employer’s Soverignity],” İşçinin Sesi, 46, (10 June 
1963). For the opinions of several other representatives, look at: “Maden-İş’in Şişli Şubesinin 
Toplantısı Hararetli Geçti [The Şişli Branch Meeting of Maden-İş Was Full of Enthusiasm],” Türkiye 
Birlik, October 18, 1962. 
642 “İşçilerin Sağlığına Önem Verilmiyor [The Workers’ Health Is Ignored],” Maden-İş, year 4 no. 65 
(21 January, 1963): 2.  
643 “Çavdargil Bu Memleketi 56 Ağaya Bırakmayacağız Dedi.” Also look at: “Maden-İş Sendikasının 
Şişli Şube Kongresi Bugün Yapılacak [The Şişli District Congress of Maden-İş Will Be Assembled 
Today],” İşçinin Sesi, (18 November 1962); “Maden-İşin Şube Toplantıları Başladı [The District 
Meetings of Maden-İş Has Begun],” İşçinin Sesi, year 3, no. 13 (1963): 1 and 2. 
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condition of being a laborer. The meaning of social justice would be more crystallized for the 
Kavel workers while they were struggling with the bosses/managers on shop floor, as I will 
discuss below. Those speeches and narratives indicate that there might be some differences 
between worker’s representatives about the term social justice, especially when it came to the 
matter of the bosses; however, it could be concluded that like unions and leftist publications 
or parties, the metal worker’s representatives adopted a relatively radical version of the idea 
of social justice in the first years of the 1960s by putting either bosses or the “corrupt order” 
in Turkey in the spotlight. That is to say, while the metal workers stood for a common interest 
between employers and themselves in theory, their portrayal of the real situation in Turkey 
was quite different. The ongoing political developments and debates seemed to radicalize, to 
a certain extent, the ideological stance of the workers, which had taken a shape in the post-
war period. 
Following their union’s official discourse and policy, the workers’ representatives 
generally welcomed the coup d’état, which promised to end the dark days of workers under 
the DP government,644 and, for the most part, they waited for new reforms to be legislated 
before actively struggling with employers in the first years of the decade. They held out hope 
that workers’ rights would be provided by the state and by legislation that had been revived 
by the new regime. In this regard, the metal workers, especially the representatives on shop 
floor, kept their trust on the legal framework in the early 1960s.645 However, this would begin 
to change after late 1962, and metal workers and their representatives began to conduct 
collective actions in several cases without waiting for the assistance of legal mechanisms. 
This change of attitude went in parallel with a transformation in the union’s discourse and 
strategy from the mid-1960, into late 1962. On this subject, I will firstly look union’s 
changing approach in fighting for workers’ rights promised by the new regime. 
  
                                                             
644 “Kongrelerimiz Yapıldı [Our Congresses Were Done],” Maden-İş, year 4 no. 61, (22 November 
1962): 1, 3 and 4.  
645 “Temsilciyi İçeriye Almayan Bir İş Yeri [A Personnel Manager Who Does not Let a Representative 
In],” Türkiye Birlik, June 30, 1962. 
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II. Maden-İş in the Times of Social Justice 
The unionist legacy of the 1950s, which hinged upon their trust of state mechanisms, 
as well as the workers’ own will to fight poverty and earn a respected place within the social 
hierarchy, was enhanced in the metal sector by the political developments that took place in 
the early part of the decade. The metal workers’ union enthusiastically saluted the political 
and institutional developments of the new era. Maden-İş hailed the 1960 coup d’état and 
succeeding reforms in terms of social justice and democratic industrial relations. For the 
union, the military intervention liberated the Turkish people and workers, too, who had been 
under threat from the oppressive policies of the DP government.646 From the first day of the 
new regime, the union attempted to exert pressure on politicians and political circles. Just 
after the military intervention, Kemal Türkler wired Cemal Gürsel, the head of the military 
government, to celebrate the coup d’état that, according to Türkler, saved the nation. He also 
wired Cahit Talas and Sıddık Sami Onar, the chair of the Committee to Prepare the 
Constitution, and stated that the new constitution should include the right to strike.647 So in 
their press interviews, the union leaders asked the military government to immediately fulfill 
its promise of granting the right to strike.648  
Maden-İş was also quick to grasp the institutional transformations and changing 
political opportunities created by the new regime, and they adopted the notion of social 
justice into their discourse. The union often declared its support for the reforms and for those 
state officials who were in charge of industrial relations.649 For the union leaders, the 1961 
Constitution, which rendered law- making institutions as the bodies to legislate the most 
crucial workers’ rights, was the most significant development of the new period. For example, 
Kemal Türkler defined the new constitution and new social order as taking the side of 
                                                             
646  Kemal Sülker, “Hakları Tanımıyan, Hürriyetleri Ayak Altına Alan Rejim Çöktü [The Regime 
Which Did not Recognize Rights and Trampled Freedoms Has Fallen Apart],” Maden-İş, (19 June 
1960): 2. 
647 Kemal Türkler, “Orgeneral Gürsel’e [To General Gürsel],” Maden-İş, (19 June 1960): 1 and 3. 
648 “Sendikacılar Ne Diyorlar [What Do the Unionists Say],” İşçinin Sesi, (September 11, 1960). 
649 “Maden-İş Başkanı dün Sayın Ecevite Karşı Değiliz Dedi [The Chair of Maden-İş Said Yesterday: 
We Were not against Ecevit],” Türkiye Birlik, September 7, 1962. 
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labor.650 Encouraged by the increasing state intervention on industrial relations, Maden-İş 
then followed the old tradition of getting their member’s rights by staying within the purvey 
of law and involving themselves primarily in peaceful relations with employers. 
Nevertheless, Maden-İş did not challenge the core of those notions and laws as 
proposed by the state; rather, it exerted its pressure on extending their scope and scale. In 
other words, the union still negotiated with the state about the content of the social justice and 
new laws, as it had attempted to do in the previous decade. For example, Kemal Türkler 
publicly criticized the DPT for not inviting unionists to help with preparations of the plan, and 
he declared that the plan ignored the idea of social justice. According to Kemal Türkler, the 
plan unfortunately did not show any sign that development would take place within the 
ideological scope of social justice.651 At the same time, he argued that the current minimum 
wages were not sufficient to provide workers with decent life, a promise that was embedded 
in the constitution itself.652 However, Maden-İş’ loyalty to the regime, and their decision to 
trust the state mechanisms instead of fighting with employers was quickly shifted into a more 
insubordinate and contentious position. 
In fact, while the military and succeeding civilian governments dallied in making new 
laws, which were in compliance with workers’ demands, the union leaned towards earning 
workers’ rights through a more active approach. When the right to strike was not recognized 
immediately after the coup d’état, the union proposed a gathering with other unions to voice 
their opinions publicly. 653  The 1961 Saraçhane Demonstration, attended by significant 
numbers of workers from several metal plants, was the first collective warning of the metal 
                                                             
650 Kemal Türkler’in Maden-İş Dördüncü Kongresi Açış Konuşması [The Opening Speech of Kemal 
Türkler in the Fourteenth Grand Congress of the Maden-İş], TÜSTAV Kemal Sülker Archive, Box 2 
Envelope 88. 
651 “Başkan Kemal Türkler Plancıların İstifasını ve Görüşlerini Açıkladı [The Chair Kemal Türkler 
Expressed His Opinions on the Resignation of the Planners],” Son Baskı, December 16, 1962. 
652  “Onüç İş Kolunda Asgari Ücret Tesbit Edilmiş Değil [The Minimum Wages Were not Still 
Determined in Thirteen Sector],” Türkiye Birlik, October 25, 1961; “Asgari Ücretler İşçileri Tatmin 
Etmekten Çok Uzak [The Minimimum Wages Do Not Satisfy Workers],” Türkiye Birlik, December 14, 
1961; “Asgari Ücret Sistemi Mutlaka Değiştirilmeli [The Minimum Wage System Must Be Absolutely 
Altered],” Türkiye Birlik, December 27, 1961. 
653 Kemal Türkler, “Sendikacılarımızın Kültür Seviyeleri [The Cultural Level of Our Unionists],” Son 
Havadis, October 6, 1960; “Maden-İş Sendikası Grev Yapmak İçin Karara Vardı [Maden-İş Decided to 
Go On Strike],” Türkiye Birlik, December 1, 1961. 
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workers to the current government that they must fulfill the promises of the regime. A Kavel 
worker remembers participating in the demonstration with his fellow workers.654 During the 
meeting, Kemal Türkler made a speech to the crowd and declared the union’s decisiveness by 
stating that if the state did not provide the strike right, workers would get it though their own 
power. In the following year, the union often declared that they would get their member’s 
rights by all possible and legal means, including collective actions, to warn the government 
that they must introduce workers’ rights legislation.655  
Leaning towards collective actions influenced the union’s stance on workers-
employers relations. The union, indeed, had revised its own statute in 1961. The new statute 
reiterated its old promises of securing peaceful relations on the shop floor, training its 
members to increase productivity, and acting on behalf of the national interests.656 That is, the 
union still defined a solidaristic relationship, linked by common interests between workers 
and employers, rather than a contentious one in its official documents. The union leaders 
further emphasized that point in their articles and press interviews.657 For example, Kemal 
Türkler claimed that the workers should have walked out only as a last resort after exhausting 
all peaceful means available to come to an agreement with employers. 658  To provide 
workplace peace, the union leaders warned that workers should have their deserved and fair 
share of the national income.659 Otherwise, social peace on shop floor would be in jeopardy.  
Like the workers’ representatives, the union leaders, indeed, did not hesitate to adopt 
a more contentious language towards bosses whose “greedy” actions, the unionists assumed, 
had resulted in workers’ poverty. The union officers often claimed that the metal employers 
                                                             
654 Quoted from Aydın, 14. 
655 Kemal Türkler’in Basın Bildirisi [The Press Interview of Kemal Türkler], TÜSTAV Nebil Varuy 
Archive, Envelope 653; “Türk-İşe Yapılan Teklif Bir Günlük Grev [The Proposal to Türk-İş is One 
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656 Maden-İş Ana Tüzüğü, 1961 [The Statute of Maden-İş, 1961], TÜSTAV, Maden-İş Archive, Box 16 
Envelope 128. 
657 “Maden-İş ve Faaliyeti [Maden-İş and Its Activity],” Maden-İş, (16 January 1961); Kemal Türkler, 
“İşçi Eğitimi ve Önemi [The Workers’ Education and Its Importance],” Maden-İş, year 4 no. 62, (10 
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who did not recognize workers’ rights were exploitative. The union also accused bosses of 
trying to “sabotage” social justice and other constitutional principles, right from the beginning 
of the new era.660 In their discourse, the union leaders used their old motto of “workers as the 
creator of all value in society.” According to this discourse, although the workers were the 
loyal children of the country and did their best for the national interests, some employers still 
insulted them and refused to recognize their rights. 661  More importantly, Kemal Türkler 
presented the first signs of defining an antagonistic relationship between capital and labor.662 
Towards the end of 1962, the union leaned towards to use the current leftist criticism of the 
social order in Turkey. According to the union, the current laws and reforms, including the 
labor law and the development plan, served the interests of the wealthy classes who 
constituted the minority of population in Turkey.663 In parallel with said political changes, the 
union’s discourse became increasingly radicalized during the 1960s. 
To conclude the point, when the expected reforms from above did not happen as the 
metal workers desired; that is, when the metal workers’ shop floor experience did not 
improve and when the metal bosses displayed their unwillingness to recognize workers’ rights 
on shop floor, the workers and the union became more determined to earn their demands 
through their own actions. So it can be said that the spirit of the new age resulted in an 
unintended consequence; the political opportunities as seen by the metal workers and union 
bolstered their inclinations for involving themselves in collective actions on shop floor level. 
The ideas of social justice reflected on shop floor relations in increasing tension between 
workers and bosses. Those tensions and succeeding conflicts would again influence political 
developments, in turn. The collective actions would further eradicate the idea of solidarity 
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and common interests between workers and employers. Moreover, they would culminate in 
the more climactic relations between these social groups. 
Even before the Kavel strike, some İstanbul metal workers and Maden-İş initiated a 
defence of those rights which were not recognized by employers, through their own collective 
actions at Gümüş Motor Factory, located at Eyüp Samurkaş Factory and a nail factory located 
at Halıcıoğlu. These actions occurred at the end of 1962 and the beginning of 1963. The key 
question, here, is whether Maden-İş developed a strategy of conducting de facto collective 
actions to enforce both employers and state mechanisms to revise shop floor relationships in a 
period when the state was still not intervening in industrial relations on behalf of workers. 
There are no documents we could use to discern whether the union led workers to act 
collectively in those factories, or whether workers acted on their own. Nonetheless, the 
similar story line in each event leads us to argue that there was a certain common rationale 
behind the walkouts. In each case, the course of events, more or less, took place as follows: 
after workers staged a work stoppage, a union officer visited the factories to meet with 
employers accompanied by a worksite inspector, who would hopefully settle the matter. 
There, if the work inspector detected any unlawful act; such as, not providing wage increases 
or not providing wages at all, he/she reported it to the Regional Work Office. Faced with such 
a fait accompli process, employers in each case became compelled to agree with workers’ 
demands. 
Such a pattern leads us to consider that those actions were waged with the 
foreknowledge of the union to force employers to accept workers’ demands. For example, in 
May 1962, the Gümüş Motor workers complained that the owner, who had fired several 
workers under the excuse of having little business over the previous month, also missed wage 
payments to its remaining employees. As a result, the workers first staged a work 
slowdown,664  and then they completely stopped working in June 1962. When the union 
leaders went to the factory, the general manager insulted both workers and unionists at first, 
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and claimed that the work stoppage was an act against the national interests. After several 
meetings, however, Kemal Türkler, the workers’ representatives and the general manager 
reached an agreement for payments to be made.665 Yet, tense relations remained inside the 
factory. After two months, the general manager forced workers to work overtime on 
Saturdays and Sundays; furthermore, he ordered the workers to work an additional three 
overtime hours during the week. When some workers would not agree to those conditions, the 
factory owner fired them. Later, in September, the workers began once more to complain that 
they had not been paid any money for two months.666 As a result, they walked out and held 
sit-down strike for one day to warn the boss.667 But after the meetings with the union, the 
employer agreed to workers’ demands.  
The tide of events was similar in the Samurkaş factory and the Halıcıoğlu Nail 
Factory. In January 1963, the workers at Samurkaş stopped working since they had not 
received their pay. Then, the union leaders and a work inspector visited the plant of 160 
workers, and the employer agreed to make a payment after the meetings.668 Likewise, the 
metal workers of Halıcıoğlu Nail Factory went out to one-day strike because the boss did not 
offer the wage increases that had been agreed to in a previous legal work settlement. In this 
factory, the boss had first attempted to divide workers by supplying wage increases to only 28 
workers out of 91 in total. In spite of the fact that a union officer, Ruhi Yümlü, met with the 
employer and explained that his behaviour was unlawful, the owner did not relent. Then, Ruhi 
Yümlü told workers that they were free to act and 68 employees stopped working. After the 
union took action, the Provincial Work Office sent an inspector to the workplace and the 
inspector succeeded in reaching an agreement between the workers and their employer. 
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According to the signed protocol, the boss promised to give the required wage increases to 
workers.669 
It is plain that those similar collective actions were not strikes in the full sense of the 
term; rather, they were work stoppages undertaken to compel employers/managers to 
negotiate and meet the workers’ demands. We cannot call them strikes because, first of all, 
neither the union nor the workers made any advance preparation for them. And secondly, the 
events did not last more than one day. However, it would be wrong to evaluate these incidents 
as spontaneous or haphazard; on the contrary, the existence of a similar pattern in these events 
proved that there was a certain rationality behind them. The actions further proved that the 
metal workers and union had become more determined and bold in acting collectively, for 
their rights and demands - especially when their legal rights were not provided by the state 
and/or employees during the time when the notions of social justice, workers’ rights, or fair 
income distribution was so widespread and influential in a society. Such a rationale could also 
be seen in Kavel in 1963. 
 
III. The Changing Forms of the Workers’ Collective Action: The Kavel Strike 
The Kavel Strike was the most famous example of the metal workers’ determination 
and trust in their own power to make a decent life for themselves and become respected 
citizens in a modern society. In fact, its repercussions significantly influenced the future 
course of worker-employer relations in the metal sector. Like in Gümüş Motor, Samurkaş and 
the Halıcıoğlu Nail Factory, the Kavel workers set out to lobby for their bonuses and to end 
the oppression of the workers’ representatives, and they used what could generally be defined 
as a fait accompli process; that is, the incident began as a sit-down strike that would draw the 
attention of mediators.670 Unlike the Gümüş Motor, Samurkaş and Halıcıoğlu incidents, the 
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collective action initiated by the Kavel workers took a form of illegal strike and lasted more 
than a month. 
The Kavel Cable Factory was established in 1954 by Vehbi Koç, Eli Burla and Emin 
Aktar in Eyüp and then was moved to İstinye, in the Sarıyer district of İstanbul, after 
urbanization had augmented the electrical infrastructure in Turkey. Before the war, there had 
been considerable number of workers who recruited into a state owned and state run shipyard. 
In addition to Kavel, several other private factories, such as Türkay Match Factory, 
Beldeyama, Beldesan etc, were founded in the region and İstinye became one of the working 
class districts of İstanbul.671 In fact, community support would factor significantly in the 
success of the strike. 
The history of work relations at Kavel was, indeed, not bereft of contention. The 
Kavel workers had already been unionized for five years. The worker’s-union’s 
representatives were the key actors in bringing workers’ demands to the bosses in Kavel: in 
1960, the worker’s representative Halis Bilici who was selected by the Kavel workers, with 
the support of Maden-İş, wrote four different petitions to present to management.672 As will 
be described below, one of the main reasons for the strike was the dismissal of the worker’s 
representatives. In 1960, the Kavel workers had complained that the Sunday overpayments 
were lower than the amount indicated by the law. The workers had another grievance, too; 
that employees who had worked more than three years not were recognized with their legal 
right of annual leave. Furthermore, the workers expressed their discontent over forced 
overtime work.673 Kavel workers then conducted two collective labor disputes in 1957 and 
1959, respectively, asking wage increases.674 The tense workplace relations reached their peak 
with the arrival of a new general manager, İbrahim Üzümcü, who had been educated in the 
management field the United States and appointed to the factory through the advice of Vehbi 
Koç in 1961.  
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As a new manager, İbrahim Üzümcü had promised the employers he would establish 
a new work relations system to increase profits. According to the narrative of one Kavel 
worker, Üzümcü arranged a meeting with the workers and asked them for complete obedience 
to their superiors, as a way of fulfilling those promises to his employers. He also ordered 
workers to resign from Maden-İş.675 Towards the end of the next year, Üzümcü cut the annual 
bonuses and replaced the old wage system based on workers’ seniority with a new one based 
on merit. Then, the representatives’ intervention in those developments on the shop floor 
resulted in a struggle between the union and the general manager. One Kavel worker, Hamit 
Şindi, told of the beginning of the strife as follows: 
“The New Year676 came. Everyone was uneasy. Would the bonuses be paid 
or not? (...) News arrived that they would not be given. Everyone became 
sad, what would happen now? (...) We left the factory but, we were full of 
hatred (...) We went to work at the following day. Yet, we slowed down the 
work.”677 
 
In return, Üzümcü firstly laid off four workers’ representatives.678 But the workers 
were quick to respond to the dismissals. Just as they did in Gümüş Motor and Halıcıoğlu 
Factories, the workers struck back by sitting down in the cable casing section, which was the 
most vital and crowded part of the factory. The cable-casing workers recruited the others and 
173 workers, out of 220 in total, began a sit-down strike on 28 January 1963. When the 
workers teased one masterman who forced the workers to get back to work, the employer 
applied to the district attorney and complained that workers were participating in “anarchist” 
activities and that they had attacked the machines. Üzümcü fired ten more workers in the 
same day. These workers were called to the police station and asked them to give a testimony 
and the incident further aggravated the tension within the factory. After giving their testimony 
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and being released, the ten arrested workers began to wait in front of the factory and the other 
workers continued to sit within the factory. On the fifth day, the police came to the factory 
and forced the employees to go back to work. But, as a result of the workers’ boisterous 
objections, the police evacuated the factory. On February 1st, İbrahim Üzümcü asked the 
workers to sign a paper resigning from the union. After the general managers fired all workers 
who had refused to sign the papers, the workers constructed the strike tent in front of the 
factory and on February 2nd, the real strike began. In the meantime, the meetings between the 
unionists and the employer had begun, at the request of the union; but the two sides could not 
reach an agreement. The employer would not accept the union’s demands, which were to get 
the four fired workers’ representatives back to work, as well as an end to the oppression of 
unionized workers, the supply of bonuses each year, certain items about work clothes and 
food were to be added to the workplace regulations, and a discipline committee composed of 
both workers’ and employer’s representatives was to be initiated. Finally, they asked that no 
one would be punished or fired without the common decision of this committee.679  
The strike brought such a strong reactions from the public that the Labor Minister, 
Bülent Ecevit, the Minister of Interior Affairs, Hıfzı Oğuz Bekata, the chair of Türk-İş, Seyfi 
Demirsoy, and chair of TİSK, Şahap Kocatopçu, met several times in an attempt to resolve 
solve the dispute. However, the meetings were interrupted often due to the uncompromising 
attitudes of both sides.680 Eventually, the state officers, both of TİSK, Türk-İş, MESS and 
Maden-İş leaders, and the workers’ representatives, sat at the table on March 1963. As a 
result of these negotiations, the bitter strike came to an end on its thirty-fifth day. 
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Figure 10: The Kavel workers, employer and Bülent Ecevit, after signing the protocol in front of the 
factory (Source: İşveren, vol. 1 no. 6, 26 March 1963). 
 
Despite the similarities in terms of the origins of the events, the Kavel strike was 
much bigger than the workers’ collective actions at Gümüş Motor or Samurkaş, both in its 
scale and scope. It spread across the nation, both sides adamant in their position, and its 
violence radicalized the relations between workers and the private metal industry in İstanbul. 
The walkout also provided significant evidence about the true state of relations in the sector at 
the time. 
So, what does the walkout tell us about the workers’ view of industrial relations at a 
time when those relations were constantly being shaped and reshaped by the struggles 
between workers and employers? What was the importance of the Kavel Strike in terms of the 
changing relationships between the state, employers and unions? What were its repercussions 
for future metal worker and employer relations? 
 
 
Figure 11: The strikers at Kavel (Source: Zafer Aydın, Kanunsuz Bir Grevin Öyküsü, 55). 
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 Among all these important questions, we can first see that the Kavel strike was a key 
event in terms of portraying the metal workers’ state of mind during the 1960s. The strike 
showed that when the metal workers felt an unfairness and a threat to their rights, or to their 
voice on the shop floor, they were determined to respond through the help of their union. In 
Kavel’s example, the bonuses were important for the workers who could barely sustain 
themselves with their meager wages. Those bonuses had previously been paid to workers 
once in a year based on seniority. Since, they had been paid for a long time, the workers 
perceived the bonuses as their rightful earning. Furthermore, the workers claimed that since 
most of them were paid low amount of wages, the bonuses had a great importance for most 
workers who could barely sustain their families. One worker, Numan Çoban, claimed that 
they had difficulty earning enough to support a family; in this regard, the bonuses had great 
importance for the workers. He added that some workers used bonuses for providing the 
educational needs of their children, and some used the funds from them to purchase essential 
wood and coal for the winter.681 In other words, the bonuses were critical to the workers’ 
daily lives. For them, the walkout stemmed from their decision to take actions in order to 
simply “put food on the table.”682 In fact, it was written on the placards that were hung around 
workers’ necks that ‘We Would Rather Die Than Give Up Our Rights’, ‘We Want Social 
Justice’, ‘End to Exploitation’, and ‘We Do Not Want To Be Exploited.’683 
But the motivations behind the workers’ action were not just material; at the same 
time, they acted against the possibility of losing an essential mechanism of making their 
demands on the shop floor, for one of the most vital conditions of the workers to end the 
strike was to get their representatives back to work. After the Kavel workers were paid less 
than the usual amounts in bonuses, they conducted a slowdown strike in the December 31, 
1962, İbrahim Üzümcü fired İlyas Kabil who was the head representative, İsmet Er, Metin 
Ant, and Ali Yıldırım who were the local representatives in the mid-January, 1963. Then, the 
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other nine worker’s representatives went to see the general manager and refused to sign the 
union resignation papers which İbrahim Üzümcü gave to them. They were consequently fired. 
The workers who were very aware that they were main mediums of negotiation with 
management in the factory reacted strongly to the dismissal of their representatives and 
gathered in a coffee house in İstinye upon the call of the union. The general chair of the union 
Kemal Türkler participated in the meeting and he, alongside with the some other 
representatives spoke to the workers. At the end of the meeting, the majority of the Kavel 
workers voted for strike.684 The representatives were so important during the strike that the 
workers within the factory confessed that they had, at first, lost their courage because the 
leading and experienced representatives had been dismissed. Then the workers regained their 
courage after learning that the representatives had gathered to wait in front of the factory.685 
The importance of representatives in Kavel can also be concluded from the attitudes 
of the general manager. Although the boss accepted the proposal of paying bonuses to 
workers, he adamantly refused to reinstate the fired representatives. 686  The manager’s 
resistance shows that the fight also took place over the issue of how to organize work 
relations within the factory. While the workers fought for broadening the scope of their 
representation, the manager strived to limit it as much as possible. 
The Kavel Strike also indicated the metal workers’ resoluteness in terms of their 
rights. When the general manager called on workers to sign a paper of resignation from the 
union, workers refused to sign them, despite the manager’s threat of firing them. As another 
example, when a truck accompanied by the police force came to the factory to help deliver 
products, they laid in front of the police and delivery trucks and prevented the trucks from 
leaving the factory. On February 5th, the employer posted an opening for new workers; as a 
result, the workers set up a barricade in front of the factory and did not allow anyone to enter. 
                                                             
684 Ibid., 16; Aydın, 19. 
685 Ibid, 39 
686 Enis, 17. 
 
 
236 
After this, all the workers began to wait in front of the factory during daylight, and at least 50 
workers kept night watch.687  
 
Figure 12: The headline states that the 220 fired Kavel workers established a barricade in front of the 
factory. The bread in the hands of the workers symbolized their fight for survival (Source: Maden-İş, 9 
February 1963). 
 
Since the Kavel workers actually engaged the general manager before and during the 
events, the workers’ anger was not directed towards their employers. Their actions targeted 
the unfairness of a factory regime that was assumed to be structured by the general manager. 
Since they had such a strained relationship with the general manager specifically, they 
personified their grievances in the figure of İbrahim Üzümcü. The workers   claimed that, 
from the beginning of the İbrahim Üzümcü era in the factory, labor rights were not taken into 
account.688 Such a point of view was bolstered by the workers’ representatives and union’s 
approach toward the role of the manager on the events. For the workers’ representatives at the 
Kavel factory, all disputes seem to have originated after the appointment of İbrahim Üzümcü 
as the general manager, in 1961. Another representative claimed that after İbrahim Üzümcü, 
bonuses were not given, and the unionized workers and representatives were forced to 
resign.689 In this regard, they shared the hegemonic ideological framework of the period; that 
work conflicts in Turkey primarily stemmed from some employer’s or manager’s “greedy and 
uncompromising” attitudes towards workers’ rights. 
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The strike itself demonstrated the ideological stance of the metal workers’ 
representatives during the first half of the 1950s. Except in one case, none of the 
representatives gave up their struggle despite all police threats, the danger of losing their jobs, 
and even despite offers of bribes from the employers. The head representative, İlyas Kabil, 
had been selected on February 1962 by the workers.690 Kabil was also the chair of Şişli 
district and a member of the TİP. In his speeches at the union congress, İlyas Kabil firmly 
defended the ideas of social justice and emphasized that, while the real producers of the 
national wealth (i.e., the workers) suffered through miserable conditions, “a parasite class” 
enjoyed their lives.691 Another local representative, Halis Bilici, was also an important figure 
in these events. Bilici was a firm defender of social justice and he asserted that there was no 
social justice and democracy in Turkey due to the exploitation of workers by the rich. For this 
reason, he said, workers had to go out and get their rights for themselves.692 
Throughout the strike, Maden-İş attempted to make the events known on the public 
scene to drum up support for the strikers. In this regard, the union activated a public relations 
strategy designed to communicate the inevitability of the strike, and show it as a last resort 
measure to resist the unfairness on the shop floor. Maden-İş, which designed its strategies to 
capitalize on the political opportunities that emerged after the coup d’état, mainly strived to 
legitimate the Kavel Strike in the eyes of the state mechanisms, officers and the wider public. 
Despite all the police attacks and the employers’ uncompromising attitudes, the union was 
careful about securing the legitimatization of the strike in a country where the idea of social 
justice and common national interests prevailed. The Maden-İş officers argued that the 
workers resisted against the employers’ unfairness, as was their natural right according by the 
1961 Constitution. Here, the union argued that the incident itself was not unlawful, an 
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accusation leveled at them by the employers.693 In his visit and talks to the Kavel workers, 
Kemal Türkler said that they were not against democracy or capital, but neither would they 
would allow capital to exploit labor. He said that the Kavel workers attempted only to balance 
social justice, which meant balancing the unfairness between labor and capital in Turkey.  
During the strike, the union officers declared their belief in the mutual interests of 
labor and capital and they often stressed the idea of maintaining a peaceful workplace. For the 
Kavel event itself, they accused the other side, specifically the general manager or employers, 
of damaging those good relations within the factory. One union officer, Ruhi Yümlü, claimed 
that the peace was first disrupted by the new general manager, İbrahim Üzümcü, not the 
workers.694 In this regard, the union attempted to personify the root cause of the troubles in 
the figure of İbrahim Üzümcü. During the meetings with the employers and state officers, the 
workers’ side claimed that the strike would not have happened if İbrahim Üzümcü had not 
acted in the way that he did.695 In other words, their view was that the strike took place as a 
result of the “unlawful and unfair” acts of the general manager. In brief, the union strategy 
was to get the support of the legal framework, as well as to drum up public support, by 
stressing the obvious injustices caused by employers or/and managers.  
To this end, the union sought to keep the state mechanisms on its side, so he workers 
tried to prove that the strike would not damage the national economy and interests. For 
example, the workers did not allow any goods to get out of the factory, with the exception of 
critical cables produced for the Ministry of the National Defence.696 During the strike, the 
union called on the government to intervene in the affairs and to act as intermediary between 
the workers and the employer. 697  Actually, the unionists often asked the government to 
protect the weaker side, namely the workers. In their meetings, the union officers called them 
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the ”father of the workers” who were expected to protect their children.698 When the police 
attacked the workers, the union wired the government to intervene and stop them.699 
 
Figure 13: The fight between the workers and police forces at Kavel (Source: M. Şehmus Güzel, 
Türkiye’de İşçi Hareketi [The Labor Movement in Turkey], (İstanbul: Sosyalist Yayınlar, 1993). 
 
However, the strike showed the workers that the state mechanism was not wholly a 
trustworthy one. From the first day of the strike, while the police forces were located around 
the factory to save the enterprises from any “harmful” acts; the people of the İstinye region 
created a buffer zone between police and the strikers. Therefore, we can see there was a 
tension between the police forces and the workers. In the meantime, the employers asked the 
police forces to let the administrative officers in the factory. On February 13th, a vehicle 
carrying administrative officers accompanied by the police forces was stopped by the strikers; 
as a result, the police attacked the workers and some strikers were injured. On February 19th, 
two workers were arrested for resisting the police. On March 3rd, the employers asked the 
police again to help transfer goods within the factory by truck. When the strikers attempted to 
prevent this, the police forces attacked again near the strike tent, and yet another clash 
occurred between police and workers.700 The workers also experienced a sense of unfairness 
in the eyes of the law. While the workers were called to the police station to give a testimony 
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upon the request of the general manager, the police did not call İbrahim Üzümcü himself, 
despite workers’ complaints against him. This caused questions about fairness in the minds of 
the workers and raised further grievances.701 But the most disappointing event for the union 
officers and the Kavel workers was the public statement made by the Labor Minister, Bülent 
Ecevit, who came out against the strikers. He publicly accused the union of choosing a 
contentious, rather than a peaceful method to resolve the dispute. According to Ecevit, this 
was a misguided approach and both workers and the employer were exposed to serious 
repercussions as a result.702 But the state officers, at the same time, strived to maintain the 
trustworthy reputation of the state in the minds of the workers. After the police attacked the 
strikers, the police chief withdrew most police forces from the factory. Then, the police chief 
visited workers and told them that he had no doubt about the workers’ patriotism. In the same 
vein, the governor, Niyazi Akı, visited the workers and claimed that workers were right in 
their cause. He also promised the workers that no one but the strikers would work in the 
factory after the strike.703 
 
 
Figure 14: The Police Chief, the Kavel workers and their children (Source: İşveren, vol. 1 no. 6, 26 
March 1963). 
 
                                                             
701 Aydın, 36-37. 
702 “Otuzbeş Günün Hikayesi [The Story of the Thirty-Five Days],” İşveren, vol. 1 no. 6, (26 March 
1963):  29 and 33. 
703 TÜSTAV, Nebil Varuy Archive, Envelope 658. 
 
 
241 
Invoking state help also meant that the union wanted to solve the issue through 
institutional means. In fact, Maden-İş conducted the strike as a leverage through which it 
could impose the workers’ demands on the state and the employers. The union also wanted 
TİSK and MESS to intervene in the affair and help them reach a peaceful solution. 704 
However, one important consequence of these institutional encounters was the further 
radicalization of Maden-İş discourse towards employers. In fact, when the negotiations fell 
into a deadlock, the union presented the source of the problem as the actions of the Turkish 
employers in general, rather than one person. During their press interviews, the union leaders 
claimed that employers only wanted to capitalize on the climate of the post-DP period. The 
strike, they said, proved that the employers’ main goal was to obstruct the legislation of those 
workers’ rights supported the constitution. Led by Vehbi Koç, the union officers claimed 
some factory owners in fact stood in the way of social justice and economic development in 
the country.705 With this declaration, the union called on other unions and workers to support 
the Kavel Strike; a call to collective action which was an important milestone in the 
realization of the social justice principle in Turkey.706 
These collective encounters radicalized the employer’s discourse, too. In fact, the 
strike can be seen as a moment in which the conflicting sides stated their attitudes towards 
social justice. The declarations of the employers during the strike demonstrated how they 
interpreted workplace peace, collective actions and workers’ rights. In opposition to the union 
discourse on injustices on the shop floor, the employers strived to prove how such a unlawful 
and contentious act as a strike might damage the so-called national interests. For the 
employers, the union chose a contentious way to negotiate, rather than meeting peacefully 
with the manager, or conducting work disputes inside the Labor Office. The actions of the 
union destroyed the possibility of workplace peace, they claimed, not the acts of the 
employers/managers in the factory. The union’s methods, they said, would create “anarchy” 
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within society.707 And the walkout was simply against the national interests and counter to the 
growth of national wealth.708  
Furthermore, the employers tried to present the strike as being a result of 
“provocations” of only a few workers who were eager to disrupt the peace in Kavel. They 
claimed that employers did not refuse the rights of workers, at all. They argued, rather, that it 
was natural for workers to have some rights, but they must reach their demands through 
peaceful ways and by following the existing laws. The main goal of the workers should have 
been to keep peace on shop floors not to disrupt it.709 The biggest employers’ union, TİSK, 
which had been founded by the initiative of MESS, explained that the Kavel Strike was an 
obstacle to workplace harmony. More importantly, the employers saw the event as a 
challenge to their property rights, which were also recognized by the constitution. Overall, 
they framed the Kavel Strike as an act against property rights. 710  During the strike, the 
employers utilized this discourse frequently. They were insistent on this point, saying that 
workers invaded the factory, ignored the police and threatened “the good intentioned” people 
who were willing to work.  
As a reply to the accusations made by Maden-İş towards İbrahim Üzümcü – they 
dubbed him a disrupter of the peace - the employers narrated the story from their point of 
view, claiming it was the “provocative” attitude of some representatives rather than 
Üzümcü’s acts that were to blame. According to them, İbrahim Üzümcü, the newly appointed 
general manager of the factory, had aimed to turn the run-down factory into a profitable one, 
so that both workers and employers would mutually benefit from those improvements. The 
employers’ narrative continued that Üzümcü, on the other hand, had learned soon enough that 
some workers, who were workers’ representatives and held a “fearful authority” over other 
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workers, and had gotten used not to working at all. They also had gotten used to opposing 
their superiors by threatening them, saying that the union supported them. Such acts eroded 
peace in the workplace and decreased productivity. İbrahim Üzümcü had often warned those 
representatives, and he had waited patiently for them to behave themselves, rather than 
punishing them immediately. Nonetheless, when those workers continued to take advantage 
of the good intentions of the manager, he had to fire four of them. 711  Through these 
accusations and their own narrative, the employers similarly attempted to drum up public 
support against the strike. 
What about İbrahim Üzümcü himself? The man in the spotlight simply reiterated the 
rhetoric of the employers, saying that the strike was “unlawful”, that it took place as a result 
of the union’s “provocations”, and that the walkout would harm the “national” interests and 
industrial peace. Üzümcü asserted that the workers went out to strike as a result of unionist 
instigations. He also claimed that such incidents harmed the entire country. As a result of the 
strike, the factory, and the “national” economy, had lost significant amount of money, he 
said.712 In fact, Üzümcü used the same rhetoric in his speech to the workers on February 1st, 
to try to persuade them to go back to work.713 
However, his uncompromising attitude towards the workers’ demands before and 
during the strike was too obvious. In fact, İlhan Lök, the former chair of MESS, remembers 
İbrahim Üzümcü as a stern man who was not fond of compromising. This, Lök asserted, had 
pleased the employers of the period, too.714 Furthermore, Üzümcü frowned upon the workers’ 
demands during the strike. In addition to firing five workers’ representatives, he forced 50 
workers to resign on the first day of the sit-down strike.715 During his speech to the workers in 
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the fifth day, he said nothing about bonuses, which was a crucial issue for the workers.716 
Moreover, he developed some tactics, which would be later used by the metal employers to 
break strikes in Turkey. For example, the manager attempted to give bribes to the leaders of 
the walkout.717 He also promised to distribute money to the workers who would resign from 
the union.718 While he agreed to provide bonuses as a result of meetings with the workers, he 
was extremely reluctant to allow the workers’ representatives back into the factory. 719 
Consequently, Üzümcü’s words, or the other employers’ discourse on the strike, had little 
impact on the strikers. 
The Kavel strike was also important to show how the employers of the period viewed 
the issue of workers’ rights, a point that was exemplified by the issuing of bonuses at Kavel. 
In fact, while the workers saw the bonuses as their natural rights, the employers saw them as 
generous blessings bestowed upon the workers by management.720 According to them, the 
annual bonuses meant the workers had no right to protest other issues.721 The outlook towards 
workers’ rights as employer blessing was widespread amongst the employers. In his meeting 
with a journalist, İbrahim Üzümcü said that although he had “good intentions”, the workers 
were acting ‘ungratefully’. 722  Ege Cansen, in our meetings, emphasized that most metal 
employers had the same approach during the period.723 Here, the metal bosses’ position on 
worker-employer relations was basically a paternalist one in which workers were expected to 
appreciate employers for recruiting them to the job, and for providing them a chance to 
supply bread for their families. 
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The strike was also important as a symbol of the solidarity between the workers of 
different factories and their different unions. The other unions, both in İstanbul and in other 
parts of Turkey, had widely declared their support. Some unions even sent food,724 while 
others provided financial aid to the Kavel workers. In their calls to their members, the unions 
emphasized the rights provided by the Constitution and the importance of solidarity between 
workers to resist, together, any injustices.725 Factory workers nearly from all metal plants in 
İstanbul came to Kavel and declared their support on February 22nd, which was a religious 
holiday.726 Furthermore, some metal workers from the other factories often visited the strike 
tent and even supplied money to the Kavel workers.727 More importantly, some metal workers 
conducted different collective actions to show their solidarity with the Kavel workers. For 
instance, the Demir Döküm workers grew their beards to protest the unlawful acts of the 
Kavel employer. The Demir Döküm workers said that their general manager, Burhan 
Günergün, did not recognize their basic rights, either. It’s likely that they supported the Kavel 
workers in the hopes that the same course of events would not happen to them. Similarly, the 
workers of other metal plants began to grow their beards to show their support. Such acts of 
solidarity greatly motivated the Kavel workers. Hamit Şindi claimed that when they heard 
about the Demir Döküm workers’ beards, the front yard of Kavel became a festive place.728 
It is important to note that the fight of the Kavel workers was also supported by the 
people of the region who were often either relatives or friends of the workers. A mother of 
one worker came to be called “Kavel Mother” due to her support for the strike. After the 
arrest of her son, Kavel Mother said: 
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‘I kept guard729 in front of the factory for thirty-six days. Way to go! I kept 
waiting. I waited for 360 days. I raised 7 boys. I can spare my life in this 
way. They should have arrested me, too.’730 
 
After the incident erupted, nearly 100 hundred children of the Kavel workers flooded 
to the factory and chanted the slogan “give our fathers their rights.”731 The İstinye locals, who 
were mostly composed of the working class families, also visited the strike tent to show their 
support and encourage workers. They distributed food, cigarettes and bread to the workers.732 
From February 2nd, nearly 500 people rallied with the workers in front of the factory. After 
the clash with the police, the İstinye people came to the factory and began to chant the Gazi 
Osman Paşa march.733 Then, the workers staged a protest meeting in İstinye. The support of 
the people, especially that of women, factored into the duration and success of the strike. In 
fact, an old woman, Hasibe Nine, led the crowd during the events. One day, when the 
governor asked the workers to disperse, she asked the governor whether he had any children, 
in order to challenge him or engage him in debate. A Kavel worker, Ahmet Usta agreed that 
women played a significant role in preventing the police from attacking the workers.734 For 
example, the women supporters prevented the employers from removing factory goods on 
March 2nd.735. The support of the community and the women did not end, even after the 
strike. When the Kavel workers were arrested after the strike had come into an end, their 
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families, including Kavel Mother, came to watch the court proceedings in April. 736  The 
gender roles within families motivated workers’ spouses, who were vulnerable to any change 
in their husband’s earnings, to support the workers’ cause. Their support was one of the most 
important factors in the workers’ victory at Kavel. 
   
 
Figure 15: The workers and their children try to get warm in front of fire (Source: Maden-İş, 9 
February 1963). 
 
IV. Aftermath of the Kavel Strike 
The Kavel strike ended with a protocol signed by the employers, the workers’ 
representatives and the Maden-İş officers on March 3, 1963. The protocol stressed the 
importance of maintaining labor peace on the shop floor, and a mutual respect for the interests 
of both sides.737 After that, the Labor minister, the Vice-President, the İstanbul governor, the 
Police Chief, the Chief of the Provincial Work Office, the Head of TİSK, and the 
representative of Türk-İş all came to the factory and spoke to workers about peaceful and 
cooperative relations between workers and employers, the unity of social groups and the 
necessity of hard work to increase productivity; speeches accompanied by the applause of the 
workers. Furthermore, the shareholder of the factory, Emin Aktar, invited the representatives 
to his office and said that the factory was the place where both workers and employers made 
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their living. He emphasized that the employers had already forgotten the incident and advised 
workers to forget what had happened, too. And then he told them to work hard.738  
The end and resulting aftermath of the strike showed that the crisis which erupted out 
of the shop floor dynamics at Kavel and immediately spread out across the whole country 
came to an end with both sides heralding their belief in social justice and the common 
national interests. The climate after the strike was as a period of analysis. Was it really so? 
Were the strike and contentious work relations really diversions from the “normal course of 
events”? Did it not leave any legacy behind it? Let’s begin with the last question. 
This particular collective action stamped its mark on the workers’ minds. The Kavel 
strike can be seen as a significant milestone for the workers’ comprehension of modern work 
relations and social relations, in general. As a result of their bitter collective action, most 
Kavel workers lost their initial feelings of “gratitude” towards the employers for providing 
them with a job; instead, the workers became more aware of their rights as citizen-workers. In 
fact, a Kavel worker, Hasbal Kayalı, expressed that, before the strike, his colleagues had 
spoken of the employers as having blessed them by recruiting them into the work force at the 
plant. After the strike, he said that the workers learned to claim their rights and fight for them, 
if necessary. Another worker said that Kavel became a place for workers to shed their peasant 
status and become modern citizens.739 The strike also motivated the union to ask more boldly 
for their members’ rights. After the strike, Maden-İş declared that employers must have 
become aware that the workers would no more bow before the unlawful and arbitrary acts of 
the employers, and that they would no longer subject themselves to eternal misery.740 The 
Kavel Strike is also a fine illustration of analyzing how the metal workers understood the 
social justice during the 1960s. The workers who went into the strike to provide for their 
families and protect the representative mechanism on shop floor demanded the social justice 
within the factory. Therefore, the social justice meant to earn a decent income to sustain a 
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better life to their families, have their own mechanism to claim their grievances and demands, 
and therefore work under labor relations based on justice for the Kavel workers. 
The strike also had significant impact on the unionization of the metal workers. 
Throughout the events, the demarcation between Maden-İş and Çelik-İş became much more 
keen.741 Çelik-İş, which had been seen by most unionists as a “yellow union” attempted to 
intervene in the affairs, too. Unfortunately, we don’t know much about the foundation and 
development of Çelik-İş. This union remained undeveloped until the early part of 1962. From 
the beginning of that year, the union began to be organized in several small metal enterprises 
and was able to win some rights for workers by negotiating with employers, bringing cases to 
the courts, or engaging in labor disputes at the Provincial Work Office.742 Apropos to the 
spirit of the new time, the union often declared its stance for the idea of social justice; that is, 
the mutual cooperation and peaceful relations between employers and employees which 
would develop the national economy.743 It is true that most unions and union leaders defined 
Çelik-İş as “yellow union” in the early 1960s, but it is very hard to take this argument as true 
one in the absence of direct evidence. Furthermore, this union conducted several labor 
disputes to get its members’ rights as stated above. 
The struggle between Maden-İş and Çelik-İş gained momentum in the first months of 
1962. It was aggravated after a fight between members of Maden-İş and the chair of Çelik-İş 
over a metal enterprise and its dismissal of the Maden-İş members in January 1962.744 In 
March, the news about the resignation of more than five hundred Türk Demir Döküm workers 
appeared in newspapers. However, two union representatives of the factory, Şinasi Kaya and 
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Sabri Kuruç countered this news after eight days and stated that Çelik-İş was deliberately 
spreading such “lies” to undermine the trust of the metal workers to Maden-İş.745 In the 
succeeding month, 300 workers of the Hot Wire Factory at Eyüp joined in Çelik-İş.746 As the 
fight between the two unions intensified inside the factory, both sides began to challenge each 
other publicly. According to Maden-İş’s allegations, the metal bosses had been funding 
representatives of Çelik-İş in a move to undermine the unity of the metal workers who 
supported Maden-İş.747 In fact, the Maden-İş’s representatives from various factories claimed 
that their employers were forcing workers to resign from Maden-İş and join in Çelik-İş.748 
The fight between Maden-İş and Çelik-iş reached its peak during the Kavel Strike. 
Çelik-İş presented an extremely negative stance during the Kavel Strike for both the 
Kavel workers and unionists. The Çelik-İş officers made several declarations and held 
organized press meetings in which they accused Maden-İş of inciting the workers to strike. 
Çelik-İş also organized a press meeting on February 9th regarding the events. Kazım Çoçu, 
the chair of Çelik-İş, said in the meeting that the “unlawful” acts, such as those that happened 
in Kavel, would destroy workplace peace. The strike, which took place as a result of the 
“direct provocations” of the unionists for their own “glory”, would ultimately harm the 
interests of workers.749 Çoçu also claimed that they were standing up against the unionists 
who deceived workers into stoppages in accordance with their “malicious” ideology, namely 
communism.750 After two days, the union published a declaration for the workers and adopted 
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the same discourse. The declaration urged the assumed “loyal, nationalist, traditionally-
minded” Turkish workers who considered the national interests first, not to create an opening 
for “corrupt” ideologies.751  
In spite of their declarations of support for the Kavel workers, but not the strike, the 
Çelik-İş officers did not visit the site of the job action and expressed their opposing views on 
the matter. Consequently, the Kavel workers saw Çelik-İş as a “yellow union” for their 
declaration that the strike should be abandoned. They said that no one from Çelik-İş came to 
strike area to distribute any leaflets. Instead, Çelik-İş officers sent the leaflets to the houses of 
the workers. İlyas Kabil got those leaflets from the workers’ homes and tossed them into the 
fire.752 In fact, the famous unionists who hired a bus to visit the strikes in Kavel kicked the 
chair of Çelik-İş out of the bus and accused him of being against the strike.753 Whether Çelik-
İş was funded by the metal bosses or whether it was a “yellow-dog union”, the Kavel strike 
proved that another player had to be considered to fully explain the complex worker-
employer relations in the metal sector.  
Another impact of the Kavel strike was one felt by the metal bosses. The strike 
motivated the metal bosses to unite under MESS. In fact, İbrahim Üzümcü stated this was a 
necessity of defending employers’ rights. 754  The resistance of workers at Kavel, and its 
aftermath, displayed the importance of staging collective struggles to the metal bosses for 
defending their rights. Indeed, one well known metal manager admitted that the metal bosses 
got together in the 1960s on the growing threat of strong workers’ unionism.755 With the 
Kavel Strike and legislation of the right to strike coming in July 1963, an increasing number 
of the metal bosses applied to MESS to be a member.756 
                                                             
751 “Kavel’deki Grevde Bazı Menfaatçıların Kasıtlı Rol Oynadıkları İddia Ediliyor [It Is Claimed that 
Some Self-Seekers Are Influential on the Kavel Strike],” Son Saat, February 11, 1963. 
752 Aydın, 58. 
753 “Kavel Grevi Olayı İçin Açıklamalar Yapan Çelik-İş Türk-İşi Protesto Ediyor [The Çelik-İş Who 
Makes Declaration for The Kavel Incident Protests Türk-İş],” Son Saat, March 2, 1963. 
754 “Kavel’de İstihsal Her Yıl Biraz Daha Artıyor [The Production Is Increasing Every Year in Kavel],” 
Türkiye Birlik, March 8, 1963. 
755 Ertuğrul Soysal, “Madeni Eşya İş Kolunda Toplu Sözleşme Tatbikatından Doğan Bazı Meseleler,” 
65. 
756 Dünden Sonraki Gün [The Day After Yesterday] (İstanbul: MESS Yayınları, no. 601, 2010), 30. 
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The Kavel walkout also left a legacy of a strike symbolism and folklore to be 
pondered by the other strikers in the metal sector. The strike tent, which the workers founded 
in front of the factory on the sixth day, became as symbol of the solidarity and decisiveness of 
the workers. It was a place for the workers to gather and debate the latest developments 
regarding the strike. In fact, the Kavel tent would be used by the other workers during the 
following strikes. The tent factored in the formation of a public space characterized by the 
worker’s solidarity. The workers from the other plants visited the tent and showed their 
solidarity within it, thus, it became a physical symbol of their collective struggle. Another 
important legacy was the strike line. The Kavel workers drew a line 200 meters in front of the 
factory and did not allow anyone, not even the police, to cross the line. It was a significantly 
threatening incident for the employers since the line meant, for them, a direct attack to their 
“property rights.” It symbolized for the workers, on the other hand, the boundaries of the very 
institution that put food on their tables. The line reminded them of the importance of their 
fight to their job, their rights and their daily bread. In this regard, it also enhanced the 
workers’ commitment to the factory. Furthermore, the support of the neighbourhood and the 
acts of solidarity of the other workers were other legacies left for the future members. The 
visits of the neighbourhood supporters, the fight with the police forces, the support of the 
other metal workers and their financial help, events which all happened during the Kavel 
walkout, would be imitated during later strikes in the sector. All of these events would also 
add up to the creation of a strike culture, not only among the metal workers, but among the all 
workers in Turkey.757 
                                                             
757 Aydın, 145-146. 
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Figure 16: The Kavel Strikers and the strike tent (Source: Zafer Aydın, Kanunsuz Bir Grevin Öyküsü, 
33). 
 
Let’s turn here to the question of whether the strike or the tense relations between 
employers and employees was a diversion from the norm. Did the course of events return to 
its “regular flow” in the metal sector after both employers and workers declared their 
willingness for peace? It simply did not. The course of events would prove the metal workers 
had to wage further wars to provide for their families and win their rights. In fact, the story of 
Kavel workers did not come to an end with the protocol that both parties signed. Fourteen 
workers were arrested in March on the charge of obstructing police.758 One arrested worker, 
Ali Sarsar, had a new son just one day after his arrest. His son was called “Fate” which hinted 
at the bad fate of the Kavel workers; in fact, the baby boy would die soon after.759 Maden-İş 
organized a campaign for the arrested workers and other unions and workers sent significant 
amounts of money to the families of the workers, and to the workers themselves. 760 
Meanwhile, the strife between the general manager and the workers continued on the shop 
floor. According to the workers, the general manager forced them to resign from Maden-İş 
after the strike had come to an end. He also fired five workers. Upon this, the union published 
a notice, according to which İbrahim Üzümcü had attempted to disrupt the peace and mutual 
                                                             
758 “Kavel Kablo’da 14 İşçi Nezarette [The 14 Kavel Workers Were Under Custody],” İşçinin Sesi, no. 
34, (17 March 1963). 
759 Tükel, 7. 
760 TÜSTAV Nebil Varuy Archive, Envelope 662. 
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understanding between the union and employers.761 When the workers’ representatives were 
in prison, İbrahim Üzümcü sent a letter to their homes, which informed the workers that their 
work contracts had been cancelled.  
On the basis of ongoing oppression, the workers’ struggles did not end. The 
prisoners, including İlyas Kabil and Halis Bilici, were released on April 11th. They were met 
by the İstinye people at the same night. In order to protest the dismissal of their 
representatives, the factory workers stopped work once again. After the meetings, the 
employers were convinced to rehire the workers. However, Üzümcü did not give up on his 
attempts to destroy the union on the shop floor. In 1964, he signed a collective agreement 
with Çelik-İş, which had been successful in organizing some workers. The tiring strike, the 
dismissal of the four workers’ representatives, and a disagreement between the union 
representatives on the shop floor, finally resulted in the acceptance of this agreement by the 
workers.762 However, the ongoing struggle in the plant was a sign of the coming struggle in 
the sector. In fact, the year 1964 would witness bitter collective struggles of the metal 
workers. 
 
V. Conclusion 
The dissolution of the DP’s government by a military intervention on May 27th, 1960 
and the succeeding social reforms did not directly change and/or improve the patterns of the 
metal workers’ common experiences that took a shape after the war years; however, it created 
new channels, or expanded the existing ones through which workers would claim their 
demands and fight for their rights. The promises of the post-May 1960 governments to 
recognize workers’ long-standing demands, the emergence of the notion of social justice as 
one of the most important components of the hegemonic discourse, and the rise of leftist ideas 
in the era, all motivated the metal workers and their union to be more bold and determined in 
                                                             
761 “Kavel’den Şikayetler Devam Ediyor [The Complaints from Kavel Are Going On],” Gece Postası, 
March 8, 1963; “Maden-İş Sendikası Açıklama Yapıyor [Maden-İş Makes a Declaration],” İşçinin 
Sesi, (3 June 1963). 
762 Aydın, 136. 
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fighting for more democratic workplace relations and society. As in the previous decade, their 
union was the İstanbul metal workers’ main tool to realize their goals. 
Accordingly, the Kavel Strike can be seen as the peak of the metal workers’ struggles 
between 1960 and 1963; there, the metal workers collectively acted to protect their rights, to 
improve their lives and, more importantly, to secure their representatives and union, Maden-
İş, which they perceived as their voice and a tool to represent themselves in workplace 
relations. Significantly, such an act would influence their common language and 
consciousness that now spoke of their lawful or “natural” rights rising out of being a laboring 
citizen and a meaningful contributor in the formation and development of their countries. 
That language would be further enhanced during their more widespread collective actions at 
the end of the 1960s.   
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PART 3 
AN INJURY TO ONE IS AN INJURY TO ALL: THE RADICALIZATION OF THE 
SHOP FLOOR - STRUGGLES IN THE METAL SECTOR, 1964-1970 
 
The Kavel Strike was a harbinger of the future contentious encounters between 
bosses/managers and workers in the metal sector of İstanbul. The 1963 Labor Law meant the 
shop floor relations and struggles were more highly regulated in Turkey. After the legislation, 
the Turkish trade unions significantly increased their influence in social, economic and 
political life, and they became much more essential to workers’ daily lives. During this 
period, the number of collective agreements was augmented, and all the sides - state officers, 
employers and unionists - would refer to those documents in order to regulate shop floor 
relations in a peaceful manner and serve the interests of all parties involved. Sorting out 
workplace relations through individual negotiations and bargaining became less common in 
several industrial sectors. Consequently, more workers were organized into unions to benefit 
from collective agreements. In essence, the shop floor principles began to be significantly 
determined as a result of negotiations, bargaining and even fights, if necessary, between the 
organizations of both employers and workers. Accordingly, I will focus on the first 
widespread collective actions between the metal workers and employers/managers in Chapter 
7, concentrating on union demands, and the strategies both unions and employers pursued 
during collective bargaining. Then, I will analyze the strikes and the process of workplace 
relations, which motivated the İstanbul metal workers to be organized in the metal sector.  
Indeed, more acute disagreements would take place between the metal workers and 
bosses/managers over the period between 1968-1970. In order to interpret their significance, 
in Chapter 8, I will track the ideological and political course of developments within Maden-
İş, MESS and Çelik-İş, the latter of which being an influential actor in the sector after the 
defeat of Maden-İş in the 1964 strikes. Regarding this topic, I will firstly touch on the 
changing ideological and political discourse of Maden-İş, and whether this union’s shift 
towards a more obvious leftist and Marxist discourse resulted in the furthering of poor 
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relations between union and bosses/managers. After delineating Maden-İş’s changing 
political discourse, the same chapter will focus on how the metal bosses and Çelik-İş 
responded not just to the developments that occurred within Maden-İş but how they also 
responded to the increasing leftist influence in Turkey. Certainly, those developments paved 
the way for more acute fights amongst workers, unions and bosses between 1968-1970.  
As a side note, in order to prevent confusion about the organization of this chapter, I 
will be explaining a shift in Maden-İş’s official policy and language by following a 
chronological order at first, with the hopes of explaining this shift more clearly. Afterwards, I 
will analyze the main elements of this union’s, the employer’s and Çelik-İş’ ideological 
position and strategies. Following that, I will change to a thematic approach, rather than a 
chronologic one, to explain those elements in detail. However, it’s possible that ideological 
and political polarizations might have influenced the degree of animosity between workers 
and bosses; yet, they do not directly explain why the majority of workers participated in those 
actions. For a better picture, we must study the workers’ actual experience in their working 
places. Thus, in Chapter 9, I will analyze the workplace relations between workers and 
bosses/managers, after 1964 in the private metal sector in İstanbul. Despite the Labor Law 
and collective agreements, most of workers’ insufferable workplace experiences remained 
unchanged towards the end of decade. The chapter will mainly focus on their low wages and 
the restrictions on workers’ free representation, and thus, free union choice, which was the 
key issue that led the majority of the metal workers to stage collective actions between 1968 
and 1970. Chapter 9 will expose how important it was for the workers to develop agency 
through their trustworthy representatives and unions as they organized workplace relations. 
And in Chapter 10, I will analyze the collective struggles wherein the majority of the 
İstanbul metal workers participated to protest their bitter work experiences, and in which the 
ideological and political polarization was rendered more obvious. As a result, Chapter 10 will 
emphasize the demands of workers, which were to be provided with high wages and the 
recognition of their free union choice, as well as their forms of actions. Certainly, those 
collective actions influenced the general mindset and the language of workers: the voice of 
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the militant metal workers at the time highlighted the legitimacy of their demands, which they 
wanted to liberate from the idea of the benevolence of bosses/managers, or the promises of 
the state and tie intrinsically to the workers’ position in the organization of society; that is, to 
being a producer of the wealth of the country and thus a contributing citizen. The chapter will 
also touch on the ways in which the militant workers conceived justice, and their common 
interests and collective struggle as an effort to win and maintain their rights. Chapter 10 will 
end with an analysis that discusses the metal workers’ collective language and mindset as the 
important aspects of this class’ formation. 
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CHAPTER 7 
THE METAL WORKERS AND BOSSES ON THE SHOP FLOOR: 
THE DEFEAT OF MADEN-İŞ IN 1964 
 
From the end of 1968 to the spectacular working class uprising of June 15-16, 1970, 
employee-employer relations in the metal sector were much more contentious than they had 
been during the previous era. Between 1968 and 1970, a significant number of İstanbul metal 
workers were involved in collective actions such as sit-down strikes, or factory occupations in 
which workers occupied the factory for few days and allowed to no one to enter into the 
enterprises except themselves until their demands were accepted. Or they were involved in 
more formal legal strikes in several big and medium-sized plants actions located both on the 
Anatolian and European sides of the city. Moreover, metal workers from nearly all factories 
participated in the June events. Several of them, including union officers and representatives, 
were arrested and many of them were hurt during the battles. One metal worker lost his life in 
the Gamak resistance, while another died during the June events. Some workers also lost their 
jobs due to their involvement in the actions. Despite this oppression, they did not yield to 
their employers’ pressures.  
However, it would be misleading to present the struggles of the period between 1968 
and 1970 as spontaneous ones. On the contrary, the roots of those battles could be brought 
back to the earlier conflicts; such as the work disputes, which were waged by the metal 
workers before the Labor Law and the notorious Kavel Strike. Yet, a significant threshold for 
the metal workers was crossed during the conflicts that stemmed from the disagreement over 
collective bargaining, and the succeeding strikes in 1964.763 Accordingly, I will study the 
                                                             
763 Before proceeding with the story of the 1964 strikes, I need to reiterate a point that I briefly touched 
on the introduction part of this dissertation, regarding how I am approaching Çelik-İş. I am well aware 
that the following story may seem to analyze this union and its role and function in the metal sector 
with an apparent bias; but I feel this possible weakness comes out of the inavailability of evidence 
which makes it difficult to develop a in-depth evaluation of Çelik-İş that does not reflect my own 
ideological inclinations. It is very possible that Çelik-İş and its representatives went head to head 
contentiously in several specific workplaces, in an effort to maintain its members rights; yet, I did not 
have such examples among the little evidence that I was able to find about this union during my 
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1964 strikes by focusing on two important issues; wage increases and the organization of 
workplace relations in the sector. Since they were mainly institutionalized fights between the 
organizations of bosses and workers, this chapter will initially look at the developments of 
trade unionism after the Labor Law 1963. Then, it will cover the strikes in an effort to 
comprehend its reasons, strategies and results. In fact, as a result of those conflicts, Maden-İş 
had lost the first round of the battles, and the bosses/managers oppression of the workers’ free 
choice in some metal factories continued. In the end, although the workers got wage increases 
in some workplaces, they had still lost their free union choice. Despite the defeat, however, 
the metal workers’ struggles left a significant inheritance for future struggling workers. 
 
I. The Development of Unionism After the Labor Law 
Post-Labor Law industrial relations in Turkey witnessed the growing influence of 
trade unions in terms of both scale and scope. The number of unionized workers overall rose 
after 1963: according to a survey conducted by Orhan Tuna in 1969, nearly 60 percent of 
workers joined unions after 1963.764 For 1964 and 1965, the number of unionized employees 
increased by 42 000 in total.765 But, the more spectacular increase took place in 1967, when 
the numbers of unionized workers were more than tripled and then in the following years. In 
                                                                                                                                                                              
research. In this regard, it is nearly impossible to prove the common allegations; such as it being a 
“yellow dog union”, or “bosses’ union” or “sold union”, which the other unions, including Maden-İş, 
accused  Çelik-İş of being. For example, there is no way to prove whether Çelik-İş and its leaders, or 
its representatives on the shop floor, were involved in monetary exchanges with bosses and managers. 
Therefore, I submit those allegations not as proven facts, but as the allegations of those who made 
them. Furthermore, the avaliable documents and the interviews that I conducted with workers, as well 
as managers, demonstrate that Çelik-İş was certainly inclined to conduct peaceful and cooperative 
relations with bosses/managers in the workplace. As an example, this union and its members strived to 
persuade workers to return back to work in several factories during the 1964 strikes. The evidence and 
course of events put forth that a considerable amount of the metal bosses preferred Çelik-İş, instead of 
Maden-İş, to represent workers as their recognized and entitled union. Furthermore, a considerable 
amount of the metal workers who staged widespread strikes throughout sector between 1968 and 1970, 
perceived and described Çelik-İş as the “yellow dog union” who functioned in the workplaces on 
behalf of bosses/managers rather than worker interests. In this thesis, I will label Çelik-İş as an 
example of business unionism which emerged in the United States in the first quarter of the twentieth 
century. I will further discuss this point when I am explaining the Çelik-İş’s official discourse in the 
Chapter 8. 
764 Orhan Tuna, Türkiye’de Toplu İş Sözleşmesi Düzeninin İktisadi ve Sosyal Tesirleri, vol. 2 [The 
Economic and Social Effects of the Collective Agreement System], (İstanbul: Devlet Planlama Teşkilatı, 
1970), 32. 
765 Alpaslan Işıklı, Toplu İş Sözleşmeleri ve Türkiye Ekonomisi İçindeki Yeri [The Collective Work 
Agreements and Their Places in the Turkish Economy], (Ankara: Ankara Üniversitesi Siyasal Bilgiler 
Fakültesi Yayınları, no. 229-211: 1967), 94-100. 
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fact the figures in Table 5 suggest that the total number of 834 680 in 1967 saw and 
unprecedented increased to 2 088 219 in 1970 and to 2 362 787 in 1971. Table 5 also shows 
that although there was a decrease in the number of unions by 1968, the number of unionized 
workers seem to have an increase in this year. More importantly, for the significant amount of 
workers, being unionized was an important step in having an advantageous situation in terms 
of basic income and sustenance. In fact, Tuna’s survey indicated that nearly 90 percent of 
workers thought that being unionized was a significant benefit for them.766 
 
Table 4: The Number of Workers’ Unions and Employers’ Associations and the Number of 
Their Members 
Years  Employers’ Organizations Employees’ Unions 
 The Figures               The Member The Union Figures      The Member 
1948 4 - 73 52 000 
1949 2 - 77 72 000 
1950 2 - 88 76 000 
1951 5 - 137 110 000 
1952 10 - 248 130 000 
1953 12 - 275 140 000 
1954 17 576 323 180 387 
1955 25 1 059 363 189 595 
1956 28 1 092 376 209 155 
                                                             
766 Orhan Tuna, Türkiye’de Toplu İş Sözleşmesi Düzeninin İktisadi ve Sosyal Tesirleri, vol. 2, 49. Also 
see: Yıldırım Koç, Türkiye İşçi Sınıfı Tarihi [The History of Working Class in Turkey], (Ankara: Epos, 
2010), 204-205. 
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1957 27 1 244 385 244 853 
1958 29 1 364 394 262 591 
1959 32 1 434 417 280 786 
1960 33 1 150 432 282 967 
1961 35 1 706 511 298 679 
1962 47 1 820 543 307 839 
1963 78 1 605 565 295 710 
1964 92 1 769 595 338 769 
1965 104 1 927 658 360 285 
1966 108 3 550 704 376 909 
1967 - - 798 834 680 
1968 - - 755 1 007 928 
1969 - - 797 1 193 908 
1970 - - 737 2 088 219 
1971 - - 631 2 362 787 
Sources: Alpaslan Işıklı, Toplu İş Sözleşmeleri ve Türkiye Ekonomisi İçindeki Yeri, 100 and Yıldırım 
Koç, Türkiye İşçi Sınıfı Tarihi, 200. 
 
As the above table indicates, the number of trade unions in Turkey showed a steady 
increase from 1948 until 1967. It is seen that the most significant increase in the union 
numbers took place between 1964 and 1966, when the first collective agreements were signed 
in Turkey. After 1966, the increase showed some fluctuations, while the number of unions 
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decreased between 1967 and 1968, 1969 and 1971. It also shows some increases between 
1968 and 1970. In parallel with those figures, the number of workers who joined unions was 
at a steady increase, too, except between 1962 and 1963. However, between 1966 and 1967, 
and between 1969 and 1970, those figures almost doubled. This timing corresponded with the 
second and third terms of the collective agreements; thus this sharp increase can be explained 
by workers who saw the benefits of the first collective agreements signed in 1963 and 1964 
increasingly joining unions. Similarly, the numbers of employer’s organizations increased 
from 1948 to 1966, except between 1956 and 1957. Unfortunately we do not have numbers 
for the period after 1966. However, it must be noted that this figure sharply increased 
between 1962 and 1964 due to the recognition of collective agreements and trade unions law 
in 1963. It is interesting that, contrary to this increase, the number of workplaces that joined 
the employer’s organizations decreased between 1962 and 1964; however we have no 
information to discuss the reasons for such a decrease. Furthermore, after 1964 this number 
began to increase again and between 1965 and 1966 until it was almost doubled. 
In parallel with the increase in the number of unionized workers in Turkish industry, 
unionization was also very high in the metal sector following the introduction of the Labor 
Law. According to Işıklı, the most frequently unionized workers were in the tobacco, 
distillery, mining, textile, railway, sugar and metal hardware sectors.767 By 1965, nearly 80 
percent of workers were unionized in the metal sector. 768  Therefore, the expansion of 
unionization in the metal sector was not significantly different from that of other sectors in 
the decade; all in all, the 1960s was characterized by the growth of unionization for the 
Turkish workers. 
However, Yıldırım Koç warned scholars that those figures, which were based on the 
reports submitted by unions to the Ministry of Labor, were unreliable because nearly all 
                                                             
767 Alpaslan Işıklı, Toplu İş Sözleşmeleri ve Türkiye Ekonomisi İçindeki Yeri, 107. 
768 Alpaslan Işıklı, Toplu İş Sözleşmeleri ve Türkiye Ekonomisi İçindeki Yeri, 107; Ertuğrul Soysal, 
“Madeni Eşya İş Kolunda Toplu Sözleşme Tatbikatından Doğan Bazı Meseleler [Some Problems 
Stemming From The Practice of Collective Agreement in the Metal Sector],” Sosyal Siyaset 
Konferansları, 19 (1968): 64; Orhan Tuna, Türkiye’de Toplu İş Sözleşmesi Düzeninin İktisadi ve Sosyal 
Tesirleri, vol. 2, 33. 
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unions deliberately distorted their reports and misinformed the Ministry by inflating their 
actual numbers in order to get authorization rights in workplaces. According to the Labor 
Law, unions were required to declare the numbers of their members to the Ministry; however, 
they were not obliged to prove them. Furthermore, the Ministry had no authority to examine 
the accuracy of those figures. Koç maintains that, especially after 1970, all figures submitted 
to the Ministry of Labor were inaccurate due to growing union competition.769 Despite these 
overblown figures, the number of unionized workers showed a considerable increase in 
Turkey after 1963, and the metal workers constituted the undeniable part of this general trend.  
Table 5 also shows that there was an increasing number of employees joining 
together in these organizations. Although the tendency to be unionized was not so widespread 
among the employers, one of the biggest employer’s unions was in the metal sector.770 By the 
end of the decade, nearly all big metal plants became members of MESS and the total number 
of MESS members rose to 250.771 For the most part, the fights between the workers and 
employers were centred on these institutions. 
One of the most significant developments in terms of unionism was the increasing 
number of collective agreements around which most shop floor disagreements took place. 
Between 1963 and 1969, the total number of collective agreements was 907 in all sectors.772 
In 1964, Maden-İş signed 106 collective agreements covering 17 369 workers in total.773 
Between June 1965 and September 1965, the union signed 21 other agreements.774 In 1967, 
the number of collective agreements between MESS-Maden-İş and MESS-Çelik-İş was 84, 
covering 26402 workers in total.775  
                                                             
769 Yıldırım Koç, Türkiye İşçi Sınıfı Tarihi, 188-202. 
770 “En Büyük İşveren Sendikası MESS [The Biggest Employer’s Union is MESS],” İşçi Postası, 
August 4, 1967; Orhan Tuna, Türkiye’de Toplu İş Sözleşmesi Düzeninin İktisadi ve Sosyal Tesirleri, 
vol. 2, 71; M. Nihad Ay, Türkiye’de Toplu Pazarlık Düzeninde Ücret Oluşumu [The Formation of 
Wages Under The System of Collective Bargaining in Turkey], (İzmir: İktisadi ve Ticari Bilimler 
Fakültesi, 1969), 122-123. 
771 Ibid, 130. 
772 Orhan Tuna, Türkiye’de Toplu İş Sözleşmesi Düzeninin İktisadi ve Sosyal Tesirleri, vol. 2, 175. 
773 “1964 Yılında 106 İşyerinde T. Sözleşme İmzalandı [The 106 Collective Agreements Were Signed 
in 1964],” İşçi Postası, January 2, 1965. 
774 “Maden-İş 4 Ayda 21 Yeni Sözleşme İmzaladı [Maden-İş Signed 21 New Agreements Within Four 
Months],” İşçi Postası, September 29, 1965. 
775 Alpaslan Işıklı, Toplu İş Sözleşmeleri ve Türkiye Ekonomisi İçindeki Yeri, 128. 
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The biggest repercussion of the increasing number of collective agreements was 
found in workers’ wages. In fact, the share of workers’ wages from the national wealth 
increased after 1963.776 There was a common consensus among Turkish scholars that the 
percentage of increase in wages in the private sector had ultimately caught up with the 
increases in living indices after 1964. Between 1964 and 1965, the average wage increase was 
10.9 percent, while the living indices in İstanbul rose by 5 percent. 
The other important underlying reason behind rising wages was the overall minimum 
wage increase. Between 1961 and 1966, minimum wages increased by 41.6 percent, and in 
the same time interval, the increase in living indices in İstanbul was 29 percent.777 In fact, the 
most contentious issue during the first collective bargaining was the matter of minimum 
wages.778  The employers objected to minimum wages in general, arguing that minimum 
wages would force employers to increase all wages in the factories.779 The minimum wage 
issue created many more conflicts towards the end of the decade. In 1969, the level of 
minimum wages became one of the burning issues between the employers’ and employees’ 
organizations.780 For the metal sector, however, minimum wages were not in focus until the 
late 1950s. It is unfortunate that we do not know how the above mentioned increase in 
minimum wages between 1961 and 1966 reflected on the metal sector, but by 1964 the 
minimum wage of 13.00 TL per day in this sector remained within the general average of the 
minimum wages in Turkey.781 It can be concluded, then, that the increase in the average 
wages in the metal sector more or less mirrored the general rise of wages in Turkey. 
Therefore, minimum wages must have factored considerably in the improvement in the 
salaries of metal workers. Consequently, it would not be wrong to argue that wages in 
                                                             
776 Ibid., 139. 
777 Alpaslan Işıklı, Toplu İş Sözleşmeleri ve Türkiye Ekonomisi İçindeki Yeri, 121 and 127. 
778 Ibid., 121. 
779 “Türkiye’de İşçi Ücretleri [The Workers’ Wages in Turkey],” İşçi Postası, October 10, 1965. Also 
look at: “Türkiye’de İşçi Ücretleri [The Workers’ Wages in Turkey],” İşçi Postası, June 24, 1965. 
780 “Türk-İş,” İşçi Postası, June 7, 1969; “Asgari Ücretler Tesbit Edildi [The Minimum Wages Were 
Settled],” İşveren, vol. 7 no. 9 (June 1969): 4-8; Nihat Yüksel, “Asgari Ücret Sorunu [The Problem of 
Minimum Wage],” İşveren, vol. 7 no. 9 (June 1969): 15-18. 
781  Türkiyede Komisyonlarca Tespit Olunan Asgari Ücretler [The Minimum Wages in Turkey as 
Detected by the Commissions], (Ankara: Bakanlıklararası Prodüktivite Merkezi, 1964), 6; Asgari 
Ücret: Türkiye ve Dünya Uygulaması [The Minimum Wages: Its Application in Turkey and World], 
(Ankara: TÜRK-İŞ Yayınları, no. 119, 1978), 61. 
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general, and minimum wages in particular, were the most important reasons which led to the 
struggles, as we will discuss in the last chapter. 
Due to the high levels of unionization, both among the metal workers and bosses (in 
fact, most metal bosses joined in MESS during the collective bargaining in 1963 and 1964), 
the fight over collective agreements mainly took place between their unions. As a result, 
when the first widespread collective struggle took place in the sector in 1964, the workers’ 
unionization was divided inside the metal plants. In fact, although the members of Çelik-İş 
had been very few in the sector in the beginning, when the bargaining turned into conflict, 
their numbers significantly rose as a result of defeat of the Maden-İş strikes. The Çelik-İş 
representatives also attempted to intervene in the events by declaring the strikes “illegal” and 
asking workers to return to work. As a result of the success of the bosses and the failure of 
Maden-İş during the strikes, this union was somehow able to organize in most of the bigger 
metal plants. This would create another pattern of collective action for the metal workers of 
the future that included yet another actor in workplace relations. In conclusion, as the 
members of employer’s and worker’s unions increased, the workplace struggles between 
workers and employers/managers became more institutionalized. 
 
II. The Metal Workers Go On Strike 
Encouraged by the Kavel Strike and the 1963 Labor Law, Maden-İş and its members 
attempted to intervene in shop floor affairs more decisively in 1964. The unionized workers 
and union’s representatives on shop floor level saw the legislation of collective agreements 
and strike right as an important events which would usher in a new era in terms of having a 
say in organizing workplace relations. Maden-İş began, therefore, to prepare for collective 
bargaining towards the end of 1963. Inspired by the law, Maden-İş was hopeful to reach its 
goals including proper implementation of minimum wages, proper enforcement of rules by 
the commission, a union presence in every enterprise, provision of benefits and bonuses, 
improvement of workplace conditions in terms of workers’ health, and an end to the arbitrary 
workers’ punishments and dismissals.  
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Since the workers’ and employers’ representatives could not reach an agreement on 
the worker’s demands during the bargaining, the union decided in favour of strikes. The most 
significant worker’s demands put by Maden-İş were the increase in wages and regulation and 
institutionalization of the workers’ interventions in shop floor affairs; namely, the 
establishment of discipline committees/which, according to union officers, would put an end 
to the widespread arbitrary dismissals and punishments of the workers in general, and 
unionized workers and union representatives specifically. In fact, Maden-İş’s representatives 
established those two issues as their line in the sand during the bargaining. On the other side, 
the metal bosses/managers, who had already been uneasy due to latest political developments 
and the parallel growing influence of the idea of social justice, not to mention the Kavel 
Strike incidents, were further perturbed by the workers’ demands; consequently, the 
owners/managers of the big metal plants frowned upon those workers’ demands during 
bargaining. As a result, most bargaining culminated in strikes, especially in the big plants 
such as Arçelik, Türk Demir Döküm, Emayetaş, Sungurlar, Altınbaş Nail, Dever Technic and 
Ayvansaray Bolt Plant, factories that were all represented by MESS in the bargaining, as well 
as in Singer, which was not a MESS member. 
The 1964 Strikes, in total, were the second instructional encounter of the Maden-İş’s 
members with the bosses after Kavel. Maden-İş bargained with individual employers when 
the union would not hand over its rights to MESS. It also clashed with the MESS officers who 
were assigned by the employers to carry out the meetings on their own behalf. The bargaining 
processes went more smoothly for the first type of enterprise, since the union could force 
those employers to go along with the union’s terms. Maden-İş was also able to sign 
agreements with some of the enterprises, which were members of MESS.782 With the majority 
                                                             
782 “Maden-İş’in Yeni Bir Başarısı [A New Success of Maden-İş],” İşçi Postası, March 20, 1964; 
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of MESS’ members, however, the meetings progressed more acrimoniously since most big 
firms, especially those owned by the Koç Holding, were determined to force Maden-İş to 
defer to MESS’ terms. And Maden-İş certainly had great difficulty making MESS agree with 
the union’s demands. Since arguments at the bargaining table evolved into collective actions, 
the encounters sharpened the language of the metal workers and the union, which had 
previously oscillated between obedience and dissent during the progress of class relations in 
Turkey. However, the union’s language would turn entirely into a radical and socialist one 
with the foundation of a more radical trade union’s confederacy DİSK in 1967.  
Collective bargaining between Maden-İş and MESS began at the end of 1963 at the 
request of the union.783 After a few sessions, the meetings came to a stand-off, in January 
1964. Then, the disagreement protocol was sent to the Regional Work Office and Maden-İş 
declared its determination to go on strike in case of disagreement during the meetings of the 
referee board.784  In compliance with the law, the referee board was established with the 
                                                                                                                                                                              
Anlaşma Oldu [The Agreement Took Place in Philips, too],” Maden-İş, year 5 no. 69 (20 June 1964): 
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783 According to the Labor Law, the collective bargaining would start with the call of either the 
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participation of one employers’ representative and one employees’ representative, and an 
impartial mediator who was chosen by the mutual consent of both sides. In mid-April, the 
board had reached a decision. Although Maden-İş voted in favour of the decision, MESS did 
not go along with the board’s proposals. As a result, Maden-İş reiterated its intention to strike 
and it asked its members to vote for a strike mandate in May. However, commanders of 
martial law enforcement, which was in effect in İstanbul at the time, did not allow the union 
to carry on the strikes in the city.785 Furthermore, Maden-İş did not totally abandon its hope of 
reaching agreement through the meetings. The union asked the government to intervene in the 
affairs in June and the Minister of Industry was assigned to conciliate both sides. By applying 
to the government, Maden-İş also hoped to gain time for its strike preparations and increase 
its legitimacy in the eyes of the public officers. Although he listened to both sides, the 
Minister did not declare his opinion on the root matters of the conflicts.786 In the meantime, 
martial law was dissolved in July 20, 1964, and the union was in a legal position to execute its 
strike plans. 
Meanwhile, the first significant strike, one that occurred at the Singer Factory located 
in Kartal, had taken place earlier that year, in March 1964. Why the military commanders 
allowed this walkout to take place is unknown, but loopholes in martial law, most probably, 
gave permission to Maden-İş to stage a strike in the Singer plant since it was a foreign 
                                                                                                                                                                              
Officers Has Met with the Union’s Representatives Yesterday],” İşçinin Sesi, 9 January 1964; “Maden-
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company. In addition to a being the first strike in the metal sector after the legislation went 
into effect, the Singer strike was a good example of how and why the strikes occurred, and 
how they were defeated. While Maden-İş and the Singer employers were waiting for the 
decision of the referee board, the Singer manager signed an agreement with Çelik-İş, which 
was, in fact, not the entitled union to make a collective agreement on behalf of workers there. 
The labor court invalidated this contract upon the objection and application of Maden-İş. But 
while waiting for the decision of the referee board, Maden-İş officers considered taking 
initiative in the workplace, inspired by Kavel, to force the bosses/managers to give in to the 
union’s terms. Maden-İş even named its strategy “Kavel Plan 2”. They asked the Singer 
workers to vote on a strike and after the majority of the workers supported the union’s 
decision, the union initiated the walkout.787  In reply, the management illegally began to 
recruit new workers to continue production within the factory; however, the state authorities 
did nothing to prevent the management’s strategy. Furthermore, the union officers were 
arrested under martial law following complaints by the management. In the meantime, 
Maden-İş accused management of exerting a pressure on workers to join in Çelik-İş: although 
we do not have sufficient evidence to prove this allegation, it is a fact that the number of 
strikers petered out over time.788 After 82 days, the union had to end the strike and it lost its 
recognition on the shop floor. Most workers joined in Çelik-İş, which had signed a general 
covenant with the employers. When Maden-İş abrogated the strike, Çelik-İş signed the 
collective agreement with the Singer Factory.789 In fact, the course of events in Singer was a 
harbinger of what would later happen at the other metal plants. 
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After the abolishment of martial law in İstanbul, the workers of Arçelik, Emayetaş, 
Sungurlar, Türk Demir Döküm, Altınbaş Nail, Dever Technic and Ayvansaray Bolt Factories 
walked off the job in August and September.790 In Ayvansaray and Emayetaş, Maden-İş and 
the factory managers reached an agreement. In other factories, though, the strikes were 
defeated. Consequently, the union lost its rights on the shop floor and Çelik-İş, who had 
proved before the labor court or the Regional Work Office that it made up the majority of the 
workers among its members in those enterprises, gained entitlement for representation and 
signed collective agreements with the bosses/managers on behalf of workers. In fact, each 
story of the strikes which ended in defeat, was, more or less, the same. After the declaration 
of a strike, the employers/managers sued the union, union officers, and workers’ 
representatives or strikers for engaging in unlawful acts on shop floor. They also publicly 
accused Maden-İş and the union’s representatives of instigating and forcing into action 
workers who were actually not willing to be involved in strikes. In the meantime, the bosses 
illegally recruited new workers to carry on production and harassed the strikers to resign from 
Maden-İş. Then, Çelik-İş stepped in and applied to the Regional Work Office or the labor 
courts, claiming that the majority of workers in those enterprises were truly members of 
Çelik-İş. As a result of all of this, the strikers failed in the main object of any strike - to stop 
production - and the number of strikers diminished over time. Then, Maden-İş had to give up 
striking altogether and it lost its recognition as a representative union. On the same day when 
the failure of Maden-İş became official, Çelik-İş called the employers to sign the agreement 
to become the entitled union on the shop floor.791 The overlapping of employer and employee 
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tactics with their shared majority trust of Maden-İş regarding the law and legal mechanisms 
paved the way for the defeat of the 1964 strikes. 
 
III. Wages and Discipline Committees 
After introduction of the legislation, there were two main goals Maden-İş and its 
members had been struggling to attain since just after the Second World War: the first was 
related to an increase in workers’ wages and the second was about consolidating the union 
mechanism on shop floor level. For the second goal, the union proposed that during the 
collective bargaining with the metal employers and/or their representatives, they would form 
a disciplinary committee to regulate workplace relations. This body would be made up of 
equal numbers of workers’ and employer’s representatives. For the metal bosses who 
absolutely refused to consider those demands, even the very existence of Maden-İş which was 
assumed to make “excessive demands”, became increasingly a thorn inside the workplaces. 
Thus, the bosses would mainly strive to undermine this union’s position during bargaining, 
and also during strikes. 
The union’s officers, the district chairs and representatives on shop floor often 
declared their determination to win their rights provided in the Constitution and Labor Law. 
The union officers argued that the new laws, as well as workers’ organized and regulated 
struggles, would end the “arbitrary” rules of employers on shop floor.792 In this regard; the 
first option for the union was to find common points with the employers at the table. In 
January 1964, the chair of the union, Kemal Türkler, asserted that they aimed to solve the 
disagreements in a peaceful manner. However, Türkler also claimed that the employers 
frowned on workers’ demands and took an uncompromising attitude towards them. Since “the 
peace breaker attitude of the employers” in the union’s lexicon had become more obvious in 
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time, the workers were compelled to go on strike to protect their own rights.793  Given this 
union perspective, one can argue that the union was willing to compromise about most of its 
demands except in regard to the two issues noted above. 
In fact, during the bargaining processes, which culminated in the strike, the metal 
union followed an attitude of compromise. For the first demand, Maden-İş rationalized its 
demand for wage increases on the grounds that it would not increase production costs. On the 
contrary, the wage increases, which would motivate workers to work harder, would reduce 
production costs by increasing productivity. 794  However, the metal employers would not 
approach this demand in a positive manner and refused the union’s proposal. For the union, it 
was impossible to cave in to the employer’s position, which leaned towards workers’ 
propositions on benefits, but allowed only very small increases for wages.795 On the second 
issue, the union proposed a discipline committee that would be composed of an equal number 
of workers’ and employers’ representatives to guarantee the job safety of its members and 
representatives. The union put forth those demands as its line in the sand and the workers’ 
representatives similarly put forth their determination to earn those rights in workplaces 
through action.796  
Further addressing the second issue of discipline committees, Maden-İş put forth that 
it might risk going into strikes to establish this key mechanism. The union officers asserted 
that, in the absence of such committees, the employers would become the only authority to 
rule the workplaces and would keep on “oppressing” the unionized workers, whom they saw 
as the main reason for workers’ insurgency on shop floor. The union also hit upon the idea 
that the discipline committees would facilitate management on shop floor by punishing the 
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workers who acted against the law and collective agreements. 797  Hinging upon such 
assumptions, Maden-İş officers claimed that the real problem during the bargaining was the 
employers’ desire to pursue their old habits (“my business, my rules”) in ruling factories. 
According to the union, the employers/managers who interpreted this as their natural right to 
rule wanted “complete obedience” from workers.798 However, the employers/managers found 
those assertions simply unacceptable. 
Therefore, according to the union officers, the main responsibility for the strikes 
rested on the shoulders of the employers who did not respect workers’ rights. The union put 
the blame on the employers who were seen as unyielding to workers’ demands on the issues 
of the discipline committee and wage increases.799 During the meetings, the union published a 
brochure entitled “The Rights Which the Employers Are Uneager to Recognize.” The 
brochure was a good summary of how the union comprehended the attitude of MESS during 
the bargaining. In it, the union narrated the strike process and emphasized the unyielding 
attitudes of MESS, which actually stood against decisions of the referee board. The brochure 
also emphasized the oppression of the Maden-iş members and the employers’ tactics to reach 
an agreement with Çelik-İş. According to the brochure, MESS objected vehemently to the 
increase in the number of workers’ representatives on shop floor. The employers rejected the 
rule of allowing the head representative to have two hours leave of absence in a day to deal 
with union issues. The metal bosses/managers were also against the union’s demands on 
overtime work and the revisions on severance pay. According to the brochure, some MESS 
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members, especially the big factory owners, were clearly against nearly all union demands.800 
For the union, this intolerance dragged out the bargaining into conflicts and strikes.  
It is unfortunate that the available evidence on the voices of employers is not so rich 
in comparison with that of the workers and the union. But I would argue, based upon those 
limited sources, that the metal bosses/managers were generally uneager to defer to the 
workers’ demands and they wanted to keep ruling their own workplaces without any outside 
intervention. Their reluctance was clear from the employer’s decline of the referee board’s 
decisions, a body which even included the employer’s representatives. Additionally, some 
employers separated from MESS, which they claimed showed an extreme intolerance to the 
workers’ demands, and they agreed to cooperate with Maden-İş. 801  In fact, the general 
manager of Arçelik, Ali Mansur, asserted that he and the other managers were against sitting 
down with workers and negotiating the terms of shop floor relations even after the Labor 
Law. In this regard, Mansur said, the bargaining progressed in a very contentious manner and 
both sides considered each other as enemy. When collective bargaining turned into strikes, 
the employers refused to even talk with workers. 802  As is plain from the employer’s 
arguments, the main reason for the conflict between the workers and employers was the issue 
of the discipline committee, which the union officers defined as their line in the sand. 
Moreover, the employers’ publications admitted that the employers “rightfully” objected to 
the union’s demands about discipline committees.803 As one general manager admitted later, 
the most unacceptable demand of workers was to have a say in ruling the shop floor.804 
Similarly, the general manager of Türk Demir Döküm, Burhan Günergun, admitted that 
Maden-İş brought some administrative demands to the table that were unacceptable for the 
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employers.805 According to the employers, the strikes took place as a result of such extreme 
workers’ demands. MESS and the employers, therefore, put the blame on the union for the 
strikes, in direct opposition to the accusations of the union. Whether the workers’ union or 
employer’s union were to be blamed, it was certain that the bargaining ultimately reached a 
deadlock and the time had come for both sides to decide their strategies to win this game. 
 
IV. Strategies 
Both Maden-İş and MESS followed various strategies to get the other side to relent. 
Those strategies and their effectiveness would determine who would achieve a victory. 
Eventually, the employers’ side came out the winner in this struggle due to its strategy of 
weakening the strikes and undermining the union through both legal and illegal methods. But 
Maden-İş’ overwhelming trust in the legal mechanism and its inability to mobilize the rank 
and file, while at the same time resorting to those slower legal methods, cost the union too 
much: it was defeated and it lost entitlement rights in most of the metal plants. 
During the strikes, the union declared that the metal workers went on strike only as a 
last resort to defend their rights.806 In order not to “kneel down” to employer’s “arbitrary” 
rules, the workers utilized their constitutional right to strike against employers who were not 
ready to provide workers’ rights in the workplace. In an effort to legitimize their decision, the 
union pointed out that the employers’ union and the employers themselves were acting 
against the Constitution and the law. Based on that assertion, the workers’ union officers 
claimed that the employers’ “uncompromising” attitude during bargaining was, in fact, an 
attack on “free” unionism as established in the 1961 Constitution. When the union began to 
bargain with the employers, it based its workers’ demands on the principles of the 
Constitution that stressed free unionism, a wage system based on social justice, and job 
security. However, the employers did not want most of these Constitutional rights to be put 
into effect. Maden-İş argued that MESS actually had a hidden agenda of obstructing 
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constitutional rights, including the right to strike, shattering the workers’ unity and disrupting 
the mechanism of workers’ representation. Such intentions, however, would only bring 
Turkish society back to where it was, 100 years previous. Examples of this behavior could be 
seen, they said, in how MESS and the employers invited the “unauthorized” Çelik-İş to sign 
agreements, how they sued the union and union officers, abrogated the work contracts of 
strikers, and threatened to resign from Maden-İş.807  
The workers’ representatives then adopted the same language of demanding the 
lawful rights and protesting the intolerant attitude of employers towards their demands.808 The 
head representative of Türk Demir Döküm, Sabri Kuruç, argued that although the employers 
earned too much, they were still unwilling to give wage increases to workers. They also 
pursued “tyranny” on shop floor, in particular by objecting to the demands of discipline 
committees.809 In the same vein, the Emayetaş and Altınbaş Nail workers claimed they went 
on strike only to get their lawful rights that were being ignored by the “uncompromising” 
attitude of employers. The placards on the factory walls asserted the same discourse of 
worker rights being provisions in the constitution.810 The placards on a building at the cross 
streets of Arçelik stated: “My Father, You Should Resist For My Rights”, “We Will Never 
Rat Out Workers” and ‘We Are Striking To Buy Freedom For 15 Liras.’811 Rising up against 
the so-called tyranny of the employers, the union’s language towards employers became 
much more radicalized than that of the previous decade.  
Since the talks had turned into conflict, the union adopted a more contentious 
language to the employers as a class, which was represented by MESS during the bargaining 
and strikes. Maden-İş did not attribute the contentious relations to a single individual within 
the ranks of the employers, unlike it had done during the Kavel Strike; rather, it sided against 
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the employers as a whole, and MESS as their organization. In fact, the Maden-İş officers 
argued that the bargaining, in which the MESS representatives did not participate, was easily 
finalized. In other words, the union officers and representatives saw that its “real fight” was 
against MESS.812 The union also accused MESS of destroying Maden-İş in order to pursue 
the “status quo of exploitation”. It considered the main goal of MESS was to “strangle” those 
workers’ rights put forward in the constitution.813 
Nonetheless, it would be wrong to conclude that the transformation of Maden-İş’s 
lexicon was a radical one. Firstly, the union officers or representatives barely utilized the term 
“class” in their accusations against the employers. Secondly, Maden-İş kept citing its 
argument about “well-intended employers” who yielded to the workers’ rights and demands. 
In those examples, the union gave up its contentious attitude and language towards the 
employers with whom it could reach an agreement. Some of those enterprises were, indeed, 
members of MESS who began to separately to meet with Maden-İş after a certain time. The 
union praised such owners and presented them as the “ideal bosses” who were aware of the 
“common” interests between workers and employers, and thought of their employees’ 
interests as well as their own. After signing the agreements, the union officers or 
representatives advised workers to work hard to deserve what they’d earned from the 
agreements. In their speeches, they emphasized the “mutual” interests of employers and 
employees in improving the national economy.814 The assumptions about “common interests” 
still held a considerable sway in the union’s and workers’ discourse. 
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Maden-İş conducted several other strategies to make the walkouts successful. As a 
legal entity, the union resorted to legal mechanisms to stop the unlawful acts of the 
employers, such as the recruitment of new workers during the strikes. In general, Maden-İş 
kept its traditional policy of trusting the legal mechanisms and complained about the 
perceived “unlawful” acts of MESS to the state officers and organs. As it was mentioned 
above, state organizations returned most applications of the union in their favor until 
September 1964. This was when the labor court invalidated the covenant between MESS and 
Çelik-İş regarding the Singer Factory, and the Regional Work Office threw out two 
applications from Çelik-İş concerning the Türk Demir Döküm Factory. However, those 
decisions eventually turned against Maden-İş.815 Furthermore, although the Regional Office 
or labor courts reached some decisions in favor of Maden-İş, they were ineffective in 
enforcing those decisions. Then, with the weakening of the their strike positions, the workers 
began to join in Çelik-İş and the law mechanism, which Maden-İş was able to utilize as the 
authorized union by having the majority of the workers inside the workplaces, then became 
useless for the union.  
The brief story of the Arçelik Strike is a good example of how Maden-İş failed in 
capitalizing on legal mechanisms. When the strike began on September 10th, the Arçelik 
employers applied to the district attorney by asserting that the strike was not legal on the 
grounds that the employers had not been informed previously about the strike date. Before the 
court decision, however, the Arçelik management began to recruit new workers, an act which 
was not in agreement with the Labor Law. Furthermore, the management sent a notification 
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that the loss of money caused by the strike would have to be compensated for by Maden-İş. 
Upon the application by Maden-İş, the Regional Work Office put on record that the employer 
illegally hired new workers. Given this official record, the union applied to the labor court to 
affix a seal on the machines. The Regional Work Office also sent a report about the unlawful 
acts of the Arçelik management to the district attorney. But the attorney refused to issue any 
warning to the employers. Moreover, the court threw out the union’s demand by arguing that 
Arçelik had a very “important” place in the Turkish economy. This was an important decision 
when it came to the ultimate defeat of the strike.816 Since the union did not, or could not, push 
the legal offices through strong and effective collective actions, all its work to utilize the legal 
mechanisms turned out to be futile.  
Another move of Maden-İş to shatter the unity of the metal employers was to 
negotiate with the metal employers individually. The tactic was influential to a certain degree 
and Maden-İş signed agreements with some MESS members. In turn, however, MESS 
gathered a meeting among its members and emphasized the importance of solidarity between 
the employers. MESS also threatened to end the membership of those who would agree to 
meet individually with Maden-İş.817 As a result, this method was in vain, too. 
It was also normal and significant for a trade union, as a legal entity, to apply legal 
mechanisms. Notwithstanding the case of strikes, a union must support their legal fight with 
strong collective actions to pressure the legal mechanisms to make progress on behalf of the 
workers. Here, Maden-İş clearly failed in organizing strong workers’ actions. Whether the 
union’s over-trust in the laws, or their inability to convince workers to pursue the strikes as a 
whole, or their failure to separate individual workplaces from MESS, or whether even the 
strategies of bosses/managers factored into the absence of widespread and effective workers’ 
actions is not very clear. But whatever the cause, it was certain that the workers’ union could 
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not mobilize its members efficiently. Consequently, Maden-İş, which was by far the most 
important workers’ union in the metal sector in İstanbul, lost its battle in nearly all big metal 
plants in 1964 and its authorization rights in those plants disappeared. In Arçelik, for 
example, Çelik-İş signed a “fine agreement” as a result of the “good intentions” of the 
employers/managers. 818  Those Kavel workers who did not walkout were joined by the 
Sungurlar workers in Çelik-İş in September, 1964. 819  In fact, between the end of the 
September and into October, most of the important metal plants, including Kavel, Arçelik, 
Profilo, Talisman, Sungurlar, Türk Demir Döküm, and Gümüş Motor, recognized Çelik-İş as 
the entitled union on shop floor.820 
It was not a surprise that the employers strived to get rid of Maden-İş, which was in 
disagreement with the bosses/managers over the organization of workplaces. In fact, the 
tactics applied by MESS and the managers to break the strikes proved that the metal 
bosses/managers of the period aimed to replace a union which sought for regulating shop 
floor relations as the equal partners of employers/managers with another union that did not 
have such cooperation on their agenda. In our interview, Hüseyin Ekinci821 claimed that the 
metal bosses/managers preferred Çelik-İş to be organized in the workplaces after the Labor 
Law, and they, indeed, desired collective agreements with this union.822 In fact, Ege Cansen 
affirms Ekinci’s views, arguing that the Arçelik managers agreed with Çelik-İş to get rid of 
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Maden-İş in 1964.823 They perceived the ongoing strikes as an opportunity to get rid of 
Maden-İş; however, it should be noted that there are no written documents to prove such 
claims. 
In the hopes of destroying Maden-İş and breaking the strikes, the bosses/managers 
utilized several tactics. The first of these was to force the workers to resign from Maden-İş. 
To accomplish this, they fired workers, transferred them to another job, or punished them 
under several excuses.824 Particularly after the union’s decision to go to strike in January, the 
employers threatened workers to force them to resign from the union.825 Capitalizing on the 
prohibition of the strikes, the managers began to force the union representatives to comply 
with their wishes, and they exerted pressures on workers to resign from Maden-İş. In June, 23 
Demir Döküm workers who refused to resign from Maden-İş, were fired.826 In the same 
manner, the Arçelik management also forced the workers to resign from the Maden-İş.827 At 
the end of June, Maden-İş made a declaration that put forth that the employers intimidated 
workers into resigning from Maden-İş to shatter workers’ unity, so that management could 
sign collective agreements with another union.828 Even in the factories where the union signed 
the agreement, the bosses/managers still demanded workers abandon Maden-İş.829 These acts 
reached their peak during the strikes. In the case of the Singer Strike, the general manager of 
the factory forced the workers to disavow Maden-İş.830 Furthermore, after the abolishment of 
the etat de siège, “the strike threat” became more real and the employers increased pressure 
on workers to embrace Maden-İş.831 In this regard, the Arçelik managers abrogated the work 
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contracts of several union representatives during the strike.832 The threat and real fear of 
losing their jobs was the most significant reason for the majority of workers to give up on 
their strike plans.   
In some cases, the employers/managers even came out against bargaining with 
Maden-İş, in spite of the fact that it was the entitled union to make agreements. For example, 
although Maden-İş called for the Kavel Factory to sit at the collective bargaining table, the 
manager, İbrahim Üzümcü, dismissed the idea, claiming that Maden-İş did not officially 
represent the Kavel workers.833 In the same manner, the Singer management was unwilling to 
sign an agreement with Maden-İş; the management, apparently, had previously signed a 
covenant with Çelik-İş.834 And like the Singer management, the Arçelik management had also 
signed a covenant with Çelik-İş before the strike.835 In fact, the metal bosses seem to be very 
determined to wipe out Maden-İş in the sector. 
The employers also threatened to fire the current workers and recruit new workers to 
continue production and break the strikes. Although the Labor Law plainly prohibited the 
recruitment of a new worker during a strike, the metal employers/managers often resorted to 
this method.836 In Singer, the management began to hire new employees even before the strike 
had started. In addition, the management made the administrative staff to wear work clothes 
and fulfill the jobs of workers. In the meantime, the Singer managers visited workers’ houses 
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and promised to increase their daily wages if they gave up the strike and left Maden-İş.837 
Likewise, the Arçelik managers also recruited new workers during the strike. While the 
Regional Work Officers drew up a record that illegal acts had been committed in these cases; 
the employers replied that whether the strike was lawful or not, they had the right to recruit 
new workers.838 As a result, the continuance of production in those factories was one of the 
important reasons in the failure of the strikes.  
All those employer tactics undoubtedly weakened the strikes. But the most influential 
of the strategies for both sides was the utilization of the legal mechanisms to argue their case. 
In nearly every strike, the employers sued Maden-İş officers and strikers on the grounds that 
they were conducting unlawful strikes, or instigating or “provoking” workers. In the Singer 
Strike, the district chair of Maden-İş, İlyas Kabil, was arrested upon the complaint of the 
general manager. 839  Furthermore, four union officers who wanted to address the Singer 
workers were taken into custody.840 In the same manner, the Emayetaş and Dever bosses sued 
the union officers for being engaged in an unlawful strike. However, the district attorney 
threw out their applications.841 The Ayvansaray workers were also interrogated by police at 
the request of the factory manager.842 Similarly, the Arçelik management sued some Arçelik 
workers for involving themselves in an unlawful strike, and later abrogated their work 
                                                             
837 “Singer İşçileri Grev Yaptı [The Singer Workers Made Strike],” Maden-İş, year 5, no. 67 (30 March 
1964): 1; “Singerdeki Greve 15 İşçi Daha Katıldı [15 More Workers Participated In The Singer 
Strike],” Gece Postası, March 31, 1964; “Singer İşçileri Grevi Yeni Bir Safhaya Girdi [The Singer 
Worker Strike Went Into A New Phase],” İşçi Postası, April 1, 1964; “Singerde Niçin Grev Yapılıyor? 
[Why There As A Strike In Singer],” İşçi Postası, April 1, 1964; “Singer Grevi Başarılı Şekilde Devam 
Ediyor [The Singer Strike Is Sucessfully Going On],” Maden-İş, year 5, no. 68 (20 April 1964): 1; 
“Singer’deki İhtilaf Yeni Bir Safhada [The Singer Dispute is at the New Stage],” İşçi Postası, May 13, 
1964; “Singer Grevi Devam Ediyor [The Singer Strike is Going On],” İşçi Postası, May 18, 1964. 
838 Kemal Sülker, Türkiye’de Grev Hakkı ve Grevler, 282-292. 
839 “Singerdeki Greve 15 İşçi Daha Katıldı [15 More Workers Participated in the Singer Strike],” Gece 
Postası, March 31, 1964; “Singer İşçileri Grevi Yeni Bir Safhaya Girdi [The Singer Workers’ Strike 
Went Into A New Phase],” İşçi Postası, April 1, 1964; “Singerde Niçin Grev Yapılıyor? [Why There Is 
A Strike in Singer],” İşçi Postası, April 1, 1964; “Singer Grevi Başarılı Şekilde Devam Ediyor [The 
Singer Strike is Sucessfully Going On],” Maden-İş, year 5, no. 68 (20 April 1964): 1; “Singer’deki 
İhtilaf Yeni Bir Safhada [The Singer Dispute is at the New Stage],” İşçi Postası, May 13, 1964; 
“Singer Grevi Devam Ediyor [The Singer Strike is Going On],” İşçi Postası, May 18, 1964. 
840 “Türk İş Başkanı ve Dört Sendikacı Nezarete Alındı [The Türk-İş Chair and Four Unionists Were 
Taken Into Custody],” Yeni İstanbul, April 6, 1964; “Demirsoy ve Türkler Tevkif Edildiler [Demirsoy 
and Türkler Were Arrested],” Maden-İş, year 5, no. 68 (20 April 1964): 1 and 4. 
841  Bakırköy Cumhuriyet Savcılığı Ademi Takip Kararı, 29 August 1964 [The Nolle Prosequi of 
Bakırköy Public Prosecutor], TÜSTAV, Maden-İş Archive, Box 39, Envelope 308.  
842  “İsabetsiz Grevlerin Geride Bıraktığı Acı Gerçekler [The Bitter Realities Caused by the 
Inappropriate Strikes],” Çelik-İş, year 1, no. 2 (17 September 1964): 3. 
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contracts.843 The possibility of being arrested, jailed, or losing their jobs, created widespread 
fear among the strikers. 
In addition to those prosecutions and interrogations which intimidated the strikers, 
both MESS and Çelik-İş applied to the labor courts or Regional Work Offices to repeal the 
authorization right of Maden-İş in the workplaces, and stop the so-called unlawful strikes. 
Çelik-İş applied to the state organs by claiming that it had majority of members in 
workplaces. MESS or managers, on the other hand, complained that Maden-İş was engaged in 
illegal acts. Until September, all these decisions were in favor of Maden-İş; however, by the 
time the strikes were growing weaker, the tides had begun to turn against Maden-İş. In Demir 
Döküm, Çelik-İş applied to the Regional Work Office and the labor courts twice; but its 
applications were declined. In September, Çelik-İş made another application and this time the 
Regional Office accepted it. As a result of several meetings, the Office provided Çelik-İş with 
representation rights on the shop floor. Upon the refusal of the Maden-İş objection, a 
collective agreement was signed between MESS and Çelik-İş, in September 1964, for this 
factory.844 When the strike began on September 10, the Arçelik employers applied to the 
district attorney, saying the strike was unlawful because the union had not informed the 
employer about the strike date. Therefore, MESS wanted the court to declare the strike 
officially unlawful and nullify it. 845  The same application was made by the Altınbaş 
management.846 In addition, Maden-İş claimed that MESS had inappropriate contact with a 
person in charge in the Labor Ministry and the Regional Work Office, with the intent to 
                                                             
843 “Arçelik’te Grev Yapan İşçiler Mahkemede [The Arçelik Strikers Are At The Court],” Maden-
İş’den Haberler, 1964/42, Tarih Vakfı Orhan Tuna Archive; “Bir İşçi Arçelik Aleyhine Açtığı 
Tazminat Davasını Kazandı [One Worker Who Had Sued Arçelik for Damages Won the Case],” MaHa 
Ajansı, 24 June 1966, TÜSTAV, Maden-İş Archive, Box 39, Envelope 308. 
844  “Türk Demir Döküm Fabrikaları İçin Çelik-İş’le Toplu Sözleşme İmzalandı [The Collective 
Agreement with Çelik-İş Was Signed In The Türk Demir Döküm Factories],” MESS Bulletin, no. 3, 
30/9/1964; “Türk Demir Döküm Fabrikaları Toplu İş Sözleşmesini Yaptı [The Türk Demir Döküm 
Factories Signed the Collective Agreement],” TİSK İşveren, (September 1964): 23.  
845 “Arçelik Fabrikasında Grev [The Strike at the Arçelik Factory]’, İşçi Postası, August 11, 1964; 
“Arçelik Fabrikasında Grev!..[The Strike at the Arçelik Factory],” İşveren, vol. 3, no. 1 (October 
1964): 4-9; Mahkemenin Direnme Kararı ile Temyiz Layihası [The Court Decision About the Right to 
Resist and the Assignment of Errors], (İstanbul: Büker Matbaası, 1966); Kemal Sülker, Türkiye’de 
Grev Hakkı ve Grevler, 282-292. 
846 Zeytinburnu Cumhuriyet Savcılığı Ademi Takip Kararı, 27 August 1964 [The Nolle Prosequi of 
Zeytinburnu Public Prosecutor], TÜSTAV, Maden-İş Archive, Box 39, Envelope 308. 
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persuade them to abrogate the strikes.847 When those legal interventions added up, MESS’s 
tactics of forcing the strikers to resign from Maden-İş, and their habit of recruiting new 
workers to carry on production seemed effective. The metal strikes stood on the brink of 
failure towards the end of September. 
To conclude the point, Maden-İş eventually lost those strikes as a result of several 
combined effects; the employers’ unity under MESS, the determination of MESS and its 
uncompromising attitude towards workers’ demands about wage increases and workers 
having a say in shop floor affairs, MESS’ skill in using the legal mechanisms, the 
employers’/managers’ strong and increasing pressure on workers to break the strikes, Çelik-
İş’s involvement in the affairs, the failure of legal mechanisms on the unlawful employer’s 
acts, Maden-İş’s overwhelming trust on the legal mechanisms to win workers’ rights, and 
finally, Maden-İş’s inability to produce an influential strategy to strike back to the employer’s 
moves.  
Nonetheless, the strike ended with victory in some factories. In Ayvansaray, which 
was a member of MESS, the employer yielded to the workers’ demands and agreed to sign 
with Maden-İş.848 In examining the terms in different collective agreements signed by Maden-
İş, it appears that although the workers got significant wage increases and benefits, there was 
no item included in the agreement about the participation of workers in shop floor regulation, 
which Maden-İş defined as its key issue.849 This right was earned in just a few small or mid-
sized enterprises.850 Therefore, this “success” remained a Pyrrhic victory for the union, since 
the widespread oppression of Maden-İş members and representatives significantly continued 
in the sector after the 1964 Strikes. 
 
                                                             
847 Maden-İş MESS Uyuşmazlığı Hakkında Rapor. 
848 “Maden-İş’in Yeni Bir Zaferi [A New Victory of Maden-İş],” İşçi Postası, September 2, 1964. 
849 “775 İşçi Zam Aldı [The 775 Workers Got Wage Increases],” İşçi Postası, February 1, 1964; 
“General Elektrik İle Sözleşme Yapılıyor [The Agreement is Being Signed with the General Electric],” 
İşçi Postası, May 14, 1964; “Maden-İş 7 Sözleşme Daha Yaptı [Maden-İş Signed 7 More 
Agreements],” İşçi Postası, September 5, 1964. 
850 “Maden-İş Yeni Bir Sözleşme İmzaladı [Maden-İş Signed a New Agreement],” İşçi Postası, June 
30, 1964. 
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V. Conclusion 
Maden-İş lost its first institutional battles against MESS mostly on, an are in which 
Maden-İş invested its time and energies more than the metal workers themselves did in 1964. 
A union officer later admitted that while the union had pursued its struggles through a 
reliance upon the relevant legislation, employers effectively responded by declaring each 
strike unlawful and exerting pressures on the legal mechanisms to forbid them. They also 
made gains when they asked the legal mechanisms to arrest the strikers and union officers. 
Those tactics focused mainly on scaring strikers through the threat of being interrogated by 
the police.851 Furthermore, especially during the Arçelik strike, when the labor court refused 
Maden-İş’s demands to affix a seal on the machines by stressing the importance of the factory 
for the broader Turkish economy, the latter union’s tactics seemed to prove the inefficacy of 
using legal mechanisms exclusively to win the battle. 852  In fact, according to the union 
officers, the freedoms provided by the constitution were defeated during the Arçelik strike.853 
And a serious repercussion of the 1964 strikes on Maden-İş was a loss of trust towards the 
legal mechanisms for securing its member’s rights. Therefore, Maden-İş’ members in other 
workplaces would resort to transgressing the law in the future, rather than depending upon it. 
Although the metal workers won significant material gains, and lived through 
relatively prosperous years compared with what they had gone through previously, as a result 
of the collective agreements in 1964 and 1965, the metal workers continued to suffer from 
insufficient representation in shop floor level. When this feeling was compounded by the 
reduction of their earnings towards the end of the decade, the metal workers would 
collectively rise again to keep their Constitutional rights and so-called natural rights that 
stemmed from being the producers in modern society. But this time, the metal workers and 
Maden-İş would not try to back actions solely with the law; rather, they would conduct more 
direct actions by trusting their own power and unity. 
                                                             
851 Akgün Ersoy, “Kanunsuz Grev ve Suç Sayılışı [The Unlawful Strike and Its Being a Crime],” 
Maden-İş, year 5, no. 72 (31 December 1964): 2. 
852 Hukuk İşleri Dairesi Raporu [The Report of Judicial Office], Tarih Vakfı Orhan Tuna Archive; 
MaHa Ajansı, 1965/9, 5 April 1965, Tarih Vakfı Orhan Tuna Archive. 
853 Kemal Sülker, Türkiye’de Grev Hakkı ve Grevler, 282.  
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CHAPTER 8 
THE CHANGING POLITICS AND THE ACTORS IN THE SECTOR: MADEN-İŞ, 
THE METAL BOSSES, AND ÇELİK-İŞ 
After the defeat in the 1964 Strikes, the tension between workers and 
bosses/managers in most metal plants seemed to disappear for a time; nonetheless, it would 
escalate again towards the end of the decade over the issue of workers’ earnings and workers’ 
free union choice. In the meantime, the official political discourse of Maden-İş underwent a 
significant transformation by the mid-1960s. It is apparent from the union journal, and from 
the speeches of union leaders and conference records that the union began to follow a 
Marxist-socialist terminology, which assumes incompatible interests between workers and 
owners, rather than common, national interests. This change in discourse was especially 
noticeable after the union separated from TÜRK-İŞ.854 Upon adopting a Marxist lexicon, the 
union’s official ideology would no longer hinge upon the idea that the collaborative work of 
workers and employers would increase the national wealth so that both sides could fairly 
benefit, since the exploitation of worker’s by bosses was a “reality” that derived from the 
private ownership of the means of production, rather than the “profit greedy acts of some 
bosses.” It seems that while the union representatives did not execute a Marxist discourse 
while organizing on the shop floor level; the radicalization of the union’s discourse strained 
already tense relations between bosses/managers and this union, a group which had long been 
a persona-non-grata entity in the workplaces. We can conclude here that the transformation 
in the Maden-İş’s political discourse and strategy was one of the main causes of the radical 
shop floor struggles that took place between 1968 and 1970.  
                                                             
854 TÜRK-İş had been founded in 1952 as the confederacy of the trade unions in Turkey. Although it 
had close relations with the Democrat Party in the early 1950s, this is replaced by the tensious relations 
while the DP did not recognize some rights that had been long asked by the trade unions. The general 
chair of TÜRK-İŞ, Nuri Beşer, resigned from its post after the military coup in 27 May and new chair, 
Seyfi Demirsoy, and execuitve committee hailed the intervention; furthermore, the union sent six 
representatives to the Constitutent Assembly. Afterwards, TÜRK-İŞ involved in close relations with 
the post-coup d’etat governments and often met with the governments’ representatives including the 
Labor Minister, Bülent Ecevit. Until the break up, Maden-İş was a member of this confederacy. 
 
 
289 
Specifically after the foundation of DİSK855 in 1967, Maden-İş adopted an obvious 
Marxist and socialist political language. The union’s publications, its officers and conferences 
began to analyze Turkey and its economic, social, political and cultural structure from the 
perspective of class struggle, which basically assumes that class conflicts are embedded in 
capitalism itself and, therefore, they cannot be balanced in a capitalist mode of production. 
Based on this theory, and by defining itself as a revolutionary union, Maden-İş declared its 
goal to contribute in founding a socialist country, albeit through democratic means, namely 
elections. However, rather than staging industrial struggles to reach their goal of a socialist 
state, Maden-İş’s main strategy was to recruit new members as much as possible by first 
getting back the authorization rights which it had lost in during the 1964 Strikes. Afterwards, 
the union would educate those members through the perspective of Marxist class 
consciousness and persuade them to vote for the socialist party in the elections. But while 
shaping such a strategy, Maden-İş did not totally abandon the pursuit of peaceful relations 
between workers and bosses in the plants where the bosses/managers were eager to recognize 
Maden-İş.  
The metal bosses, who had already displayed their disdain over the existence of the 
union in the workplaces in 1964, were not eager to recognize the new, radicalized Maden-İş 
inside their enterprises; consequently, most bosses/managers frowned upon the workers’ 
demands of being represented by Maden-İş on the shop floor. Although their union, MESS, 
was one of the largest and most influential employers’ unions in the country, it did not have a 
significant role to play in coming events; and it should be underlined that nearly all the plants 
                                                             
855  DİSK (Devrimci İşçi Sendikaları Konfederasyonu-The Progressive Workers’ Trade Union 
Confederacy of Turkey) was founded in 1967 by the five unions, Maden-İş, Lastik-İş (Türkiye Petrol, 
Kimya ve Lastik Sanayii İşçileri Sendikası - The Oil, Chemical and Rubber Industry Workers’ Union 
of Turkey), Basın-İş (Türkiye Basın, Yayın, Matbaa Çalışanları Sendikası - The Press, Publishing and 
Printing House Workers’ Union of Turkey), Gıda-İş (Türkiye Gıda Sanayii İşçileri Sendikası - The 
Food Industry Workers’ Union of Turkey), Türk Maden-İş-Zonguldak (Türkiye Maden-İşçileri 
Sendikası – The Mine Workers’ Union of Turkey, Zonguldak). The first three of those unions had been 
the member of TÜRK-İŞ, but they broke up with this confederacy under the allegations that this 
confederacy turned into a agent of the United States and Turkish bosses. Then, they founded DİSK 
alongside with Gıda-İş and Türk Maden-İş in 1967. From the beginning of its foundation, DİSK 
publicly expressed its political aim as founding a socialist country; DİSK, thus, followed a clear 
Marxist strategy and heavily influenced the Turkish politics until it’s activities were suspended by a 
military coup d’etat in September 12, 1980. 
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where the bitter struggles took place were the members of MESS. Generally speaking, it 
would not be wrong to consider the bosses’ intolerance of Maden-İş as the unspoken policy of 
MESS. 
For the metal workers, some of whom some having experienced the fights in 1964, 
and for some newer workers as well, the metal bosses/managers were not willing to recognize 
their rights on shop floor and they paid no attention to the working and living conditions of 
their employees. We can see that the metal workers also struggled to remove these injustices. 
Between 1968 and 1970, Maden-İş’s members and the majority of the metal workers 
who wanted to make Maden-İş the authorized union on shop floor clashed with their fellow 
workers. The two workers’ unions in the metal sector mainly fought for authorization rights, 
and each put forth that they were the “true union of workers” which could better obtain 
workers’ rights. In this fight, Çelik-İş used an anti-communist language that was the exact the 
opposite of Maden-İş’s statements. In fact, Çelik-İş had always displayed a nationalist and an 
anti-communist stance; but it was the shift of Maden-İş’s line that eventually added up to the 
radicalization of Çelik-İş’ language. However, the majority of the metal workers leaned 
towards leftist Maden-İş and selected their own representatives with their free choice on the 
shop floor. As a result, Maden-İş, which had been defeated in many big metal plants in 1964, 
finally prevailed over Çelik-İş at the end of the decade. 
To conclude the point, the radicalization of the political discourse of the bosses and 
the workers’ unions had undeniably influenced industrial struggles at the end of the decade. 
Although the metal workers did not vote for the socialist party, and nor were they recruited 
among the ranks of the socialist movements as Maden-İş had hoped, they did begin to feel 
themselves part of a class by internalizing or consolidating certain thoughts, notions and 
language such as exploitation, class differences, wealthy vs. poor classes, the ideas of social 
justice, corrupt order, and imperialism. In this regard, this chapter will focus on the 
transformation of Maden-İş’s discourse, its new political language and the opposing position 
of the bosses and Çelik-İş.  
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I. Maden-İş Shifts Towards the Left 
The official discourse of Maden-İş in terms of the social order, economic policies, 
industrial relations and workers’ place in modern society have made sometimes moderate, 
sometimes radical reformations on the unfair economic and social order caused by the 
“greedy acts” of Turkish employers. The union asked for state intervention to eradicate these 
injustices. In terms of the employers, the union’s strategy had always oscillated between the 
emphasis on a struggle against those who did not accept workers’ rights, and mutual 
cooperation with those who have had “good intentions” and “benevolent behaviours” towards 
their workers, ever since the foundation of the union in 1947. This strategy was also followed 
when the post May 27th governments promised to provide social justice and to tear down 
inequalities in Turkey. Maden-İş’s politics, inspired by the rise of the left, shifted towards the 
explicit criticism of “the corrupt order” in which capital prevailed over labor and “wealthier 
classes, as the happy minority” capitalized on the resources of Turkey for their own interests. 
But the union’s policy, which had often stressed the importance of state or laws as neutral 
mechanisms to protect the interests of weaker social groups, did not deviate from the 
framework of the post-war industrial democracy; that is to say, workers and employers, as the 
main groups of society, had the shared interest of improving the national economy and 
wealth. Both sides would benefit from economic and social development by respecting each 
other’s rights within the framework of social justice, the limits of which would be defined by 
the state. Nonetheless, Maden-İş’s official policy went through a significant change after the 
mid-1960s, due to the rising influence of TİP and leftist ideology on the high ranks of the 
union and its split from TÜRK-İş, and further, through to the establishment of DİSK in 1967. 
The stern and uncompromising attitudes of the metal bosses towards Maden-İş and 
their strategy to get rid of the union on the shop floor during the 1964 strikes hardly changed 
the union’s official language. Although Maden-İş’s publications continued to accuse some 
employers” of “stalling” on workers’ rights” and “exploiting them for their own pockets;” the 
union officers stood for peace on shop floor and good relations between employers and 
employees for the sake of the “development of the national wealth”, which would be made 
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possible by the resulting increase in productivity.856 A union report which reflected on the 
defeat of the 1964 Strikes emphasized that Maden-İş had always tried to secure workplace 
peace as an official union policy.857 Furthermore, in his message for the New Year, 1965, 
Kemal Türkler stated that the union would try to foster good relations with the bona fide, or 
“good faith” employers who were “generous” to the workers’ demands. 858  Likewise, the 
district chairs mentioned the union’s attempts in terms of their support of industrial 
democracy and mutual respect between workers and employers.859 Even when the union’s 
official discourse began to shift towards the left, Maden-İş claimed to be respectful to the 
employers who provided a “fair share” to the workers.860 Accordingly, the union officers 
sometimes met with the employers to pursue peaceful relations in workplaces.861 In essence, 
Maden-İş’s political line still stood for a regulated type of capitalism in which the workers 
and employers, as “respected and productive social groups,” would cooperate to improve the 
national economy after defeat in the 1964 Strikes. 
However, several leftist authors who were either close to the political line of TİP, or 
the party intellectuals themselves, began to participate in the affairs of Maden-İş by 1964. 
This was a moderate deviation from the union’s old political language. Leftist writers 
regularly wrote in the union journal or organized workshops to educate union’s 
representatives and workers. In those seminars, they spoke through a mixture of Third-
Worldist and Marxist terminology. Educators emphasized the unequal distribution of wealth 
in Turkey, claiming the problem stemmed from the “dominant economic model.” In order to 
                                                             
856 Gerçek İşçi Sendikası [The True Workers’ Union], (İstanbul: Maden-İş Yayınları, no. 2, 1965), 13-
17; İşçiler Sendikalı Olmalı [Workers Should Be Unionized], (İstanbul: Türkiye Maden-İş Sendikası 
Yayınları, no. 4, 1965), 15; Kemal Türkler, “İşçi Gözü İle, İşçi-İşveren Münasebetleri ve Prodüktivite 
[The Employer-Employee Relations and Productivity from the Gaze of Worker],” Ekonomik Gelişmede 
İnsan Gücü Semineri [The Seminar on Human Power in Economic Development], 7 February 1966-12 
February 1966, İstanbul; TÜSTAV, Kemal Sülker Archive, Envelope 157. 
857 Maden-İş MESS Uyuşmazlığı Hakkında Rapor [The Report on the Dispute Between Maden-İş and 
MESS], TÜSTAV, Maden-İş Archive, Box 39, Envelope 307. 
858 Kemal Türkler, “Yeni Yılın Bütün İşçilere Mutlu Olmasını Dileriz [We Wish Happiness For All 
Workers in the New Year],” Maden-İş, year 3, no. 72 (31 December 1964): 4. 
859 “Topkapı Kongresinde Ergün Erdem Yine Genel Başkan Seçildi [Ergün Erdem Was Selected Again 
As the Chair in the Topkapı Congress],” Maden-İş, year 9, no. 8 (27 July 1965): 6. 
860 “Singer’de Çalışanlar Uyarıldılar [The Singer Employees Were Warned],” Maden-İş, year 10, no. 
24 (7 November 1966): 2. 
861 “Şakir Zümre İşçileri Adına Sendikanın Teşebbüsü [The Union Initiative in the Name of Şakir 
Zümre Workers],” Ma-Ha Ajansı, 1 July 1966, TÜSTAV, Maden-İş Archive, Box 39, Envelope 308. 
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overcome inequalities, the lecturers favoured applying a statist economic policy that would 
side with the interests of laborers.862 Kenan Somer, who was a member of TİP, a professor of 
political science in the Ankara University, and who had translated several Marxist-Leninist 
classics such as The Holy Family (Marx), Anti-Dühring (Engels), and The State and 
Revolution (Lenin) during the decade, talked about the science of the working class without 
labeling it as Marxism in his union lectures. He was clear to address capitalism as a system, 
which revolved around individual ownership of the means of production.863 Simultaneously, 
some union brochures encouraged increased class consciousness in a Marxist sense for 
workers.864 Articles appeared in the union’s journal about the necessity of a change in the 
economic order and of workers’ participation in the administration of the country as a class.865 
This moderate shift was not that influential among the union’s officers and representatives, 
but it clearly had its effect on the language of the union journal with the assignment of Kemal 
Sülker866 as the editor-in-chief, in 1965. 
At the beginning of that year, Kemal Sülker began to write the front-page editorial for 
the journal, articles which generally included a leftist lexicon. In his writings, Sülker 
mentioned how workers were the sole creators of wealth, how they suffered and were 
exploited under the capitalist system, but not simply under the “greedy acts of some bosses.” 
The key to overcoming their problems, Sülker argued, was that workers had to be infused 
with a class consciousness, one which made the assumption that the interests of the workers 
and employers were not actually the same. In addition to defining political power as a 
                                                             
862 Uğur Cankoçak, Maden İş Eğitim Araştırma Bürosu Hafta Sonu İşçi Eğitim Notları: Türkiye’nin 
Kalkınmasında İşçilerin Rolü [The Weekend Workers’ Conference Notes of the Maden-İş Education 
and Research Bureau: The Role of Workers in the Development of Turkey], TÜSTAV, Maden-İş 
Archive, Box 39, Envelope 307. 
863 Kenan Somer, Maden İş Eğitim Araştırma Bürosu Hafta Sonu İşçi Eğitim Notları: Sendikalar ve 
İstihdam Problemi [The Weekend Workers’ Conference Notes of the Maden-İş Education and Research 
Bureau: Unions and the Employment Problem], TÜSTAV, Maden-İş Archive, Box 39, Envelope 307. 
864 İşçiler Sendikalı Olmalı, 11. 
865 “Sendikacılık ve Gerçek [The Unionism and Truth],” Maden-İş, year 3, no. 73 (15 January 1965): 2. 
866 Kemal Sülker has long worked as a journalist who reported about workers’ and trade union’s news 
in various newspapers such as Gece Postası, İkdam, Son Telgraf. During the 1960s, he published 
Türkiye Birlik with Kemal Ilıcak and he joined in TİP. He became the general secretary of this party 
and a member of the general executive committee. He actively participated in the foundation of DİSK 
and was assigned as the general secretary of the confederacy. After 1975, he withdrew from this post 
and involved in writing the history of trade unionism in Turkey. 
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capitalist power, Sülker assumed a non-capitalist path for the Turkish economy to develop.867 
Although neither Sülker’s writings, nor the other articles, speeches and declarations of the 
union officers talked about the abolishment of private property, or even about the foundation 
of socialism, in a clear sense, Sülker’s articles contained a certain difference from the old 
official political language of the union. At this point, a Third-Worldist ideology, according to 
which Turkey was an underdeveloped country and society due to the sovereignty of the 
“conservative-exploitative powers and circles,” began to be influential in the union’s journal. 
It seems, though, that the journal was not so effective among the higher officers of the union 
in terms of their definitions of class character for the existing order. For example, Kemal 
Türkler, in the Fifteenth General Congress of Maden-İş, still mentioned capitalizing on the 
Constitution to found a social justice order, which all the classes would equally benefit 
from.868 
However, the activity report of the same congress also called for unionists to realize 
that the classes and class differences were a “reality” in modern society. The report also 
addressed capitalist circles as “the happy minority” who exploited the natural resources of the 
country for their own pockets, in collaboration with the foreign capital. This exploitation was 
the main reason for inequalities in the country. The report presented the idea of “true 
salvation” as the pursuit of a non-capitalist development methodology.869 Likewise, Türkler, 
in the same speech, also proposed a non-capitalist path for the economic development of 
                                                             
867 Kemal Sülker, “Türkiye’nin İki Önemli Konusu [The Two İmportant Issues in Turkey],” Maden-İş, 
year 9, no. 1 (21 February 1965): 1; Kemal Sülker, “Sendikacılık ve Toplumculuk [The Unionism and 
Socialism],” Maden-İş, year 9, no. 2 (15 March 1965): 1; Kemal Sülker, “İşsizlik Artıyor, Milli Gelir 
Düşüyor, İşçiler de Birbirine Düşürülüyor [The Unemployment is Rising, The National Income is 
Declining, the Workers Are Being Set Against Each Other]”, Maden-İş, year 9, no. 3 (4 May 1965): 1 
and 7; Kemal Sülker, “Bir Yılı Değil Bir Zihniyeti Yendik 1965’te [We Did not Overcome a Year But 
a Mentality in 1965],” Maden-İş, year 10, no. 15 (30 December 1965): 1; Kemal Sülker, “Biz 
Kişilerden Yana Değil, Fikirlerden, İlkelerden Yanayız [We Do not Side With People But Opinions 
and Principles],” Maden-İş, year 10, no. 17 (1 April 1966): 1 and 6.  
868 “Türkler’in Kongreyi Açış Konuşması [The Opening Speech of Kemal Türkler],” Maden-İş, year 9, 
no. 8 (27 July 1965): 3. 
869 “İşçi Sendikalarının Genel Durumuna Dair [On the General Conditions of the Workers’ Unions],” 
Maden-İş, year 1, no. 11 (26 September 1965): 5 and 8; “Hakim Sınıflar ve İktidarlar [The Dominant 
Classes and the Political Powers],” Maden-İş, year 1, no. 12 (20 October 1965): 3; “Türkiye’nin 
Ekonomik Durumuna Genel Bakış [A General Outlook to the Economic Condition in Turkey],” 
Maden-İş, year 1, no. 14 (20 December 1965): 6.  
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Turkey.870 Other authors published articles in this journal that supported the severing of all 
relations with imperialism and full economic independence.871 In conclusion, it is apparent 
that the union’s political language began to transform to a leftist one by the beginning of 
1965. 
We do not have sufficient evidence to debate how the rank-and-file reacted to these 
publications, conference speeches, or seminars. We also have little evidences to show that the 
Maden-İş representatives were probably influenced more by anti-communist propaganda. For 
example, one Maden-İş representative claimed that foreign and harmful ideologies functioned 
to destroy the country by disrupting the brotherhood of workers and employers. He supported 
the idea of obstructing the infiltration of such ideologies among workers.872 Moreover, Kemal 
Türkler often distanced himself and Maden-İş from communism upon the increasing assaults 
of employers or government officials. In fact, Türkler explained that Maden-İş was against 
communism as a platform, which was an ideology assumed by many to seek power through 
revolutionary methods. It was a regime of coercion.873 But, after the foundation of DİSK in 
1967, neither he nor other union officers ever resorted to such an anti-communist discourse. 
The question here is; to what extent did the election success of the TİP in 1965,874 and 
the TİP itself, influence the shift of Maden-İş’s official political position? Zafer Aydın, who 
has recently published several books on the working class movements during the 1960s, 
asserts that the rise of an anti-imperialist movement led by the party and the YÖN movement 
in the mid-1960s influenced those unions, which would later establish DİSK.875 Similarly, 
another working class historian, Yıldırım Koç, argues that the election success of TİP ignited 
                                                             
870 “Türkiye Ortak Pazardan Çıkmalıdır [Turkey Must Get Out Of the Common Market],” Maden-İş, 
year 10, no. 15 (30 December 1965): 3. 
871 İsmet Ercan, “Anayasa’ya Sahip Çıkmak [Looking After the Constitution],” Maden-İş, year 10, no. 
20 (25 June 1966): 8; İsmet Ercan, “Kurtuluş Yolu Anayasada [The Way of Salvation is the 
Constitution],” Maden-İş, year 10, no. 21 (10 August 1966): 8.  
872  Halil Ceylan, “Bir Sendika Temsilcisi Konuşuyor [One Union’s Representative Is Talking],” 
Maden-İş, year 9, no. 2 (15 March 1965): 7-8. 
873 Kemal Türkler, “İftiralara Son Cevap [The Last Reply to the Slanderings],” Maden-İş, year 10, no. 
19 (22 May 1966): 2. 
874 In the 1965 general elections, while AP took 52% percent of all votes, and CHP took %28 of all 
votes, this ratio for TİP was %3. Despite its low percentage, TİP gained to be represented by 15 
members in the National Assembly thanks to the election system used in the 1965 elections. 
875 Aziz Çelik, Vesayetten Siyasete Türkiye’de Sendikacılık [The Unionism from Paternalism to Politics 
in Turkey] (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2010), 323. 
 
 
296 
the hope of the left-wing unionists within TÜRK-İş.876 It was true that the unionists from TİP 
founded DİSK without taking any direct orders from the party; however, their approaches to 
Turkey were nearly the same.877 In fact, the influence of the TİP on Maden-İş reached its peak 
after its separation from TÜRK-İş in 1967. While the TİP members prepared reports for the 
Maden-İş Congresses or organized education seminars,878 there was always a gap between the 
union and the party; in fact, the union chair, Kemal Türkler, did not mix with union affairs 
and party affairs.879 But, there is no doubt that the Maden-İş’s political line, which would 
become more radical after the foundation of DİSK, resembled that of TİP to a great extent 
after 1965. 
The major turning point for the radicalization of Maden-İş’s policy was the break 
from TÜRK-İŞ and the foundation of DİSK in 1967. But why did Maden-İş, which alongside 
some other unions had founded TİP in 1961, decide to break its ties with TÜRK-İŞ? The 
union’s officers’ answer to this question was rather ambiguous, since the union had declared 
TÜRK-İŞ as the “true” confederacy of Turkish unions only six months before the split. The 
union’s abandonment of the confederacy was blamed generally on the involvement of TÜRK-
İş with America’s unions, which acted as the agents of the imperialist state. Maden-İş 
publications gave abundant examples of AID’s cooperation 880  with TÜRK-İŞ. They also 
published news that argued that AFL-CIO,881 which was funded by CIA to pursue imperialist 
                                                             
876 Yıldırım Koç, Türkiye İşçi Sınıfı Tarihi [The History of Working Class in Turkey], (Ankara: Epos, 
2010), 214-215. 
877 Sadun Aren, TİP Olayı [The TLP Case] (İstanbul: Cem, 1993), 111. 
878 For example, look at: Türkiye Hakkında Rapor [The Report on Turkey], (İstanbul: Türkiye Maden-
İş Sendikası Yayınları, no. 10, 1969). 
879 Sadun Aren, 37 and 112; Aziz Çelik, Vesayetten Siyasete Türkiye’de Sendikacılık, 540. 
880 In the context of the emerging Cold War and Marshall Plan that the United States undertook to 
rebuild the war-torn Europe and save it from Communism, President Truman’s government initiated a 
program to provide technical and financial aid for enabling underdeveloped countries to tackle their 
social problems effectively. After several steps, the Congress approved the foundation of the Agency 
for the International Development (AID) in 1961, which would supply aid to foreign countries. In this 
context, AID provided considerable amount of funding to Turkish institutions, including trade unions.  
881 AFL-CIO was founded in 1955 as a result of the merging of the two biggest trade unions in the 
United States. The American Federation of Labor (AFL) was founded in 1886 through the initiative of 
several craft union and by doing so it became the oldest federation of the American unions. In order to 
pursue a more industrially-based union policy, several unions left the AFL in 1935 and founded the 
Congress of Industrial Organization at the same year. The CIO attempted to organize in mass industrial 
entreprises, such as steel or auto production plants, and it organized several radical and violent strikes 
until 1945. Although Taft-Hartley Act of 1947 made the obligatory that the union leaders would swear 
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propaganda among the unions world-wide, provided TÜRK-İŞ with funding.882 Maden-İş’s 
official explanations also asserted that TÜRK-İŞ had given up on the interests of the laboring 
classes and did not strive to defend their rights anymore. In other words, TÜRK-İŞ, in their 
opinion, was no longer a workers’ organization; Maden-İş even addressed TÜRK-İş “traitor” 
of the working class.883  
The other important reason presented by Maden-İş was that TÜRK-İŞ did not support 
the important strikes such as Mannesman, Bozkurt Textile, Ataş Refinery884 and the famous 
Paşabahçe strike.885 In fact, the Maden-İş’s reports presented the developments during the 
                                                                                                                                                                              
that they were not Communists, many CIO leaders refused to take that action. However, the radical and 
communist leaders were purged from the union by the beginning of 1948. The CIO merged with the 
AFL in 1955 and the resulting AFL-CIO took a more anti-communist line in the climate of the Cold 
War era. 
882 “Amerikan Casusluk Teşkilatı İşçi Sendikalarına Geniş Para Yardımları Yapmış [The American 
Intelligent Agency Provided Large Amount of Money to the Workers’ Unions’],” Ma-Ha Ajansı, 4 
March 1967, Tarih Vakfı Orhan Tuna Archive. Also look at: Türkiye Maden-İş Sendikası XVIII. Genel 
Kurul Çalışma Raporu, 1966-1967, vol. 1 [The Work Report of XVIII. General Congress of Maden-İş], 
(22, 23, 24, 25, October 1967), 21: Türk-İş Çıkmazı [The Dead End in Türk-İş], (İstanbul: DİSK: 
Türkiye Devrimci İşçi Sendikaları Konfederasyonu Yayınları, no. 1, 1967), 9. 
883 TÜRK-İŞ (Türkiye İşçi Sendikaları Konfederasyonu) Üyeliğinden Ayrılma Hakkında Rapor [The 
Report on the Seperation from TÜRK-İŞ], October 1967, TÜSTAV, Maden-İş Archive, Box 12, 
Envelope 8; Türkiye Maden-İş Sendikası XVIII. Genel Kurul Çalışma Raporu, vol.1, 21; Türk-İş 
Çıkmazı, 3. 
884 The workers who were members of Maden-İş in the Mannesman Pipe Mill, which was located in 
İzmit, a city next to İstanbul, carried out a strike in November 25, 1965 after a disagreement over the 
collective bargainings. The strike has come to an end in January 15, 1966 when both sides reached an 
agreement. In Bozkurt Textile Factory, which was located in Zeytinburnu, İstanbul, the workers 
walked out in November 13, 1963 due to disagreements during the collective bargainings. After a 
protocol was signed in November 15, 1963, the strikers returned back to work. Nearly two hundred 
workers in Ataş Oil Refinery in the city of Mersin which was located in the southern Turkey, staged a 
strike on December 21, 1963 since the workers and employers could not agree on the terms of the 
collective agreement. In these enterprises there were 31 workers who were the citizens of the United 
States and the 23 workers of them voted for the strike. However, the Council of Ministers postponed 
the strike on its tenth day as arguing that “it was harmful to the national security.” 
885 There were two unions in the Paşabahçe Factory which had been established in Beykoz, İstanbul in 
1936 to produce primary glass products. Cam-İş had been founded in 1947 by skilled workers who 
were close to the Democrat Party under the name of Paşabahçe Şişe ve Cam Sanayi İşçileri Sendikası 
[Paşabahçe Bottle and Glass Industry Workers’ Union]. The union would change its name to Türkiye 
Cam Sanayi İşçileri Sendikası [The Glass Industry Workers’ Union of Turkey]. This union was a 
member of TÜRK-İŞ. After the 1963 Trade Union Law, a second union, Kristal-İş (Seramik Şişe ve 
Cam Sanayi İşçileri Sendikası Ceramic, Bottle and Glass Industry Worker’s Union) was established 
and became influential among the Paşabahçe workers who were fond of the collective agreements 
signed between Cam-İş and the Paşabahçe employers in 1963. In May 1965, the Kristal-İş 
representatives asked the employers to create a new agreement, claiming that Kristal-İş was the 
authorized union in the factory. Since the employers refused to sign a new agreement, 2 200 workers 
stopped working and declared a strike on January 31, 1966. Towards the end of the second month of 
the strike, TÜRK-İŞ made a public declaration asking for an immediate end to the walkout. 
Afterwards, six members of TÜRK-İŞ, including Maden-İş, founded a committee to support the strike 
on April 6, 1966 and several other unions who were also the members of TÜRK-İŞ declared support of 
the strike. On April 19, the Council of Ministers postponed the strike for one month,claiming that “it 
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Paşabahçe Strike as the most obvious example that TÜRK-İŞ was no longer an organization 
of the working class. According to their narrative, when Kristal-İş had called the Paşabahçe 
workers out on strike in 1966, TÜRK-İŞ had initially supported it. In the meantime, however, 
it had signed a protocol with the employers’ confederation and asked Kristal-İş to stop the 
walkout. When the Kristal-İş officers refused TÜRK-İŞ’ request, the five unions, including 
Maden-İş, established a committee to support the strike. Then, TÜRK-İş administration 
expelled those unions from the confederacy.886 According to the union’s version of the events, 
the militant unions perceived TÜRK-İş’s move as the last straw and decided to establish a 
different confederation. 
However, the reasons given by Maden-İş for the breakup of the unions were truly 
confusing. For example, a working class historian, Aziz Çelik, asserts that the real reason was 
the increasing influence of the AP887 on the confederacy. The right-wing AP, as the successor 
of the DP, had been victorious in the 1965 elections and had adopted a staunch anti-
communist line opposing the increasing influence of the left, both in political and social life. 
The AP pursued a policy to inhibit the rise of the TİP’s influence in every sphere of life, 
including inside the unions, which were known to keep close ties to this party. In this regard, 
AP was successful in augmenting its influence in TÜRK-İş during the general congress of 
1966. Consequently, the left-wing unions realized that their breathing space was shrinking 
within TÜRK-İŞ. According to Çelik, the AP’s move was more of an explanation than the 
reasons presented by DİSK or Maden-İş about the split. First of all, the unions, which would 
establish DİSK, had previously taken huge amounts of money from the AID. Furthermore, 
                                                                                                                                                                              
was harmful to the public health”; however, with the exception 11 workers, no other workers returned 
back to the work. On May 18, both sides, Kristal-İş and the employers deferred to the advice of the 
High Arbitration Council and the strike has come to an end. After the strike, several unions, including 
Maden-İş and Lastik-İş, who would later establish DİSK, were temporarily dismissed from TÜRK-İş. 
For the details of the strike, see: Çelik, Aziz and Aydın, Zafer. Paşabahçe: Gelenek Yaratan Grev, 
İstanbul: TÜSTAV, 2006. 
886  Türkiye Maden-İş Sendikası 1. Bölge Temsilciliği: Maden-İş Sendikası’nın Değerli Üyeleri, 
Kıymetli İşçiler [The First District Representative of Maden-İş: The Dear Member of Maden-İş and the 
Precious Workers], 1.3.1967, no. 967/7, TÜSTAV, Maden-İş Archive, Box 39, Envelope 308; Türk-İş 
Çıkmazı, 23-31. 
887 The Justice Party was founded in February 11, 1961 with some ex-members of the DP as the 
successor of this party. From the beginning of its foundation, it became the most important and 
influential party of the right wing in Turkey. It took the power after winning the 1965 elections. 
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even after the Zonguldak events, Maden-İş did not show any signs of wanting separation from 
the confederacy. Çelik seems right when he talks about the Paşabahçe Strike and its aftermath 
– how it can be viewed as the tipping point after a long series of events, rather than a decisive 
cause.888 Likewise, Yıldırım Koç states that the anti-communist climate, which augmented its 
influence within TÜRK-İŞ after the election of 15 TİP representatives in the National 
Assembly, resulted in the exclusion of the TLP unionists from the TÜRK-İŞ management in 
the 1966 General Congress.889 As a result, the separation from TÜRK-İş can be attributed to 
the cumulative effects of all the above mentioned developments. It seems that there was not a 
single cause that led Maden-İş and other unions to break away from TÜRK-İş. Rather, TİP’s 
election success, AP’s growing influence within the confederacy and TÜRK-İŞ’s move 
towards the right all accounted for the separation of those unions from this organization. 
Maden-İş and other unions founded DİSK in February 1967. Maden-İş hailed the 
foundation of DİSK as an important historical moment for the rise of the revolutionary 
working class: 
“(...) DİSK emerged out of a revolutionary hope and became the 
representative of the working class among the unions with a solid foundation 
to revive the unionism which was dormant, shattered and defeated.”890 
 
Maden-İş declared DİSK an organization that would fight against domestic and 
international exploiters, seek replacing the order of exploitation with the order of social 
justice, improve the national economy and make fair sharing of the national wealth 
possible.891  After the foundation of DİSK, Maden-İş’s language transformed to a radical 
Marxist line. 
                                                             
888  Aziz Çelik, Vesayetten Siyasete Türkiye’de Sendikacılık, 514-528. Also look at: “Türk-İş’ten 
Gazilik Beratı Aldık [We Got The Veteran Certificate From Türk-İş],” Maden-İş, year 10, no. 26 (27 
December 1966): 1; Aziz Çelik and Zafer Aydın, Paşabahçe 1966: Gelenek Yaratan Grev [Paşabahçe 
1966: The Strike Created Tradition], (İstanbul: TÜSTAV, 2006), 143. 
889 Yıldırım Koç, Türkiye İşçi Sınıfı Tarihi, 214-215. 
890 Türkiye Maden-İş Sendikası XVIII. Genel Kurul Çalışma Raporu, vol.1, 20. 
891 DİSK (Türkiye Devrimci İşçi Sendikaları Konfederasyonu) Kuruluşu Hakkında Rapor [The Report 
on the Foundation of DİSK], October 1967, TÜSTAV, Maden-İş Archive, Box 12, Envelope 8. 
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The most important change in the official language of Maden-İş was the adoption of 
the word “class” in the Marxist sense: Maden-İş’s outlook on the political, social, cultural or 
economic developments began to take a shape based on the perspective that class differences 
and antagonisms were the inherent characteristics of any capitalist regime. In light of the 
deaths during the Zonguldak incidents of 1965; the union’s news agency declared that: 
“The Turkish working class will never forget their brothers who defended 
their bread with blood.”892 
 
Furthermore, the phrase “working class” was inserted into the union’s statute in 1967, 
a term never appearing in the statutes of 1947, 1961 and 1965. Unlike the previous statutes, 
the 1967 statute also defined a clear mission to the union to establish an independent country 
based on the principles of social justices - ideas bestowed upon the Turkish working class to 
imbue them with a revolutionary consciousness and abolish class exploitation. 893 
Furthermore, as the chair of the union, Kemal Türkler began to define the existence of classes 
and class differences as an “undeniable reality” in his public declarations.894 Similarly, a more 
explicit Marxist lexicon based on class analysis was adapted in the union’s reports. For 
example, they argued that class conflict, which was reflected in every sphere of society with 
strong economic, political and cultural affect, was inherent to the capitalist system.895 The 
Report on Turkey, published in 1969, stated: 
“(...) Since the basic antagonism between the laboring classes and the 
dominant capitalist classes stems from mode of production and distribution, 
the struggle does not come to an end [in the capitalist order, a.n.]. For, as 
                                                             
892 “Zonguldak Olaylarının Acı Yıldönümü [The Bitter Anniversary of the Zonguldak Incidents],” Ma-
Ha Ajansı, 10 April 1967, Tarih Vakfı Orhan Tuna Archive. 
893 See: İstanbul Demir ve Madeni Eşya İşçileri Sendikası Ana ve İç Tüzüğü, 1947, TÜSTAV, Kemal 
Sülker Archive, Box 5, Envelope 281; Maden-İş Ana Tüzüğü, 1961, TÜSTAV, Maden-İş Archive, Box 
16, Envelope 128; Türkiye Maden-İş Sendikası, Ana Tüzüğü [The Main Statute of Maden-İş Trade 
Union, Turkey], 1965, TÜSTAV Library; Maden-İş Ana Tüzük [The Main Statute], 1967, TÜSTAV, 
Maden-İş Archive, Box 39, Envelope 309. 
894 DİSK Genel Başkanı Kemal Türkler’in Demeci [The Declaration of Kemal Türkler as the Chair of 
DİSK], TÜSTAV, Kemal Sülker Archive, Box 28, Envelope 1475. 
895 Türkiye Maden-İş Sendikası XX. Genel Kurul Çalışma Raporu, 1969-1971, [The Work Report of 
XX. General Congress of Maden-İş], (10, 11, 12 September 1971), 49-63. 
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long as the exploitation goes on, capitalists make interventions through law in 
order to defend their own interests and keep [that, a.n.] order surviving. 
Consequently, they lead the laboring classes into new forms of actions. Yet, 
the conflict of interests between laboring and dominant classes cannot be 
overcome. Because it is impossible to abolish this basic antagonism under an 
order based on exploitation.”896 
 
According to the same report: 
“The interests of the Turkish working class are against those of the agha 
[landlord, a.n.]-‘comprador’ classes and usurers. That means, it is impossible 
to defend the exploitation rights of agha, boss, comprador, usurer and, at the 
same time, side with the laboring classes to protect their rights. Being rich on 
one side means the being poor on the other side. In this regard, a party which 
claims to protect the rights of both sides, and to not touch the exploitation 
right of aghas, bosses, and usurers, to argue for the existence of a unity or 
mutual interests between classes, is hiding the truth from the laboring classes, 
lulling them and deliberately lying.”897 
 
In other words, the union’s social, economic and cultural analysis grew out of “the 
class perspective”, and the union analyzed and presented the current political, social and 
economic developments from that class language and its unique views. The cartoons 
published in the union’s newspapers began to portray the bosses as the ones who enjoyed 
their lives by resting on the back of poor laborers, those who knelt down and crawled on the 
ground. 
                                                             
896 Türkiye Hakkında Rapor, 56. 
897 Ibid., 141. 
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Figure 17: Source: Maden-İş, 1 April 1969, 4. 
 
In addition to capitalism, Maden-İş’s political language censured imperialism, too. 
They blamed socio-economic problems and worker’s miseries on the collaboration of Turkish 
capitalism with imperialist forces, those who actually wanted Third World countries to 
remain underdeveloped in order to exploit their resources more efficiently. The union reports 
basically argued that the social order in Turkey had been corrupted by collaboration with 
imperialism. Imperialism had once been wiped out during the Liberation War, between 1920 
and 1923, but afterwards it seeped back into the country through economic channels.898 In this 
sense, the resources of Turkey were exploited by the imperialist forces, especially after the 
Second World War, through the willing collaboration of the various state organs. And not just 
the state, but the dominant classes also collaborated with these imperialist forces who aimed 
to exploit the natural and human resources of underdeveloped countries and enlarge their 
sphere of influence. Here, there was a common interest between the capitalist order and 
classes in Turkey and the imperialist system and forces.899 In parallel with those assumptions, 
Maden-İş declared its agenda would include fighting national capitalism and international 
imperialism simultaneously. 
                                                             
898 Türkiye Hakkında Rapor, 1 and 45. 
899 Türkiye Maden-İş Sendikası XVIII. Genel Kurul Çalışma Raporu, 1966-1967, vol.1, 24-26 and 51; 
Milli Gelir Dağılımında Eşitsizlik [The Inequalities in the Distribution of the National Income], 
(İstanbul: Türkiye Maden-İş Sendikası Yayınları, no. 6, 1967); Türkiye Hakkında Rapor, 50; “Montaj 
Sanayi İşçileri Emeğiniz Gavura Akıyor [The Workers in the Assembled Industry! Your Labor Is 
Going to the Foreigners],” Maden-İş, (1 May 1969): 4; “Genel Yönetim Kurulu Bildirisi [The 
Declaration of the General Executive Committee],” Maden-İş, (1 May 1969): 7; “Hokkabaz Sandığı 
[The Illusionist’s Chest],” Maden-İş, no. 17 (22 October 1969): 8. 
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In doing so, Maden-İş abandoned their idea of a more personal cause of the 
injustices; the most important problem in Turkey was no longer the “exploitative or greedy 
behaviours of the employers”, but the broader capitalist order of private property based on 
individual ownership of the means of production. That means the “corruption” of order in 
Turkey stemmed from its very social foundations.900 Accordingly, their long-enduring view of 
state mechanisms had transformed: the dominant classes now held the political power and 
made the laws according to their class interests to maintain the system.901 So the union put 
forth that the state’s economic policies were designed on behalf of the interests of wealthier 
classes, which were in conflict with those of the laboring classes; that is, the political power 
in Turkey functioned against the interest of the working class.902 The state, or the current 
political order, which contributed to the social injustices despite being assumed to operate 
otherwise, made the rich richer and poor poorer. Therefore, the dominant classes were 
extremely reluctant to see the transformation of such a system, since they had carte blanche 
to exploit the poor people under the current one.  In the report of the eighteenth general 
assembly of the union, it was stated that: 
“We can easily say that the dominant classes cannot apply the method to 
prevent insurgency in this society, in the east or different regions. They 
cannot make planned and regular social-economic development. They cannot 
build a solid administration and systematic justice system. The bourgeoisie 
has lost the opportunity of establishing an order based on social justice a long 
time ago.”903 
                                                             
900 Türkiye Maden-İş Sendikası XVIII. Genel Kurul Çalışma Raporu, vol. 1, 55 and 62. 
901 Türkiye Maden-İş Sendikası XIX. Genel Kurul Çalışma Raporu, 1967-1969, [The Work Report of 
XIX. General Congress of Maden-İş], (7, 8, 9,10 September 1969), 3. 
902 Ibid,158-164. 
903 Türkiye Maden-İş Sendikası XVIII. Genel Kurul Çalışma Raporu, vol.1, 47. Also look at: Türkiye 
Hakkında Rapor, 57-58; Türkiye Maden-İş Sendikası Altıncı Bölge Temsilciliği Faaliyet Raporu, 17 
August 1969 [The Deed Report of the Sixth District of Maden-İş], TÜSTAV, Kemal Sülker Archive, 
Box 15, Envelope 180. 
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Figure 18: The production and consumption (Source: Maden-İş, 22 July 1969, 2). 
 
This new language claimed that those classes who had the means of production and 
held the political power got the lion’s share from the national wealth. Yet, due to capitalist 
sovereignty, the working class in Turkey was bereft of many social and economic 
opportunities, despite being sole creator of all wealth.904 In fact, another cartoon in the union 
paper depicts a skinny worker operating a machine while a heavily sweating boss sits in front 
of a table on the other side eating the product of the machine with great pleasure. This 
dominant economic model, in which workers labored hard and bosses consume the products, 
and the sovereign state mechanism that functioned to serve the interests of the wealthy 
classes, was firmly entrenched in Turkey. Accordingly, workers must abolish this system to 
achieve their true interests since they were the true creators of the wealth, and even the true 
creators of factories, as another cartoon portrayed in the union’s newspaper. 
 
                                                             
904 Türkiye Maden-İş Sendikası XVIII. Genel Kurul Çalışma Raporu, vol.1, 147; Türkiye Maden-İş 
Sendikası XIX. Genel Kurul Çalışma Raporu, 231-234. 
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Figure 19: 1-Hey, Disperse the Factory, 3- Hey, boss, what happened to the factory. When the 
workers gone, it disappeared! (Source: Maden-İş, no. 19, 1 December 1969, 2).  
 
The union put forth its intention to be involved in a political struggle alongside other 
revolutionary forces in Turkey, as well as economic battles. The new union statute said that 
the solution of the working class dilemma would be possible only upon the foundation of a 
social order in which the state would be independent, and in which a statist economy would 
be dominant.905 Moreover, the congress’ reports openly called the new order socialism, which 
all the unionists had to embrace because social injustices and exploitation could only came to 
an end under this order.906 And the most efficient and permanent way of abolishing injustices 
and founding socialism was through the participation of the laboring classes in the relevant 
state mechanisms.907  Upon the arrival of the US’ Sixth Fleet to İstanbul in 1968, Kemal 
Türkler declared that: 
“The happiness of the Turkish working class and the other laboring classes 
will only be possible when our country gets rid of the exploitationists, 
                                                             
905 Maden-İş Ana Tüzük. 
906 Türkiye Maden-İş Sendikası XVIII. Genel Kurul Çalışma Raporu, vol.1, 56 and 62; Türkiye Maden-
İş Sendikası XIX. Genel Kurul Çalışma Raporu, 2 and 223-224. 
907 Türkiye Maden-İş Sendikası XVIII. Genel Kurul Çalışma Raporu, vol.1, 24; “Köylü İşgalleri [The 
Peasant Invasions],” Maden-İş (1 April 1969): 3; “Direnmeler [The Resistances],” Maden-İş, no. 15 
(10 September 1969): 2; “4. Bölge Temsilciliğinden Haberler [The New From the Fourth District 
Representative],” Maden-İş, no. 15 (10 September 1969): 3; Türkiye Maden-İş Sendikası XX. Genel 
Kurul Çalışma Raporu. 
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foreigners and their servants. This will be successful if our laboring people 
hold the political power.”908 
 
That means, in addition to being organized alongside revolutionary unions, the 
working class would lead the founding of a socialist country, and therefore had to be a 
political force by being organized politically, as well. 909  To such an end, the union 
publications and officers stated that the workers had to understand their place as a class and as 
free citizens society; the working class had to reach a “class consciousness”. 
But Maden-İş did not interpret the establishment of socialism in the classical Marxist-
Leninist terminology. To found a socialist country, the workers had to replace the current 
economic, social and political order in accordance with the principles of the 1961 
Constitution which would pave the way for the abolishment of the “corrupt order” and 
establishment of a just one: 
“(...) The [1961, a.n.] Constitution sides with the interests of the laboring 
popular classes and segments, rather than the interests of the dominant 
classes. And today’s corrupt order will be changed in accordance with the 
Constitution when the representatives of the laboring classes get the majority 
in the National Assembly.”910 
 
Maden-İş’s officers declared the 1961 Constitution to be supportive of the laboring 
classes.911 In its speeches, the officers promised to apply the 1961 Constitution to the fullest 
                                                             
908 “Kemal Türkler’in Demeci [The Declaration of Kemal Türkler],” Maden-İş, 15 March 1969, 5. 
909 Selahattin Ünlü, “Emekçiler Birleşiniz [The Laborers, Unite],” Maden-İş, (7 July 1969): 2; Türkiye 
Maden-İş Sendikası XIX. Genel Kurul Çalışma Raporu, 6-7; “Sosyalist Türkiye İşçi Sınıfının 
Öncülüğünde Kurulacaktır [The Socialist Turkey Will Be Founded By the Working Class],” Maden-İş, 
no. 15 (10 September 1969): 3; Kemal Sülker, “Türk İşçi Sınıfı ve Örgütlenme [The Turkish Working 
Class and the Organization],” Maden-İş, no. 20 (8 December 1969): 2; Kemal Sülker, “İşçi Sınıfının 
Politik Güç Olması [Workers’ Becoming the Political Force],” Maden-İş, no. 21 (January 1970): 2. 
910  Türkiye Maden-İş Sendikası XVIII. Genel Kurul Çalışma Raporu, vol.1, 24. Also look at: 
Anayasada İşçi Hakları [The Workers’ Rights in the Constitution], (n.p.: Maden-İş Yayınları, no.8, 
October 1967). 
911 Türkiye Maden-İş Sendikası Altıncı Bölge Temsilciliği Faaliyet Raporu. 
 
 
307 
extent.912 This strategic, rather than theoretical, discourse would provide Maden-İş with a 
medium through which the union would argue against the accusations of the metal bosses – 
accusations that said the workers and unions acted only to defend their Constitutional rights 
by engaging in collective actions between 1968 and 1970. Maden-İş’s official policy, in fact, 
reasoned that the radicalization of the workers’ movements in those years was due only to the 
lack of proper application of the Constitution. For the collective actions, the congress’ reports 
emphasized that the primary social group who truly engaged in unlawful actions were 
employers.913 Moreover, they called for the state forces, district attorneys, the police, the 
Labor Ministry and the government, all of whom the union depicted as the servants of the 
capitalist regime, to act on behalf of the workers.914 Ironically, this union policy also accused 
Çelik-İş and the employers of instigating the workers by becoming involved in these unlawful 
acts and by not respecting workers’ free choice of union.915 This irony undoubtedly stems 
from the fact that, despite all the revolutionary rhetoric, Maden-İş was still a legal entity - a 
position which the union capitalized on to reach its goals. Another point was that Maden-İş 
believed in recruiting new members as much as possible and educating them through the 
socialist ideology in order to establish socialism, rather than crippling the economic 
production through industrial disputes. 
 
Figure 20: 1- Capitalism and Boss, 2- The Strike Guardian, Capitalism and Strike (Source: Maden-İş, 
May 1970, 3). 
                                                             
912 Kemal Türkler, “İşçi Gözü İle, İşçi-İşveren Münasebetleri ve Prodüktivite.” 
913 For example, look at: Türkiye Maden-İş Sendikası XIX. Genel Kurul Çalışma Raporu, 146 and 154. 
914 Ibid., 5. 
915 Ibid., 138; Türkiye Maden-İş Sendikası XX. Genel Kurul Çalışma Raporu, 163. 
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In summary, Maden-İş’s official policy foresaw a clear political mission for the 
unions. The articles in the union journal plainly targeted the AP’s power because of concerns 
that they were trying to pass legislation to prop up the corrupt order. These laws would 
destroy the Constitutional rights of workers and free unionism.916 Another cartoon depicts the 
prime minister, Süleyman Demirel, locking up a worker, saying that the capital is under lock 
and key and the imprisoned worker replies: Me, too! In fact, the union journal defined the AP 
government as a political power that was an enemy to the working class.917 The journal 
interpreted the collective actions between 1968 and 1970 as the rise of the workers as a 
defined class. Those actions proved that the workers realized their class power and they 
would stand to fight against the current the social order. The journal presented those actions 
as the fight against exploitation by the capitalist classes, as well.918 But the revolution would 
only take place as a result of the unity of all laboring classes and revolutionary groups. 
 
Figure 21: The fat man is the Prime Minister, Süleyman Demirel says: Capital is under lock and key. 
The prisoner replies: Me, too (Source: Maden-İş, 7 July 1969, 2). 
 
Accordingly, the union reports emphasized establishing alliances with other 
revolutionary organizations within the country.919 Maden-İş began to be involved in relations 
with the revolutionary youth clubs, which were very active at the end of the decade.920 In 
1965, Maden-İş declared its participation in a campaign of nationalizing oil resources and it 
                                                             
916 “Emekçi Halka Hücum Tasarıları [The Drafts Against the Laboring People],” Maden-İş, (1 April 
1969): 1; Kemal Sülker, “Özgür Sendikacılığa Son Verilmek İsteniyor [The Free Unionism is Desired 
to be Ended],” Maden-İş, (1 April 1969): 2. 
917 Maden-İş, no. 28 (23 May 1970): 1; “Demirelin Yediği Naneler [The Shit That Demirel Did],” 
Maden-İş, no. 28 (23 May 1970): 2. 
918 “Demir Döküm İşçilerinin Eylemi Örnek Olmalıdır [The Action of Demir Döküm Workers Should 
Be An Example],” Maden-İş, no. 15 (10 September 1969): 1. 
919 Türkiye Maden-İş Sendikası XIX. Genel Kurul Çalışma Raporu, 195. 
920 Türkiye Maden-İş Sendikası XVIII. Genel Kurul Çalışma Raporu, vol.1, 148. 
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was supported by the youth organizations.921 In fact, several union members participated in a 
public demonstration organized by a university association to protest poverty in Turkey.922 In 
return, the youth organizations participated in several workers’ demonstrations.923 In another 
example, the workers and youth groups organized a joint protest meeting on the coming of the 
US Sixth Fleet to İstanbul on February 16, 1969.924 
Importantly, Maden-İş’s reports criticized the dominant perception of unionism; that 
unions solely functioned to provide their members with material gains. According to those 
reports, this was not how to bring “true salvation” for the workers; on the contrary, the 
workers’ salvation lay in reaching a common class consciousness. So, the unions had to work 
to give that political and class consciousness to the workers who would then become involved 
in political and the other important matters of the country. In this regard, the reports presented 
Maden-İş’s main goal of giving a class consciousness to workers, in terms of both an 
economic and political sense.925  
The union journal and its various reports exploded with articles and news about the 
importance of education for the working class. According to the union journal, education 
would be a very significant tool in fighting against the dominant classes.926 A poem published 
in the Maden-İş Journal read: 
“Learn!  
Begin from the simplest one! 
Learn the ABC’s .Yet, it is not enough 
                                                             
921 “TÜRK-İŞ ve Gençlik Emperyalizme Karşı Mücadeleye Başladı [TÜRK-İŞ and the Youth Began to 
Fight Against Imperialism],” Maden-İş, year 9, no. 5 (7 June 1965): 8. 
922 Türkiye Maden-İş Sendikası XVIII. Genel Kurul Çalışma Raporu, vol.1, 149. 
923 Türkiye Maden-İş Sendikası XIX. Genel Kurul Çalışma Raporu, 198-199. 
924 Türkiye Maden-İş Sendikası Genel Başkanlığı [The General Chair of Maden-İş], 31 October 1968, 
TÜSTAV, Maden-İş Archive, Box 6, Envelope 37; Türkiye Maden-İş Sendikası XIX. Genel Kurul 
Çalışma Raporu, 201. The students and workers who participated in the demonstration were attacked 
by a fascist group chanting “Communists, Go to Moscow” and saying “Allahuekber-God is the Great”. 
Two students were stabbed to death during the incidents. 
925 Türkiye Maden-İş Sendikası XVIII. Genel Kurul Çalışma Raporu, 1966-1967, vol. 2 [The Work 
Report of XVIII. General Congress of Maden-İş],(22, 23, 24, 25, October 1967), 202-217 and 225; 
Türkiye Maden-İş Sendikası XIX. Genel Kurul Çalışma Raporu, 5; Kemal Sülker, “Devrimci 
Sendikalara Düşen Görev [The Duty of the Revolutionary Unions],” Maden-İş, no. 17 (22 October 
1969): 2. 
926 “İşçi Eğitiminin Önemi [The Importance of the Workers’ Education],” Maden-İş, (1 May 1969): 3. 
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But, you learn at first. 
Do not let anybody break your courage 
Begin, now! 
You must learn everything 
Since you will rule tomorrow 
(...)”927 
 
A union report written in 1969 argued that since cultural capital was in the hands of 
the dominant classes, and the movies or theaters served the interests of the dominant 
ideology, the laboring classes and poor people either lacked any opportunity to get a proper 
education, or were deluded by a “false consciousness”. Therefore, the content of education, 
movies or theaters had to be revolutionary and the laboring classes had to be provided with 
open access to that media.928 The Education Bureau of Maden-İş explained the goal of the 
workers’ education was to increase awareness of class-based social, economic, cultural and 
political events.929 In order to create this awareness among the workers, the union organized 
seminars and conferences, and gave lessons about the nature of the capitalist system, classes, 
the social and economic structure in Turkey. They also touted the features of the 1961 
Constitution, socialism, class consciousness, the function of unions, and discussed the internal 
organization of Maden-İş. In 1969, the total number of workers who participated in those 
seminars was 1 875, and more than 3 500 metal workers participated in the conferences that 
same year.930 Although we do not have any evidence to show how the rank-and-file was 
influenced by such educational efforts, we can speculate about its success to a certain extent 
by reviewing the statements of the union’s members in the union journal. 
                                                             
927 “Öğren [Learn],” Maden-İş, (1 May 1969): 7. 
928 Türkiye Maden-İş Sendikası XIX. Genel Kurul Çalışma Raporu, 170-177. 
929 Eğitim Dairesi Komisyonu Raporu [The Report of the Education Bureau Commission], October 
1967, TÜSTAV, Maden-İş Archive, Box 39, Envelope 309. 
930 “Eğitim Seminerleri [The Education Seminars],” Maden-İş, (7 July 1969): 3. Also look at: Türkiye 
Maden-İş Sendikası XIX. Genel Kurul Çalışma Raporu, 178-180. 
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The transformation of Maden-İş’s official policies certainly radicalized its relations 
with the metal employers. Another important question to ask here is; to what extent did the 
Maden-İş’s rank-and-file incorporate the changing official policy of the union? And how did 
the employers respond to the radicalization of the union’s discourse? How did the dissident 
workers, those who were employed in the factories where Çelik-İş had the recognition right, 
react to this leftist discourse? Although it was true that Maden-İş did not follow a leftist 
political line among rank and file, and the majority of the metal workers did not vote for the 
TİP in the elections, the union discourse was echoed amongst the metal workers at the end of 
the decade. Such a language would become more explicit over time, especially among the 
workers who were actively involved in the collective struggles between 1968 and 1970. 
Analyzing this language will be the subject of the next chapter. But first, it’s time to turn to 
the metal bosses’ response to the changing language of Maden-İş. 
 
II. The 1960s: Hard Times for the Metal Bosses 
The radicalization of the unions’ political language during the foundation of DİSK 
created widespread anxiety among employers, men who were already worried about the 
growing influence of leftist ideas in the country. Vehbi Koç wrote a report on Turkey and sent 
it to the CHP’s administration in 1965. He lashed out the current climate in Turkey, saying: 
“The authors who publish leftist articles repeatedly attack the private sector 
(...) What sin is it if the private sector works, succeeds and makes some 
money under the existing laws and order? After the last strike in the 
Çanakkale Ceramic Factory, some leftist writers presented the income of the 
enterprise and wrote some articles saying ‘the enterprise earned this amount 
of money, the workers cannot get their deserved share’. The private sector 
surrendered to intimidation in the face of those attacks (...) The extreme 
 
 
312 
leftist currents significantly grew and demonstrated their influences 
everywhere in our country.”931 
 
Vehbi Koç’s pessimism and trouble about the existing political climate of the country 
was shared by most of the bosses during the 1960s. In fact, the post-May 27th period was 
truly a hard time for the entire capitalist class in Turkey. The growing influence of socialism, 
the widespread public debates on the idea of “social justice” and the “corrupt” social-
economic-political order, and the increasing organization of workers’ under trade unions, all 
whittled away at the credibility of employers as a class in the period. In fact, the Arçelik 
institutional history, published by the enterprise itself in 2001, depicted the period as troubled 
times for management and employers.932 In the same manner, Ege Cansen remembered this 
period as a “dark age” for Turkey.933 In our interview, Nuri Çelik claimed that the 1963 Labor 
Law, the improving unionism and the growing prestige of the left movement, intimidated the 
employers who had been very comfortable and had run their enterprises just as they had done 
in the past.934 According to Ayşe Buğra, a well known scholar who published a book about 
the history of state and entrepreneurs in Turkey, the reason why the entrepreneurs began to 
take an active role in social life was the increasing unionization of workers and the spread of 
socialist ideas.935 Three specific historical developments were especially terrifying for the 
metal employers; the election of 15 TİP candidates to the National Assembly in 1965, the 
foundation of DİSK in 1967, and the rise of the student movements in 1968. 
In his recollections, Can Kıraç, who worked as a high ranking staff in Vehbi Koç’s 
companies for several years, spoke of the 15 TİP members inducted into the National 
                                                             
931 Quoted from Mehmet Altun, Ortak Aklı Ararken [In Search for the Common Reason] (İstanbul: 
Doğan Kitap, 2008), 50. 
932 Mamulattan Markaya Arçelik Kurum Tarihi, 1955-2000 [From Product to Brand: The Institutional 
History of Arçelik], (n.p.: Arçelik Anonim Şirketi, 2001), 166. 
933 Ege Cansen, interview by author, Kızıltoprak, İstanbul, August 29, 2012. 
934 Nuri Çelik, interview by author, Mecidiyeköy, İstanbul, January 16, 2013. 
935 Ayşe Buğra, Devlet ve İşadamları [State and Businessman] (İstanbul: İletişim, 1997), 334. 
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Assembly, an event that rippled across business circles in Turkey in 1965.936 Vehbi Koç also 
admitted that such an election result worried the entrepreneurs, including himself. He even 
said that the TİP members who disseminated anti-private sector ideas had to be silenced.937 
Those anxieties reached their peak after the foundation of “the militant and extreme DİSK” – 
a common denominator used by the reports of the employer’s organizations938- on which 
Maden-İş had a great influence. The foundation of DİSK in 1967 further appalled the metal 
bosses when that union openly declared its socialist ideology. After the foundation of DİSK, 
MESS made a statement saying that although DİSK’s officers knew very well how the strikes 
bled the workers, they aimed to conduct more strikes in the industry due to their “extreme” 
political ideology. MESS’ declaration also asserted that, due to the DİSK’s attacks, Türk-İş 
would lean towards a more “extreme” position, itself, to keep its members who would be 
“deluded” by the DİSK’s “deceiving discourse.”939 The metal employer’s attitude towards 
DİSK would become even more radical in time. As a result of DİSK’s stance, they argued, 
labor unionism had taken on the structure of political unionism and diverged from its “true 
goals” over the preceding few years.940 In the General Assembly of MESS, organized in 1969, 
they used the words “sugar and honey” to define TÜRK-İş in comparison to DİSK.941 In the 
same meeting, the metal employers talked about every move of DİSK’s being an “illegal” 
one.942 Such a hostility towards DİSK was so embedded that Ege Cansen, in our interviews, 
still talks about DİSK as a political and militant union which “indoctrinated and brainwashed” 
workers against the employers between 1963 and 1980. According to him, all militancy 
                                                             
936 Can Kıraç, Anılarımla Patronum Vehbi Koç [My Boss, Vehbi Koç, in My Memories], (İstanbul: 
Milliyet, 1996), 157 and 190. 
937 Vehbi Koç, “Sanayicilere Düşen Vazifeler [The Duties of Entrepreneurs],” Bizden Haberler, no. 11 
(May 1966): 1 and 2. 
938  For example, see: MESS: IX. Genel Kurul Müzakere ve Karar Tutanağı [MESS, The Meeting 
Decision Record of the IX. General Assembly], Tarih Vakfı, Orhan Tuna Archive. 
939 “Son Gelişmeler [The Latest Developments],” MESS, no. 48 (16 February 1967). 
940  Tuğrul Kudatgobilik, “Toplu Sözleşme Düzeni [The Collective Agreement Order],” Bizden 
Haberler, no. 17 (May 1969): 25. 
941 MESS: IX. Genel Kurul Müzakere ve Karar Tutanağı [MESS, The Meeting Decision Record of the 
IX. General Assembly], Tarih Vakfı, Orhan Tuna Archive. 
942 Ibid. 
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during the 1960s rose as a result of the political attitude of DİSK.943 So the metal employers 
suggested taking a radical and uncompromising attitude towards workers’ actions, which 
were assumed to promote political revolution rather than simply securing the workers’ 
economic stability. 944  The succeeding left turn of Maden-İş’ language and political line 
assured the employers that they had to wipe out this union from the workplaces in order to 
secure their order.  
Thirdly, the student movements which began to flourish with the rise of leftist 
movements in the latter part of the decade, and the establishment of independent student 
organizations that reached their peak during the 1968 and 1969, worried bosses even further. 
In fact, the student movement that began with the questioning of educational problems, and 
the foundation of the student organizations to solve those problems, were gradually 
characterized by leftist ideas that framed educational problems as just a one repercussion of 
the bigger social inequalities in Turkey. As a result, the students increasingly organized, not 
just to voice their own demands, but also to get rid of an overall unjust social order. In 
parallel with this, they staged huge demonstrations in which they demanded to put an end to 
the existing order. The employers of the time defined those movements as “extreme” ones, 
which disrupted the peace and social order in Turkey.945 In fact, the General Assembly of 
MESS saw the student and workers’ movements as parallel forces.946 And the employers felt 
that the student movements, which were rising in Turkey and the rest of the world at that 
time, had “infected” work relations in Turkey. 947  According to the metal employers, all 
workers’ militancy and growing hostility towards the private sector in Turkey was caused by 
                                                             
943 Ege Cansen, interview by author, Kızıltoprak, İstanbul, August 29, 2012; Ege Cansen, interview by 
author, Kızıltoprak, İstanbul, January 14, 2013. 
944  Türkiye Madeni Eşya Sanayicileri Sendikası: X. Olağanüstü Genel Kurul Müzakere ve Karar 
Tutanağı, 1970 [The Union of the Metal Hardware Employers in Turkey: The Meeting and Decision 
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946 MESS IX. Genel Kuruluna Sunulan Faaliyet ve Hesap Raporu [The Account and Deed Report 
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Tuna Archive. 
947  Türkiye İşveren Sendikaları Konfederasyonu [The Confederation of the Turkish Employers], 
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“leftist propaganda” which hinged upon deceiving workers and the larger society to 
undermine democracy in Turkey. Given those perceptions, Vehbi Koç believed that a 
widespread struggle against communism was necessary, since the left deliberately 
undermined the credibility of the private sector to establish its own “tyranny”.948 This would 
add to the tense relations in the metal sector between 1968 and 1970. The next section of this 
chapter will concentrate on the questions of how those developing conflicts reflected on the 
worldview of the metal employers, and how the metal employers responded, in turn. 
The first thing for the Turkish employers to do was simply to unify, like the workers 
had already done. To combat the increasing worker solidarity under trade unions, the metal 
bosses increasingly touched on the importance of being organized to defend their own rights 
in society. Jak Kamhi, who was an influential figure in MESS as the owner of the Profilo Iron 
Rolling Factory, claims that the threat of disorder in the workplaces caused by strong, 
political and militant unionism during the 1960s pushed the organization of the metal bosses; 
consequently, some of the biggest factory owners, including himself, founded MESS and 
strived to persuade the other employers in the sector to join.949 A brochure published by 
MESS called the employers to support the union by stating that the metal employers lagged 
behind the workers in terms of solidarity.950 MESS had actually been founded in 1959 on the 
initiative of owners of the several big metal plants in İstanbul. The union was established to 
“defend the common interests of the metal employers, provide solidarity between them, 
maintain harmonious and peaceful work relations on the shop floor, and contribute in the 
development of the national wealth.”951  
There were two important features of the organization that influenced shop floor 
relations and collective encounters in the metal sector. First of all, MESS had a significant 
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impact on the institutional developments of the big metal plants. For example, a professor of 
management and industrial relations from İstanbul Technical University, İlhami Karayalçın, 
evaluated the foundation of MESS as a significant group that influenced the course of events 
in Arçelik. Secondly, the bosses/managers of the big metal plants who founded MESS were 
greatly influential in the affairs of the union. Thus, the policy making process within the 
union was shaped, directly and indirectly, through the interests of the big metal plants. Şekip 
Menço, İlhan Lök, Burhan Günergun, Jak Kamhi, Lütfü Doruk, Adnan Bensel, and Halil 
Kaya were the decisive figures in MESS.952 Especially with their stern attitudes of preventing 
the infiltration of “militant and political unionism” into the workplaces, their presence 
factored into the radicalization of shop floor relations towards the end of the decade.  
Despite the attempts of the big factory owners to organize, the metal bosses were 
hardly interested in being unionized in the first years of the decade. Although the members of 
MESS had a considerable impact on the formation of TİSK in 1961, and some metal bosses 
attempted to be influential on the decision making process of the new laws concerning 
industrial life, very few of the metal bosses leaned towards the idea of the “collective 
defence” of employer rights, except during the period of the 1964 strikes. 953  The 1961 
Constitution broadened institutional channels that provided workers the opportunity to raise 
their demands. This development led the metal bosses to join in MESS, a fact that was 
admitted by the bosses and managers, themselves.954 In fact, after the Kavel Strike and the 
Labor Law, and with the approach of collective bargaining in 1964, an increasing number of 
enterprises joined in MESS.955 By 1964, the total number of MESS members was 145, and 
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half of that number had joined the union after the beginning of collective bargaining events at 
the end of 1963.956 
 
Table 5: The Number of MESS Members After 1960  
  
Years  Number of Members 
1960 17 
1961 17 
1962 27 
1963 72 
1964 145 
1965 185 
1966 208 
1967 236 
1968 240 
1969 269 
Source: MESS IX. Genel Kuruluna Sunulan Faaliyet ve Hesap Raporu [The Account and Deed Report 
Served to the IX. General Assembly of MESS], 31 October-14 November 1969. 
 
Table 5 indicates the number of MESS members doubled between 1963 and 1964 and 
later figures disclose a steady increase in each year. Despite this growth, the dominant 
worldview effective among the employers (“my business, my rules”) influenced their 
relations with the union. Most of the metal employers were not willing to allow any outsider, 
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even if it was their own association, to intervene in the running of their enterprises. 
Furthermore, most metal employers showed indifference to the organization’s affairs; that’s 
why most MESS officers and factory owners still complained about the ignorance of their 
members towards the association’s affairs until the end of the decade. That’s also one of the 
reasons why MESS, as an organization, was less influential on the course of events between 
1968 and 1970. In fact, Ege Cansen remembers MESS was as a minor actor in the employee-
employer relations during the late 1960s.957  
Ege Cansen was right. Although MESS had been a considerable actor during the 
1964 strikes, the metal employers did not collectively respond during the events that 
happened between 1968 and 1970. Rather, they responded to the collective actions of workers 
as individuals. In the General Assembly that took place in 1970, Burhan Günergun, who was 
the general manager of the Türk Demir Döküm Factory from the beginning of its foundation 
in 1958 and a general chair of MESS in the late 1960s, would admit that the metal employers 
did not respond collectively, or take any action at all against the workers’ militant collectives, 
between 1968 and 1970.958 Even in 1967, Adnan Bensel, who was the general manager of the 
Arçelik Factories, had talked about the inefficacy of MESS in the political sphere.959 In order 
to confirm Adnan Bensel’s complaint, when one member criticized MESS for not 
participating in the meetings of the Minimum Wage Commission960 in 1969, an organization 
officer replied that the Ministry did not even ask them to join in the meetings. 961  To 
summarize the point, although one of the main goals of MESS was to deal with the social 
problems of its members, which referred to polishing the waning social prestige of the 
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employers, the employers hardly acted upon this task in a collective manner during the 1960s, 
except during brief periods.962 
As a result, the task of securing the respect for private property and entrepreneurs was 
undertaken by a few individual metal employers. Vehbi Koç’s attempts were considerable in 
terms of ameliorating the credibility of private capital, which was wasting away. 963 For this, 
Koç became more visible in the public arena. He organized conferences, gave press 
interviews and spoke on the radio. As a first step towards securing their credibility, Vehbi 
Koç and the other metal employers blamed the rise of left for their collective poor repute in 
the society. For them, the leftist journalists and writers who became more effective day by 
day were misleadingly disseminating the idea that the employers as a class were actually 
exploiters who considered nothing but their own profits.964 Responding to such leftist “lies”, 
the employers confessed that the majority of society had begun to see employers as 
“exploiters” and “pillagers” who robbed the economic resources of the country; their profits 
were, indeed, perceived to be gained through unfair and illegal methods. One metal boss 
claimed that the leftist ideas had become so widespread and influential that even owning a 
workplace was seen as a crime in the 1960s.965 But the metal employers were well aware that 
it would not be enough to simply cast the blame on the left for all their troubles. 
In addition to pointing to the left as the main body responsible for increasing social 
criticism towards the private sector, and increasing workers’ militancy, the metal 
employers/managers tried to bolster the prestige of the private sector through seminars, 
publications and speeches in which they talked about how they actually took care of the 
development of the national wealth, not just their own pockets. In those events, they 
presented examples of how their businesses contributed to the improvement of the national 
economy. In their public speeches, articles and press interviews, the metal employers 
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mentioned how they thought primarily of the national interests and spent their time and 
efforts to develop the whole country against the increasing and influential criticisms about 
bosses being “greedy and profit-oriented.”966 Koç said the aim of the private sector was to 
develop the national economy without forsaking the freedoms of a “democratic order.” He 
claimed that the employers had to persuade the government and the Grand National Assembly 
that they weren’t interested solely in the contents of their own pockets.967  To disseminate this 
idea across the whole of Turkish society, the metal employers argued for the necessity of 
proving how their businesses were beneficial for the entire country.968 According to Vehbi 
Koç: 
“(...) If we are able to keep our attitudes and behaviours going on during the 
next couple of years, the danger of the destruction of private property in 
Turkey will vanish (...) Unless we, by our self-control, will prove that we 
serve for this country, our existence will be in jeopardy.”969 
 
For this, the employers had to pay their taxes and engage in social aid campaigns.970 
To uphold their social prestige, the metal employers/managers presented the metal factories 
and their products as the pride of Turkey.971 In this way, the metal employers expressed the 
existence of a capitalist class as indispensable; sine qua non of a democratic order based on 
the idea of social justice. And since the private sector was an indispensable part of the 
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democratic and economic order, the state then had to enlarge the opportunities provided to the 
private sector.972 To summarize the point, the employers aimed to kill two birds with one 
stone through such public relations; the first goal was to increase their profits through state 
help, and the second was to remake the public image of being an entrepreneur as a righteous 
and respected citizen.  
Consequently, the metal employers often declared their loyalty to the new regime of 
rights and social justice. For them, the new era, the 1961 Constitution and the 1963 Labor 
Law provided both employers and employees with the chance of elevating Turkish society to 
the same level as developed, democratic countries, through mutual cooperation and work.973 
They defined the collective agreement order as a way to maintain peaceful work relations and 
considered the agreement a path to institutionalizing the mutual and common interests of both 
employers and employees.974 In the words of Cüneyt Dosdoğru, the personnel manager of 
General Electric: 
“Employee-employer relations are the indispensable part of production. 
While workers contribute in production throughout labor, the employer’s 
contribution comes through the production tools of enterprises and the risk of 
business. As long as this common order is maintained, this mechanism 
should function well.”975 
 
The bosses publicly declared their stance for such ideals as the assumption of mutual 
interests and cooperation, as well as the need for a decent and respected place in modern 
social and political life, which was increasingly centred around the concept of social justice, 
the new rights provided by the Constitution, just income distribution, development and 
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planning based on improvement of all social groups, etc. In fact, the metal bosses specifically 
took up the cause of social justice; they expressed that one of their duties was to contribute in 
creating social justice in Turkish society.976 They also claimed to support the right to strike, 
on the condition that the lockout right would be also provided to them.977 Likewise, Vehbi 
Koç declared in his speeches and press interviews that he stood for the idea of 
developmentalism, just like the workers’ unions; however, unlike the unions’ assertions, he 
felt that the state had to provide more support to private capital, without which national 
development would spiral into disaster.978  This point is important since such differences 
emerged not just around the idea of developmentalism, but also around a certain gap between 
how the metal employers comprehended all these concepts and ideals, and how the workers 
interpreted them. That gap, which actually stemmed from their different class affiliations, was 
one of the main reasons for their radical collective encounters at the end of the decade. 
Although the metal employers declared their belief in social justice and workers’ 
rights, at the same time, they criticized nearly all workers’ and union’s demands regarding 
wages and representation rights on the shop floor, calling them excessive and harmful to 
businesses that fed both employers and employees, equally. When they came out in favour of 
the right to strike, the metal bosses also stated that every strike, whether in the metal sector or 
not, was at its root unlawful, and was disruptive of work peace. Likewise, they contended that 
strikes arose from the irresponsible or “provocative” acts of the unionists. 979  The MESS 
Bulletin also published articles to show how the modern world opposed strike events, which 
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caused a deterioration of everyone’s lifestyles. 980  Secondly, MESS said nearly all wage 
increase demands of the workers and unions were extreme ones, since it insisted that the 
wages were already relatively high in the metal sector when the wages were judged against 
the productivity of workers. Moreover, MESS strictly objected the idea that workers’ wages 
in Turkey were low; on the contrary, they thought wages were quite high, countrywide. 
Therefore, the workers’ power to purchase basic goods was also very high. Ertuğrul Soysal 
was the general manager of Iron and Needle Industry founded in Topkapı, İstanbul in 1951, 
and the general chair of TİSK between 1969 and 1970. He stated in 1967: 
“The wages have been increasing by 10%, since 1963. The share of the 
industrial worker from the national income was bigger than those of other 
individuals by three to five times. Such a difference does not exist in any part 
of the world. Here, the workers were a happy minority (...) To what an extent, 
such an increase goes on? We say let’s pass this year in every collective 
agreement. It shall not go on like this. The most expensive item is labor in 
my cost account (...) We are going into a deadline.”981 
 
According to Ertuğrul Soysal, the workers’ wages were well above the national 
average income per person.982 Furthermore, MESS asserted that to increase wages before 
augmenting productivity would culminate in inflation, and that would be to the detriment of 
all citizens in the country.983 For MESS, the excessive wage demands would disrupt the 
economic balance.984 Thus, the union denounced the 1969 decision of the Minimum Wage 
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Commission which had been agreed to by the state, and which also allowed one Türk-İş and 
one TİSK representative each on the committee.985 But, the differences between metal bosses 
and workers were not just about the existing lifestyle conditions; they had also different views 
about organizing work relations on shop floor.  
In this regard, the metal employers were especially irritated by the workers’ demands 
about participating in management decisions on the shop floor.986 According to Orhan Tuna, 
most employers in Turkey saw the management of businesses as their sole domain.987 Such an 
outlook was valid for the metal employers/managers. Nuri Çelik stated that the management 
right refers to the employee’s obligation of obedience. 988  In the same vein, Ege Cansen 
claimed that the workers’ participation in management was neither possible nor beneficial.989 
The metal employers who refused the Maden-İş’s demand to sit on discipline committees 
during bargaining in 1964 claimed full authority on the labor process on the shop floor.  
In conclusion, although taking a stance for social justice, workers’ rights including 
strike and unionization rights, and just income distribution, MESS and the metal employers 
interpreted and presented nearly all the demands of workers as excessive, unnecessary or 
peace-disrupting during the 1960s. The production manager of Arçelik, Ethem Yücesan, 
asserted in 1968 that the Turkish workers were experiencing their golden age in terms of their 
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income and rights.990 In reality, the metal employers perceived those workers’ gains to be a 
result of the blessings passed down from employers/managers. In fact, MESS declared in 
1968 that workplace peace, which had been made possible as a result of “generous attitudes 
of employers”, was about to be destroyed due to the extreme demands of the unions.991 The 
clashes between workers and employers were examples of exactly this point. The metal 
employers/managers displayed a certain intolerance to the workers’ demands which extended 
beyond the bosses’ “blessings”; in other words, the entrepreneurs wanted workers to accept a 
kind of social justice or industrial democracy framed by themselves. Nuri Çelik defined the 
metal employers as very uncompromising people in terms of workers’ rights. In fact, the 
bosses’ despotic methods continued to be dominant in the sector.992 Ege Cansen’s narratives 
about the metal bosses confirmed those of Nuri Çelik’s regarding the bosses’ intolerance of 
workers’ rights. The metal bosses were actually willing to progress worker-employer 
relations, according to Cansen, but on the basis of paternalism. In Cansen’s words: 
“The metal bosses had such an understanding towards workers: ‘if I recruited 
you to my workplace and provided bread, you have to obey my rules and feel 
gratitude towards my blessings.”993 
 
Otherwise, the workers were seen as disrupters of the peace, or traitors by the 
employers, Cansen added. When those “ungrateful demands” coincided with the political and 
ideological instigations of the growing left at the end of the decade, a movement which 
provoked a “bloody class war” for the union’s own hidden agenda, the employers defence 
was that the social peace was threatened by workers. Those attitudes towards workers’ actions 
to see them as seditionary activities might further radicalize the struggle between workers and 
employers at the end of the decade. 
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In addition to Maden-İş and MESS/the metal bosses, the other important actor was 
Çelik-İş, which had been able to organize several big and middle sized metal plants during 
1964. This union was actually characterized by a staunch anti-communist language. 
 
III. Çelik-İş: Workers’ Rights and Anti-Communism 
Contrary to Maden-İş’s shift towards left, Çelik-İş represented a rigid anti-communist 
line in the metal sector during the 1960s. Furthermore, this union represented a deviation 
from the general line of policy of Turkish trade unionism in certain aspects, such as the 
debate over statism. Due to its ideological framework and activities, this union was accused 
of being a “yellow-dog union” not just by Maden-İş, but also by other Turkish trade unions. 
However, there is no evidence to prove such accusations. In fact, while the DİSK began to 
use the lexicon of revolutionary and/or industrial unionism, Çelik-İş followed a model of 
business unionism that began inside the American Federation of Labor, with its famous leader 
Samuel Gompers,994  and with its anti-communist/socialist lexicon. Under this model, the 
union placed an emphasis on responsible unionism; paying particular attention to the benefits 
of its members, as well as those of employers and common national interests. Although Çelik-
İş’s official discourse was close to liberalism in terms of the defence of private property, its 
ideological position seemed more closely tied to the traditional nationalist movements, due to 
its comprehension of class in modern Turkish society. Furthermore, due to the lack of 
evidence we do not know how the charismatic leadership of its leader, Kazım Çoçu, 
                                                             
994 Samuel Gomper was born in 1850. He became the first president of AFL in 1886 and held the seat 
until his death in1924. Under his leadership, AFL became the primary example of business unionism as 
being structured around his charismatic and oligarship leadership. The business unionism as developed 
by AFL also referred to a responsible unionism in terms of providing the optimal benefits for its 
members and dealing "fairly” with employers. Although Samuel Gompers debated about any possible 
alternative capitalism in the late 1890s, by the turn of the century, he declared socialist/communists as 
the worse enemies to the modern society. In this regard, business unionism also meant to being in 
opposition to revolutionary unionism which addressed the unionist activites to abolish the order of the 
private property. In fact, nearly two hundred radical anarchist, socialist, communist trade unionists 
founded Industrial Workers of the World in 1905 in Chicago, the United States to supplant capitalism 
with socialism. For further details, see: Foster Rhea Dulles and Melvyn Dubofsky, Labor in America: 
A History, (Wheeling: Harlan Davidson, 1984), 142-232; and Melvyn Dubofsky, Industrialism and the 
American Worker, 1865-1920, (Wheeling: Harlan Davidson, 1996), 35-154. 
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functioned in the internal structure of Çelik-İş; it seems, however, that his name was at the 
forefront of every union activity, especially in the union’s journal.  
Despite being founded in the late 1950’s, Çelik-İş remained a very small and 
ineffective union when it came to shaping the worker-employer relations in the metal sector, 
up until 1963. As of 1962, the union had begun to act inside several workplaces to take 
authorization rights away from Maden-İş.995 The fight reached its peak during the Kavel 
Strike and the following 1964 strikes, and Çelik-İş seems to be victor with its strategy of 
business unionism, in particular while demonstrating a clear anti-communist language. Çelik-
İş even attacked Maden-İş during the strikes on the charge that Maden-İş had a hidden agenda 
of establishing a “leftist tyranny” by provoking the workers into striking.  
After the 1964 strikes, the union’s politics took shape around an anti-communist 
ideology. It made the accusation that all actions of Maden-İş and DİSK were politically 
motivated ones that had nothing to do with the workers’ demands and rights. In fact, the 
Çelik-İş discourse comprehended the TİP’s election to the National Assembly, the foundation 
of DİSK, and the student movements, as great threats to the country and to workers’ rights. 
Although, Çelik-İş’s officials hit on the idea that the unions had to stay of out of politics to 
defend their member’s rights efficiently, Çelik-İş ironically defended the necessity of private 
property to stabilize the existing political system. In this regard, while following the business 
unionism model, it often advised the employers to provide workers’ rights in order to obstruct 
the spread of communism in Turkey. This staunch anti-communist position provides us with 
some idea of how Çelik-İş defined a modern society, work relations, and their strategy as a 
union to get its member’s rights. 
Çelik-İş’s officers’ depiction of modern society was, more or less, in line with the 
hegemonic one that existed amongst the related state organs, and both employers’ and 
employees’ organizations, at first glance. That is, the union officers defined society as a 
                                                             
995  “Küçük Sendikalar Toplu Sözleşme İçin Büyük Sendikaları Yıpratıyor [The Small Unions 
Undermine the Big Unions for the Collective Agreement],” Gece Postası, September 13, 1963; “Çelik-
İş’in İthamlarını Maden-İş Reddetti [Maden-İş Refused the Accusations of Çelik-İş],” Gece Postası, 
September 19, 1963. 
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family in which all individuals shared a “common” interest of supporting national 
development. Kazım Çoçu, the chair, objected the idea of labor as a commodity, and claimed 
that there were no class differences or even different classes in society; on the contrary, 
society itself was formed on the “common” interests of the nation. On this subject, Kazım 
Çoçu talked about the existence of shared interests between workers and employers in his 
articles.996 On the development of family, or nation, Çelik-İş assumed a high place within the 
hierarchy for workers, since workers had a significant role in the creation of national 
wealth. 997  Following upon that idea, the union held that the biggest shares belonged to 
workers, for their contribution to the development of Turkish factories: 
“While there were 500-600 workers in OTOSAN in the past, 1300 workers 
are laboring today. The biggest share belongs to our fellow workers in this 
development.”998   
 
Therefore, the union was adamant that workers must get their deserved share from the 
economic-social order in Turkey. Until that point, Çelik-İş’s discourse seemed to be the same 
as the hegemonic approach of the period in theory; most of the unions, including Maden-İş, 
reflected on the existence of common and national interests before the middle of the decade. 
But the answer to one of the most intensely debated questions of those years - how the 
Turkish economy and society would further develop - differed with Çelik-İş, and not just 
from its rival counterpart, Maden-İş, but also from most of the unions of the period. Çelik-İş’s 
officers firmly objected a common idea, widespread among the Turkish unions, that statism 
was the best choice for the Turkish economy and society to develop.999 On this issue, Çelik-
İş’s political stance seemed to be closer to the idea of private entrepreneurs of the time; it said 
                                                             
996 Kazım Çoçu, “İşçi Köle Değildir [Worker is not a Slave],” Çelik-İş, year 4, no. 90 (1 December 
1968): 4. 
997 Kazım Çoçu, “Sağduyunun Zaferi [The Victory of Common Sense],” Çelik-İş, year 1, no. 3 (1 
October 1964): 1; Kazım Çoçu, Sendikacılık Yolu [The Way of Unionism], (İstanbul: Bayraktar, 1967). 
998 Kazım Çoçu, “Otosan’da İsteğimiz Olacaktır [We Will Reach Our Demands in Otosan],” Çelik-İş, 
year 4, no. 92 (1 January 1969): 1. Also look at: “Pancar Motor Dizel Motopomp İhraç Etti [The 
Pancar Motor Exported the Diesel MotoPomp],” Çelik-İş, year 4, no. 96 (1 March 1969): 1. 
999 “Türk-İş’e Saygı ve Güven Boşuna Değildir [There is Good Reason To Respect and Trust to Türk-
İş],” Çelik-İş, year 4, no. 97 (1 April 1969): 4. 
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that the private sector had to have a larger place in the economic order. The union journal is 
dotted with articles that argue how the more influential statist ideology in Turkey actually 
constituted a threat to the “order of freedom”, and even paved the way for socialism-
communism. Furthermore, like the employers, Çelik-İş’s officers defended the idea that the 
state had to take necessary precautions so that the private sector would improve further.1000  
Kazım Çoçu objected those who saw private property as an exploitation of the natural 
resources of the country1001 and he stood firmly against the definition of the private sector as 
inhibiting the national development with its profit-oriented attitudes; the private sector, 
according to him, was more beneficial than the state sector in terms of economics. In every 
country, the “miracles” of development were realized through the encouragement of private 
sector interests.1002 In fact, the private sector provided essential employment opportunities for 
workers.1003 
Another hegemonic idea of the period, which was shared by Çelik-İş, was the 
common notion of the necessity of improving productivity in Turkish industry to develop the 
national economy.1004 To this end, Çelik-İş’s officers assigned a duty to the workers to take 
on their tasks diligently. The function of unions was to motivate workers to work hard and 
increase productivity, it said, which, in turn, would greatly contribute to wage increases. The 
large unions that would fulfill this duty were seen as beneficial associations for the national 
interests.1005 As for the employers, Kazım Çoçu advised them to respect workers’ rights in 
                                                             
1000  Kazım Çoçu, “Kalkınmamızda Türk-İş’in Basireti [The Foresight of Türk-İş in Our 
Development],” İşçi Postası, April 5, 1968. 
1001 Kazım Çoçu, “Montaj Sanayii [The Assembling Industry],” Çelik-İş, year 4, no. 96 (1 March 
1969): 4. 
1002 Kazım Çoçu, “Planlı Kalkınma ve Karma Ekonomi Sistemi [The Planning Development and the 
System of Mixed Economy],” Çelik-İş, year 1, no. 1 (17 September 1964): 1. 
1003 Kazım Çoçu, “İşgaller ve Boykotlar [The Invasions and Boycottes],” Çelik-İş, year 4, no. 93 (15 
January 1969): 4. 
1004 O. Zeki Demirel, “Kalkınma ve İşçiler [Development and Workers],” Çelik-İş, year 4, no. 93, (15 
February 1969): 2. 
1005  “İşçi Kardeşlerimiz Hedefimiz Milli Sanayii Geliştirmek [Fellow Workers, Our Target is to 
Develop the National Industry],” Çelik-İş, year 1, no. 2 (17 September 1964): 1; “Asgari Ücretler 
Konusunda Türkiye, Asya Milletleri Arasında En İyi Durumda [Turkey is the Best Among the Asian 
Nations In Terms of Minimum Wages],” Çelik-İş, year 4, no. 91 (15 December 1968): 3; 
“Sendikalarımıza Dört Elle Sarılalım [Let’s Firmly Embrace Our Unions],” Çelik-İş, year 4, no. 94 (1 
February 1969): 2. 
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order to ensure peace in the workplace, which, in turn, would increase the productivity.1006 
The important question for the union was; how would those cooperative and mutual work 
environments be implemented on the shop floor? 
On this point, Çoçu suggested that the more productive workers had to be rewarded 
through the application of a “scientific job evaluation system.”1007 But more than this, the 
issue was both sides, workers and employers, internalizing the idea of social justice and how 
their interpretations of that idea would decide the fate of work relations. In other words, 
Kazım Çoçu emphasized that good work relations depended upon a brand of social justice, 
which would secure the interests of both sides as assurance of the order of freedom. Under 
such a system, the employers would recognize workers’ rights to keep order in the workplace. 
And, under this brand of social justice, Çoçu asserted that the workers would work harder to 
contribute to their factories. Therefore, productivity would increase and enterprise would 
increase its profits.1008 Since all sides would benefit from a common idea of social justice and 
productivity increases, the system would keep functioning without serious difficulties. 
Çelik-İş’s discourse defined the current situation in Turkey as incompatible with this 
simple framework. According to Çelik-İş’s officers, there were two main actors responsible 
for the lack of workplace peace in Turkey; the employers who did not recognize workers’ 
rights, and the “provocative unions” that were actually more interested in political aims rather 
than the workers’ rights and well-being. Kazım Çoçu further divided the Turkish employers 
into two categories: those who believed in social justice and provided workers’ rights, and the 
other employers who were motivated by “selfish thoughts” and did not want the workers to be 
organized.1009 Rather than the employers, however, the articles in the union journal pointed 
the finger at the unions, which it defined as provocative (socialist-communist) to the already 
                                                             
1006  Kazım Çoçu, “İşletmede Verimlilik ve İşçi Refahı [Productivity in Enterprise and Workers’ 
Wealth],” Çelik-İş, year 1, no. 5 (1 November 1964): 2; Kazım Çoçu, “Randımana Göre Ücret Sistemi 
[The Wage System According to the Efficiency],” Çelik-İş, year 1, no. 6 (1 December 1964): 1. 
1007  Kazım Çoçu, “İşletmede Verimlilik ve İşçi Refahı”; Kazım Çoçu, “Randımana Göre Ücret 
Sistemi.” 
1008 Kazım Çoçu, “Çalışma Düzeninde Mutluluğumuz [Our Happiness in the Work Order],” Çelik-İş, 
year 1, no. 1 (17 September 1964): 1 and 4; Kazım Çoçu, “Sosyal Adalet Hürriyet Düzeninin 
Teminatıdır [The Social Justice is the Insurance of the Order of Freedom],” Çelik-İş, year 2, no. 37 (1 
April 1966): 1 and 4. 
1009 Kazım Çoçu, Sendikacılık Yolu [The Way of Unionism], (İstanbul: Bayraktar, 1967). 
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disrupted workers-employers relations in Turkey. In this regard, Çoçu maintains that although 
Çelik-İş stood against the employers who did not provide workers’ rights, at the same time, it 
objected to other unions that perceived and presented the entrepreneurs as enemies. In one 
interview conducted in 1965, Kazım Çoçu asserted that there had been no single disagreement 
between Çelik-İş and employers. For Çoçu, the private sector provided considerable social 
rights to workers. He added that he was content with how the employers grasped the idea of 
social justice.1010 Furthermore, Çelik-İş painted most of the big metal bosses as tolerant and 
eager to cooperate with workers. In this regard, the union pursued good relations with the 
employers and managers of those plants. 1011  Furthermore, the union journals frequently 
mentioned how the metal employers took care of their employees. However, especially 
towards the end of the decade, Çelik-İş began to criticize the owners more harshly by 
declaring that they, as the union, would no longer kneel down to any employers who did not 
recognize workers’ rights.1012 Çelik-İş lashed out at the Turkish employers: 
“(..) it is unfortunate that most of our employers does not seem to be aware of 
danger of the class war which threatens our country. The important point to 
remember is that crowds, which are bereft of a decent life, will become the 
most available mean for the vicious people who seek for class differences. 
If our employers really stand for the order of freedom, they immediately have 
to seek for the possibilities that will bless the laboring people with a better 
life. The most important factor which will bring our country to the edge of 
the leftist tyranny is the people’s misery which comes out of lack of good 
conditions for living.”1013 
 
                                                             
1010 “Çelik-İş Başkanı Kazım Çoçu’nun Türk Sanayii Hakkındaki Görüşü [The Opinion of Çelik-İş’s 
Chair, Kazım Çoçu, on the Turkish Industry],” Çelik-İş, year 1, no. 16 (15 May 1965): 2. 
1011  “Türk Demir Döküm Fabrikası Hızla Büyüyor [The Türk Demir Döküm Factory Is Fastly 
Enlarging],” Çelik-İş, year 4, no. 91 (15 December 1968): 1. 
1012 Kazım Çoçu, “Otosan’da İsteğimiz Olacaktır [We Will Reach Our Demands in Otosan],” Çelik-İş, 
year 4, no. 92 (1 January 1969): 4; “Grevden Tedirgin Olmamak Lazım [There is no Cause to be 
Worried About Strike],” Çelik-İş, year 4, no. 94 (1 February 1969): 2; Kazım Çoçu, “İşverenin Oyunu 
[The Employer’s Ploy],” Çelik-İş, year 4, no. 95 15 February 1969, 1; “Eveleme Geveleme Ben 
Gidemem [Don’t Mince, I Can’t Accept],” Çelik-İş, year 4, no. 97 (1 April 1969): 2. 
1013 Kazım Çoçu, Sendikacılık Yolu [The Way of Unionism], (İstanbul: Bayraktar, 1967), 104. 
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After 1968, Çelik-İş began to highlight the second category of employers who did not 
recognize workers’ rights and who acted in a selfish manner.1014 Further, Çelik-İş organized a 
strike in Levent Madeni Eşya, in May 1969, to defend its member’s rights.1015 The intolerance 
of employers, they claimed, was the force dragging the workers into the political and 
provocative unions.1016 As a result, the threat of communism was growing day by day in 
Turkey. In truth, the communist threat was the most burning issue for Çelik-İş. 
In those times when Çelik-İş increased its criticisms towards employers, Çelik-İş 
simultaneously presented “the irresponsible unionists”, those who instigated workers to act 
against their employers for their own political aims, as the main reason for the lack of peace 
in workplaces. Çelik-İş claimed these unionists had no interest in worker rights. According to 
an article in the union journal, a unionist who really sided with workers would say: 
“(...) We analyzed the current condition of your workplace, that is, its 
economic and financial situation. Following this analysis, we demanded 
wage increases and social rights which cannot be supported under current 
conditions. After the bargaining process, we reached an agreement over most 
of our demands (...) We never lead the way by undermining your workplace 
and lowering your economic and social conditions into further misery by 
demanding items which your employers cannot give (...) 
Our beloved brothers, we never want you to be involved in fights with your 
bosses; such a fight will never be beneficial; neither to you nor to your bosses 
or the country (...) If there is a fight between workers and employers, our 
                                                             
1014 “Hepten Kendine Yontan, Bindiği Dalı Keser [Those Who Act Selfishly Cut Their Own Throats],” 
Çelik-İş, year 2, no. 64 (1 August 1967): 2; Kazım Çoçu, “Nereye Gidiyoruz? [Where We Are 
Heading],” İşçi Postası, October 1, 1968; Kazım Çoçu, “Allah Belasını Versin Sarı Sendikaların [God 
Damn the Yellow Unions],” Çelik-İş, year 3, no. 87 (15 October 1968): 1; Kazım Çoçu, “Bazı 
İşverenler Çok Yanlış Yoldadır [Some Employers Pursue Wrong Ways],” Çelik-İş, year 3, no. 89 (15 
November 1968): 1 and 4; Kazım Çoçu, “İşçi Köle Değildir [Worker is not a Slave],” Çelik-İş, year 4, 
no. 90 (1 December 1968): 1; “Otosan Büyük Sözleşme Komitesi Toplantı [The Agreement Committee 
Assembled in Otosan],” Çelik-İş, year 4, no. 95 (15 February 1969): 3; “Ay’a Gidenler ve Biz [We and 
Others Who Go to the Moon],” Çelik-İş, year 4 no. 92 (1 January 1969): 2. 
1015 Kazım Çoçu “Levent’e Dair [About the Levent Strike],” Çelik-İş, year 4, no. 100 (15 May 1969): 
4. 
1016 Ahmet Arkan, “Herkes Aya, Biz Yaya [Everyone Goes to Moon, We Are on Foots],” Çelik-İş, year 
4, no. 95 (15 February 1969): 4. 
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national industry will collapse, the factories will be closed, we will all be 
unemployed and we will be forced to leave our country to find a work and 
chase after our bread. 
We do not believe that the rights of our fellow workers can be earned through 
fighting, we believe that every good result can be reached through agreement 
and compromise. Nonetheless, when we encounter vicious employers who 
abstain from providing your rights despite the good economic position of the 
workplace, we do not refrain from seeking your rights within the framework 
of the law.”1017 
 
But a unionist who did not side with workers would tell them: 
“(...) Our aim is to make you boss and make your boss workers. Until now, 
while you worked like slaves, they lived in the mansions; from now on, you 
will be like a boss, your boss will be slaves under your mandate. 
(...) We want your wages to increase by double, the condition of your 
workplace is none of our business. We do not care if any workplace, which 
does not provide wages we ask, is closed (...) 
(...) Our heroic brothers, we wanted the union’s representatives be paid to do 
no work and to have a right to participate in the factory management (...) 
(...) there was no agreement since your bosses who relentlessly exploit you 
did not agree with those demands (...)Even if the factory is closed, even if 
you become hungry, even if your family and children fall into misery on 
streets, we will insist on our decision as your mighty representatives (...)”1018 
 
                                                             
1017  “İşçiden Yana Olan Bir Sendikacı İşçiye Böyle Söyleyecektir [An Unionist Who Sides With 
Worker Will Harangue Worker Like This],” Çelik-İş, year 1, no. 11 (15 February 1965): 2. 
1018 “İşçiden Yana Olmayan Bir Sendikacı İşçiye Şöyle Nutuk Çekecektir [An Unionist Who Does not 
Side With Worker Will Harangue Like This],” Çelik-İş, year 1, no. 11 (15 February 1965): 2. 
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Kazım Çoçu asserted that the secret goal of that kind of unionist was to create a class 
war by capitalizing on every disagreement between workers and employers. In every battle, 
they misleadingly encouraged workers to stage strikes without estimating the likely damages 
of such acts upon the workers themselves, and upon national industry. Those unionists 
motivated workers to act against the law, as was obvious from what it had happened during 
the metal strikes in 1964.1019 For Çelik-İş’s discourse, the main goal of the “provocative” 
unionists was to found a “communist tyranny” in Turkey. 
Çelik-İş was a union that followed the methods of business unionism and presented a 
staunch anti-communist stance during the 1960s and 1970s. In its views, the method of 
conflict and class war, which the “provocative” unionists were assumed to conduct to get 
workers’ rights, would bring the country to the edge of communism, which Çelik-İş perceived 
as the great destroyer of workers’ rights. In fact, communists wanted only “chaos”, under the 
excuse of class differences inherent to every society, to found their own “tyrannies”. 
According to the union’s political discourse, while the most powerful unions existed in the 
countries where there the sovereignty of private property hinged upon the idea of social 
justice, there was no union freedom at all in communist countries. 1020  The communist 
ideology called for bloody wars, but the ideology of “free” order searched for human 
happiness.1021 In other words, communists sought an order in which there was no freedom. 
Çoçu says that the real “yellow-dog unionism” was dominant in communist countries. Using 
this reasoning, Çoçu also accused the so-called ideological unions, such as Maden-İş, of being 
yellow ones. For them, both the “yellow” and “provocative” unions referred to the same 
thing. They did not heed workers’ rights; on the contrary, they secretly agreed with employers 
                                                             
1019  Kazım Çoçu, “Zonguldak Olaylarının Sorumluları İşçiden Yana Olmayan Tahrikçilerdir [The 
Responsible of the Zonguldak Incidents Are the Provocators Who Do Not Side With Workers],” Çelik-
İş, year 1, no. 13 (15 March 1965): 1 and 4; “Çelik-İş’in Bildirisi [The Declaration of Çelik-İş],” Çelik-
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1020 Kazım Çoçu, “İşçi Köle Değildir [Worker is not a Slave],” Çelik-İş, year 4, no. 90 (1 December 
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no. 93 (15 January 1969): 2. 
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and instigated workers’ involvement in unlawful acts.1022 In fact, Çelik-İş declared DİSK on 
the industrial scene, and TİP on the political scene, to be the most dangerous of actors, one 
which followed a Marxist-communist agenda. Before the foundation of DİSK, Çelik-İş had 
alread accused Maden-İş of being communist, since, in 1961, it was one of the founders of 
“the Marxist TİP”. Çelik-İş officers argued that the Maden-İş unionists were, at the same 
time, the members of TİP who pursued an agenda of creating class conflicts against 
employers.1023 Those unionists were dealing with the success of their political ideologies, 
namely communism, but not workers’ rights or well-being. The Maden-İş officers staged 
collective actions for their own “pious revolutionary” purposes. 1024  For Çoçu, Maden-İş 
dragged the workers into poverty by encouraging them to strike in 1963 and 1964; but the 
Maden-İş officers actually sought their own fortunes and fame.1025 Furthermore, for Çoçu, 
DİSK founders, (one of them was Maden-İş) actually aimed to “exploit” workers for their 
own political purposes.1026 In fact, the “unlawful and destructive” workers’ collective acts 
began with the foundation of the “anarchist DİSK.”1027  
Çelik-İş’s officers also declared TİP to be against the order of private property, and of 
having the agenda destroy democratic order and establish a communist tyranny. Çelik-İş 
highly criticized the TİP’s representatives at the Assembly.1028 Those representatives who 
called for socialism wanted workers to be harshly exploited by their employers so that they 
could incite class hostilities in Turkey, with the end goal of founding communism. By hiding 
behind the idea of social justice, they propagated the idea that the social order was corrupt, 
                                                             
1022 “Sarı Sendikacılar ve Ötesi [The Yellow Unionists and Beyond],” Çelik-İş, year 3, no. 87 (15 
October 1968): 3. 
1023 Kazım Çoçu, “Türk İşçisi Özgürlüğü İçinde Mutlu Olma İsteğindedir [The Turkish Worker Want 
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1028  “Türkiye Vietnam Olmayacaktır [Turkey Will not be Vietnam],” Çelik-İş, year 3, no. 67, (1 
September 1967): 3. 
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and in doing so, they actually aimed to destroy the order of “freedom”.1029 Similarly, Kazım 
Çoçu presented the student movements in 1968 as “anarchist” incidents, which would bring 
Turkey to the brink of destruction.1030 Those approaches to class movements, which were on 
the rise between 1968 and 1970, would radicalize the fight between Maden-İş and Çelik-İş. 
It is apparent that Çelik-İş analyzed the events between 1968 and 1970 from this 
perspective. For the union journal, DİSK resorted to unlawful acts in that period as they saw 
them as necessary outcomes of the destructive actions of students and TİP.1031 Starting in 
early 1968, Çelik-İş claimed that the provocative unionists wanted to create anarchy among 
the workers and class differences between employers and employees by capitalizing on every 
opportunity. They actually wanted to found a “leftist tyranny” under the excuse of defending 
workers’ rights.1032 The main goal of the “provocateurs”, on the other hand: 
“(...)is not the well-being of the workers within freedom or a good future for 
the nation. What they desire is the rise of a class war, whilst (supporting) the 
slavery, misery, lose of freedom and destruction of the freedom of 
nation.”1033 
 
Çelik-İş perceived and presented the rising class movements at the end of the decade 
to be a result of the deceptions of unions who aimed to drag the workers into establishing 
communism where there was no real freedom. Kazım Çoçu and the union journal argued for 
                                                             
1029 “Hürriyet İçinde Mutluluk İstiyoruz [We Want Happiness Within Freedom],” Çelik-İş, year 2, no. 
65 (15 August 1967): 2; Kazım Çoçu, “Sosyalistlerde Özgürlük Safsatası [The Fallacy of Freedom in 
Socialists],” Çelik-İş, year 3, no. 81 (1 September 1968): 1; “Hangi Düzende? [In Which Order?],” 
Çelik-İş, year 4, no. 101 (1 June 1969): 2. 
1030 “Anarşi Hürriyetsizliğe Giden En Kötü Yoldur Hürriyetsizliğin Sendikasızlığın Sonudur [Anarchy 
is the Worst Way of Going to Unfreedom, and The Ultimate Way of Unfreedom and Lack of Unions],” 
Çelik-İş, year 3, no. 82 (1 August 1968): 1; Kazım Çoçu, “Anarşi Çıkar Yol Değil [Anarchy is a Dead 
End],” Çelik-İş, year 3, no. 82 (1 August 1968): 1. Also look at: “Taşkınlığın Sonu [The End of 
Extremism],” Çelik-İş, year 3, no. 79 (15 May 1968): 3. 
1031 “Türk-İş Nerdesin? [Türk-İş, Where Are You?],” Çelik-İş, year 3, no. 82 (1 August 1968): 2; 
“Sendikalara Politika Sokulamaz [The Politic Should not Be Allowed to Penetrate Into the Unions],” 
Çelik-İş, year 5, no. 93 (15 January 1969): 2; Kazım Çoçu, “İşçi Olaylarının Sorumluları İşçiden Yana 
Olmayan Tahrikçilerdir [The Responsible of Labor Incidents Are the Provocators Who Do Not Side 
With Workers],” Çelik-İş, year 5, no. 132 (1 September 1970): 1. 
1032  “İşçiler Tahrike, Kaba Kuvvete Karşı Hürriyeti ve Meşruluğu Savunuyor [Workers Defends 
Freedom and Legitimacy Against the Provocations and Brute Force],” Çelik-İş, year 3, no. 76 (1 March 
1968): 1 and 4. 
1033 Kazım Çoçu, Sendikacılık Yolu, 44. 
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these collective actions to be defined as unlawful acts, which would damage the whole 
country.1034 In opposition to such “communist provocations,” Çelik-İş assumed a nationalistic 
character to the Turkish workers and utilized a nationalist discourse and approach. And Çoçu 
defined the obstruction of class war as a “national” duty: 
“Given that the spread of the idea of class war will greatly damage the 
Turkish worker and Turkish unionism, we, as unionists, consider siding 
against the provocateurs who aimed to create a class war as a honour of debt 
and think such an action as a national duty, on the other side.”1035 
“Yes, our fellow workers, we, Çelik-İş, are not provocateurs, we are a 
nationalist union; for being a nationalist means to love Turkey. The one who 
loves Turkey does not encourage the Turkish workers to become involved in 
the destructive acts that put Turkey into difficult situations. 
The one who loves Turkey pursues the way of increasing the wage as return 
for labor, without the hands of workers robbing the workplace, within the 
framework of existing law and order.”1036 
 
In this regard, the union defined the identity of the Turkish worker; and it was a 
definition filled with assumptions of nationalism and liberalism. Under this characterization, 
the Turkish workers did not want to become “proletariats”. The Turkish workers did not want 
class war and did not seek to destroy the employers as a class.1037 Kazım Çoçu asserted that 
the Turkish workers, on the contrary, were aware that they could gain their rights under the 
order that recognized the importance of private property. Such an order assumed not the 
division of, but the unity of different segments within society. Çoçu asserted that there were 
                                                             
1034 Kazım Çoçu, “İşgaller ve Boykotlar [The Invasions and Boycottes],” Çelik-İş, year 4, no. 93 (15 
January 1969): 1; “Tahrikçi Sendikacılık, Kapkaçcı Sendikacılık, Gerçek Sendikacılık [The 
Provocative Unionism, Purse-Snatching Unionism and the Real Unionism],” Çelik-İş, year 5, no. 132 
(1 September 1970): 3-4; “Türkiye Vietnam Olmayacaktır [Turkey Will not be Vietnam],” Çelik-İş, 
year 3, no. 67, (1 September 1967): 3. 
1035 Kazım Çoçu, Sendikacılık Yolu, 45. 
1036 “Kavele Duyuru [The Declaration to Kavel],” Çelik-İş, year 3, no. 88 (1 November 1968): 2. 
1037  Kazım Çoçu, “Kalkınmamızda Türk-İş’in Basireti [The Foresight of Türk-İş in Our 
Development],” İşçi Postası, April 5, 1968. 
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no classes in Turkey, and that Turkish workers had the same rights as the other members of 
the Turkish nation in general.1038 And the union journal defined those Turkish workers who 
would not be tempted by the “provocateurs” as people who stood for nationalist ideals. For 
the union, a good Turkish worker thought about national interests first.1039 Drawing upon such 
assumed features of the ideal Turkish worker, Çelik-İş’s official policy suggested the unions 
stage a coordinated struggled against “provocateurs”: 
“We, as the young Turkish workers, have to stand, by keeping our unity, 
against those who try to drag our future to the darkness by ignoring the 
national interests on behalf of their own individual ambitions and 
caprices.”1040 
 
But what was the method offered by Çelik-İş to resolve the disputes between workers 
and employers in order to prevent workers from falling in the hands of “provocative” 
unionists? At this point, it is important to note that, according to Çelik-İş, there might be 
disagreements on workers-employers relations, but neither side should abuse the 
disagreements and resort to methods of conflict, rather than compromise. The path of 
compromise would both resolve the disputes and prevent a destructive class war. 
Consequently, the unionists must resort to a method of agreement, rather than a method of 
conflict, to solve the problems.1041 As for employers, Çelik-İş demanded they to be eager to 
provide workers’ rights.1042 Çoçu stated that: 
                                                             
1038 Kazım Çoçu, “45. Yılda Daha da Güçlüyüz [We Are Getting More Powerful in the 45th Years],” 
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1039 “Türk-İş’e Saygı ve Güven Boşuna Değildir [There is Good Reason To Respect and Trust to Türk-
İş],” Çelik-İş, year 4, no. 97 (1 April 1969): 4. 
1040 Ahmet Arkan, “Artık Yeter [Enough is Enough],” Çelik-İş, year 4, no. 94 (1 February 1969): 3. 
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Collective Agreements Accompanied by Drum and Horn, Are Deceiving Workers],” Çelik-İş, year 1, 
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“We sincerely desire that employers have a contribution in the creation of a 
happy Turkey by giving the deserved share to labor, within the idea of social 
justice; such an attitude is also appropriate with the twentieth century.”1043  
 
By showing tolerance during the collective bargaining and accepting the workers’ 
demands of wage increases, the employers would also join in the anti-communist struggles: 
“It should not be forgotten that the family affairs of businessmen and 
industrialists of our country are being revealed day and night. The workers, 
who work for salaries equal to 400-500 TL, and they are truly honorable, 
show loyalty to the land, love freedom and live under thousands of 
difficulties, know about these meetings in which everything is being spent 
like water. Our employers who have such a superior lifestyle should provide 
what is necessary to be provided to our very good-hearted workers, for whom 
the employers are responsible to provide a peaceful life. The employers 
should not act selfishly, so that our workers would not be influenced by those 
who seek a change of order. The employers should not cut their own 
throats.”1044 
 
As a model of the ideal employer, the union officers gave the example of Vehbi Koç 
as a “great man” who fought against communism by recognizing workers’ rights and being 
involved in charitable acts.1045 
Like a business union, Çelik-İş advised its members to deal “fairly” with the 
employers by not claiming “excessive demands”, for the sake of the future well-being of 
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private enterprise. In fact, while siding with the right to strike against the employers who did 
not recognize workers’ rights, Çoçu claimed that the workers had to think about the limits of 
the enterprise in order not to damage the national economy. In this regard, the workers should 
not make extreme demands that might put the workplace in danger. The workers demands 
had to be appropriate, and made with consideration of the conditions of the national economy 
and of that particular enterprise. It is important to find the optimal level of demands during 
strikes; otherwise, both the workers and the workplace would be in danger.1046 The strikes 
should also not transgress the law. There had to be respect for the law.1047 This dialogue about 
excessive demands and lawful action in particular shows us of the mindset of the metal 
employers about the limits of the right to strike. 
How much success did Çelik-İş’s discourse on the common interests between 
workers and employers see among the working class? Also, to what extent did the workers 
accept the notion of the superiority of the private sector over the state sector, or the discourse 
being offered on economic productivity, the dangers of “provocative” unions and class war, 
anti-communism and nationalism as a means to fight those dangers? We don’t have much 
evidence to reflect on those important questions, but one master worker from Sungurlar 
Factory wrote a letter to the union newspaper that mentioned how he and his family passed 
through a difficult time in their lives thanks to the help of his boss. In this letter, the worker 
praised the enterprise as a benevolent one.1048 Yet, we do not know if the larger portions of 
the metal workers shared the same feelings towards their bosses and enterprises. Based on the 
workers’ language, which can more obviously be followed during the Kavel and succeeding 
strikes, the workers’ feelings appear to be closer to grievance and complaints, rather than 
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gratitude. I will analyze the features of this language in the next chapter. But since the 
majority of the metal workers participated in collective struggles between 1968 and 1970, we 
can claim that Çelik-İş’s arguments about above-mentioned matters found little footing 
among its members.  
What about workers’ representatives as the most important figures linking workers, 
unions and employers? In this regard, we similarly have little record of the voice of Çelik-İş’s 
representatives on the shop floor. Few of them touched on the importance of getting together 
in a collective to defend their lifestyles and rights.1049 Some others talked about the workers’ 
right to live in a dignified manner, which was implied in the Constitution.1050 Some others 
declared their belief in fighting against communism and provocative unionism as a way to 
win their rights. Similarly, they emphasized the need to attain workers’ rights through 
peaceful means. They also talked about the necessity of mutual respect to secure workplace 
peace.1051 In this sense, the Çelik-İş’s representatives seem to share the ideological framework 
of the union, but we don’t have conclusive findings to debate further how language shifted in 
their relations with workers on shop floor, or even if it did. Nor can we determine 
conclusively if the representatives revised or modified that language. 
 
IV. Conclusion 
An important repercussion of the 1963 Labor Law was the growth in union 
membership and further institutionalization of workplace conflicts between workers and 
employers/managers: accordingly, the ideological shifts and policies of the organizations 
gained importance in explaining shop floor relations and the struggle between those groups. 
And the transformation of Maden-İş’s official discourse towards a more radical one further 
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intimidated the metal bosses who had already plainly showed their reluctance about this 
union’s presence in their factories during the 1964 strikes. When this combined with their 
rigid objections to the metal workers’ demands about high wages and more democratic 
workplace relations, shop floor relations in the İstanbul metal sector became increasingly 
difficult. The presence of Çelik-İş, which had adopted a staunch anti-communist line, would 
further radicalize the struggle at the end of the decade.  
Yet, the important question of “why” still remains. Why, indeed, were the majority of 
metal workers not attracted by the Çelik-İş discourse that was characterized by the model of 
business unionism? Why did the metal workers participate in collective actions against the 
same union that provided them with important wage increases, especially in the collective 
agreements of 1964 and 1965, and even won them extra benefits? In fact, the union 
prioritized the material gains of workers during its bargaining with employers. Its 
communications highlighted how the union had battled and won wage increases and benefits 
for its members and1052 the union journal was full of news about benefits like maternity, coal, 
or school benefits provided by the union itself to its members.1053 In Levent Metal Hardware 
Factory, the union staged a strike when the employer/manager did not recognize the 
union’s/worker’s demands. Furthermore, the union organized circumcision feasts for the 
children of its members.1054 Similarly, why did most of the metal workers act against those 
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bosses who provided them with their “deserved share” from the profits of the factories and 
benefits to improve workers’ and their families’ living conditions? Why did the shop floor 
relations between workers-unions and employers become so heated at the end of the decade? 
We’ve seen some answers to those questions posed above; such as the radicalization 
of the union’s politics that severed relations between Çelik-İş, Maden-İş, and the metal 
employers. The bosses’ extreme intolerance to Maden-İş and DİSK also factored into the long 
and harsh battles in the sector, a union that they assumed was a satellite of the Marxist TİP, 
and thus one of the main actors fighting to destroy the current order. But the union’s shifting 
political ideologies remains an insufficient factor, in and of itself, to explain why the majority 
of the metal workers preferred Maden-İş over Çelik-İş in the fight against employer 
oppression. The answer lies in the course of shop floor relations: in particular, in the issues of 
decreasing wages and representation problems, both of which gave the İstanbul metal workers 
the final incentive to joine the collective fights between 1968 and 1970. 
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CHAPTER 9 
MODERN MANAGEMENT AND THE METAL WORKERS ON THE SHOP 
FLOOR: THE AGE OF THE COLLECTIVE AGREEMENT 
“There is another class that stands against us beyond 
all. Unless we workers will get together and be as 
one against this class, they will crush us (...) We 
have to get together. We constitute the majority, but 
our words are not effective anywhere.”1055 
 
These were the words of Ahmet Sürmene, a metal worker, just before the notorious 
labor upsurge of June 15-16th, 1970. Sürmene and his fellow workers felt that the necessity 
of being unified stemmed from their common experiences in their factory and city lives. Their 
conviction became even further consolidated during the collective struggles at the end of the 
decade. Not having any say in their workplace, and having a desire to change this situation, 
led Ahmet Sürmene and his fellow metal workers to act together at the end of the 1960s. The 
metal workers collectively responded in an effort to make themselves respected citizens who 
had the right to speak their opinions on events in the workplace. As a result, the metal sector 
in İstanbul experienced very contentious years with the workers’ collective actions that 
occurred between 1968 and 1970; several factories were occupied, several of them witnessed 
strikes and other kinds of collective actions, and the metal workers asked, or forced, the 
bosses/managers of factories to recognize the union and workers’ representatives which had 
been chosen by themselves, by free vote.  
There were two basic, underlying reasons, which drove the metal workers to act 
collectively; one was insufficient income to provide for their families, and the other was the 
absence of proper mechanisms through which workers could make their demands. Their 
battle was to make their freely chosen union the authorized workers’ body on the shop floor, 
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since the majority of the metal workers did not feel Çelik-İş was a proper mechanism to 
represent them. Furthermore, even in the workplaces in which Maden-İş was organized, the 
bosses/managers’ oppression of the unionized workers went on until after the mid-1960s. 
Consequently, the metal workers’ struggle was a struggle to be organized. 
 In essence, the post-Labor Law conditions on the shop floor, which were assumed to 
be characterized by the mutual agreement of the workers and employers through collective 
bargaining, accounted for the labor upsurge in the factories. In this sense, the workers’ fights 
referred to the workers’ attempts to intervene in work relations, which had formerly been 
unilaterally organized by the metal bosses/managers. The social justice promised by the state 
regulations, the 1963 Labor Law, and even the employer’s association, had ignited the 
workers’ hopes of getting their deserved share of the national wealth and having their 
respected place as citizens in the social hierarchy in the early parts of the decade. The workers 
had been promised a decent life in the cities with their families, and their relations with the 
employers were to have been based on mutual respect in the workplaces. Yet, the story of the 
İstanbul metal worker progressed in nearly the opposite direction: the majority of the labor 
force neither reached a lifestyle which would provide for their families, nor did they 
experience a democratic work relationship based on a recognition of workers’ rights, and 
respect for the diligent and loyal citizen’s hard work. 
But the issue of worker empowerment was still there for the metal bosses/managers. 
The 1964 Strikes led the owners/managers of the larger plants, in particular, to reflect on the 
difficulty of ruling their workplaces by depending on force and oppression. In fact, after the 
1964 Strikes, the metal bosses/managers increased wages and gave benefits to workers. 
Furthermore, they applied certain so-called scientific managerial techniques to both get 
workers’ consent and create loyalty among them to the workplace. However, most metal 
workers still felt overly exposed to injustices caused by the bosses/managements’ profit 
“greediness” and “intolerant” attitudes towards workers’ demands, despite the fact that 
several enterprises applied the “scientific methods” of work evaluation systems to garner 
commitment among workers and increase profits. Wage increases, furthermore, began to 
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dwindle in the face of the rising inflation towards the end of the decade. Most metal bosses 
were not eager to recognize what they saw as the “communist and militant” Maden-İş, which 
was perceived by most metal workers as the true union to defend their interests efficiently. 
 
I. The Era of Modern Management in the İstanbul Metal Sector 
 As mentioned previously, the idea and practices of modern-scientific management 
emerged and developed in North America at the end of the nineteenth century. After the 
Second World War, those ideas and practices were imported by developing countries. In fact, 
the ideas and practices of “scientific” management, as developed in the United States, were 
received as the “true” and “sole” model in Turkey during the 1950s and 1960s. These ideas 
were brought to the country by students who were educated in the West, in institutions that 
operated to disseminate these “modern ideas” to the rest of the world. The students who 
received their MA, MB and/or Ph.D from universities in the United States began to return to 
Turkey and they were recruited by the big or mid-sized private or public enterprises as 
managers. In the context of the development of the private industrial sector, “scientific” 
management was also imported to the country via several educational institutions, such as the 
Institute of Business Economics at the University of İstanbul, which was established in the 
mid-1950s under the model of business schools in the US. The Institute received a 
considerable amount of financial support from Harvard Business School during its first years. 
The managers who were trained in the US were also influential in the dissemination of the 
ideas and practices of scientific management in Turkey during the 1960s. Furthermore, upon 
the advice of the US’ officials who often visited Turkey to contribute to the industrial 
development of the country, Türk Sevk ve İdare Derneği (The Turkish Management 
Association-TSİD) was founded in 1962 to train managers in the ways of scientific 
management techniques, in order to increase profits and successfully control the labor 
process. Afer publishing a journal in 1966, TSİD also organized several conferences, in which 
employers/managers from various private and public enterprises participated, about the ideas 
and practices of scientific management. Furthermore, the scholars began to publish books on 
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the ideas and practices of scientific management and possible ways to implement them in the 
Turkish enterprises, during the beginning of the 1960s.1056 
The period between 1964 and 1968 saw some employers/managers make an effort to 
provide a sense of fairness to the workers in the İstanbul metal industry by applying these 
ideas and using the practices of scientific management. The 1964 Strikes truly motivated the 
metal bosses/managers to tackle the issues of workers more closely. The general manager of 
Arçelik, Ali Mansur, admitted that he was keenly aware of the abyss between workers and 
managers in terms of their work relations during the 1964 Strike in the factory. Consequently, 
he attempted to improve his relations with workers through “scientific management 
methods.”1057 The idea of scientific management, which was thought to provide stability in 
the workplace by getting both employers and employees interests together and increasing 
productivity in turn, had penetrated into the agenda of the metal bosses by the end of the 
1950s. The metal bosses/managers saw it as an opportunity to determine the distribution of 
extra benefits by applying work evaluation system to calculate each workers’ labor 
“scientifically.” But almost none of them had reflected on improving their professional 
relationships with workers, or thought of creating proper channels through which workers 
could voice their problems and demands. Most managers still counted on the lure of extra 
benefits and the aversive items in the collective agreements, plus the work evaluation system, 
                                                             
1056  For some of those studies, look at: Mehmet Oluç, İşletme Organizasyonu ve Yönetimi [The 
Organization and Management of Enterprises], (İstanbul: İstanbul Üniversitesi İşletme Fakültesi 
Yayınları, 1963); İlhami Karayalçın, Zaman Etütleri [The Researches on Time], (n.p.: Sümerbank 
Merinos Yünlü Sanayi Müessesi Eğitim Bürosu Yayınları, no. 39, 1965); İlhami Karayalçın, 
Organizasyon Planlaması [The Planning of Organizations], (İstanbul: İstanbul Teknik Üniversitesi, 
1966); İlhami Karayalçın, Hareket Araştırması [The Research on Motion], (İstanbul: İstanbul Teknik 
Üniversitesi, 1968). For the influences of the US’ officials on the foundation of TSİD, see: Şahap 
Kocatopçu, “The Role of Management in the Development of Turkish Industry.” For examples of the 
secondary literature on the coming of the ideas and practices of the scientific management to Turkey, 
see: Atilla Baransel, Çağdaş Yönetim Düşüncesinin Evrimi [The Evolution of the Contemporary 
Management Thought], (İstanbul: İstanbul Üniversitesi İşletme Fakültesi Yayınları, 1979); Behlül 
Üsdiken and Yorgo Pasadeos, “Türkiye’de Örgütler ve Yönetim Yazını [The Organizations and 
Management Literature in Turkey]”, Amme İdaresi Journal, 26/2 (1993): 73-93; Ayşe Buğra, Devlet ve 
İşadamları [State and Businessman], (İstanbul: İletişim, 1997); Behlül Üsdiken, “Importing Theories 
of Management and Organization,” International Studies of Management & Organization, vol. 26, no. 
3, (1996): 33-46; Behlül Üsdiken, Nisan Selekler and Demet Çetin, “Türkiye’de Yönetim Yazınına 
Egemen Anlayışın Oluşumu: Sevk ve İdare Dergisi Üzerine Bir İnceleme [The Emergence of the 
Dominant Ideas on the Management Literature in Turkey: A Research on the Journal of Organization 
and Management],” Amme İdaresi Journal, vol. 31, no. 1, (March 1998): 57-87. 
1057 Mamulattan Markaya Arçelik Kurum Tarihi, 1955-2000 [From Product to Brand: The Institutional 
History of Arçelik], (n.p.: Arçelik Anonim Şirketi, 2001), 169-170. 
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the presence of a union that was assumed to deal fairly with management, and their more 
forceful techniques of oppression of workers as they ruled the factories after the 1964 Strike. 
The only exception to this mindset would be the owners/managers of the Arçelik Factory who 
took a different tone in employee relations. 
In addition to the strikes, the strengthening of the metal sector and the planned 
capacity expansion of some big metal plants encouraged the bosses/managers to devise 
certain ideas for dealing with work relations more efficiently. By the mid-1960s, big factories 
such as Arçelik, Türk Demir Döküm and Otosan increased both the scale and scope of their 
production. By 1962, production in Demir Döküm had significantly increased and its 
production per worker increased by 27 percent. The factory was further expanded by 300 
percent in 1965, and this capacity expansion work lasted until 1967.1058 Similarly, the Arçelik 
Factory went through a capacity expansion after 1964, and it moved to a new plant in the 
Anatolian side of the city at the end of the decade. Likewise, the General Electric Factory 
made new investments in 1967, and the Otosan Factory increased its production capacity in 
1965.1059  All those expansions contributed to the growing number of workers and to an 
increasing work pace.  
As a result, the managers of such enterprises began to reflect on better ways of 
dealing with workers who, in an increasing number, might instigate a rise in shop floor 
tensions. For example, Bernar Nahum expressed his concerns about the rising probability of 
strike due to the growing number of workers in the factory, in his letter to Vehbi Koç in 1965, 
written upon the planning of the expansion in Otosan.1060 The important problems of earning 
workers’ loyalties in order to prevent collective resistance, and at the same time maintain 
work discipline, penetrated more notably into the agenda of the metal bosses/managers after 
                                                             
1058 “Türk Demir Döküm Fabrikaları [The Türk Demir Döküm Factories],” Bizden Haberler, no. 9 
(October 1966): 10-11; “Türk Demir Döküm,” Çelik-İş, year 3, no. 77 (1 April 1967): 3; 
Demirdöküm’de 50 Yıl [The Fifty Years in Demirdöküm], (n.p.: Türk Demir Döküm Fabrikaları 
Anonim Şirketi, 2004), 67-76. 
1059 “1967 Yılında Koç Holding Çalışmalarına Toplu Bir Bakış [A General Outlook to the Works in the 
Koç Holding Company in 1967],” Bizden Haberler, no. 15 (June 1968): 10; Bernar Nahum, Koç’ta 44 
Yılım [My 44 Years in Koç], (İstanbul: Milliyet, 1988), 127-139. 
1060 Ibid., 134. 
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the mid 1960s; as a consequence, several tactics were used by the managers to meet their 
goals. 
The first widespread tactic of the metal employers to earn the workers’ loyalty was to 
provide extra benefits to support workers and their families, in addition to wages. In fact, 
nearly all the metal plants provided workers with this economic incentive through the first 
collective agreements signed in 1964 and 1965. Most of the agreements, whether signed in 
the period of the first agreements or in the succeeding periods, supplied the employees with 
important bonuses, premiums and several extra benefits, or money to help the worker who 
had lost his/her spouse or children, or extra fuel funds for the winter.1061 Furthermore, for the 
first time, wages in the metal sector reached beyond the level of the living indices in 1965. 
But those wages, which constituted the most significant portion of the workers’ income, came 
to be undermined in time, although plants kept on providing benefits, notwithstanding. But 
the metal bosses/managers had several concerns about wage increases in the sector. From the 
beginning of 1967, the metal employers/managers had already begun to complain that the 
higher wages were greatly damaging their businesses.1062 Their concerns reached a peak in 
1969, 1063  when the bosses/managers seemed determined to provide an income level 
insufficient for the metal workers to consider accepting. 
                                                             
1061 Arçelik A.Ş. Toplu İş Sözleşmesi [Arçelik Joint Stock Company: The Collective Work Agreement], 
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no. 16, 1971). 
1062 MESS: VII. Genel Kurul Müzakere ve Karar Tutanağı [MESS: The Report of the Proceedings and 
Decisions of the Seventh General Assembly], 14 November 1967, Tarih Vakfı, Orhan Tuna Archive; 
Dünden Sonraki Gün [The Day After Yesterday] (İstanbul: MESS Yayını no. 601, 2010), 35-38. 
1063 “Toplu Pazarlık Rejiminde İşletmelerin Ücret Sorunları [The Wage Problems of Enterprises In the 
Collective Bargaining Regime],” MESS-İşveren, no. 88 (1 November 1968): 1; Ertuğrul Soysal, 
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Another widespread tactic was to provide premiums and hand out promotions to 
employees who were the hardest working and most loyal to their superiors on the shop floor 
level. The Rabak Factory’s collective agreement included a promise to give premiums to 
employees who devised ways of increasing productivity.1064 The Singer plant management 
promoted the workers who were most diligent, and several workers who had been unqualified 
in the beginning were promoted to supervisor of their sections. This company also rewarded 
the most determined workers. 1065  Likewise, other factories opened educational courses 
through which unqualified workers would be trained to be mastermen, and the company 
otherwise rewarded its hardest working employees. 1066  But the most well-known and 
widespread strategy to earn the workers’ loyalty was undoubtedly the work evaluation 
system, implemented to create a sense of fairness among employees and increase productivity 
and profit, simultaneously. 
In fact, evaluation systems were much discussed in Turkey during the 1960s. The 
importance of a system to create both a sense of fairness and a rise in productivity was 
emphasized in several conferences, books and journals. The authors or speakers argued that a 
work evaluation system would end wage injustices on the shop floor by imposing an 
“objective criteria” on the workers’ earnings or promotions. As a result, it would yield worker 
motivation and increased productivity.1067 The metal employers’ organization, MESS, made 
                                                                                                                                                                              
“Sanayimizde İşçi Ücretleri [The Workers’ Wages in Our Industry],” MESS-İşveren, no. 104 (1 July 
1969).  
1064 Türkiye Maden-İş Sendikası İle Rabak Elektrolitik Bakır ve Mamulleri A.Ş. Arasında Toplu İş 
Sözleşmesi ve İç Yönetmeliği [The Collective Work Agreement and Factory Rules and Regulations 
Between Maden-İş and Rabak Electrolitic Copper Products Joint Stock Company], in effective 
between 1967-1968, 17.  
1065 Mahmut C. Mucuoğlu, “İhracat Gayesile Sevk ve İdare [The Management For the Exportation],” 
Sevk ve İdare (1966): 104; Singer’e Hoşgeldiniz, 7. 
1066 A.T. Yazman, “Bugünkü Otosan! [Today’s Otosan],” Bizden Haberler, no. 15 (June 1968): 2; 
“Otosan Bayramı [The Otosan Festival],” Bizden Haberler, no. 12 (September 1966): 10; Benim Adım 
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6.1963, Tarih Vakfı, Orhan Tuna Archive; Mahmut C. Mucuoğlu, “İş Etüdü Verimin Arttırılmasında 
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its first attempts to put the “scientific” work evaluation system into practice in 1964, based on 
the assumption that this system would alleviate the injustices stemming from the differences 
between workers’ wages by bringing the rule of equal wage for equal work. By this system, it 
was assumed the managers would have the chance to analyze the workers’ merits impartially 
and efficiently. MESS organized seminars to stress the importance of managers ruling their 
workplaces in a “scientific” manner. 1068  Although MESS could not practice this system 
organization-wide until 1969, several factories individually applied it on the shop floor.1069 
Yet, with the exception of a few cases, the application of this system contributed to the 
workers’ sense of injustice and their frustration over factory work policies, contrary to the 
expectations of managers. 
 
Figure 22: A figure which symbolizes a worker in a “modern workplace”. (Source: Sevk ve İdare, no. 
1-4, 1966, 86). 
 
Above all, the work evaluation system significantly automated the workers’ 
movements by defining a specific job for each worker. As portrayed in the above figure, the 
system also assumed a time interval for the each job to be finished and managers promised to 
reward workers who were able to finish their duties in the shortest time. The workers were 
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forced to work harder and faster in order to finish the job within the prescribed time 
allotments. In the Singer Factory: 
“A worker uses the mill and makes a hole with five different machines by 
plugging and detaching the unit, all within a 1.02 minute time interval (after 
which time the entire process starts again).”1070 
 
 
Figure 23: An example from the work evaluation system from the Singer Factory. The numbers show 
the hours and minutes which the workers were expected to invest in finishing specific jobs. (Source: 
Sevk ve İdare, no. 1-4, 1966, 103). 
 
In this so-called scientific system, neither workers nor unions had any say in 
changing or revising the objective criteria that, again, “scientifically and impartially” 
evaluated each worker. And the workers’ income was determined through these 
evaluations.1071 As a result, the managers had nearly complete control over the work process 
through this system, and since it was applied and interpreted by the managers/foremen, it was 
hard to persuade the workers of “the scientific and impartial” characteristics of the system. 
Despite growing worker frustration, most big metal plants kept the system, or began applying 
the work evaluation system for the first time, on the assumption and rhetoric of it being a 
scientific, objective and impartial measure of work. 
 
II. Arçelik: A Unique Case? 
The Arçelik Factory was a distinct example, in terms of the scale and scope of the 
work evaluation system and other managerial tactics to create a commitment among the 
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workers to bosses/managers. Despite this, the majority of the Arçelik workers would demand 
to be represented by Maden-İş at the end of the decade; in other words, employers/managers 
could not derive workers’ consent as extensively as they hoped, even under supposedly 
improved factory work relations. Arçelik had been applying the work system to give a sense 
of fairness to the employees since 1960. 1072  Adhering to the rules of the system, the 
management often evaluated the workers by measuring each workers’ movements and 
efficiency within a given time.1073 Work was defined in the factory journal in 1969 as follows: 
“Each worker assembles an unit on the assembly line. The work never stops 
and demands constant attention. The clock immediately reveals which 
workers are slow.”1074 
 
The Arçelik Factory was exceptional in getting workers’ consent to the system. Here, 
the management organized seminars to examine time and motion studies in the factory in 
1965. In those, the workers were shown how to use the given time efficiently to increase 
productivity.1075 One researcher who analyzed the work evaluation systems claimed that the 
Arçelik workers were clearly told about the details of the system, and their complaints were 
carefully examined by the management. According to him, most workers, therefore, gave 
their consent to the system.1076 In addition to the management’s close interest to the workers’ 
complaints, the tangible benefits of work evaluation must have factored in the workers’ 
presumed consent. The system even promised the chance of being promoted to everyone who 
worked hard enough and was able to show their merit, 1077  and the factory organized 
examinations for promotions by 1965. In the first year, 81 workers out of 144 applicants were 
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promoted through the exam results. The number increased to 204 workers out of 312 
applicants in 1967.1078 It is important to note that, rather than asking for knowledge about 
their jobs, the exam’s questions were rather about the pros and cons of the strike and work 
discipline.1079 It seems the exam was conducted to evaluate the loyalty of the workers, rather 
than their merits and hard work. 
Arçelik was also a distinct example in terms of the management’s several other 
attempts to earn workers’ consent to the factory and management. Arçelik management 
argued for the need to bestow the workers with a factory identity. According to Cansen: 
“(…) That means, [our aim, a.n.] was to create a unified spirit within Arçelik. 
It was our main goal. We always wanted to make ‘Arçelik worker’ the 
second identity of the employees (…).”1080  
 
Ali Mansur, who claimed that he understood the lack of communication between 
workers and managers during the 1964 Strike, decided to publish a factory journal called 
Arçelik’te Bir Ay [A Month in Arçelik]. The journal was first published and distributed to 
workers in 1965. It aimed to create a factory identity among the employees.1081 To this end, 
the articles in the journal hit upon the idea that the factory rose through the common work of 
all its members, including workers. It described Arçelik as a family and the general manager, 
Lütfü Doruk, called the employees from the journal pages “children.” Several articles in the 
journal also often emphasized developing the Arçelik family further through diligent work. It 
was assumed that the national industry and wealth would develop, in turn.1082 In addition to 
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the journal, the Arçelik company attempted to earn worker’s commitment through mastership 
and apprentice courses. The company opened a mastership course in 1964, an apprenticeship 
course in 1960, and another in 1965 after the factory was moved to Çayırova, in order to 
infuse workers with a factory identity starting from childhood. For example, Celalettin Kiriş 
attended those courses in Sütlüce in the early 1960 and then he began work in the assembly 
line.1083 With the apprenticeship course, the management recognized an opportunity with the 
workers’ children. In fact, workers’ children attended the course starting in 1965 and, as a 
result of this training, it was assumed that those workers’ children who were indoctrinated 
with the institutional culture of Arçelik would see the enterprise as their home.1084  
Management also sought other ways of creating a sense of fairness and family 
identity amongst workers. After 1965, the managers, including the top officers, began to sit at 
the same cafeteria tables with the workers in an attempt to improve relations with them.1085 
The factory also provided medical examinations to the workers’ children and even school 
sundries.1086 It organized night festivals called “Arçelik Nights” in which both workers and 
managers socialized together.1087 The management even founded a solidarity association for 
the employees in order to give social aid to its members. 1088  But the most sophisticated 
management plan was to establish an “Arçelik City” where the company would provide 
workers with houses surrounding a factory: 
“We will create such a surrounding and such a city that, for example, the 
master Zeki in my mould section will talk about Arçelik when he goes home 
at night (…) He will talk about his day at the factory, his problems; for 
example, how he did the mould, what kind of problems he encountered; then, 
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how he tackled those problems. The boy or child of master Zeki will listen 
this conversation, he will get used to Arçelik right from his childhood and 
when the age of work comes for him, ultimately, he will apply to Arçelik 
first, either as worker, master, engineer, or the manager…consequently, 
Arçelik will become a family at first, then a school, and finally a small 
city.”1089 
 
Yet, the Arçelik City projects failed. According to Ege Cansen, workers preferred to 
stay in Pendik, Kartal or Tuzla districts, rather than the surrounding factory community that 
was seen as a deserted place. 1090  However, the other methods seemed to contribute to 
developing the majority of the workers’ loyalty to the factory, at least in the first years of the 
mid-1960s. Ege Cansen recalled that worker-employer relations progressed in a different way 
in Arçelik compared to the other factories. 1091  The stories and narratives of the Arçelik 
workers that we are able trace in the factory journal confirmed Ege Cansen’s comment to 
certain extent. 
It is evident that widespread promotions were a main contributor to worker loyalty in 
the Arçelik Factory. Several workers who had been trained as apprentices in the factory found 
their chance to climb the ladder of work hierarchy. For example, Celalettin Kırış began to 
attend an apprenticeship course in 1965. After three years of education, he was assigned to 
the assembly line as a worker. Then, he was promoted to work in the research laboratory 
within the factory. 1092  Furthermore, several workers stated their contentment with the 
promotion system. They thought that it was a fair system, since those who deserved it most 
would have the chance to be promoted.1093 Thus, the management, is appears, was successful 
                                                             
1089 Mamulattan Markaya Arçelik Kurum Tarihi, 153-154. 
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in creating a commitment among the workers to the factory, their jobs, or even to the 
management itself.  
The workers’ own voices confirm this assumption. İsmail Erkan claimed that he was 
very proud of being in Arçelik. Muhittin Öztürk stated his contentment with the enterprise 
giving workers all their rights.1094 Likewise, Orhan Güven voices his contentment in working 
in Arçelik, which he said was one of the best and benevolent enterprises in Turkey. Veli 
Toptankaya was also grateful to Arçelik, because it was through their help that he bought his 
house. Aytekin Babalık stated that there was good work discipline in Arçelik, and that meant 
workers valued their labor there.1095 Mustafa Kaleli claimed that all his children were raised 
on the “bread of Arçelik”. He also claims that he was very happy about the Arçelik Nights. 
He advised his fellow workers to obey the orders in any enterprises in which workers earned 
their living.1096 An Arçelik worker also stated that the workers should obey the orders of their 
superiors.1097 This overall sense of fairness and contentment about working in Arçelik drove 
workers to feel loyal to management, to their orders, and to existing factory rules. 
In this regard, the workers seemed to internalize the notion of family. In a poem 
written by a worker from the welding section: 
 “This is the welding section 
 Everyone is enthusiastic to work 
 You will see everyone at the bench before the ring 
 (…) 
 The climate of the section changes suddenly 
 The welding section turns to a festive place 
 Our greasy clothes, darkened hands 
 We keep working with pleasure. 
                                                             
1094  “İki Arkadaşımızla Başbaşa [Together With Two Our Friends],” Arçelik’te Bir Ay, no. 4 
(December 1965): 6. 
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 (…) 
 Arçelik is our benefactor 
 Our value is known there 
 We are all grateful to our Father 
 We say good day to the Arçelik family.”1098 
 
In a similar manner, Hüseyin Şenyer expressed his feelings as following: 
“(…) They [the trucks, a.n.] carry our perfectly produced goods by taking 
them from the door to the service of our beloved land and to all the world, for 
the comfort and peace of the humanity (…)I feel myself lucky to work in this 
happy home.”1099 
 
Veli Güner, who was content to work in Arçelik, defined the factory as a family and 
called Lütfü Doruk the ‘father’.1100 In conclusion, the Arçelik management seemed to be 
successful in creating worker loyalty to the factory itself. 
Nonetheless, the factory commitment or identity did not necessarily mean loyalty to 
the management in Arçelik. First of all, management techniques, promotions being the most 
important of those tactics, had weakened in their efficacy towards the end of the decade. The 
number of workers who got promotions slightly decreased in Arçelik at that time.1101 And 
secondly, the workers’ own labor, rather than gratitude towards the bosses/managers, was at 
the center of the factory identity. In other words, the workers’ factory commitment stemmed 
from the idea that the factory developed on the shoulders of workers. In parallel with the 
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management discourse, the workers advised their fellow workers to work hard to improve 
both Arçelik and themselves.1102 According to Mehmet Anar: 
“Arçelik is at the right place in the national development with its product and 
its workers. It has a say and stake in the fate of the land.”1103 
 
In this sense, their “loyalty” referred at the same time to their jobs or the goods they 
produced, for which the workers had contributed their hard labor. For example, the workers 
of the Polisaj Section wrote of pride in their work in articles from the factory journal.1104 
Another worker also stated that he was proud of his labor and products.1105 The workers 
believed that the factory flourished on the shoulders of workers.1106 The development of 
Arçelik, which the workers made possible, also meant the development of the nation.  
Despite all the management’s efforts and its relative success in earning worker’s 
commitment to the factory, the Arçelik workers would choose to be represented by Maden-İş 
at the end of the decade. In fact, in 1970 the majority of workers in the factory sided with 
Maden-İş, which was not well thought of by the employers, just like the other metal workers 
in different factories. Furthermore, the Arçelik became a contentious place in terms of 
worker-employers relations. The Arçelik workers were at the forefront in the June 15-16th 
events, which Ege Cansen described as a trauma for that factory.1107 Açelik management was 
successful in creating a kind of factory commitment among the employees; but this 
commitment did not necessarily mean a complete obedience to the management or 
management rules. It is true the management of this factory was unique among the other 
private metal factories located in İstanbul, in terms of its sophisticated managerial tactics. 
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However, even in such a place, the majority of the metal workers wanted to have their own 
organizations to ensure their rights. 
 
III. Wages, High Work Tempo and the Problem of Representation 
Although a lot of collective agreements were signed between workers and employers 
with an eye to pursue peaceful relations in the metal sector, the İstanbul metal workers were 
still frustrated over working conditions. The main factors which had driven workers to 
organize in a union in the first place did not dramatically change in the era of the collective 
agreements. Firstly, although the increasing scale and scope of the factories contributed to the 
build-up of workers in sheer numbers, general labor demographics hardly changed after the 
mid-1960s. And although some parts of the labor force that had been hired, especially after 
the mid-50s, were older, a significant number of the workers were still young, uneducated, 
male migrants. Most of those men arrived in the big city to provide for their families and/or 
have a decent life. Ahmet Sürmene says that he had to come to the big city with his wife and 
children out of a state of misery in his village.1108 Likewise, most of the workers with whom I 
conducted interviews said they came to İstanbul in the mid-1960s to escape the impoverished 
conditions of their birthplaces. 1109  These people had already been married with children 
before migrating to the city, or were married soon after finding a job in the sector. According 
to the MESS’s statistics, more than sixty percent of them were married with children by 
1969.1110 Furthermore, they were the sole income earners within their households. One metal 
worker claimed that most of his fellow workers were the sole wage earners within the 
household, while their wives dealt with the domestic duties and took care of the children.1111 
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The voice of the metal workers verified this status of the workers. 1112 It would appear that the 
metal workers’ main concern was tangible; providing for their spouses and children was still 
the main concern of the metal workers. 
Secondly, the socialization patterns of the metal workers, which contributed in the 
workers’ unity within the workplaces and collective actions, remained intact. Whether old or 
young, the workers continued to live in the squatter houses that surrounded the workplaces. 
They engaged in established community patterns that mostly revolved around networks based 
on residents’ original birthplaces.1113 Those community ties would help them to find jobs in 
the metal workplaces. An ex-Demir Döküm worker, Aziz Amca, mentions that he was able to 
find work in the factory through one of his relatives in 1967.1114 Another old Demir Döküm 
worker, Mustafa Türker’s maternal uncle, had been employed since the construction of Demir 
Döküm and with his uncle’s help, Türker was recruited to the factory as a painter to spray 
products with a special pistol in the enamel section.1115 Seyfi Çağan’s father also helped him 
to find a job in Demir Döküm in 1964.1116 Such a process must have resulted in the quick 
adaptation of the new workers into the social networks within the factory. With so many 
relatives around them, it must have been easy for the new workers to adopt the established 
social networks within the workplaces and develop a commitment to the factory. This 
commitment and involvement might have enhanced the attitudes of both of consent and 
demur among the workers – an attitude that I will discuss at the end of the chapter. 
Thirdly, there seems no significant social fragmentation to factor into the collective 
action patterns between the metal workers in terms of the requirements of jobs, which they 
were assigned to perform. For example, based on the interviews, the Demirdöküm workers, 
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who either worked in the foundry section to carry the cast iron,1117 or worked in the rectify 
section to determine the quality of radiators,1118 participated in the invasion of the factory in 
August 1969. In fact, Hüseyin Ekinci, who actively participated in most of the collective 
actions in the region between 1968-1970 as the chair of Silahtarağa district of Maden-İş, 
performed a so-called unqualified job, carrying out the raw materials to trucks in the Rabak 
Factory.1119 Unqualified workers who had not been trained to perform certain jobs that require 
expert knowledge still constituted the majority of the total employees in the metal sector. 
According to the MESS’s statistics, more than half of the metal workers had graduated only 
from primary school by 1969.1120 Similarly, a Maden-İş report stated that nearly 20 percent of 
the metal workers were illiterate and 50 percent of them had graduated only from primary 
school. For example, Mustafa Birinci could not continue in school due to a lack of financial 
opportunities for his father who had been a worker, too. He had to go out and find work when 
he was fourteen.1121 In the same vein, İlyas Kabil, a worker from Kavel, began to work after 
graduating from primary school.1122 Furthermore, the majority of the work force, who were 
assigned to do jobs those require certain knowledge, did not have any formal education for 
their jobs; they were mostly trained on the job, or through courses that the factories’ 
management organized.1123 İsmet Amca, an old Demir Döküm worker who was assigned a 
job that required measuring camshafts and threading radiators so that bungs could be plugged, 
claims that he had no prior knowledge about his job and he learned every skill in the 
factory.1124 Mustafa Türker also says that he learned to paint the furnaces, stoves and radiators 
with the help of his maternal uncle during the job.1125 This culture of transmission of skill 
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from worker to worker must have also alleviated the social divisions within work force on the 
shop floor to some level, and contributed to unity between workers.  
But those divisions, which one would think might arise out of gender, skill or birth 
place differences, did not reflect on the worker’s collective actions. In fact, the metal workers 
collectively rose up at the end of the decade, firstly against those men (i.e. bosses, managers) 
who did not recognize workers’ rights, or and Çelik-İş’s men, who were assumed not to be 
working on behalf of workers. The workers’ continuing grievances on the shop floor truly 
motivated the metal workers to join in the collective actions at the end of the decade. The 
sense of not having a say in the labor process greatly factored into the metal worker’s 
widespread collective actions at the end of the decade. For the metal workers, there were two 
main sources of their grievances: the first one was a lack of decent income to sustain 
themselves and their families in İstanbul, and the second was the lack of mechanism for the 
workers to affect the progress of work relations on the shop floor. 
The framework set forth for social justice in Turkey had promised workers that the 
institutionalization and formalization of work relations through collective agreements would 
force employers to respect and recognize employee rights on the shop floor, and would 
further provide them with a decent lifestyle. Nonetheless, it is difficult to demonstrate that the 
metal workers experienced a democratic industrial relationship after the mid-1960s; the 1964 
collective agreements did not relieve the oppression of the metal workers. Only a few 
enterprises resorted to modern management techniques based on getting the consent of the 
workers in the progress of work relations. In our interview, Nuri Çelik claimed that most 
managers in the metal sector were uncompromising, unlike the Arçelik managers led by Ege 
Cansen who reflected on the beneficial side of the “industrial democracy.” Most of them, like 
Burhan Günergun who was the general manager of Demir Döküm, were very oppressive.1126 
In fact, a Demir Döküm worker, Kasım Sert, says that he had been oppressed by the managers 
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ever since he was recruited to the factory in 1967.1127 The vague word “oppression” was 
reiterated by the majority of the metal workers who joined in the collective actions. But what 
does it mean exactly? What kind of oppressions were the metal workers exposed to on the 
shop floor? 
The word “oppression” firstly referred to the income issue for the metal workers. 
While it was true that the collective agreements signed after 1964 gave significant benefits to 
the workers in addition to the wage increases, the benefits still constituted only a small 
portion of the workers’ income. Although there is no exact data to show the changes in the 
wages of the metal workers between 1965 and 1970 within the factories, or in comparison 
with other sectors, the real wages which constituted the essential portion of the workers’ 
income began to lag behind consumer price indices in İstanbul by 1970. It is true that if we 
take 1963 as the base year, while real wages increased from 100 to 136 between 1963 and 
1969, price indices increased from 100 to 131 in İstanbul.1128 This meant that the purchasing 
power of waged labor increased after 1963 until 1969. However, the same statistics showed 
the increase in real wages decreased under the level of increases in price indices by 1970.1129 
Other scholars, such as Yıldırım Koç and Korkut Boratav, calculated that the real workers` 
wages increased between 1963 and 1973 in Turkey.1130 The official statistics also show that 
the increase in real wages in the private sector reached its peak in 1969. 1131  But more 
important than the increases in wages was how the metal workers experienced city life in 
İstanbul. Ziya Kayla said in his public declaration in 1969 that consumer price increases had 
actually clawed back the workers’ income hikes in İstanbul.1132 The metal workers keenly felt 
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the reduced buying power of their incomes due to these basic price increases. A worker 
complained that the increasing prices had eradicated workers’ incomes.1133 Likewise, a metal 
worker, Ahmet Sürmene, claimed at the end of the decade that the workers could barely feed 
themselves.1134 Another metal worker describes his low income as follows: 
“I am a worker dwelling in the Kasımpaşa squatter houses. I earn a minimal 
amount of money at the end of the month. I was walking by a grocery store 
with my small child. The child cried a lot. I could not bear it and bought 4 
sugar candies. The grocery asked for 2 TL. I would give 2 out of 5 in my 
pocket for 4 sugar candies. I was surprised since we have not eaten even such 
an expensive vegetable before (...)”1135 
 
Insufficient income was especially suffered by the workers who were recruited into 
the middle sized plants. The Horoz Nail Factory workers complained about their low wages 
in 1969.1136 In the poem of Ali Şahin, a worker from the Aksan Factory, the misery of the 
workers was narrated as follows: 
“A worker should not be hired to work for a 13 TL daily fee 
He does not involve himself in society out of his discontent 
Not every employer has mercy on workers 
When we complain of this, we are labelled as disrupters 
(...) 
 We cannot have the tailor sew clothes and jackets 
The debt to grocery and butcher has increased 
Our needs are too many to be calculated 
Poverty is infused our essence and veins 
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(...) 
A small room is 100 TL to rent 
Children get sick, the weather turns cold 
There is no stew pot and pan to cook a soup 
We do not care about our stomach.”1137 
 
Even the employees of the big metal plants who earned more than their counterparts 
in the middle or small sized metal plants had several hardships to overcome in the fight to 
sustain their families.1138 The recollections of the former Demir Döküm workers confirm the 
problem of low wages, too. İsmet Amca was recruited to Demir Döküm in 1966 and he 
claimed that from the beginning of his job in the factory, he always received poor wages.1139 
Likewise, Ali Can said that the Demir Döküm workers always earned low wages and there 
were few wage increases in the 1960s.1140 Low wages, it appears, were the most severe 
problem for the metal workers, but they were certainly not the only problem. 
Secondly, “oppression” referred to the arbitrary nature of the employers/managers in 
organizing work relations, despite the existence of collective agreements and the Labor Law. 
In brief, oppression encompassed the unlawful acts of the employers/managers regarding the 
progress of work relations on shop floor level and it had a pattern in the sector. First of all, the 
arbitrary acts included the lack of job guarantees in the workplaces. The metal workers were 
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frustrated that the bosses/managers fired them whenever they found appropriate.1141 In fact, 
the metal workers were still working under the threat of being fired at every moment. Some 
metal bosses fired, in particular, the older workers who had higher wages.1142 Secondly, there 
were the issues of arbitrary punishment and unilateral regulation of workplace relations, 
which contributed to widespread unfairness for the metal workers. The metal workers often 
complained about these arbitrary punishments.1143 Some factories cut the Sunday wages of the 
workers without giving any proper reason1144 and some of them did not pay wages on time.1145 
Others paid reduced wages to the workers,1146 or forced workers into overtime hours.1147 
Another tactic was to transfer workers within the factory without getting their consent.1148 The 
Efem workers complained that they were not allowed to go to the workers’ hospital when 
they were sick.1149 Seyfi Çağan said that the dissident workers were transferred to other jobs 
as punishment during the time of Çelik-İş in Demir Döküm.1150 The workers’ narratives on 
this subject show that even the institutionalization of work relations through collective 
agreements did not put an end to unilateral rulings and arbitrary punishments exerted by the 
bosses/managers. The workers I met criticized Çelik-İş for the perceived unfair relations in 
the factories; in fact, when they spoke of the old days of being treated unfairly, they called it 
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the “time of Çelik-İş.” Such a portrayal, which depicts Çelik-İş as and its representatives as 
the ‘men’ of bosses/managers, must be carefully analyzed in the absence of evidence, 
notwithstanding; since, as it was clear from a memory of Ali Can below, the representatives 
of this union attempted to defence worker’s rights in several cases.  
In addition to failing to stop the employers’/managers’ arbitrary behaviour in the 
workplace, the collective agreements tightened workplace discipline by formalizing how the 
workers’ were expected to act on shop floor. In this regard, oppression thirdly meant a strict 
control over the workers’ movements and attitudes within the factories. For instance, the 
managers were free to search workers in the entrance and exit area at the workplaces, 
according to items in the collective agreements. In addition to the strict rules over the arrival, 
breaks and leaving work on time, the factory rules emphasized control over the movement 
and attitude of workers within the factories.1151  And most employers were free to assign any 
workers to any type of work. According to the collective agreements, the employers were 
further free to extend work hours on the condition of extra payment.1152 Some clauses put 
forth that the employers were free to fire the workers whose recovery from illness was 
predicted to last more than 90 days.1153 Those strict rules, and the manner of their application, 
added to the workers’ grievances in the metal sector. One Arçelik worker complained about 
wage cuts due to a slower work pace.1154 İsmet Amca described the strict control as follows: 
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“The workers’ every moment was controlled by the management and Çelik-İş 
employees. Forgive my words, if you had to go to toilet, you had to take 
permission from the foreman in the time of Çelik-İş. There was a strict and 
overwhelming control over the workers.”1155  
 
Likewise, Mehmet Kul recalls that the foremen and gang bosses controlled the 
workers very strictly in Demir Döküm. There was no permission to smoke, or even go to the 
toilet during the work hours.1156 According to Ali Can: 
“Before the resistance, we could not even go to the toilet. I wanted to go to 
the toilet once to urinate. I saw the late Necati who was a foreman at the gate. 
He suddenly began to yell at us that we stayed too long in the toilet. You had 
to return to your work immediately. The foreman watched our every 
movement closely by saying ‘do your jobs fast!’ ”1157 
 
Demir Döküm was not an exception. The Singer workers were similarly frustrated 
over the strict management control of workers.1158 But the items in the collective agreements, 
or arbitrary punishments exerted by bosses/managers, were not the only causes of the 
workers’ frustration over the strict work control. 
The workers’ grievances over the manager’s/foreman’s control over the labor process 
also stemmed from the application of the work evaluation system, which was assumed to 
provide a sense of justice among the workers in the metal plants. According to this system, 
each labor gang was given a valuation point determined according to surveillance of the work 
by the engineers and managers. Mustafa Türker says that: 
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“The managers and engineers watched our every movement. They were 
assigning points to us according to our efficiency in each section and 
team.”1159 
 
As well as this strict control over the labor process, the system yielded a high work 
tempo for the workers by forcing the workers to finish their jobs in certain time to get a high 
wage. The high pace of work was defined in Arçelik as follows: 
“The work tempo in Sütlüce was more serious than that which exists today. 
Every morning, everyone used to sign and enter the factory at 8.00 a.m.. 
Signing the paper at 8.10 a.m. was impossible. As well, as you were not 
allowed to work that day, and your Sunday wages used to be cut. There was 
highly disciplined work.”1160 
 
A visitor to Otosan Factory mentioned the high production pace in the factory, 
too.1161 The Arçelik workers often complained that the hard, fast and relentless work pace 
exhausted the workers.1162 The situation was not different in other factories. Seyfi Çağan said 
that the foreman always forced the workers to work hard and fast in Demir Döküm.1163 In the 
same manner, an Emayetaş worker cried out that he was overwhelmed by the work in the 
factory. He said that he used to work 12 hours in a day.1164 The work evaluation system, 
which was implemented to create a sense of fairness among the workers through its 
“scientific and impartial methods”, actually contributed to the workers’ frustration. Most 
metal workers were frustrated that the so-called scientific evaluation system did not function 
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impartially. In fact, the points given to workers were decided through the evaluation of those 
who applied this system. Consequently, such a system was highly vulnerable to corruption on 
the part of management.  
Ege Cansen draws attention to this issue when he claims that such systems created 
wage differences in the overall private metal industry because the workers, who knew they 
were paid according to the piece rate system, developed his or her own methods and in some 
cases could disrupt the team’s work. Also, some jobs were totally carried out by means of 
machines, so it was hard to measure the workers’ efficiency.1165 In addition, nepotism was 
widely seen in the metal sector and it factored into the workers’ growing sense of unfairness 
about the job evaluation system. In several workplaces the masterman and foreman gave high 
points to those who were close friends or family.1166 Mustafa Türker also talks about nepotism 
within the Çelik-İş, almost all of whom worked as “gang boss or foreman” when it came to 
categorizing them in terms of the job evaluation system.1167 Moreover, the Demir Döküm 
workers who had worked in the same team for at least six years and had earned the right to 
get the highest wages were transferred to other sections; as a result, such workers were not 
paid the maximum wages, instead they were paid the minimum wages of their new teams.1168 
Therefore, it is clear that these methods of application of the new, “scientific” system resulted 
in frustration among the Türk Demir Döküm workers. Of special concern were the favors 
being done for the bosses and managers that created a sense of unfairness between the 
workers. This theme of unfairness turned out to be the most common subject of the workers’ 
language when they collectively expressed their claims to management. 
Fourthly, the term “oppression” referred to the poor treatment of those workers who 
were thought to work inefficiently, and they were outspoken in their frustrations. Insults and 
humiliations directed at such workers and were widespread in the sector.1169 In one incident, 
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Ali Can poured molten iron into the oven, but the edge of the oven was clogged. Can tried to 
twist it, but he could not open it. Then, the foreman yelled at him and told the gang boss to 
fire him immediately. When the gang boss said that it was not fair, since Ali Can had a wife 
and children, the foreman swore at Ali Can, saying to keep out of the matter, in no uncertain 
terms.1170 In the recollections of İsmet Amca, especially in the foundry section of the Demir 
Döküm Factory, gang bosses or foreman slapped the workers if they performed inefficiently, 
or if they expressed their concerns.1171 Likewise, Mehmet Kul said that there was a great deal 
of humiliation and insults hurled in Demir Döküm before the invasion that took place in 
1969.1172 Mustafa Türker also claimed that the management, the gang bosses and the foreman 
insulted, beat and even relocated the workers who were thought to not work efficiently, 
and/or who talked about their concerns. Seyfi Çağan said that there were arbitrary wage cuts 
and humiliation of inefficient workers in Demir Döküm. The foremen acted like a “god 
figure” and workers could not say anything in front of them. He said that they were generally 
oppressive and intolerant of all workers.1173 This poor treatment was certainly one of the 
causes that led the metal workers to conduct collective actions. 
Fifthly, the traditional problems of arduous work, frequent work accidents and 
problems of inadequate food at the factories, did not relent in most plants during the period. 
For example, the work was particularly difficult in the foundry section where most of the 
labor force was employed in Türk Demir Döküm. Foundry work required immense labor 
power. Hüseyin Ekinci described the working conditions as follows: 
“The work was definitely very strenuous in Türk Demir Döküm. There were 
melting pots and ovens in the foundry section. The heat increased to a 
hundred degrees at times. The workers had to work under such a high heat 
for hours without having a proper break. The foundry workers used to carry 
white pieces of cloth in their pockets to dry their sweat. But, after some time, 
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the colour of those cloths turned to black. The workers also expended a lot of 
energy due to the strenuous work.”1174 
 
Similarly, Ege Cansen claimed that the work in Demir Döküm was very strenuous 
and dirty. The foundry work at the time meant exposure to dust and coal and the risk of 
overheating. At the end of the workday, the faces of the foundry workers were blackened by 
coal dust.1175 İsmet Amca, who worked an assembly job for more than 10 years, claimed that 
although work in his section did not require enormous physical strength, the workers in the 
foundry section had to transfer nearly 10 tons of pig iron to the ovens by hand every day. 
Then, these workers used to carry the molten iron in melting pots.1176 Likewise Mehmet Kul, 
who worked in the press section, claimed that it was very difficult job in the foundry section, 
since the workers had to work in 180-degree conditions.1177  
Despite strenuous work conditions, most metal employers did not take enough 
measures to ease the burden of work on the shop floor. Ege Cansen claimed that there were 
ventilation and lighting problems in Demir Döküm.1178 In addition, Ali Can claimed that there 
was no cooling system for the workers of the foundry section who had to work under in 
extremely high heat.1179  The workers also complained about the bad work conditions in 
Gamak. 1180  Those work conditions, and the increasing work tempo, resulted in the high 
number of illnesses and work accidents among the metal workers.1181 Even in Arçelik, which 
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was one of cleanest and least intense workplaces, the number of work illnesses and accidents 
was not minor.1182 I listened to a lot of narratives about work accidents during my interview 
with the ex-workers of Demir Döküm. One example came from Celal Akıl who recalled that 
he saw the internal organs of a friend from Aksaray, İstanbul. Additionally, one of his close 
friends, İbrahim, and another man were badly hurt in the factory. He also admitted that he 
accidentally crushed the feet of one of his fellow workers, Ali Can, when he was carrying 
goods.1183  To compound these illnesses and accidents, the metal worker also complained 
about not getting proper treatment in the workers’ hospitals.1184 It was obvious from these 
narratives that that the metal workers’ very lives were at stake under the current system. 
The metal workers were also concerned about insufficient or ill-prepared foods in 
their workplaces. One of the reasons which led the workers to conduct a collective action in 
Horoz Nail Factory in 1969 was the poor food.1185 İsmet Amca claimed that the workers, 
whether from the foundry section or assembling section in Demir Döküm, were also short of 
food and most workers performed their jobs on an empty stomach. He also maintained that 
the chefs were sycophantic towards management and the Çelik-İş’s representatives, and that 
they distributed food unfairly. They put a lot of food onto the dishes of union leaders while 
the other workers received less. According to him, the managers and the workers used to eat 
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in separate areas and the managers were provided with a higher quality and quantity of 
food.1186  Mehmet Kul also claimed that, before the 1970s, the managers who ate in the 
different section were supplied with better nutrition. 1187  The workers’ concern about the 
inadequate and poor quality food was also verified by Hüseyin Ekinci’s memories: 
“One day in 1966, when I was sitting in my chair in the regional district of 
Maden-İş, one fellow worker came and asked to talk with the chair of the 
union. I said that I was the chair, but he did not believe me. He had expected 
to see fat old man, most probably. After persuading him that I was the chair, 
he talked about his concerns. He said that he was fired from Demir Döküm, 
where he had worked in the foundry section, because he stole a quarter loaf 
of bread from the cafeteria. When I asked ‘why did you do this?’, he replied 
that it was because he was hungry. Then he unfortunately was caught by one 
of the union representatives and this man reported the incident to the 
managers. As a result, the managers fired the worker.”1188 
 
In general, the metal workers’ experiences of unfairness did not end, despite all the 
promises, collective agreements and “modern-scientific” management techniques; the 
workers, consequently continued to fight to overcome injustice as they had done in the 
previous periods, this time through their own mechanism; namely, the trade union. During 
this period, the metal workers were exposed to widespread oppression in their unionization 
attempts and the metal bosses/managers would exert high pressure on the workers to give up 
trying to select their own union through their own free will. This oppression constituted one 
of the primary reasons, which would lead the metal workers to rise up collectively at the end 
of the decade.   
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In this regard, the word “oppression” lastly referred to the lack of a proper 
mechanism to voice the workers’ demands and frustrations after the mid-1960s. An Arçelik 
worker, Remit Aslan claimed that the Arçelik workers did not have a proper mechanism to 
voice their complaints and demands in the factory.1189 During my interviews, the ex-Demir 
Döküm workers also verified that it was nearly impossible for the workers to express their 
concerns and grievances openly. İsmet Amca, as another example, said that there was no one 
to complain to.1190 While there was a union in nearly all the big and mid-sized metal plants, in 
those plants where Çelik-İş was organized, the union did not invest itself in attempts to solve 
workers’ problems. During the time of Çelik-İş, Mehmet Kul said that union representatives 
did not listen to complaints and the workers who were brave enough to express their concerns 
were immediately blacklisted.1191 In one case, some workers of Demir Döküm went to see 
Kazım Çoçu, the chair of Çelik-İş, to discuss the workers’ problems in the factory. But Kazım 
Çoçu declined to see them and drove them away from the union building.1192 Turhan Söyler, 
from the Elektro Metal Factory, claimed that workers could not ask for their rights in the time 
of Çelik-İş.1193 In the words of one Emayetaş worker: 
“One Sunday, the masterman came at 19.00 pm and said that you would 
work until 7.00 am. I objected to this. When I came to work in the following 
day, I learned that I was fired. Our daily wages were cut. But the 
representative did not say anything about this.”1194 
 
In fact, it is nearly impossible to know exactly whether the bosses/managers were 
involved in under-the-table dealings with the representatives of Çelik-İş in the metal sector. 
Yet it was clear that there was not a particularly close relationship between the union and the 
                                                             
1189 Remzi Aslan, “Arçelik’li İşçi Kardeşlerime Sesleniyorum [I am Calling for my Fellow Workers of 
Arçelik],” Maden-İş, The Special Issue on Unionization, November 1969, 3. 
1190 İsmet Amca, interview by author, Yıldız Tabya, İstanbul, June 21, 2012. 
1191 Yellow Mehmet Kul, interview by author, Yıldız Tabya, İstanbul, June 21, 2012. 
1192 Mustafa Türker, interview by author, Yıldız Tabya, İstanbul, August 29, 2012. 
1193  “Elektrometal Baştemsilcisi Turhan Söyler’le Konuştuk [We Talked With Turhan Söyler, the 
Headrepresentative of the Elektrometal Factory],” Maden-İş, no. 25 (6 April 1970): 2. 
1194 Muharrem Yankaçan, “Emayetaş İşçileri Bu Mektubu Okuyunuz [The Emayetaş Workers, Let’s 
Read This Letter],” Maden-İş, 15 February 1970, 4. 
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rank and file. The union made no attempt to construct a mechanism of trust with its members. 
Although they were the most important link between the union and its members, for example, 
the Çelik-İş’s representatives were not chosen by the workers themselves. Anyone who 
searches inside the union’s journal pages finds nothing about the representative selections on 
shop floor; on the contrary, the news articles relate that the union assigned the representative 
in workplaces from the center.1195 In Arçelik, collective bargaining stated that the employers 
would choose three candidates out of the representatives assigned by Çelik-İş, and the union, 
in turn, would assign one of them as the head representative1196 Secondly, Çelik-İş and its 
representatives did not ask workers’ opinions about the collective agreements. In fact, most 
agreements were being signed without workers’ knowledge. 1197  In Demir Döküm, the 
majority of the workers did not have any knowledge about when and how the agreement was 
signed, or its content.1198  In the absence of a trusted and proper mechanism to make their 
voices heard, the majority of the metal workers leaned towards Maden-İş at the end of the 
decade. 
The majority of the metal bosses clearly preferred Çelik-İş, instead of Maden-İş, to 
represent the workers on shop floor.1199 Maden-İş’s reports accused the employers of forcing 
the workers to join in unions that the workers did not support, and employers signed 
collective agreements without the workers’ knowledge with this union.1200 The Demir Döküm 
workers claimed that the general manager, Burhan Günergun, forced them to join in Çelik-
                                                             
1195 “Temsilci Tayinleri [The Assignments],” Çelik-İş, year 1, no. 7 (15 December 1964): 1; “Çelik-İş 
Sendikasının Temsilcileri Vazife Başında [The Çelik-İş’s Representatives Are On Duty],” Çelik-İş, 
year 1, no. 12 (1 March 1965): 2; “Sendika Temsilcilerinin Görevleri Büyüktür [The Duties of the 
Union’s Representatives Are Huge],” Çelik-İş, year 2, no. 40 (15 May 1966): 4. 
1196 Arçelik A.Ş. Toplu İş Sözleşmesi, 12. 
1197 “Pancar Motor’da İşçiler Çelik-İş’in Oyununa Gelmedi [The Pancar Motor Workers Did not Fall in 
the Tricks of Çelik-İş],” Maden-İş, year 10, no. 23 (26 September 1966): 8; Rasim Öz [ed.], 40. 
1198 Türkiye Maden-İş Sendikası Altıncı Bölge Temsilciliği Faaliyet Raporu, 17 August 1969 [The Deed 
Report of the Sixth District of Maden-İş], TÜSTAV, Kemal Sülker Archive, Box 15, Envelope 180. 
1199 Ege Cansen, interview by author, Kızıltoprak, İstanbul, January 14, 2013; Nuri Çelik, interview by 
author, Mecidiyeköy, İstanbul, January 16, 2013. 
1200 Türkiye Maden-İş Sendikası XVIII. Genel Kurul Çalışma Raporu, 1966-1967, vol.1 [The Work 
Report of XVIII. General Congress of Maden-İş], (22, 23, 24, 25, October 1967), 288. 
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İş. 1201  Ali Can recalls that, Burhan Günergun cooperated with Çelik-İş in Türk Demir 
Döküm.1202 They perceived Çelik-İş and its representatives as not being a body of their own 
choosing, for most workers, their union managers were seen as the “man of the bosses” who 
sold workers’ rights for their own pockets.1203 In the poem by Osman Keskin: 
“While the yellow unionists smoke expensive cigarettes 
Workers could not find the İkinci 
Do not blink your eyes, my friends, to them 
Wake up fellow workers, the time has come.”1204 
 
The lack of free choice of representatives was a main cause of Maden-İş’s 
organization on the shop floor. Unlike Çelik-İş, Maden-İş gave importance to constructing 
close relations with the workers through the union’s representatives. First and foremost, the 
union’s representatives were also the representatives of the workers chosen by their free will. 
A manager in the sector admitted that while Maden-İş left the choice of the workers’ 
representatives to the workers themselves, most unions assigned them from the center.1205 In 
fact, the union newspapers are full of news on the various representative elections that took 
place.1206 As the chair of the one of the most important metal workers’ district, Silahtarağa, 
Hüseyin Ekinci claimed that they put voting chests in the ateliers so that the workers would 
                                                             
1201 “İşçiler Fabrikayı Gece İşgal Etti [The Workers Invaded The Factory At Night],” Akşam, August 2, 
1969, 1 and 7; “Fabrika Ordunun Elinde [The Factory Is At the Hand of The Army],” Milliyet, August 
7, 1969, 1 and 11. 
1202 Ali Can, interview by author, Yıldız Tabya, İstanbul, June 20, 2012. 
1203 “İşçiler Fabrikayı Gece İşgal Etti [The Workers Invaded The Factory At Night],” Akşam, August 2, 
1969, 1 and 7; “Otosan İşçileri Maden-İş’e Girdiler [The Otosan Workers Joined in Maden-İş],” 
Maden-İş, no. 24 (20 March 1970); “Singer Baştemsilcisi Ahmet Yüzyıl’a Sorduk, Söyledi [We Asked 
the Singer Headrepresentative, Ahmet Yıldız, He Told],” Maden-İş, no. 25 (6 April 1970): 3. 
1204 Osman Keskin, “Yeter Zulüm [Enough to Oppression],” Maden-İş, no. 28 (23 May 1970): 3. 
1205 Cüneyt Dosdoğru, “Türkiye’de İşçi-İşveren Münasebetlerinin Tarihi Seyri [The Historical Course 
of Worker-Employer Relations in Turkey],” Sosyal Siyaset Konferansları, no. 21 (1970): 76. 
1206 For example: “Emayetaş’ta Temsilci Seçimi Başarı İle Neticelendi [The Representative Election 
Was Successfully Done in Emayetaş],” Maden-İş, year 10, no. 21 (10 August 1966): 7; “Sendika’dan 
Haberler [The News From the Union],” Maden-İş, 15 March 1969, 7; “VI. Bölgeden Haberler [The 
News From the Sixth District],” Maden-İş, 22 May 1969, 6; “Sendikadan Haberler [The News From 
the Union],” Maden-İş, 1 April 1969, 7; “Kısa Sendika Haberleri [The Short Union News],” Maden-İş, 
1 May 1969, 6; “Estaş İşçileri İle Toplu Sözleşme İmzalandı [The Collective Bargaining Signed With 
the Estaş Workers],” Maden-İş, 7 July 1969, 6; “Türk Demir Döküm Fabrikalarında Seçim Yapıldı 
[The Election Was Made in the Türk Demir Döküm Factories],” Maden-İş, 22 July 1969. 
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be able to choose their own representatives.1207 Mustafa Türker likewise claimed that no one 
influenced the selection of their representatives in Maden-İş’s times.1208 Mehmet Kul recalls 
that the workers themselves democratically chose their representatives. 1209  When I asked 
Celal Akıl about the reason for his choice for Maden-İş, he simply said that it was a better 
union since workers were free to choose their representatives in Maden-İş.1210  
Maden-İş also demanded its representatives engage in close relations with the rank 
and file on shop floor level. The 1967 Congress Report advised the representatives to meet 
with workers, to hold meetings to explain the union’s aims and to heed their problems. The 
head representatives were asked to write reports about their meetings with the workers and 
send them to the local district. Through these meetings and reports, the strategies of the local 
district would be devised.1211 Maden-İş also leant importance to listening to rank and file 
opinions on the collective bargaining. The union reports stated that the union had to organize 
meetings with the workers before the collective bargaining agreements were signed in order 
to first learn their demands and inform them about the process of bargaining.1212 In fact, the 
collective agreement section of the union published a report, which suggested that the local 
districts distribute survey sheets to the members to get their opinions about the agreements in 
1967. The report mentioned that the representatives acknowledged the workers on shop floor 
during every stage of the bargaining. 1213  It seems that those union strategies worked 
efficiently in earning the workers’ trust to the union during the late 1960s. 
It’s also evident that Maden-İş was more successful than Çelik-İş, in terms of 
constructing trust mechanisms between the rank and file and the union itself, through its 
representatives on shop floor. Most workers claimed that they joined in Maden-İş due to their 
                                                             
1207 Hüseyin Ekinci, interview by author, Sarıyer, İstanbul, June 19, 2012. 
1208 Mustafa Türker, interview by author, Yıldız Tabya, İstanbul, August 29, 2012 
1209 Yellow Mehmet Kul, interview by author, Yıldız Tabya, İstanbul, June 21, 2012. 
1210 Celal Akıl, interview by author, Yıldız Tabya, İstanbul, June 20, 2012. 
1211 Türkiye Maden-İş Sendikası XVIII. Genel Kurul Çalışma Raporu, 1966-1967, 223-225. 
1212 Türkiye Maden-İş Sendikası XIX. Genel Kurul Çalışma Raporu, 1967-1969, 30-32. 
1213 “Toplu Sözleşme Dairesi Komisyon Raporu [The Commission Report of the Collective Agreement 
Section],” in Türkiye Maden-İş Sendikası XVIII. Genel Kurul Çalışma Raporu, 1966-1967, vol. 1 [The 
Work Report of XVIII. General Congress of Maden-İş], TÜSTAV Maden-İş Archive, Box 39, 
Envelope 312, (22, 23, 24, 25, October 1967), 223-225. 
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trust in this union, and their desire for it to represent their rights in a proper manner.1214 İsmet 
Amca narrated his transfer to Maden-İş as follows: 
“We did not know anything about unionism, about Çelik-İş (...) One day 
Celal Alçınkaya who was from Rabak and a very trusted, respected and 
honored man, came to us. He told us about Maden-İş and persuaded us. After 
the work, we began to register for Maden-İş (...).”1215 
 
In his recollections, Aziz Amca states that they had a good union to defend their 
rights.1216 In the words of Mustafa Türker: 
“We were very content about the union, it was our union. We all trusted 
it.”1217 
 
Despite being a religious worker, İsmet Amca said that he chose leftist Maden-İş out 
of his trust of the union. 1218  Even the managers admitted that since Maden-İş defended 
workers’ rights truly, the workers chose this union.1219 But this trust did not emerge just out of 
the union’s policy. It also stemmed from the workers’ intense struggles to make Maden-İş the 
authorized union in the workplaces at the end of the Sixties. 
 
IV. Conclusion 
It’s clear that the metal workers had to struggle to organize Maden-İş in their 
workplaces. It’s equally clear that the metal bosses/managers were determined to obstruct the 
                                                             
1214 Ahmet Sürmene, “İşçiler ve Politika [Workers and Politics],” Maden-İş, 7 July 1969, 5; “Demir 
Döküm İşçileri Konuşuyor [The Demir Döküm Workers Talk],” interview by Hüseyin Ekinci, Maden-
İş, 10 September 1969; Hıdır Yıldırım, “Elektro Metal İşçilerine Sesleniyorum [I am Calling for the 
Elektro Metal Workers],” Maden-İş, no. 20, (8 December 1969): 5; “Auer Fabrikası Baştemsilcisi 
Cengiz Turhan’la Konuştuk [We Talked With Cengiz Turhan, the Headrepresentative of the Auer 
Factory],” Maden-İş, no. 25 (6 April 1970): 2; “Elektrometal Baştemsilcisi Turhan Söyler’le Konuştuk 
[We Talked With Turhan Söyler, the Headrepresentative of the Elektrometal Factory],” Maden-İş, no. 
25 (6 April 1970): 2. 
1215 İsmet Amca, interview by author, Yıldız Tabya, İstanbul, June 21, 2012. 
1216 Aziz Amca, interview by author, Yıldız Tabya, İstanbul, June 19, 2012. 
1217 Mustafa Türker, interview by author, Yıldız Tabya, İstanbul, August 29, 2012. 
1218 İsmet Amca, interview by author, Yıldız Tabya, İstanbul, June 21, 2012. 
1219 Nuri Çelik, interview by author, Mecidiyeköy, İstanbul, January 16, 2013. 
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penetration of Maden-İş into the metal plants. The Maden-İş reports emphasized how the 
employers acted to prevent Maden-İş from being organized.1220 One hundred and twenty five 
Gamak workers were fired in 1969 after they joined Maden-İş,1221 and/or the Demir Döküm 
workers who sought to become organized in Maden-İş were fired by management.1222 The 
workers who wanted to be organized in Maden-İş were fired in Singer, too.1223 And there are 
many more examples of management stifling the workers’ union. Management did not allow 
the workers to choose their unions freely in the Horoz Nail Factory.1224 The employers of 
Gamgam gave half wages to the workers who were unionized in Maden-İş.1225 One Otosan 
worker claimed that the management did not allow Maden-İş to be organized inside the 
factory. 1226  Kemal Uğur, from the Pendik District, complained that the workers’ 
representatives and workers themselves were exposed to the bosses/managers’ oppression 
                                                             
1220 Türkiye Maden-İş Sendikası XVIII. Genel Kurul Çalışma Raporu, 1966-1967, 245-252; Türkiye 
Maden-İş Sendikası XIX. Genel Kurul Çalışma Raporu, 1967-1969, 4; Türkiye Maden-İş Sendikası XX. 
Genel Kurul Çalışma Raporu, 1969-1971. Also look at: “Bir Bölgenin Çabalarına Toplu Bakış: 
Topkapı [A General Outlook to the Works of a District: Topkapı],” Maden-İş, year 9, no. 2 (15 March 
1965): 5; “Pancar Motor’da İşçiler Çelik-İş’in Oyununa Gelmedi [The Pancar Motor Workers Did not 
Fall in the Deceptions of Çelik-İş],” Maden-İş, year 10, no. 23 (26 September 1966): 8; “Jeep Fabrikası 
İşçileri Uyarıldı [The Jeep Factory Workers Were Warned],” Maden-İş, year 10, no. 20 (25 June 1966): 
2 and 8; “Singer’de Çalışan İşçiler Uyarıldı [The Singer Employees Were Warned],” Maden-İş, year 
10, no. 20 (25 June 1966): 4; “İşçi Sendikası Üyeliğinin Teminatı İçin Uyarma Yapıldı [A Warning 
Was Made For the Guarantee of the Free Union Choice],” Maden-İş, year 10, no. 24 (7 November 
1966): 2; “İşverenler Tazminata Mahkum Oldular [The Employers Were Convicted to Pay 
Reparations],” Maden-İş, 1 April 1969, 6; “Horoz Çivi Fabrikasında Direniş [The Resistance at the 
Horoz Nail Factory],” Maden-İş, 22 May 1969, 2; “Toplu Olarak Maden-İş’e Katılan Altılar Sanayi 
İşçileri Konuşuyor [The Altılar Industry Workers Who Completely Joined in Maden-İş Speaks],” 
Maden-İş, 22 May 1969, 5; “Türk Demir Döküm İşvereni 19599 Liraya Mahkum Oldu [The Türk 
Demir Döküm Employer Was Convicted to Pay 19.599 Turkish Lira],” Maden-İş, no. 20 (8 December 
1969); “Emayetaştan Bir İşçi Sesleniyor [One Worker From Emayetaş Is Calling],” Maden-İş, no. 24 
(20 March 1970): 5. 
1221 Yıldırım Koç, DİSK Tarihi: Efsane mi Gerçek mi? [The DİSK History: Reality or Legend?], 
(Ankara: Epos, 2008): 131.  
1222 İbrahim Osmanoğlu, “Kendileri İşgalci Olanlar Demir Döküm İşçisini Suçlayamaz [Those Who 
Are Themselves Invaders Cannot Accuse the Demir Döküm Workers],” Ant, 12 August 1969, 4; 
“Demir Döküm İşçileri Konuşuyor [The Demir Döküm Workers Talk],” interview by Hüseyin Ekinci, 
Maden-İş, 10 September 1969; Türkiye Maden-İş Sendikası Altıncı Bölge Temsilciliği Faaliyet Raporu, 
17 August 1969. 
1223 “Singer Olayı İle İlgili Özel Bülten [The Special Issue About the Singer Event],” MaHa Ajansı, 11 
January 1969, TÜSTAV, Maden-İş Archive, Box 39, Envelope 308. 
1224 “Horoz Çivi İşçileri Direniyor [The Horoz Nail Factory Workers Are Resisting],” Maden-İş, 1 June 
1969, 1. 
1225 “Şerif’i Patron ve Polis Kurşunu Öldürdü [The Bullet of Police and Boss Killed Şerif],” Maden-İş, 
The Special Issue on Unionization, November 1969, 5. 
1226 “Otosan Fabrikasından Bir İşçi [A Worker From the Otosan Factory],” and “Otosan İşçilerine 
Sesleniyorum [I am Calling to the Otosan Workers],” Maden-İş, 1 April 1969. 
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over union choice.1227 Despite such oppression, the metal workers from nearly all plants 
collectively acted to make Maden-İş their authorized union in the workplaces. Even the 
employer’s organization admitted that this type of oppression over the free union choice of 
workers was one of the causes of the so-called illegal events.1228 Nearly all metal plants in 
İstanbul witnessed similar workers’ struggles to make Maden-İş be recognized by the 
bosses/managers between 1968 and 1970. Through those struggles, the militant metal workers 
would adopt a more radical language, which reflected their intention to put an end to 
injustices that they felt to be exposed on their working and living places. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                             
1227 “Pendik, Topkapı Şube Kongreleri de Yapıldı [The Pendik and Topkapı District Congress Were 
Done, Too],” Maden-İş, year 9, no. 8 (27 July 1965): 6. 
1228 Türkiye İşveren Sendikaları Konfederasyonu [The Confederacy of Turkish Employer’s Unions]’, 
İşyerlerinde Vuku Bulan Kanun Dışı Olaylar Hakkında Rapor [The Report on the Illegal Actions Take 
Place on the Workplaces], Tarih Vakfı, Orhan Tuna Archive, 11; Esin Pars, Türkiye’de İşveren 
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CHAPTER 10 
THE PERIOD OF COLLECTIVE ACTIONS, 1968-1970 
“Wolves tear apart a horse who wanders alone. But, 
when horses discern the threat, get together and act 
together, they would instantly destroy the monster.” 
A Worker, Dursun Seyit, from Samsun, quoted from 
Ağralı, Sedat Türk Sendikacılığı, 9. 
 
The most distinguishing characteristic of the collective actions that took place 
between 1968 and 1970 was certainly their radical nature. The metal worker, who suffered 
through factory life and encountered significant hardships in the city, joined in collective 
responses to their conditions between 1968 and 1970, just as they had previously done in 
1963 in Kavel, Gümüş Motor or Samurkaş, and in 1964 in several other plants through 
strikes, or as they had done during the 1950s in nearly all metal factories through legal work 
disputes. But this time their effort was different in terms of the scale and scope of the actions. 
In fact, Turkey witnessed widespread collective actions that were conducted by the various 
social groups in the different parts of the country between 1968 and 1970. By 1968, the 
revolutionary youth groups had organized important and large scale in the big cities of the 
country, İstanbul, Ankara and İzmir, and within the different universities such as Middle East 
Technical University, Ankara University, İstanbul University, Istanbul Technical University, 
etc., to protest the educational issues, as well as the overwhelming influence of the US in 
Turkey’s economic and political life and unfair social relations within the country. They 
would often occupy the universities to make their demands heard. Different youth groups 
would also get involved in relations within workers and peasants to spread their ideas and 
encourage a revolution. In this way, they would support every workers’ and peasants’ 
collective actions. In those years, peasants made an unprecedented effort and organized 
meetings to protest the low prices of good that they produced, and/or landless peasants 
invaded the lands of landlords who were assumed to force the peasants to work for their own 
 
 
384 
interests by usurping lands. In addition to students; and peasants’ struggles, the collective 
actions in several factories became more frequent and radical between 1968 and 1970 in 
Turkey. The workers who were recruited in textile, chemical, rubber factories and mines, not 
just in İstanbul but in the different parts of Turkey, occupied those enterprises, or went into 
strikes to make their voices heard. For example, the Alpagut workers, who had not been paid 
for more than two months, invaded the mine in Çorum, a city in the Central Anatolia, in May, 
1969. Bossa workers, too, in a big southern city, Adana, stopped production and occupied the 
factory in November 1970 to get higher wages.1229 In the absence of direct evidence, it is 
impossible to discuss whether the collective actions of the İstanbul metal workers led the way 
for the workers in the other sectors, or students and peasants who engaged in the collective 
struggles; nonetheless, considering the rise of radicalism among the other social groups as 
well as among workers between 1968 and 1970, the metal worker’s actions were the part of 
those larger struggles and constituted a rule rather than an exception. Furthermore, the metal 
worker’s actions in İstanbul were the most influential of those struggles since it expanded to 
nearly all the important workplaces in İstanbul. 
First of all, the actions swept through many workplaces in the sector and thus 
influenced a considerable number of workers. Secondly, although the collective actions of the 
period resembled the previous struggles in terms of the workers’ demands on wages and free 
union choice, the metal workers did not rely on legal mechanisms to reach their demands in 
this period. They did not apply to any state office to ask permission to engage in collective 
actions. The metal workers, first and foremost, counted on their own collective power, which 
                                                             
1229 For further details about the student’s, peasant’s and worker’s collective actions between 1968 and 
1970, see “Türkiye’de 1968 [1968 in Turkey],” in Sosyalizm ve Toplumsal Mücadeleler Ansiklopedisi 
[The Encyclopedia of Socialism and Collective Struggles], vol. 7 (İstanbul: İletişim, 1988), 2068-2109; 
“Köylü Mücadeleleri [The Peasant’s Struggle],” Sosyalizm ve Toplumsal Mücadeleler Ansiklopedisi 
[The Encyclopedia of Socialism and Collective Struggles], vol. 7 (İstanbul: İletişim, 1988), 2136-2138; 
“1969-1970 İşçi Hareketi [The Workers’ Action Between 1969 and 1970]”, in Sosyalizm ve Toplumsal 
Mücadeleler Ansiklopedisi [The Encyclopedia of Socialism and Collective Struggles], vol. 7 (İstanbul: 
İletişim, 1988), 2146-2148. It is unfortunate that the literature on the story of collective actions 
between 1968 and 1970 are still very immature; in fact, the existing ones which focus on the 
interactions between those actions analyze the period within the perspective of development of the 
leftist currents in Turkey. For some examples of this literature, see: Ergun Aydınoğlu, Türk Solu: 
Eleştirel Bir Tarih Denemesi [The Turkish Left: An Attempt to Write a Critical History], (İstanbul: 
Belge, 1992); İlhan Akdere and Zeynep Karadeniz, Türkiye Solu’nun Eleştirel Tarihi, [The Critical 
History of the Turkish Left], (İstanbul: Evrensel, 1996). 
 
 
385 
was rooted in their class position inside the production process. Counting on this power, the 
metal workers transgressed the laws and staged direct collective actions. The workers simply 
stopped producing and did not allow any outsider to maintain production in their workplaces. 
These workplace invasions/factory occupations 1230  were one of the most common and 
influential forms of the metal worker’s collective actions between 1968 and 1970. Thirdly, 
the workers fought fiercely with police forces, despite deaths, casualties and imprisonment. 
And the workers’ community surrounding the factories participated in the actions through 
several means.  
Nonetheless, this radicalism had its limits. Maden-İş and their workers based their 
actions on the items and demands which they linked to a decent lifestyle; issues such as 
democratic work relations and free union choice, which were items drawn from the 1961 
Constitution. In this regard, they insisted on the legal legitimacy of their actions against the 
accusations from other unions and bosses/managers. After all, their fight was for rights that 
were already promised in constitutional text – promises that were presumably a high priority 
in a democratic state. And after all these struggles, a considerable number of the İstanbul 
metal workers began to redefine their place in modern society, as well as their interests and 
dreams, through a common language and consciousness; a language the placed labor of 
workers at the core of the general progress of society, and one that reflected the workers’ 
widespread desire to balance out social inequalities. 
 
                                                             
1230  The factory occupation is a form of worker’s direct action to control the labor process and 
production, to prevent a possible lockout and/or make their demands recognized by bosses/managers. 
There had been examples of factory occupations before, but the term took holdin the collective actions 
repertoire of the working class first with the widespread factory occupations that took place in 1919 
and 1920 in Italy, and then in 1936 and 1937, in France. The workers also invaded factories in 1968 in 
Italy and France. In those examples, the workers collectively occupied factories and they generally 
continued to work for their own behalf by trying to sell the finished goods. They did not let anyone 
else, except the factory workers, enter the factories. This type of action was perceived as a direct 
assault to property rights by bosses/managers. For example, see: Paolo Spriano, The Occupation of the 
Factories: Italy 1920, G. A. Williams (trans.) (London: Pluto Press, 1975); Michael Torigian, “The 
Occupation of Factories: Paris 1936, Flint 1937”, Comparative Studies in Society and History, vol. 41, 
no. 2, (April 1999): 324-347; Dave Sherry, Occupy!: A Short History of Worker’s Occupation, 
(London: Bookmarks, 2010). In parallel with this, the İstanbul metal workers did not let anyone into 
the factories during the occupations. However, the metal workers occupied the factories between 1968 
and 1970, not to disrupt the labor process or prevent lockouts, but to make their demands, higher wages 
and free union choice, more widely accepted in Turkey. 
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I. For Our Bread and For Our Union 
 Several metal workers had attempted to organize Maden-İş inside factories where the 
union and its representatives had been wiped out during 1964, well before the time period of 
1968 to 1970. Throughout 1966, the increasing number of Çelik-İş’s declarations which 
warned workers to not be deceived by “some provocateurs” demonstrated that Maden-İş 
officers facilitated its attempts to register members in such workplaces that year.1231 When the 
end of the first collective agreements approached, Maden-İş’s unionists tried to organize 
workers inside several enterprises such as Pancar Motor, Auer, Singer, Türk Demir Döküm, 
Elektro Metal and Emayetaş, but those efforts were unsuccessful.1232 The first reason for the 
failure was employer/manager oppression of the metal workers. The employers who learned 
of the Maden-İş’ attempts to organize threatened to fire workers. 1233  Hüseyin Ekinci, a 
Maden-İş officer in the Silahtarağa district, claimed that although they tried to organize 
Maden-İş after 1965 in the region, they could not accomplish this due to strong employer 
oppression. He claimed that when a worker even spoke about Maden-İş inside the workplace, 
he was immediately fired.1234  
For example, Seyfi Çağan was fired in 1966 under the excuse that he was organizing 
Maden-İş in Demir Döküm.1235 In the same manner, several Pancar Motor workers lost their 
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Provocators],” Çelik-İş, year 2, no. 47 (1 September 1966): 1 and 4; “Çelik-İş Üyelerini Uyardı [Çelik-
İş Warned Its Members],” Çelik-İş, year 2, no. 48 (1 October 1966): 2; “Bildiri [The Declaration],” 
Çelik-İş, year 3, no. 70 (15 November 1967): 3. 
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For],” İşçi Postası, September 27, 1966, 1 and 4; “Oturma Grevinden Sonra Ankaraya Yürüyen Pancar 
Motor Fabrikası İşçilerinin Durumu Ne Olacak [What Will Happen to the Pancar Motor Workers Who 
Marched to Ankara After The Sit-Down Strike],” İşçi Postası, October 3, 1966, 1 and 4; “Pancar Motor 
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Consciously Joining in Maden-İş],” Maden-İş, year 10, no. 25 (5 December 1966): 2 and 3; “İşçileri 
Aldatmaya Kalkanlar İçin Bilgi Savaşı Açıldı [The War of Knowledge Has Declared Against Those 
Who Tried To Deceive the Workers],” Maden-İş, year 10, no. 25 (5 December 1966): 2 and 8; “Pancar 
Motorda, Singer’de Auer’de Sözleşmeyi Türkiye Çelik-İş Sendikası İmzalıyor [Çelik-İş Signs the 
Agreement in Pancar Motor, Singer and Auer],” Çelik-İş, year 2, no. 51 (21 November 1966): 1. 
1233  “İşçi Sendikası Üyeliğinin Teminatı İçin Uyarma Yapıldı [A Warning Was Made For the 
Guarantee of the Free Union Choice],” Maden-İş, year 10, no. 24 (7 November 1966): 2. 
1234 Hüseyin Ekinci, interview by author, Sarıyer, İstanbul, June 19, 2012. 
1235 Seyfi Çağan, interview by author, Alibeyköy, İstanbul, January 15, 2013. 
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jobs when they joined in Maden-İş instead of Çelik-İş. 1236  But when we consider the 
employer’s/manager’s oppression during workers’ attempts to organize Maden-İş between 
1968 and 1970, employer oppression cannot be the sole and sufficient explanation of their 
failure. Another factor was that the union’s strategy still took shape around the belief that the 
Regional Work Offices would hand over authorization rights to Maden-İş if it was able to 
register the majority of the workers on shop floor. As late as 1967, a union report put forth 
that the union would conduct its struggle for authorization rights in the workplaces without 
going beyond the law itself.1237 And in several factories, such as Gamak and Türk Demir 
Döküm, the labor court recognized the authorization rights of Çelik-İş.1238 Despite union 
arguments that the court’s decisions were not lawful, Maden-İş did not abandon its trust in 
legal mechanisms towards the end of the decade. 
However, the status quo had begun to change by 1968. DİSK had been founded the 
year before and had declared its Marxist agenda. Furthermore, the widespread collective 
actions of the students and poor peasants polarized the political climate in Turkey. The 
workers of different industrial sectors, who suffered similar problems to those of the metal 
workers, also began to stage collective actions. For example, the Derby workers occupied 
their factory in 1968.1239 Furthermore, due to the increasing prices in the city, İstanbul’s 
workers were more concerned about their wages. Even the moderate Türk-İş officers began to 
publicly complain in 1968 that the workers’ wages were too low to provide for their families. 
They also protested the employers’ approach to minimum wages and workers’ income in 
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general.1240 The reports from Maden-İş similarly touched on the Turkish workers’ problem of 
insufficient income.1241  
It would become explicit from their public statements that the metal employers 
already frowned on union demands for wage increases. Well known bosses/managers, such as 
Ertuğrul Soysal in the metal sector, pursued a public relations strategy that declared unionists 
wage demands did not reflect the reality of their paycheques. In his articles and speeches, 
Eruğrul Soysal claimed that wages were not actually low in Turkey and that the union’s 
demands for increasing wages did not have any scientific foundation. The reality was, 
according to managers, that wages were already high in comparison with productivity per 
worker, right across Turkish industry. 1242  The articles in MESS’s newspaper, likewise, 
assumed that the employers had already given in to “excessive” wages to the workers out of 
“generosity” during previous periods of worker discontent. The employers held that the 
unions had always provoked their members into demanding more wages, just to keep the 
union’s membership numbers up. The union’s pragmatist strategy and the language of 
“excessive wage demands” culminated in high inflation, which was the real reason for wage 
erosions, according to the employers. The articles also warned that since the unions insisted 
on these “excessive demands,” peaceful work conditions were about to disappear. And they 
wrote of how employers were determined not to bow down to the unions’ “excessive 
demands,” because employers wanted to keep industry and production going.1243 It is obvious 
                                                             
1240 “Çalışma Meclisi Kuruluyor [The Work Assembly is Assembling],” Çelik-İş, year 3, no. 77 (1 
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from such articles in the journal that the metal bosses would not tolerate workers’ demands 
for high wages. 
The minimum wage issue further escalated the nervous relations between employers 
and unionists in 1968 and 1969. In the first meetings of the Minimum Wage Commission, a 
disagreement between the workers’ and employers’ representatives about the level of wages 
took place. While the employers’ representatives argued for adjusting the minimum wage 
based on the needs of one worker, the workers’ representatives fought for wages to be 
estimated by considering a worker’s family needs, where the family was composed of at least 
4 people.1244 Although the report of the Biochemical Institute of the Ankara University, which 
was prepared for those meetings, stated that the minimum amount of food which a worker’s 
family (composed of five people in total) required per day was equal to 23 TL, the 
commission adjusted that level to between 15.50 and 19.50 TL, after long debates.1245 The 
employers were not pleased with even this lowered range. The association of the metal 
employers, MESS, declared that such a high level of minimum wage would add up to 
increases in prices and inflation. The declaration further argued that the decision was 
arbitrarily taken without “scientifically” reflecting on the economic conditions of the Turkish 
industry.1246 Articles in the TİSK Journal came to the conclusion that the sudden rise in 
minimum wages, after which all the workers’ wages would be have to be adjusted upward, 
would harm their enterprises.1247 And a report to MESS stated that the metal employers had to 
prepare themselves and their enterprises for the “excessive increases” in minimum wage.1248 
The minimum wage level was an important threshold for the unions as well, since the 
other workers’ wages would be fixed accordingly. A TÜRK-İş officer, Sedat Ağralı, wrote in 
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April 1969, that the minimum wages that had been settled unfairly by the commission were 
actually too low for the workers.1249 Such concerns were also raised by Maden-İş. Their union 
reports stated that it was the most important issue for the workers since the other wage 
increases and salary scales would be based on minimum wage.1250 Amidst all these debates, 
the unionists were further concerned that the employers would not properly implement the 
wage levels set by the commission. A news report published in April 1969, in İşçi Dünyası 
(The Workers’ World) argued most employers were reluctant to give the minimum wages at 
all. 1251  In the meantime, a Maden-İş report assumed that employers might not pay any 
workers’ wage that exceeded the new minimum level. In this case, the report put forth the 
determination of the union to engage in collective actions in the workplaces over the 
matter.1252  But, in order to force the employer to apply the minimum wage agreements 
properly, Maden-İş firstly had to earn authorization rights in the workplaces. Here, the 
collective fight over wages intermingled with the fight over unionization rights. 
When the workers’ frustration over these injustices took root on the shop floor, work 
relations and oppression of their free union choice combined with the issue of low wages to 
create heightened tensions at the end of the Sixties. At this time, the metal workers chose to 
be represented by Maden-İş in the hopes that the union might be more effective in making 
their voices heard. In this climate, Maden-İş and its representatives were able to mobilize the 
majority of the metal workers in İstanbul. According to Hüseyin Ekinci, the combined effects 
of the high cost of living and oppression of their free union choice motivated the workers to 
resist in Demir Döküm.1253 One of the underlying reasons for the metal workers to take action 
was the simple desire to have a decent life. For example, the Singer workers asked for wage 
                                                             
1249 Sedat Ağralı, “Sendikacılar ve Ücret Politikası [The Unionists and Wage Policy],” Yeni İstanbul, 
April 20, 1969. 
1250 Türkiye Maden-İş Sendikası XIX. Genel Kurul Çalışma Raporu, 1967-1969, 29. Also look at: 
“İşçiler Fiili Direnmeye Çağrılacak [Workers Will Be Asked to Resist],” Maden-İş, 7 July 1969, 1. 
1251 “Asgari Ücreti Vermek İstemeyenler Pek Çok [There Are Too Many Who Are Reluctant to Give 
the Minimum Wage],” İşçi Dünyası, 23 April 1969, 1 and 4. 
1252 TÜSTAV, Maden-İş Archive, Box 6, Envelope 37. 
1253 “Demir Döküm İşçileri Konuşuyor [The Demir Döküm Workers Talk],” interview by Hüseyin 
Ekinci, Maden-İş, 10 September 1969. 
 
 
391 
increase during the invasion in 1968.1254 The Demir Döküm workers staged a collective action 
as a response to their management’s intransigence on wages by invading the factory.1255 The 
workers there complained that the factory management refused to implement the new 
minimum wages, which were to have taken effect July 1, 1969, and they were further angered 
over general wages in the sector.1256 One Demir Döküm worker, Kasım Çiftçi, claimed that 
the workers demands included the implementation of the new minimum wage laws.1257 The 
disagreement between Maden-İş and management over wages also paved the way for sit-
down strikes in Horoz Nail Factory in 1969, and İzsal, in 1970.1258 The Gamak workers 
complained, too, that the management did not apply the minimum wages in the factory.1259  
 
Figure 24: The Demir Döküm workers in the action. In the placard which was located in front of the 
workers it was stated that: ‘Our Fellow Worker, Our Struggle is the Struggle for Our Bread.’ (Source: 
Türk Solu, year 2, no. 90, 5 August 1969). 
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As noted, the other burning issue for the metal workers was the restriction of their 
free union choice. According to a report by Maden-İş, written in 1969, the workers battled to 
choose their union, independently of any oppression. The report narrated the typical series of 
events in a factory as follows: any worker who wanted to join Maden-İş was immediately 
fired by managers and no other workers could give testimony of support due to the fear of 
being unemployed. Then, the employer signed agreements with the “yellow dog” unions. 
Ultimately, when the workers resorted to their resistance right provided by the Constitution, 
the “man of the yellow union” and police forces attacked the workers.1260 Although the series 
of events rarely took place as described in the narrative of the report, it was plain that the 
metal workers actively fought for their free union choice in the period, inside several different 
plants.1261 For example, the Demir Döküm workers claimed that the oppression of their free 
union choices, and the oppression of Çelik-İş’ demands on the workers culminated in 
collective events.1262 In fact, one of reasons behind the factory invasion of 1969 was the 
humiliation and beating of a Maden-İş representative in the management office by a police 
chief and the Çelik-İş representative. When the factory management did not obey the 
protocols signed between Maden-İş and the management in 1969, one Maden-İş 
representative decided to talk with Burhan Günergun, who then began yelling, saying that the 
workers were all communists, and that the factory already provided them with their  “bread”, 
but they still asked for more rights. Then, he called a police chief and wanted the 
representative to come his office again. There, the police chef and the Çelik-İş leader beat and 
degraded the Maden-İş representative. When the workers’ representative resisted, the police 
arrested him.1263 Other Maden-İş members were called to the management office and were 
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forced to resign from Maden-İş and register for Çelik-İş. One female worker was harassed 
and the teeth of another male worker were smashed.1264  
Likewise, the conflict between Çelik-İş and Maden-İş led to the events in the 
notorious Kavel Factory in 1968. Here, although nearly all workers resigned from Çelik-İş 
and transferred to Maden-İş, the management allowed Çelik-İş to collect union dues from the 
workers. In the meantime, it forced the workers to resign from Maden-İş and fired 26 
workers, some of whom were Maden-İş representatives.1265 In reply, the workers occupied the 
factory, demanding that their dismissed colleagues be hired again.1266 Similarly, when the 
Teksan management fired 15 workers after everyone in the factory joined Maden-İş, the 
workers conducted a sit-down strike.1267 After the Gamak workers joined Maden-İş, the boss 
fired 124 workers.1268 In Hisar, Efem, Magirus, Horoz Nail, ECA, and Sungurlar Factories, 
the workers struck back by sitting down, or occupying their workplaces, demanding to make 
Maden-İş the authorized union between 1968 and 1970.1269 The majority of the metal workers 
fought to get rid of Çelik-İş. An anonymous Demir Döküm worker expressed his feeling 
towards Çelik-İş and Maden-İş as follows: 
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 “We will not sign anything under duress 
 Damn it, we will not live with this money 
 The traitor Çelik-İş does not seek our rights 
 Let’s stick to our Maden-İş.”1270 
 
Figure 25: Text painted on a factory wall: “Down With Çelik-İş.” (Source: Maden-İş, April 1970, 2). 
 
In Singer, the workers claimed that Çelik-İş sold out to the employers, and they 
demanded to transfer to Maden-İş.1271 İsmet Amca remembers that the workers fought hard in 
Türk Demir Döküm for Maden-İş to be recognized by the employer.1272 Like him, several 
Demir Döküm workers said that they fought for their union freedom.1273 In İzsal, the workers 
conducted a strike for Maden-İş to be recognized by management.1274 These were “excessive 
actions,” in the words of employers, which were staged to overcome or revise the existing 
framework of shop floor relations that was enforced by the bosses/managers on behalf of their 
own interests. They were also “excessive” in the sense that these forms of actions 
transgressed the law, which dictated when and how to conduct a collective action in the 
workplace.  
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II. The Metal Workers in Action 
A Demir Döküm worker, Binali Karaca, summed up the determination of his fellow 
workers to overcome the oppression of the managers by saying that the workers would resist 
until such time that they finally got their rights.1275 In fact, the most important feature of the 
collective actions in the metal sector was the workers’ determination, and therefore the 
radicalism of their actions, which stemmed from the fact that the metal workers did not limit 
themselves to legal mechanisms during these collective struggles. Rather, the metal workers 
first and foremost trusted in the power of their solidarity to reach their demands for higher 
wages and free union choice between 1968 and 1970. The workers counted on their class 
position as essential producers of goods in the factories, and they stopped working without 
first applying to any legal mechanism. Another important characteristic of the actions was its 
scale in the sector. The Emayetaş workers invaded the factory in 1968 for twelve hours. The 
workers conducted sit-down strikes in Yapar Biraderler, Gemi Zinciri, Mehmet Üretmen, 
Teksan, Topuz and Magirus Factories. They also occupied Kavel, Demir Döküm, Singer and 
Rabak and they stopped working in the Hisar, Efem, Gamak, Horoz Nail, ECA, Auer 
Factories. These actions spread to İzsal and Sungurlar in the first months of 1970. With the 
collective actions happening across so many factories, a considerable number of İstanbul 
metal workers were affected by those events. 
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Figure 26: The Auer workers during the invasion of their factory (Source: Maden-İş, no. 25, 6 April 
1970, 2). 
 
The most widespread and effective form of action was factory occupations. During 
these actions, the workers did not allow bosses or managers to enter the factory, as we know 
from the bosses’/managers’ complaints. 1276  In Demir Döküm, the workers first stopped 
working on May 15th. But since the employer’s oppression continued for Maden-İş members 
and the management refused to apply the minimum wage increases, the workers invaded the 
factory on July 31st.1277 In Sungurlar, the workers locked the factory doors and did not allow 
anyone to enter.1278 When the employer did not keep his promises that had been made through 
a protocol between the employer and Maden-İş in 1969, the Sungurlar workers invaded the 
factory for a third time in 1970.1279 In Rabak, the workers stopped working for 18 days and 
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did not allow anyone, except themselves, to maintain the production line.1280 The workers 
who occupied the factory finally had their say on the shop floor, even if temporarily.  
In İzsal, one placard stated that the factory belonged to workers.1281 The radicalism of 
these actions and attitudes resulted in widespread fear among the metal bosses/managers. The 
metal employers perceived the acts as direct attacks on their property rights.1282 One article in 
the TİSK Journal stated that the events were direct and illegal interventions on their “natural 
right” to rule the workplaces; according to the employers, the underlying cause of the events 
was the workers’ desire to manage the workplace.1283 While the invasion was a direct threat to 
capitalist property rights in modern society; nonetheless, it would not be correct to say that 
the metal workers acted to abolish those rights. Rather, they acted to supercede the 
unacceptable workplace relations to which they were subjected. And their actions took a 
radical shape since the bosses were not allowing the workers to have a say on the shop floor. 
The collective actions of the metal workers were so influential that their scale truly 
irritated the bosses/managers who perceived those actions as paving the way for socialism. In 
fact, at the end of 1969, Vehbi Koç exclaimed that the workers’ actions undermined work 
order and discipline on the shop floor level.1284 In addition, the employers complained that the 
workers were involved in several other practices such as laziness and going to toilet, etc., as a 
means of sabotaging the work.1285 For the employers, the workers’ grievances did not stem 
from unfair work relations, but instead were caused by ideological factors. The collective 
events were promoted by DİSK whose main goal was “ideological”.1286 When the collective 
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actions gained momentum after the second half of the 1968, TİSK published a report that 
implied all these actions were conducted by a central group with a hidden agenda. 1287 
Likewise, the MESS reports defined the workers’ actions as communist. 1288  The 
bosses/managers called on their employees to pay no attention to what the “radicals” 
preached on the streets. They said that there had always been inequalities and differences in 
terms of rulers and the ruled in the society and that it was impossible to find an order, which 
based on total equality.1289  
The workers discontent and actions spread towards the mid-1970s to such a great 
extent that the bosses/managers complained that work ethic and discipline totally disappeared 
in the factories. For them, the workers had gotten used to claiming their every demand 
through collective and unlawful actions and, according to managers, the workers had stopped 
using any legal mechanism, at all. The bosses/managers complained that workers hung 
placards that referred to class struggles.1290 In June 1970, the metal employers said that the 
workers’ discontent and actions grew in the sector day by day and, in fact, these illegal acts 
threatened the whole industry.1291 In the words of Ege Cansen, if the period between 1960 and 
1980 was a dark time for the metal bosses, the events that took place between 1968 and 1970 
significantly accounted for the creation of that nightmare. 
                                                                                                                                                                              
Place on the Workplaces], Tarih Vakfı, Orhan Tuna Archive, 11; MESS: IX. Genel Kurul Müzakere ve 
Karar Tutanağı [MESS, The Meeting Decision Record of the IX. General Assembly], 14 November 
1969, Tarih Vakfı Orhan Tuna Archive; Esin Pars, Türkiye’de İşveren Sendikacılığı, 196. 
1287 Türkiye İşveren Sendikaları Konfederasyonu, 5. 
1288 MESS IX. Genel Kuruluna Sunulan Faaliyet ve Hesap Raporu [The Account and Deed Report 
Served to the IX. General Assembly of MESS, 31 October-14 November, 1969, 34. 
1289 Lütfü Doruk, “Arçelik’liler [The Members of Arçelik],” Arçelik’te Bir Ay, no. 53 (January 1970): 
5; Ege Cansen, “Demokrasi [Democracy],” Arçelik’te Bir Ay, no. 56 (April 1970): 1; Ege Cansen, 
“Asıl Mesele [The Real Problem],” Arçelik’te Bir Ay, no. 58 (June 1970): 1 and 3; Ege Cansen, “Beyin 
Yıkama [The Brainwashing],” Arçelik’te Bir Ay, no. 59 (July 1970): 1. 
1290 Ahmet Baysal, “Sanayimizi Tehdit Eden Büyük Tehlike [The Great Danger Which Threatens Our 
Industry],” TİSK-İşveren, vol. 9, no. 8 (June 1970): 25-28.  
1291  Türkiye Madeni Eşya Sanayicileri Sendikası: X. Olağanüstü Genel Kurul Müzakere ve Karar 
Tutanağı, 1970 [The Union of the Metal Hardware Employers in Turkey: The Meeting and Decision 
Record of the X. Extraordinary General Assembly], Tarih Vakfı, Orhan Tuna Archive. 
 
 
399 
 
Figure 27: The wounded Demir Döküm workers after the clash with the police force. (Source: Ant, 12 
August 1969, Front Cover). 
 
This implied sense of radicalism also stemmed from the details of the events. In most 
factories, the workers did not abstain from clashing with police forces. On the contrary, the 
metal workers fought fiercely with police during the events. In January 1969, there was a 
battle between the Singer workers and police.1292 The Magirus strike, which lasted 46 days, 
was also a bloody one.1293 The Demir Döküm workers, too, fought with the police1294 and a 
Horoz Nail factory worker, Sabri Yılmaz, was seriously injured during a fight with police.1295 
One worker, Şerif Aygün, was shot dead by the police in Gamak.1296 Those violent fights 
would also prove workers’ determination to achieve their demands. 
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Figure 28: An illustration, which depicts the murder of Şerif Aygün in Gamak by police forces 
(Source: Maden-İş, no. 21, 8 January 1970, 5). 
 
The support of the community that resided in the neighbourhoods surrounding the 
factories further increased the radicalization of the events and the success of the collective 
actions. This had been proven by the İstinye people, most of whom were the relatives of 
either the Kavel workers, and by the other laborers recruited in the various factories in the 
region, during the Kavel Strike in 1963. In fact, most collective actions quickly turned into 
community events between 1968 and 1970, since the workers’ well-being was critical to the 
survival of the community. Indeed, the metal workers were one of the most significant groups 
in the neighbourhoods, alongside their families. The communities, which surrounded the 
workplaces, were mostly fed through the workers’ salaries. In the words of Mehmet Kul: 
“On pay day, the whole region used to turn into a festive place. In fact, all of 
the region [Eyüp, a.n.] was fed by the workers’ income.”1297 
 
In this regard, the workers were the sole earner of their families, as well as 
significantly contributing to the economic well-being of the community. As stated above, 
community life, itself, developed around the factories after the Second World War in İstanbul. 
Therefore, the boundaries between working and living places were very vague. After leaving 
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the factory, the workers socialized in places such as coffee houses, or at community events 
like weddings, circumcision feasts, religious festivals, picnics, etc. In fact, Maden-İş 
conducted meetings in the workers’ houses and inside local coffee houses, which were the 
usual places of socialization for the workers.1298 In our interview, Seyfi Çağan said that he 
and his fellow workers organized Maden-İş in the coffee houses of Eyüp.1299 This was a fact 
well recognized by the bosses and managers of the period. Ege Cansen confessed in our 
interview that militant unionism spread to the whole Silahtarağa region during this period.1300 
A report published by TİSK stated that the workers’ families who dwelled nearby to the 
plants acted as supplementary forces during these events. In some cases, they closed the roads 
so that the police forces could not get to the factories.1301 It seems that the TİSK’s report was 
right. For example, the families of the Horoz Nail Factory workers supported the strikers and 
fought with the police.1302 The workers’ close relatives became a part of the events at Singer, 
too, where they stoned the police forces who attacked the workers.1303 Seyfi Çağan recalls that 
both workers and people from the community pushed the police back from Demir Döküm 
factory.1304 In Demir Döküm, the children, wives and close relatives of workers who stayed 
outside the factory during the invasion resisted against the police forces and called up other 
residents of the region from the mosque when the workers were attacked. Alongside the 
workers, the community fought off the police forces in the sixth day of the invasion.1305 In the 
words of Hüseyin Ekinci: 
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“(...) After the second and third sound of bombs, we saw that people of the 
neighbourhood came into the factory like ants. The mob surrounded the 
police forces which had surrounded the factory.”1306 
 
In general, the collective actions were seen as a matter of death and life for the metal workers, 
as well as their communities. In fact, not just the worker’s families, but the other residents of 
the community who participated in the events defended the well-being of the community, due 
to the fact that the workers constituted one of the most indispensable parts of the community 
inside the poor districts of İstanbul.  
 
Figure 29: The children of the Demir Döküm workers collecting stones in case of a police attack 
(Source: Akşam, August 7, 1969, 1). 
 
This radicalism, however, had its limits. While the metal workers did not utilize any 
legal mechanisms at this time, their union sought for the legitimacy of the collective actions 
in the legal texts, after the accusations of illegal actions made by the bosses and Çelik-İş. The 
metal bosses/employers condemned the actions as illegal and disruptive of the general work 
order1307 and they complained that the workers had resorted to illegal mechanisms to make 
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their demands.1308 For example, during the Demir Döküm events, the employers and their 
unions, namely TİSK and MESS, said that the irresponsible unions provoked the workers for 
political gain.1309 In MESS declarations, Maden-İş was accused of provoking the workers in 
Emayetaş. 1310  Similarly, Çelik-İş claimed the collective actions were illegal. The union 
journal published statements saying that a few “provocateurs” instigated the workers and 
threatened to establish a “communist dictatorship” in the country.1311 On the face of these 
public accusations, Maden-İş officers attempted to persuade the larger public on the 
legitimacy of the actions. In these cases, the union held up the Constitution to legitimize the 
workers’ actions. The union officers statements cited the main cause of the actions as neither 
“excessive” demands nor “provocations” of the union, but rather, the they claimed that 
workers had been forced to act because the employers had ignored the Constitution, a 
document which provided workers with rights that state mechanisms could not/did not 
enforce. The union said further that the workers acted only to apply the rules of the 
Constitution, in the fullest sense.1312 This defence echoed amongst the representatives and 
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workers on the shop floor level, too. For the workers and their representatives, their resistance 
was a right set out in the Constitution.1313 Kasım Sert from Demir Döküm, claimed that: 
“I want to state that our action is not illegal. We only utilized our rights 
provided by the Constitution.”1314 
 
 
Figure 30: A photo taken from the Demir Döküm invasion. The workers wrote the 14th item of the 
Constitution that stated that every person had the right to improve his/her life and no one could be 
tortured or oppressed over his/her thoughts. (Source: Maden-İş, no. 17, 22 October 1969, 8). 
 
This radicalism was also limited in terms its clash with state forces. The metal 
workers fought back fiercely against police; yet, when the military forces intervened in the 
events, they quickly reached an agreement. When military forces came to Demir Döküm after 
a fierce battle with the police, the workers declared their confidence in them. A workers’ 
council agreed to meet with the man in charge and evacuated the factory, but only after a 
military leader promised them no one but the Demir Döküm workers would work again in the 
factory. The commander told them that, until the dispute was resolved, he would not hand 
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over the factory to the employers, and, in fact, the commander kept his promise.1315 The story 
of this event was repeated to me several times during my interviews with the ex-workers. The 
same thing happened in Sungurlar when the workers invaded the factory in May, 1970.1316 
But the same metal workers would not hesitate to clash with the military forces in June 15-
16th, 1970. 
Some militant workers, however, did not seek the legitimacy of their actions in any 
legal text. They resisted out of their “natural” right to resist injustice and unfairness. They 
resisted when their natural rights, rooted in being producers in society, were not recognized or 
were oppressed. The source of their legitimacy stemmed from their position in society, 
namely being producers of wealth. For some of the militant metal workers, it was their natural 
right to resist against unfairness.1317 This stance demonstrated that their radicalism and their 
beliefs in their rights had two sources: one was the law, and the second one was their 
contributions to society as producers. Based on the latter belief, they demanded their true and 
deserved share from the bosses and the state. The belief in the righteousness of their cause, 
indeed, motivated them to act against what they saw as unfairness in the workplaces and 
larger society. Their motivations and their experiences during the struggles contributed to the 
existence of a common consciousness among the militant metal workers. 
 
III. For the Sake of Our Labor: The Language of the Militant Metal Workers 
The militant metal workers’ common consciousness took shape as a result of their 
experience of surviving injustices and their common actions to end them. This consciousness, 
first of all, demonstrates a certain pride among the militant workers on their position within 
                                                             
1315 “Ordu Gelince İşçiler Fabrikadan Çıktı [The Invaders Left the Factory When the Military Forces 
Have Arrived],” Milliyet, August 6, 1969, 1 and 11; “Demir Döküm’de İşgal ve Gev Sona Erdi [The 
Invasion and Strike Have Come To An End in Demir Döküm],” Milliyet, August 21, 1969, 1; Türkiye 
Maden-İş Sendikası Altıncı Bölge Temsilciliği Faaliyet Raporu, 17 August 1969. 
1316  “Sungurlar Fabrikasında Kaynayan Kazan [The Boiling Furnace in the Sungurlar Furnace 
Factory],” Maden-İş, no. 28 (23 May 1970): 2. 
1317 “Singer Baştemsilcisi Ahmet Yüzyıl’a Sorduk, Söyledi [We Asked the Singer Headrepresentative, 
Ahmet Yıldız, He Told],” Maden-İş, no. 25 (6 April 1970): 3. 
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the society as the producer of wealth of the nation. Ali Şahin, from the Aksan Factory, 
described how the workers created the country as such: 
“They say citizen in the tax and vote 
Friend in the road, brother in the front 
Fight with the enemy for the land and honor 
But, insult us when the time to work comes 
 
It is the worker who makes the country 
Peasant is the patron of the country 
Profiteer, broker crushes workers 
Open your eyes, I say to you 
(…)”1318 
 
The discourse here reflected the widespread thought amongst the militant workers, 
that it was the labor of workers that advances the development of the society and the nation. 
For example, Hüseyin Kuş claimed that the workers’ labor established the country, bridges, 
high rises and roads.1319 The author of the above poem, Şahin, believed workers produced the 
wealth in society, yet they were treated unfairly. That is the main point that the militant 
workers touted as the reason for the legitimacy of their collective actions. In return for their 
labor, the bosses who owned the factories, or the managers who ran them, had to provide 
rewards for the “true” or “just” value of that labor. But they did not. In the words of a union 
representative: 
“We are the workers who devote their knowledge and bodies to the national 
industry so that our country would catch up to the level of the developed 
nations in terms of technology and industry. In parallel with this, although 
there is no discussion on which elements are being used to construct that 
                                                             
1318 Ali Şahin, “Sorarım Size [I Ask You],” Maden-İş, 1 June 1969, 5. 
1319 Hüseyin Kuş, “Bu Düzenin Sonu Gelir [This Order Will Come to an End],” Maden-İş, 7 July 1969, 
4. 
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future, our value is unfortunately not taken into consideration. Before all, we 
must be aware of our true value and, in accordance with this, we should ask a 
fair return for our value and knowledge, without having any shame, and we 
should also ask for our rights alongside this awareness.”1320 
 
For the militant workers, their commitment, if any existed, to their workplaces came 
out of their own labor, not out of the so-called the “benevolence” of the bosses/managers. An 
Arçelik worker said that although he had a certain commitment to his workplace, in which he 
earned his bread for his children, the workplace did not provide for his true share of labor.1321 
He defines the management as such: 
“We called him [Lütfü Doruk, a.n.] ‘father’ for years, we committed our hope 
to him. He made a promise to us. We would own a house. We would own a 
car. Our life would change through his help. You know the result: he made 
his own house. He bought his own car, he did to us what he did (...) 
[For the General Manager, a.n.] That person, we heard his name, but we have 
not seen him once. He was unaware of our existence, he does not bother to 
know us. He has no intent to know us (...).”1322 
 
Therefore, their common language spoke for the widespread belief among the 
militant metal workers that while they were making considerable contributions in the society, 
their rights, whether lawful or natural, were not recognized. One Demir Döküm worker 
complained that that the workers were treated as (unwanted) step children in the country.1323 
A poem by Ekrem Ekinci depicted his sense of injustice as follows: 
 “(...) 
                                                             
1320 “Bir Sendika Temsilcisi Konuşuyor [A Union Representative is Speaking],” Maden-İş, year 9, no. 
2 (15 March 1965): 7. 
1321  “Arçelik’te Çalışan Bir İşçi Arkadaş Yazıyor [A Fellow Worker Who Works in Arçelik is 
Writing],” Maden-İş, no. 19 (1 December 1969): 4. 
1322 Ibid. 
1323 “Evleri Yıkılan İşçiler Yürüdü [The Workers Whose Houses Were Demolished Marched],” Maden-
İş, no. 17 (22 October 1969): 4.  
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 We are workers but we do not have capital 
 We are citizens but we do not have a protector 
 We do not have any member in the law and government 
commissions 
 (...).”1324 
 
Salih Topçu from Arçelik expressed the misery of “poor” workers as compared with 
the wealthy employers as follows: 
“A worker labors and strives and he commits to his job and brings his family 
from his villages, out of his trust in his boss. He thinks that he will work in 
factory for his whole life, furthermore, he rents a squatter house, but he could 
not afford a furnace for the winter. How can he, the poor creature, afford one: 
money is necessary for buying fuel. He earns: 19 TL and 50 kuruş (...) 
The life of an employer: He rides in his automobile; he carries his wife and 
child. Well my wife, where shall we go tonight? My lord, the weather is cold, 
let’s ride to Beyoğlu go to the Club Kartiyer. We shall have some dinner and 
have some fun  (...) after having some food there, the time is 02.00 am and 
they desire whisky (...) There, they go and spend their nights. (...)The life of 
the boss goes on like this.”1325 
 
Some militant workers, therefore, perceived the injustices, which workers exposed to 
be as a result of unequal relations between workers and employers. In this regard, the militant 
workers’ complained about the unequal income level between bosses and workers in Turkey: 
 “Agha owns a hundred thousand square meters of land 
 There is no balance in justice 
                                                             
1324 Ekrem Ekinci, “İşçi Kardeşlerime Sesleniyorum [I am Calling for My Fellow Workers],” Maden-
İş, no. 28 (23 May 1970): 9. 
1325 Salih Topçu, “İşçi Sınıfının Kurtuluş Yolu Nedir? [What is the Salvation Way for the Working 
Class],” Maden-İş, no. 24 (20 March 1970): 9. 
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 Who hears the voice of the worker? 
 Boss counts his money 
 (...).”1326 
 
A poem written by an anonymous Demir Döküm worker during the occupation 
emphasized on the same point and berated the bosses who exploited workers in the country 
and oppressed the workers who went after their rights: 
 “The laborer cannot get their true share 
 Most could not even find proper food 
 The general manager, this world is not yours 
 Let’s look at the labor of the worker.’1327 
 
 “The poor peasant goes to a foreign land 
 He enters into factory work 
 The exploitative boss chases after him 
 He does not like those who seek for their rights 
 
 You begin to your work and work with your labor 
 You keep working with your strength 
 The exploiters defraud you of your rights 
 (Maden-İş) runs after such an exploiter 
 
 Worker attends his work every day 
 He asks for the money when the time comes 
 But asking his true share 
 The exploitative boss does not like this 
                                                             
1326 Ahmet Arslan, “Mücadele [The Struggle],” Maden-İş, 22 May 1969, 7. 
1327 İşçi-Köylü. 
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 (...).”1328 
 
One placard which was hung on the Auer factory walls during the action stated that 
‘We Will Crush the Heads of the Exploiters.’1329 Ahmet Yüzyıl, from Singer, said that the 
capitalist classes who exploited the workers were the main reasons for the workers’ 
misery.1330 According to Ahmet Sürmene, the bosses, and their chiefs who were not actually 
involved in production activity, usurped workers’ labor.1331 
The prevailing language among the militant metal workers, therefore, demonstrates 
that the workers collectively rose up to overcome the injustices they experienced. The Demir 
Döküm workers said that they rose up because their income was barely enough for their 
families, while the general manager earned huge amounts of money. According to the Demir 
Döküm workers, it was unfair to earn an average 500 TL a month, while the general manager, 
Burhan Günergun, got a 600 000 TL premium from the profit of the factory.1332 Another 
injustice detailed in the language of the militant Demir Döküm workers was that, although the 
men closest to the Çelik-İş representatives got high points in the job evaluation system, the 
other workers were given lower points; as a result, their wages were less.1333 Related to this, 
the common language further disclosed that the militant metal workers demanded a more 
decent life: 
“Worker shall work and know his job 
 Boss shall relent 
                                                             
1328 Osman Yavuz, “Garip İşçi [The Poor Worker],” Maden-İş, no. 21, (1 January 1970): 11. 
1329 Maden-İş, April 1970. 
1330 “Singer Baştemsilcisi Ahmet Yüzyıl’a Sorduk, Söyledi [We Asked the Singer Headrepresentative, 
Ahmet Yıldız, He Told],” Maden-İş, no. 25 (6 April 1970): 3. 
1331 Ahmet Sürmene, “İşçiler ve Politika [Workers and Politics],” Maden-İş, 7 July 1969, 5. 
1332 Altan Öymen “Usül Meselesi Dışında Silahtarağa Olayı [the Incident At Silahtarağa Except the 
Method Problem],” Akşam August 7, 1969. 
1333 Tanju Cılızoğlu, “2500 İşçi 4 Gündür Taş Üstünde Yatıyor [The 2500 Workers Have Been Lying 
on the Stone For 4 Days],” Akşam, August 4, 1969, 1 and 7; Altan Öymen, “[Usül Meselesi Dışında 
Silahtarağa Olayı [the Incident At Silahtarağa Except the Method Problem]’, Akşam, August 7, 1969, 1 
and 7; “Demir Döküm Protokolünde Bahsi Geçen İş Değerlendirmesi Nedir [What is the Work 
Evaluation That Was Mentioned in the Protocol in Demir Döküm],” Türk Solu, year 2, no. 93 (26 
August 1969). Seyfi Çağan mentioned about the same injustice in our meeting. Seyfi Çağan, interview 
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 And give the value of workers in a human manner.”1334 
 
Some militant metal workers pointed out that they acted collectively to revise or 
change the existing unfair social relations.1335  İskender Çerkes asked for change and justice 
in his poem: 
 “(...) 
 It is not true to say that this is our fate from birth 
 It is not ethical to destroy love and respect in this order 
 Boss eats, but worker does not 
 My brother, although it went on like this, it will not go on like that 
  
 (...) 
 It is not right to give much to wealthy people, but less to poor ones 
 God sees this segregation, but accepts it not 
 Is it not clear that’s why a heavenly justice exists 
 My brother, although it went on like this, it does not go on like 
that.”1336 
 
 
Figure 31: The placards held by the Talisman workers stated that: “We are not growing our bellies, we 
are laboring! We Ask For Our Rights,” “We want to live in a human manner.” (Source: Maden-İş, no. 
25, 6 April 1970, 3). 
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1970): 10. 
1336 İskender Çerkes, “Böyle Gitmez [It Does Not Go On Like This],” Maden-İş, 22 May 1969, 4. 
 
 
412 
The militant workers asked for their deserved place in Turkey’s social life; they 
wanted to be recognized as good and respected citizens.1337 The head representative of Auer 
claimed that his fellow workers desired to be treated well, wanted work guarantees and higher 
wages.1338 Kemal Güçlü from Demir Döküm claimed that they staged the collective action to 
abolish the oppression of workers and ease their misery. They acted in order to live in a 
human manner.1339 An anonymous worker, together with Ali Demirel, wrote to the union 
journal that they and their friends in the workplaces dreamed about their rights and fair share 
in society.1340 The Efem workers stated that what they wanted was only their natural rights 
earned by their labor. 1341  Several metal workers expressed their desire to live in a 
fundamentally different kind of society. İskender Çerkes dreamed of a different country, 
bereft of oppression, exploitation, unfairness, and full of equality and justice: 
 “Think about a country’ where the Laborer gets his rights 
 Worker and peasant will not be oppressed in the future 
 Where one is not afraid of the future, and will not be exploited 
 (...) 
 Think about a country! Where there is no class difference 
 It does not bother with meaningless questions 
 No one robs the individual, nation or state 
 It is not afraid, nor bows down to unfairness.”1342  
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Figure 32: The Eca workers at the invasion. The placard says that: “We, the ECA workers, said end to 
the exploitation.” (Source: Maden-İş, no. 28, 23 May 1970, 7). 
 
Accordingly, the militant metal workers believed in solidarity and staging common 
struggles to get their rights and put an end to injustices. Their common voice, then, also spoke 
of the workers’ own power. A Demir Döküm worker states: 
“My brother, do not we have a right to live? We wanted union freedom. The 
employer’s representative permanently destroyed our rights. Then, the 
oppression, tricks, ploys caused in the events. We said ‘enough was 
enough’.”1343 
 
An Emayetaş worker called on his fellow workers not to be afraid of bosses/managers 
and the “man of Çelik-İş,” since the workers, collectively, were stronger than them.1344 Binali 
Karaca says that unless the working class did resist, it could not obtain its rights.1345 One 
Demir Döküm worker said that they would fight until the working class was recognized as a 
                                                             
1343 “Demir Döküm İşçileri Konuşuyor [The Demir Döküm Workers Talk],” interview by Hüseyin 
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social group, one which deserved to live in human manner.1346 Ahmet Canbaba’s poem called 
the metal workers to battle: 
 “Why, your house is nothing but single room 
 Lords own castles and apartment buildings 
 Don’t say it always went on like this 
 Gain strength slowly 
 
 Your labor is not in vain 
 Your hands shall rise against the tyranny 
 Your pen in this cause 
 Shall declare a war against unfairness.”1347 
 
 
Figure 33: The İzsal workers dance a traditional Turkish folkdance during their actions. (Source: 
Maden-İş, no. 28, 23 May 1970, 6). 
 
Lütfü Aykut, from Elektrometal, expressed the workers’ misery and told the others 
that their time had come: 
 “Few coins in a day 
 This is our whole money 
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Class],” Maden-İş, no. 28 (23 May 1970): 4. 
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  Half hungry half full 
  Our mothers suffer 
 You work, the others earn 
 Our condition is always bad 
  We were tricked for years 
  And we barely came to here 
 (...) 
  Hey, my friend, wake up 
  Our time has come 
 We opened the banner of victory 
 Ahead of us...”1348 
 
Osman Keskin, from Demir Döküm, gave examples of their struggles when they 
collectively overcame injustices: 
 “We are not horses to participate in a race 
 We are not soldiers to hail the commanders 
 Why is there oppression of workers? 
Wake up fellow workers, your time has come 
 
We hoisted our flag in Demir Döküm 
Everyone boos the general manager 
Hail the workers as Maden-İş 
Wake up fellow workers, time has come.”1349 
 
Another worker from Demir Döküm narrated their collective actions: 
 “The sleeping workers awaken  
                                                             
1348 Lütfü Aykut, “Uyan İşçi [Wake Up, Worker],” Maden-İş, no. 24 (20 March 1970): 8. 
1349 Osman Keskin, “Yeter Zulüm [Enough to Oppression],” Maden-İş, no. 28 (23 May 1970): 3. 
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 They came to the factory at one p.m. 
 I checked to see, did the general manager wake up? 
 Give us our right, or we’ll take it.”1350 
 
And, Karaveli, a Gamak worker, put forth the workers’ determination in his poem on 
the death of Şerif Aygün: 
 “The workplace called Gamak produces motors. 
 The bourgeoisie called ‘boss’ worships money. 
 Do not consider that my death will end this war.”1351 
 
In conclusion, there emerged a certain common consciousness among the militant 
metal workers, which pointed out a pride in their labor and an unfair relationship between 
bosses/managers and workers within the existing social order. More importantly, the militant 
metal workers who shared this consciousness talked about their determination and desire to 
overcome those suffering experiences that they lived through in their working places. The 
most important lesson that the metal workers learned from their experiences, thus, was the 
necessity of solidarity to make their dreams come true. 
 
IV. An Injury to One… 
The metal workers’ experiences of their factory and city lives and collective actions 
culminated in the formation of workers’ commitment towards their workplaces, to each other, 
and their own power and unity. The idea of the common labor of the militant metal workers, 
improving their factories (their own sources of income) and the nation, as well as the common 
nature of their struggles, tightened their bonds to the factories. The form of action taken, 
namely the factory occupation, shows that the metal workers were indeed looking after their 
workplaces. For example, the Demir Döküm workers who participated in the occupation did 
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1351  Gamak İşçilerinden Karaveli [Karaveli, A Gamak Worker], “Şerif Canma Ne Oldu? [What 
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not leave the factory, which was their source of income, in the “hands of anyone else.”1352 In 
fact, the struggle itself enhanced this feeling of loyalty among the militant workers. Mustafa 
Türker remembers Demir Döküm as the best factory in Turkey, due to the workers’ struggle 
there.1353  Hüseyin Ekinci expressed the workers’ commitment to the factories and union 
policy in the following: 
“After the workers began to choose their union and representatives freely, 
they began to see the factories as their income sources. They considered the 
fact that they had to work efficiently and fully deserve what they earn, they 
reflected that they had to care about their workplaces. We educated the 
workers in that way. We always wanted our members to work efficiently in 
their workplaces.”1354 
 
Their collective struggles and factory lives also enhanced their commitment to each 
other within the workplaces. In this sense, they reached a common consciousness of being 
“we” through their struggles. The İzsal workers said that: 
“We became unified during the strike. We learned each other very well. We 
learned new things. Most importantly, we realized our power, we realized 
that the factory would not work without us.”1355  
 
A factory manager defined this commitment as following: 
“(…) the employer provides bonuses to the workers whom he assumed had 
worked hard. No, you cannot. Reason? Either you give it to us all, or you 
cannot give it to anyone (...).”1356  
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Their commitment to each other and their feeling of “we” went beyond the factory 
level, as well. In fact, the active metal workers visited each other’s places of resistance, or 
supported each other through several means. Hüseyin Ekinci said that the workers of the other 
factories, such as Sungurlar or Magirus, sent food to the Demir Döküm workers during the 
invasion. The Demir Döküm and Auer representatives visited the Otosan workers who newly 
joined in Maden-İş in 1970 and shared their experiences.1357 The Demir Döküm workers 
staged a protest march in the region to support the Sungurlar workers who were taking action. 
And the workers of Demir Döküm, Rabak, Elektro Metal, Şakir Zümre and the Steel Industry, 
visited the Sungurlar workers to proclaim their support.1358  
This kind of support enhanced and empowered the workers’ sense of unity within the 
workplaces. In fact, the struggles transgressed even regionalism or job differences among the 
metal workers. The workers from different regions and different jobs participated in the 
collective actions and in the education seminars of Maden-İş, in order to defend their 
common rights. The workers of Bufer, Türk Demir Döküm, Kavel, Magirus, Uzel, Elektro 
Metal, Grundig, Philips, Profilo, Auer, Tekfen, Arçelik, etc., all participated in the union’s 
seminars.1359 Those common struggles and encounters resulted in a sense of unity among the 
militant workers. An enthusiastic Demir Döküm worker asserted that the unity between 
workers had begun with the actions of the Demir Döküm workers, since the workers of the 
other factories and people of the region supported them.1360 
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Figure 34: The Demir Döküm workers march in Eyüp to support Sungurlar workers (Source: Maden-
İş, April 1970). 
 
 
Figure 35: The placard proclaims the support of the ECA and Sungurlar workers for the Günterm 
workers who occupied the factory (Source: Maden-İş, no. 29, 20 June 1970, 4). 
 
More importantly, these struggles enhanced the idea among the militant metal 
workers that only they and their own organizations could defend their own rights. Even the 
metal managers admitted at the end of the decade that the workers acted collectively on every 
issue.1361 In İsmet Amca’s recollections, the workers had to fight to prove their own power 
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and unity.1362 As the İzsal workers stated, the workers realized their own power throughout 
the struggle.1363 The Demir Döküm events meant, according to Kemal Güçlü, that: 
“This action is the latest stage of the history of the Turkish workers’ actions. 
The following actions will take this as an example. For this, the workers have 
to show their class power (...) The working class must realize its own class at 
first, then it has to learn that there is another class on the other side. Since, 
when the working class with a class consciousness rises up, it will be 
triumphant.”1364 
  
And lastly, battling together enhanced their commitment to their solidarity and union, 
which actually was created and/or empowered in the workplace through the workers’ 
collective struggles. In our interview, Aziz Amca said that their interests were common and 
they had a strong solidarity. He added that they could win their rights from the bosses thanks 
to their union. He recalled that that they were, as workers, very powerful and Maden-İş was a 
strong and trustworthy union.1365 According to Mehmet Kul, the union had made the workers 
strong and led the workers to believe in their own power.1366  
Maden-İş also left an important legacy in the minds of the people who dwelled in the 
neighbourhood. During our interview with Aziz Amca, a man intervened in the talk and said 
that the union provided a focus of solidarity for the workers. He said that in today’s Turkey 
there is no such thing as solidarity.1367 I realized during my interviews with the ex-metal 
workers that they often compared the current conditions of workers in Turkey with the 
conditions that once existed with a certain nostalgia. Mustafa Türker compared their times 
with the current situation: 
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“I remember the old times and miss them very much. Now, I am very sad 
about the current situation of workers in Turkey. There is no unity among 
them, they are being oppressed but they cannot resist. There was a unity in 
our times. If any workers’ noses bled, we used to get together and resist. 
Now, there is nothing.”1368 
 
But such memories were not just the products of yearning for the good old times. In 
fact, Mustafa Türker’s memories were confirmed by Osman Yavuz’s poem, written in 1970: 
“Come fellow workers 
 Our unity makes us strong.”1369 
 
Osman Yavuz’s voice was a good example that the metal workers’ unity may be 
simple nostalgia for Mustafa Türker, but it was a reality for the metal workers who lived 
through those times and participated in the actions.  
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                             
1368 Mustafa Türker, interview by author, Yıldız Tabya, İstanbul, August 29, 2012. 
1369 Osman Yavuz, “Garip İşçi [The Poor Worker],” Maden-İş, no. 21, (1 January 1970): 11. 
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CHAPTER 11 
CONCLUSION: ONE BIG FAMILY 
The metal workers’ own collective experiences and struggles led them to the 
realization and enunciation of their common consciousness. It was not a pure class 
consciousness in the Marxist sense of the term; however, it was common among the İstanbul 
metal workers. This consciousness defined the common interests and desires of the metal 
workers to live in a decent manner and become a respected group of the society. More 
importantly, it emphasized the need for solidarity in the struggle to make their dreams come 
true. It was not a movement against capitalism per se, or against the order of private property; 
yet it certainly demanded a change in the existing social structure, which had enabled 
injustices and impoverished certain social groups. In order to abolish those social injustices, 
the language of the militant workers increasingly emphasized unity and struggle, but not the 
benevolence of the state or bosses. Above all, it derived the legitimacy of their demands from 
the workers’ special place in society as the producers of the nation’s wealth. Having a sense 
of pride in being laborers, the metal workers claimed their demands in several ways in post-
war Turkey. 
 In this study, I am offering a social history, which is based on three interconnected 
sets of relations, in an effort to delineate the specific factors that paved the way for the 
formation of common class experiences and the rise of a class consciousness. The first set of 
relations is made up of the workers’ experiences in their living and workplaces. History 
writing has to problematize the social formation of workers, both in living and working 
places, in terms of the social dynamics of workers’ unity and their divisions in terms of race, 
gender, family patterns, etc. For living places, the dynamics of migration, the geographical 
construction of neighbourhoods, 1370  the pattern of social formation, the mechanism(s) of 
workers adaptation to the city life, workers’ desire to be a part of larger community, etc., are 
                                                             
1370 Labor geography is a new and stimulating field in the studies of working class history. See, Don 
Kalb, “Class (in Place) Without Capitalism (in Space)?” International Labor and Working-Class 
History, 57 (Spring 1994): 31-39; Andrew Herod, “Workers, Space, and Labor Geography,” 
International Labor and Working-Class History, 64 (Fall 2003): 112-138. 
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all factors that matter in class formation, action and language. 1371  In this regard, I take 
workplace as the battleground 1372  between workers and bosses/managers. The history of 
enterprises should not only deal with the rise of particular sector(s), or with statistics in terms 
of workers’ numbers, but history should also consider the actions and perspectives of 
managers and owners, as well as the application of managerial techniques which complete the 
framework for labor relations. This institutional history must be enriched by the 
managers’/employers’ organizational history in order to understand how the bosses situated 
their social identity in the larger social relations, and society. When considering the 
bosses/managers, it is also important to show how they reacted to a new world characterized 
by workers’ rights, the expansion of union density, and state growth.1373 Therefore, I focus on 
how control1374 is maintained on shop floor level, within the limits of my evidence. This 
control was a significant cause for workers’ grievances and frustrations, and I focus, too, on 
                                                             
1371 Mary Lynn Mc Dougall, “Consciousness and Community: The Workers of Lyon, 1830-1850,” 
Journal of Social History, 12:1 (Fall 1978): 138; Michael Hanagan, The Logic of Solidarity: Artisans 
and Industrial Workers in Three French Towns, 1871-1914 (Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 
1980); Lenard R. Berlanstein, “The Formation of a Factory Labor force: Rubber and Cable Workers in 
Bezons, France (1860-1914),” Journal of Social History, 15:2 (Winter 1981): 181; Michael Hanagan 
and Charles Stephenson, “Introduction” in Michael Hanagan and Charles Stephenson [eds.] 
Proleterians and Protest: The Roots of Class Formation in an Industrializing World, (New York: 
Greenwood Press, 1986): 13; Sharon Stichter, “Migrants and Working-Class Consciousness in Kenya,” 
in Michael Hanagan and Charles Stephenson [eds.] Proleterians and Protest: The Roots of Class 
Formation in an Industrializing World, (New York: Greenwood Press, 1986): 171-196; Michelle 
Perrot, “On the Formation of the French Working Class”, in Ira Katznelson and Aristide R. Zolberg 
(eds.) Working Class Formation: Nineteenth Century Patterns in Western Europe and the United 
States, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1986): 88-91. 
1372  Richard Edwards, Contested Terrain: The Transformation of the Workplace in the Twentieth 
Century, (New York: Basic Books, 1979): 13. Also look at: Joseph A. McCartin, Labor’s Great War: 
The Struggle for Industrial Democracy and the Origins of Modern American Labor Relations, 1912-
1921 (Chapel Hill and London: The University of North Carolina Press, 1997). 
1373 Richard McIntyre and Michael Hillard, “Capitalist Class Agency and the New Deal Order: Against 
the notion of a Limited Capital-Labor Accord,” 134. For an excellent account on how the American 
capitalist class responded to the “labor problem” in the First World War years, look at: H. M. Guelman, 
“Being of Two Minds: American Employers Confront the Labor Problem, 1915-1919,” Labor History, 
25:2 (1984): 189-216. Also look at: Richard Edwards, 99-110; Donald Reid, “Industrial Paternalism: 
Discourse and Practice in Nineteenth-Century French Mining and Metallurgy,” Comparative Studies in 
Society and History, 27:4 (October 1985): 579-607; Joseph A. McCartin, Labor’s Great War; Susan 
Eleanor Hirsch, After the Strike. 
1374 I agree with Richard Edwards about the conflictual nature of control at the workplace: “Those basic 
relationships [relations between capitalist and worker, my addition] in production reveal both the basis 
for conflict and the problem of control at the workplace. Conflict exists because the interests of 
workers and those of employers collide, and what is good for one is frequently costly for the other. 
Control is rendered problematice because, unlike the other commodities involved in production, labor 
power is always embodied in people, who have their own interests and needs and who retain their 
power to resist being treated like a commodity.” Richard Edwards, 12. 
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how the workers respond to the managerial practices they are experiencing.1375 Then, the 
particular types of workers’ acceptance and resistance, individual or collective, to managerial 
practices further contribute to the story of the formation of class and consciousness. The most 
general means for organizing collective resistance is certainly through unions. Therefore, it is 
inevitable that the unionization process must be researched, plus the kind of social dynamics 
unionization was dependent upon, and what kind of new dynamics it created, as well as the 
particular forms of workers’ commitment to the union.1376  
The institutional history of unions, their ideologies, actions, leadership, and 
organizational types must also be the subjects of any thorough social history of workers. 
Hence, I focus secondly on the set of relations between institutions. Here, the state, its 
institutions and their particular relationships with workers, bosses and their organizations 
must be analyzed. The history of intra-elite political competition has to detail how and why 
competition rises, and how individual workers, or their collective organizations, seize and 
exploit the opportunities of that same competition. Thus, I narrate the state policies in Turkey 
after the war years to tackle the question of the particular forms of citizenship, rights and 
social justice offered by the state, and the perception of those elements by both the workers 
and the trade unions.1377  
                                                             
1375 Cf. Richard Edwards, 57-75; Lenard R. Berlanstein, 163-186; Jürgen Kocka, “Problems of the 
Working-Class Formation in Germany: The Early Years, 1800-1875” in Ira Katznelson and Aristide R. 
Zolberg [eds.] Working Class Formation: Nineteenth Century Patterns in Western Europe and the 
United States, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1986): 316-324; Michael Hanagan, “Solidary 
Logics,” Theory and Society, 17 (1988): 309-327; Craig Heron, Working in Steel: The Early Years in 
Canada, 1883-1935 (Toronto: McClelland & Stewart, 1991); Dave Lyddon, “Industrial-Relations 
Theory and Labor History,” International Labor and Working-Class History, 46 (Fall 1994): 122-141; 
Susan Eleanor Hirsch, After the Strike: A Century of Labor Struggle At Pullman, (Urbana and Chicago: 
University of Illinois Press, 2003); Joseph A. McCartin, Labor’s Great War, 217. 
1376  For a good study analyzing how the workers committed to their union based on workers’ 
experiences, see: Jack Metzgar, Striking Steel: Solidarity Remembered, (Philadelphia: Temple 
University Press, 2000). 
1377 For the importance of contentious politics and state policies on the class formation and language 
see, Sean Wilentz, “Against Exceptionalism: Class Consciousness and the American Labor Movement, 
1790-1920,” International Labor and Working-Class History, 26 (Fall 1984): 1-24; Martin Shefter, 
“Trade Unions and Political Machines: The Organization and Disorganization of the American 
Working Class in the Late Nineteenth Century,” in Ira Katznelson and Aristide R. Zolberg [eds.] 
Working Class Formation: Nineteenth Century Patterns in Western Europe and the United States, 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1986): 197-276; Aristide R. Zolberg, “How Many 
Exceptionalism?” in Ira Katznelson and Aristide R. Zolberg [eds.] Working Class Formation: 
Nineteenth Century Patterns in Western Europe and the United States, (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1986): 452-455; William H. Sewell, Jr. “Uneven Development, the Autonomy of 
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Furthermore, such a history must discuss the framework of law that assumes a 
particular place for the workers and their organizations, and employers and their 
organizations, in the “natural” order of things in the country. These are laws designed to 
affect and regulate the factory regime and shop floor dynamics. On this topic, my main focus 
is on the process of law, since the state policies or institutions might transform to points of 
contention between workers and bosses/managers, over time.1378 In general, the unions and 
workers demanded formal control promised by the state so that they could negotiate the 
conditions of work more easily. 1379  But this discussion will not be confined with the 
framework of law. It has to question how managers/owners and workers all legitimized their 
demands based on the laws and state policies. This reasoning must also search for the 
underlying patterns in which managers/owners and working class actors actually behaved, 
either within the laws, or how they transgressed them. 
 And lastly, I am encompassing the set of relations that took shape at the action level. 
The collective actions of workers, the role of union(s), the dynamics of workers’ 
participation, their demands, the form of actions and their repercussions on both state actors, 
has to be a part of the agenda scrutinized1380 since as Friedman argues:  
“Strikes are among the formative experiences in many workers’ lives, 
recalled in detail long after their conclusion. By demonstrating their 
solidarity, participation in public action solidifies workers’ commitment to 
                                                                                                                                                                              
Politics, and the Dockworkers of Nineteenth-Century Marseille,” The American Historical Review, 
93:3 (June 1988): 604-637; Lizabeth Cohen, Making a New Deal: Industrial Workers in Chicago, 
1919-1939, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993); Gerald Friedman, State-Making and 
Labor Movements; Jeremy Adelman, “Political Ruptures and Organized Labor: Argentina, Brazil and 
Mexico, 1916-1922,” International Labor and Working Class History, 54 (Fall 1998): 103-125; Susan 
Eleanor Hirsch, After the Strike. 
1378  For a recent account of how the institution of workers democracy as part of the industrial 
democracy offered by the state turned to a point of struggle between workers and bosses/managers in 
France, see: Mathieu Floquet and Patrice Laroche, “The Impossible Transition From ‘Absolute 
Monarchy’ Toward Industrial Democracy in France: The Experience of Workers’ Representatives at 
Schneider, 1899-1936,” Labor History, 55:1 (2014): 117-136. Also look at: Lizabeth Cohen, Making a 
New Deal; Joseph A. McCartin, Labor’s Great War; Susan Eleanor Hirsch, After the Strike. 
1379 Cf. Richard Edwards, 19-22. Also look at: Joseph A. McCartin, Labor’s Great War. 
1380 For some examples of social history which focused on collective actions, see: Ronald Aminzade, 
Class, Politics, and the Early Industrial Capitalism: A Study of Mid-Nineteentc-Century Toulouse, 
France (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1981); Gerald Friedman, State-Making and 
Labor Movements; Susan Eleanor Hirsch, After the Strike; Thomas G. Andrews, Killing For Coal: 
America’s Deadliest Labor War, (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2008). 
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the union; it convinces them that their cause is just because they are 
united.”1381 
  
In essence, I situate the narration of a class formation within the social relational 
settings, which are contemporaneous to it.1382  This is an analysis that examines the fine 
networks of those relationships, both in time and space.1383 An analysis of workers’ discourse 
must complement the broader picture in order to understand how the workers saw and defined 
themselves, their particular place in society as a distinct social group, “their condition as 
creators of the wealth of the community”,1384 and how this definition related to the general 
definition of citizenship and rights,1385 their relations with managers/employers and the state, 
and how they defined bosses/managers as “others”.1386 Of course, the workers’ collective 
language is a refracted image of reality; however, such an analysis will provide us with 
invaluable clues to penetrate into the intellectual minds of workers and sketch their actual, not 
assigned, consciousness. 
The interrelated processes of industrial struggles, class formation and the emergence 
of a certain common consciousness among the İstanbul organized metal workers between 
1945 and 1970 took shape through the interplay of different actors and institutions within a 
changing historical context. In other words, being constrained by the historical context, the 
metal workers engaged in various relations with their fellow workers, both in the working and 
living places, with bosses/managers, unions, employer’s associations and the state 
institutions. What they experienced through such relations motivated some of them to 
recognize their common interests and stand in unity to overcome their shared problems. 
                                                             
1381 Gerald Friedman, State-Making and Labor Movements, 50. 
1382 Cf. Margaret R. Somers, “Narrativity, Narrative Identity, and Social Action: Rethinking English 
Working-Class Formation,” 609. 
1383 Don Kalb, “Class (in Place) Without Capitalism (in Space)?” 34. 
1384 Custodio Velasco Mesa, “Revolutionary Rhetoric and Labor Unrest: Liége in 1886 and Seville in 
1901,” International Review of Social History, 56 (2011): 245.  
1385 Lizabeth Cohen, Making a New Deal, 355; Joseph A. McCartin, Labor’s Great War; Custodio 
Velasco Mesa, 246. 
1386 Michelle Perrot, “On the Formation of the French Working Class,” 100; Joseph A. McCartin, 
Labor’s Great War. 
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Eventually, and in several instances, they acted together to change, or at least reform, the 
existing conditions from which they suffered. 
After the war years, being deprived of any hope for the future in their original 
birthplaces, an increasing number of mostly young male peasants began to arrive in İstanbul, 
seeking a decent life. They hoped to benefit from the opportunities created by city life; 
shopping, cultural activities, a decent education for their future children, etc. Most of them 
settled in the squatter areas where their relatives, either by kin or by birthplace, were already 
embedded in social networks. Here, they were socialized with the population of 
neighbourhoods, which was composed mostly of workers from different sectors. The 
existence of those social networks helped new immigrants to find jobs in factories, including 
the metal plants, which were flourishing after the mid 1950s and thus required an expanded 
labor force.  
The wealthy classes who had previously been involved in commercial activities 
began to invest in industry during the post-war period. Coming from the background of 
limited commercial activities, these entrepreneurs aimed to make quick and large profits from 
the businesses; accordingly, they were intolerant any outside intervention, either coming from 
the state or from trade unions, which might squeeze in their profits. They attempted to 
organize workplace relations according to this requirement, and that reflected in workplace 
relations in the so-called arbitrary actions of employers; employers who showed little 
tolerance of workers’ demands, which might obstruct profits. Furthermore, few of them 
adopted tangible or discursive managerial techniques to commit workers to the workplaces, 
and/or management; they largely exerted close and strict control over work processes. As a 
result, there was no consolidated network of trust between workers and bosses/managers in 
those workplaces. 
However, the bosses/managers were not the sole actors in regulating workplace 
relations; the state intervened, albeit much less effectively than it did in the 1960s, in 
industrial relations with several mechanisms and discourses on industrial democracy during 
the post-war era. In addition to founding several institutional mechanisms such as workplace 
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representation, labor courts, the Ministry of Labor, the Work Assemblies, and in addition to 
allowing the foundation of trade unions, albeit with several constraints, and invoking several 
laws such as the Work Accidents, Work Diseases and Maternity Law, the Old Age Insurance 
Law, etc., the state thereby infused the discourse of industrial democracy based on the 
assumption that the cooperative efforts of different groups in the workplace would lift 
productivity and, eventually, the national economy. In other words, the state promised 
workers would have their rights, have a decent life and have a respected place in the social 
hierarchy, if they were loyal, cooperative and assiduous citizens. However, the state actually 
expended little effort in democratizing the progress of work relations and providing a good 
life to its worker-citizens, and there is evidence that the metal workers experienced a very 
different life than it was promised in the working and living places. 
Despite the promises, and unlike their hopes, the metal workers experienced suffering 
in their living places and due to workplace relations. In their neighbourhoods, they had 
problems with housing and had difficulty providing for their families. In the factories, they 
worked for low wages, which were always under the official levels of minimum wages, while 
their working time was also longer than the laws indicated, and most of them were forced to 
work for longer hours. They were under constant threat of being fired due to fluctuations in 
the sector, their work conditions were dangerous and unhealthy, and most importantly, their 
legal rights of being unionized and being represented by their fellow workers - representatives 
whom they wanted the right to choose freely – was an issue that went unrecognized by the 
bosses/managers. In short, the majority of the metal workers suffered an unjust relationship in 
the workplace, where they felt they were “over-exploited”; thus, an increasing number of 
them realized, in time, that the hopes of having a decent life would not be realized unless they 
took action. 
Neither socialism nor liberalism had taken deep roots in the Turkish society before 
1945.1387 In the context of the emerging Cold War, people could increasingly identify with 
                                                             
1387 Tevfik Çavdar, Türkiye’de Liberalizm: 1860-1990 [The Liberalism in Turkey], (Ankara: İmge, 
1992). 
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nationalism without giving up their religious identities.1388 However, neither the CHP nor the 
succeeding DP governments tolerated, except during brief periods, the independent 
development of nationalist and religious movements, as well as a socialist ones. Therefore, 
the dominant hegemonic ideology represented by the party in power, the DP, was constituted 
by a nationalism heavily informed by religious identities, a staunch anti-communism leaning, 
and an absolute support and infatuation with the US and liberalism that did not exclude state 
intervention in people’s lives or economic relations, but assumed that Turkey would develop 
by means of an economic order based on private property. Surely, this could be interpreted as 
a keen support for the capitalist world in the context of the Cold War.1389 In particular, the 
anti-communist ideology and nationalist language was certainly influential on the trade 
unions in the decade.1390 
However, the official discourse and mechanisms offered after the war years provided 
workers with opportunities to raise their collective voice and struggle for their demands, and 
to allow their views to be heard on the subject of the current state of affairs; in fact, the 
workers used the nationalist ideology to ask their rights. Above all, the state allowed the trade 
unions to exist and act, albeit within the constraints framed by itself. And the metal workers 
used those opportunities to improve their lives and have a say in workplace relations during 
the decade. The metal workers’ union was founded in 1947 by a few master-workers in the 
sector with the aim of increasing productivity in the workplace and making the metal workers 
honored members of society. The union had largely trusted the legal mechanisms to get its 
members’ rights between 1945 and 1960. Since the union depended upon political lobbyism 
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instead of workers’ own unity and action, and since they were being oppressed by the 
widespread bosses/managers’ intolerance in the workplaces, the metal workers did not show a 
considerable interest in the union’s efforts and affairs during its first years. Afterwards, 
however, the union pursued a more balanced policy and weighed in the workplace struggles, 
as well as initiatives on the level of higher policy making - especially after the arrival of a 
young and militant generation to posts in the union. As a result, an increasing number of the 
metal workers joined in the union and voted for the representatives nominated by the union to 
speak for them in the workplace. The union then improved on the shoulders of workers’ 
representatives, in whom the workers had certain trust and recognition as their own voices; 
although the new union administrators were already the workers’ representatives in the 
workplaces where they were recruited. But the union gradually became the main mechanism 
to make dreams come true for most of the metal workers towards the end of the 1950s. 
In its first years, the union’s official discourse stressed cooperative relations between 
workers and employers to lift and support the national economy, thanks to having a 
philosophy of using their political connections to gain workers’ rights. For this, the union 
advised its members to work hard and be compromising in their relationships with the 
employers. The union spread the idea that for loyal and assiduous workers, the state and 
employers who first considered the national interests rather than their own pockets would 
eventually recognize workers’ rights.  
Due to an absence of evidence, we do not know how effective such a discourse of 
loyalty was among the rank and file; yet we do know that after the gradual shift of the union’s 
policy, and as a result of long term workers’ suffering, the metal workers’ own vision of their 
workplace relations, bosses/managers, and the best ways to revise them, was rather different 
than their imagined picture. After the election of the new administration, the union applied the 
legal mechanism of work disputes more often to resolve workers’ grievances, and an 
increasing number of workers openly stood against their bosses/managers on the shop floor. 
Secondly, poor, unchanging workplace experiences, widespread poverty and a lack of state 
intervention motivated workers to act together to handle their own problems. An increasing 
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number of the metal workers began to touch on the subject of workers’ unity and using 
collective struggle to deal with widespread injustices. In parallel with this, the union 
discourse shifted towards the language of insubordination. This shifting language did not 
transgress the ideological borders mapped out by the state; it still assumed peaceful relations 
in workplaces would improve the national economy, it still advised workers to be loyal and 
hard working citizens, it still stated the primary goal of the union’s existence was to increase 
the productivity; nonetheless, neither workers nor union’s representatives encountered many 
bosses/managers who were eager to accept workers’ rights, recognize workers’ demands or 
tolerate workers’ representatives. The situation was different for the metal workers. Unlike 
the union’s assumptions of industrial democracy, the true-life experiences of the metal 
workers culminated in the flourishing of another discourse simultaneously, with a language 
that perceived and enunciated the bosses/managers as “profit greedy”, “oppressive tyrants” 
who considered nothing but their own pockets. For the metal workers, workplace relations 
were frustrating as they did not promise any hope for the workers who were entrapped in 
constant poverty and injustice. This language, at the same time, increasingly stressed how the 
unity and solidarity of workers could change this situation. As demonstrated, the pattern of 
collective action, which hinged upon workplace struggles and political lobbyism, as well as a 
growing world vision, which oscillated between loyalty and insubordination, remained as a 
legacy of the industrial movement into the 1960s. 
The military intervention that took place on May 27th, 1960 did not bring a 
fundamental change to the metal workers’ lives; the metal workers were still frustrated over 
low wages and/or the bosses/employer’s oppression in the workplaces. But the new order re-
iterated the old promise of industrial democracy and fostered it with the promise of social 
justice, which referred to the just distribution of national wealth. Those promises, 
furthermore, were put in the new Constitution that was declared in 1961. The widespread 
public debates that followed on social justice, unfair income distribution in Turkey, or the 
“corrupt order” which was rooted in the large inequalities between poor and wealthy citizens, 
indicated a promising era in which the workers’ dream of having a decent life and respected 
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place in the social hierarchy might be realized. The state also broadened institutional channels 
through which the workers might make their demands known; and finally the Labor Law, 
invoked in 1963, recognized the long-expected right to strike. 
The new period opened up by the military intervention would also witness the 
proliferation of different ideologies and new political struggles that would affect the whole of 
Turkish society. Nationalist or religious movements could not be embodied as distinct social 
movements until the end of the decade, but socialist movement(s) in particular made a huge 
leap during the 1960s, considering they were previously suppressed by the state. In this 
decade, the Justice Party, as the heir of DP, represented nationalism and religiosity especially 
as a stand against the growing alleged communist threat in Turkey and the new policy of its 
main rival, CHP, being defined the “left of the center”.1391 In fact, as one of the young and 
charismatic leaders of CHP, Bülent Ecevit did not hesitate to define the party in public as a 
leftist one.1392 The AP and particularly his new, young leader, Süleyman Demirel, seemed to 
adopt a discourse of the Cold War era by addressing the US the savior of “free “people on 
earth and denigrating the Soviet Union or China as the real enemy to the humanity. 
Accordingly, the AP’s leaders accused socialist or “left of the center” parties, and leftist 
movements or people, of being the “servants” of “disguised” communists. Towards end of the 
1960s, an independent nationalist and/or religious movement emerged in opposition to 
student and worker’s movements in the streets. Being greatly informed by an anti-communist 
discourse, those political movements emphasized the idea that communism posed the greatest 
threat to national integrity and the devoutness of Turkish people. On February 16, 1969, 
(Bloody Sunday) a crowd attacked a public meeting that was jointly organized by the workers 
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and students to protest imperialism. Two workers from TİP were murdered, and the attackers 
chanted “Death to the Communists” and “Allahuekber”, literally meaning “God is the 
Greatest”.1393 Those types of street movements got considerable support from the party in 
power, the AP, in its struggle against “anarchy”. And fascist types of street movements would 
become a human resource for the nationalist party, the MHP (Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi - The 
Nationalist Movement Party,) which was established under the charismatic leadership of an 
old army member, Alpaslan Türkeş, in 1969, after incorporating some elements of Muslim 
beliefs in its vision. Opposing both capitalism and communism, this nationalist movement 
declared its adherence to a ‘third way’ defined by the national economy.1394 Here, Çelik-İş’s 
ardent anti-communism, nationalism and liberalism in terms of an absolute support for private 
property did not conform to the mainstream ideological currents of time. 
As evidenced by the Maden-İş’s shifts toward left after the mid-decade, socialist 
ideology gradually became much more influential in the political scene and in social life in 
Turkey. Until the socialist movement became further fragmented towards the end of the 
decade, two main sources of support, the YÖN Journal and TİP, represented socialism in 
Turkey during the better part of the 1960s. Being affected by an Arab Socialism that was 
mainly pioneered by Gamal Abdal Nasser and Ba’ath Parties in Egypt and Syria, YÖN 
followed a socialist ideology informed by nationalism, anti-imperialism that was believed to 
have roots in Kemalism, and the Kemalist statist policies of the 1930s. Thus, YÖN aimed to 
found a statist economy, rather than seeking the abolishment of private property, an approach 
that would make rapid economic development possible and simultaneously provide social 
justice for all people. Although there were some articles about how İslam and socialism might 
                                                             
1393 Yüksel Taşkın, “Anti-Komünizm ve Türk Milliyetçiliği: Endişe ve Pragmatizm [Anti-Communism 
and Turkish Nationalism: Anxiety and Pragmatism],” in Tanıl Bora [ed.] Modern Türkiye’de Siyasi 
Düşünce [The Political Thought in Modern Turkey], vol. 4: Milliyetçilik [Nationalism], (İstanbul: 
İletişim, 2002): 618-634; Kemal Can, “Ülkücü Hareketin İdeolojisi [The Ideology of the Nationalist 
Movement]”, in Tanıl Bora [ed.] Modern Türkiye’de Siyasi Düşünce [The Political Thought in Modern 
Turkey], vol. 4: Milliyetçilik [Nationalism], (İstanbul: İletişim, 2002): 663-685; Tanıl Bora, “Alparslan 
Türkeş” in Tanıl Bora [ed.], Modern Türkiye’de Siyasi Düşünce [The Political Thought in Modern 
Turkey], vol. 4: Milliyetçilik [Nationalism], (İstanbul: İletişim, 2002): 686-695. 
1394 Tanıl Bora and Kemal Can, Devlet Ocak Dergâh: 12 Eylül’den 1990’lara Ülkücü Hareket [State, 
Hearth and Dervish Lodge: The Nationalist Movement from the 12th September to the 1990s], sixth 
edition (İstanbul: İletişim, 2000): 52-60; Aydın and Taşkın, 1960’tan Günümüze Türkiye Tarihi: 157-
159 and 175-176. 
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be compromised in the journal, this did not become a defined topic for the influential writers 
of the journal who were the ardent believers of Kemalist laicisim. In fact, YÖN writers 
believed in the establishment of socialism as the result of efforts of enlightened intellectuals 
followed by the zinde kuvvetler (robust forces) of society, including workers, peasants, 
bureaucrats, middle class intellectuals, small shop owners and army officers, rather than the 
revolutionary struggle of workers. It is interesting that YÖN presented socialism as the sole 
way to smooth over class conflicts that were ignited by the capitalist economic order.1395 TİP, 
on the other hand, defined a party through which the oppressed classes would peacefully take 
over the political power. In this sense, its political stance was closer to the orthodox Marxist 
ideology. But similar to YÖN, TİP’s leaders envisioned an anti-imperialist political agenda, 
which emphasized Kemalist nationalism as the suitable ideology of an oppressed nation. In 
fact, the first program of the party accepted in 1961 stressed the Mustafa Kemal reforms and 
the notion of social justice as included in the 1961 Constitution: socialism aside, the word 
“class” was not even incorporated in the document.1396 Therefore this party, too, attempted to 
construct an alliance with the defenders of a left-interpretation of Kemalism in the 1960s. A 
party brochure published and circulated in 1965 addressed gerçek Atatürkçüler (real 
Atatürkists) to join in the struggle to save the country from the oppression of imperialism.1397 
Both YÖN and the TİP had an active role in inserting the idea of socialism into the very center 
of the political scene in Turkey and they garnered considerable popular support during the 
1960s. Although YÖN movement disappeared from the political scene after the military 
intervention in 1971, TİP continued to exist until the military coup d’état in 1980. However, it 
would later be much less influential and it would revise its socialism to resemble an orthodox 
                                                             
1395 Gökhan Atılgan, “Yön-Devrim Hareketi [The Yön-Devrim Movement],” in Murat Gültekingil [ed.] 
Modern Türkiye’de Siyasi Düşünce [The Political Thought in Modern Turkey], vol. 8: Sol [Left], 
(İstanbul: İletişim, 2007): 597-646; Özgür Mutlu Ulus, The Army and the Radical Left in Turkey: 
Military Coups, Socialist Revolution and Kemalism (London-New York: I. B. Tauris, 2011): 20-43; 
Aydın and Taşkın, 1960’tan Günümüze Türkiye Tarihi: 109-111. 
1396  Mustafa Şener, “Türkiye İşçi Partisi [The Turkish Labor Party],” in Murat Gültekingil [ed.] 
Modern Türkiye’de Siyasi Düşünce [The Political Thought in Modern Turkey], vol. 8: Sol [Left], 
(İstanbul: İletişim, 2007): 356-418. 
1397 Doğan Özgüden, “Türkiye İşçi Partisi’nin Kuruluşu [The Foundation of the Turkish Labor Party],” 
Sosyalizm ve Toplumsal Mücadeleler Ansiklopedisi [The Encyclopedia of Socialism and Social 
Struggles], vol. 6, (İstanbul: İletişim, 1988): 1998-1999; Ulus, The Army and the Radical Left in 
Turkey: 64-92; Aydın and Taşkın, 1960’tan Günümüze Türkiye Tarihi: 132-133. 
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Marxist-Leninist party in the 1970s. In fact, their political agendas would become the subject 
of intense discussion at the end of the 1960s and the main bodies of the socialist movements 
in Turkey eventually became fragmented.1398 Maden-İş and its leader held close ties with the 
left movement, especially after 1965; nonetheless, those debates did not seem to influence 
this union and its vision remained in parallel with the TİP. Furthermore, the word ‘socialism’ 
became clearly pronounced by the TİP’s officials and the party program was revised through 
the orthodox Marxist ideology. In parallel, the official Maden-İş’s documents were predicated 
upon the general terms of Marxism. The intense debates within the social movement seemed 
to reflect little on the workers who were more inspired by the terms as social justice, rights 
and citizenship, or the contents of the 1961 Constitution, than the unending terminology and 
debates of the socialists in Turkey, as evidenced by the language utilized by the militant metal 
workers. 
In reply, the Turkish bosses began to appear more and more on the public scene. 
Although they defended the idea that they and their enterprises were progressing in 
accordance with the national interests; they were unconvincing when they claimed to stand 
for social justice, too, since the on-going workers’ grievances indicated that the bosses’ 
oppression had never stopped. It is true that some bosses/managers planned managerial 
techniques to derive workers’ consent, but they were very few, both in limit and scope, in the 
metal sector. The 1960s were truly hard times for the capitalist class, as they would later 
admit. 
The Turkish unions immediately perceived those changes and participated in public 
debates; the union leaders made public calls for the foundation of a new order based on social 
justice through which the workers, the producers of the wealth in the country, would get their 
deserved share of the national wealth and finally become respected citizens. To achieve this, 
they exerted considerable pressure on the military and succeeding civil governments to work 
together to formulate the necessary laws, which would end the tyranny of the bosses. The 
metal union was one of those unions: its leader, Kemal Türkler, engaged in several lobby 
                                                             
1398 Ulus, The Army and the Radical Left in Turkey; 94-179. 
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actions to invoke the labor laws as soon as possible. But, the union’s activities were not 
constrained by the meetings with the related political circles in Ankara; Maden-İş actively 
involved itself in the organization of the Saraçhane Demonstration in 1961, the first workers’ 
public demonstration after the post-war years. As stated in Türkler’s speech, if the state or 
state institutions’ officers delayed in founding the order of industrial democracy, the workers, 
as the producers of the wealth, would act together to establish it by their own power. Thus, 
Kemal Türkler clearly declared the official line of the union. In fact, Maden-İş proved its 
determination to make changes happen at the beginning of 1963, with the Kavel Strike. 
The representatives on the shop floor were quick to adopt the new language and 
benefit from any changes. In the union’s general and district congresses, the representatives, 
who were the most important links between workers and the union, cried out against the 
bosses/employers’ unchanging oppression and the workers’ continued misery, despite the 
promises of the new order. In an effort to overcome those issues, the workers’ representatives 
emphasized unity and action. As a result, the metal workers conducted sit-down-strikes in 
three factories, Samurkaş, Gümüş Motor, Halıcıoğlu - factories that did not pay workers’ 
wages on time. But the most notorious and effective of those acts was the Kavel Strike which 
lasted 35 days and divided the public into two groups; those who supported the strike and as 
those who did not. 
The Kavel workers stopped working first when the management refused to pay them 
annual bonuses. Then, after the dismissal of their representatives who organized the first work 
stoppage, the workers decided to walk out. In a short time, the strike was brought to the 
public eye and the Ministry of Labor and the Ministry of Interior intervened in the events to 
find a common point between the union and bosses, the latter of whom were adamant about 
not to allowing the workers’ representatives to return. In the meantime, the bosses attempted 
to get products out of the factory and the police forces attacked the strikers several times; yet, 
the workers were able to hold their line with the help of people from the surrounding squatter 
houses. In the end, the bosses accepted the majority of the workers’ demands and the strike 
had come to an end. 
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 The Kavel Strike, as a collective industrial struggle, is an important example to show 
how the bosses and workers perceived the character of the decade. First of all, it showed that, 
according to bosses, the workers’ wages, premiums or benefits were actually “blessings” 
which the bosses themselves presented to workers out of their “generosity”. Secondly, the 
bosses were still uneager to accept any outside intervention in the regulation of the 
workplace. They wanted to abolish or constrain the mechanism of workers’ representatives. 
In essence, the bosses were eager to pursue their old habits of “my business, my rules.” But 
the workers were pursuing what they felt were their lawful or “natural” rights which stemmed 
from their social position as the producers of wealth; accordingly, Kavel was a just fight and 
not one undertaken to disrupt peace, but instead to get workers their deserved and rightful 
share from society. Furthermore, the strike showed that the metal workers, at least those who 
worked in Kavel, were decisive in fighting for their right to be represented on the shop floor. 
The Kavel workers resisted for the sake of securing their representatives’ positions, whom 
they had chosen with their own free will. In this regard, the Kavel Strike was also the clash of 
two different mindsets. 
Another significance of the Kavel event was that it contributed to the further 
deterioration of relations between workers, unions and bosses in the sector, and it became one 
of the causes of the uncompromising attitudes of the bosses towards workers’ demands in the 
collective bargaining events of 1964. By that time, the collective agreement era, which was 
assumed to pave way for the industrial peace and solidify the cooperative work relations 
between workers and bosses/managers, had arrived. But the first collective bargaining 
meetings had not progressed in a peaceful manner: MESS, the bosses’ association in the 
metal hardware sector, was determined to constrain the rights of workers’ representatives; 
Maden-İş, on the contrary, sought to strengthen them. The first bargaining meeting went into 
a deadlock and the union declared its strike decision at several big metal plants. Due to 
mismanagement by the union, it was defeated and Maden-İş lost its authorization rights in 
several metal plants. Çelik-İş won recognition rights and the era of collective agreement had 
truly begun, albeit poorly, for the metal workers. 
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The new era held promise that the collective agreements reached through the mutual 
consent of both sides would yield peaceful work relations in which workers and employers 
would respect each other’s interests and demands. The contentious work relations, however, 
did not evolve into orderly relations after 1964. Some big plants, such as, Arçelik, applied 
new managerial tactics to better commit workers to their job, to their workplaces and to the 
existing managerial rule. Initiatives like these, however, were still limited, both in scale and 
scope; many firms planned to derive workers’ consent with wage increases and some benefits. 
Yet, most metal workers began to complain about low wages towards the end of the decade. 
Furthermore, the metal workers still toiled in unhealthy workplaces under strenuous and 
dangerous work conditions. More importantly, their grievances were not heard and their 
demands were mostly not tolerated; that is to say, they suffered from the absence of a proper 
mechanism to make their demands on the shop floor. Here, they had a certain distrust of the 
representatives of Çelik-İş, whom they did not choose. All these underlying causes motivated 
the metal workers to search for an alternative mechanism in the workplace and in several 
plants they rose up collectively to make Maden-İş the recognized union between 1968 and 
1970. 
In the meantime, Maden-İş’s official line shifted left and it became one of the 
founding unions of DİSK; as a result, this union and its representatives certainly became 
persona non grata for the metal bosses in the workplaces. Partly because of this, and partly 
because of the legacy of the contentious relations with Maden-İş, bosses had punished all 
workers who strived to re-organize Maden-İş in the workplaces before 1968. As a result, the 
collective actions became much more radical and transgressive after that time. Instead of 
waiting for the legal procedures to work, the metal workers simply stopped working in most 
places to wait for their demands to be met. They were finally successful in organizing Maden-
İş and making their freely chosen representatives be recognized by the bosses/managers. 
These common experiences, struggles and changing consciousness motivated the 
İstanbul metal workers to be one of the leading groups in the June insurrection. When they 
felt threatened, they gained their rights through their own struggles. The workers of the Çelik 
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Industry, Elektro Metal, Rabak, Singer, Sungurlar, Türk Demir Döküm, Kavel, İzsal, ECA, 
Hisar Döküm, Ayvansaray Bolt and other factories, accumulated a significant amount of 
experience in collective struggle between 1968 and 1970. Even before that, they had marched 
from their factories or living places to the city center in Taksim. But that was not a 
spontaneous event: from the end of May, the high officers of DİSK convened more than once 
and planned to take illegal collective actions against the draft which would result in the 
dissolution of the confederacy. After the law was invoked in June, DİSK called the workers’ 
representatives to take immediate action in their workplaces. And all the workers’ 
representatives, not just from the metal sector, got together on June 14th in the DİSK 
headquarter in İstanbul. The speeches the metal representatives made during that meeting 
reflected their determination to fight against the dissolution of the unions, and for the 
retention of workers’ rights which had previously been the subject of their bitter struggles. A 
representative from Haymak stated that: 
“(...) My fellow workers, we always resist against employers who desired to 
usurp our rights that we gained through our struggles and yellow gangs 
[yellow dog unions, a.n.] who wants to consume the daily bread of our new 
born children. Friends, I am shutting off switches by tomorrow (...)”1399 
 
Orhan Adem’s words indicate the same point: 
“(...) My age is now 37, I am still hungry, I am working with my all strength 
but I cannot get my rights (...) My work, the work of my honor, fills their 
treasure, stomach and gizzard (...) Unlike them, I do not spend money in 
clubs, theaters, in the USA or whatever places. I was grown in İstanbul, I am 
37 years old but I still do not know much of İstanbul. Why this is so? It is 
because of my financial condition. Because, my financial condition is not 
well. For any of us, it is not good. There are a lot of things that we cannot 
                                                             
1399  Quoted from, Turgan Arınır and Sırrı Öztürk, İşçi Sınıfı-Sendikalar ve 15-16 Haziran [The 
Working Class-Trade Unions and 15-16 June], (İstanbul: Sorun, 1976), 188. 
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see, eat or travel. They always spare us those rights. We worked with our full 
strength. They did not give us our deserved rewards, they made us work for 
nothing. They made us work as slaves. And from now on we woke up. We 
will crush them and resist them like this, we will knock them down with our 
full strength and power and with our unity (...).”1400 
 
And the union administration used journal headlines to call the workers to fight: “The 
Working Class, Be Prepared! Our Big War is Beginning”.1401  Following the promise of 
Haymak’s representative, the metal workers, indeed, closed off the factories in the next two 
days. In some factories, such as Türk Demir Döküm, İzsal and Sungurlar, the workers were 
not persuaded to return to the line until June 22nd, despite martial law being declared by the 
government on June 16th, the second day of the events.  
After the June uprising, several Maden-İş’s officers and workers’ representatives 
were arrested and imprisoned. Nearly 5000 workers were fired from the plants. But their 
actions previous to June 15-16th were fruitful in terms of placing the foundation for the 
workers’ own and trusted union to rise in the workplaces. Despite continuing to battle over 
the representation issue in the succeeding years, Maden-İş and its representatives were the 
main mechanism through which İstanbul metal workers claimed their demands until the 1980 
coup d’état. In fact, after the June events, Osman Keskin from Demir Döküm wrote: 
  “(...) 
İstanbul became a place of victory 
  The workers’ blood lay on the streets 
  Traitor Türk-İş blames us 
  Let’s find out guilty and innocent, brothers 
 
  We are not guilty of their accusations 
                                                             
1400  Quoted from, Turgan Arınır and Sırrı Öztürk, İşçi Sınıfı-Sendikalar ve 15-16 Haziran [The 
Working Class-Trade Unions and 15-16 June], (İstanbul: Sorun, 1976), 202-203. 
1401 Maden-İş, the Special Issue, 15 June 1970. 
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  We will not be exhausted with three martyrs 
  We will not bow down to the tyrants 
  Since we have unbreakable ankles 
 
  The guilty are too obvious, innocents are suspected 
  We are suffering from the etat de siege (martial law) 
  Yet, our struggle continues 
  Think, bosses, your time has come (...)”1402   
 
The workers’ collective struggles were so intimidating for the metal bosses and 
managers that one metal boss, Jak Kamhi, confessed in the meeting of MESS that took place 
on December 29th, 1970, that the unity and power of the bosses was on the verge of 
dissolution. Jak Kamhi claimed that the entrepreneurs’ properties and lives were under 
threat.1403 The rest of the speakers emphasized the necessity of the bosses’ own unity against 
the increasing unity of the workers.1404 They did, indeed, begin to work together. As a result, 
the decade between 1970 and 1980 witnessed much more contentious industrial relations 
between the metal workers and bosses. Eventually, it was not the metal bosses, but military 
intervention which brought an end to this fight, on September 12th, 1980. 
All these experiences and struggles led to the proliferation of a collective mindset and 
language among the militant metal workers. It was not an anti-capitalist vision in the sense 
that it did not refuse the rights of private property. It was, on the other hand, against the 
“over-commoditization” or “over-exploitation” of labor. This vision has a certain sense of 
fairness and justice, as it took its roots from the public notion of social justice that reflected 
on the necessity of installing a certain balance between different social groups in order to 
                                                             
1402 Osman Keskin, “Bizim Salı [Our Tuesday]”, Maden-İş, 31 (30 September 1970), 4. 
1403 MESS XI. Olağanüstü Genel Kurulu Müzakere ve Karar Tutanağı, 29 Aralık 1970 [The Deeds of 
Meeting and Decision of MESS’ XI. Extraordinary General Assembly, 29 December 1970], Tarih 
Vakfı Orhan Tuna Archive. 
1404 MESS XI. Olağanüstü Genel Kurulu Müzakere ve Karar Tutanağı, 29 Aralık 1970 [The Deeds of 
Meeting and Decision of MESS’ XI. Extraordinary General Assembly, 29 December 1970], Tarih 
Vakfı Orhan Tuna Archive. 
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maintain a healthy social progress, and from the notion that labor was the producer of the 
wealth of the land. As a result, it demanded the reformation of the existing “corrupt and 
injustice social order” in Turkey. More importantly, this vision had a well-founded trust in the 
workers’ unity, solidarity and struggle to make the world, or at least their living places, a 
better place. And this vision is still alive in the memories of the old metal workers; in the 
words of one ex-Türk Demir Döküm workers: 
“The union made us strong and taught us that if the workers would unite, 
they won. We would get our rights. We trusted in our own power. Our unity 
was very beautiful like a family. We were very powerful.”1405 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                             
1405 Yellow Mehmet Kul, interview by author, June 21, 2012. 
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